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Friday, September 13, 2013

List of possible extremists

Man, about 30 of the items on this list apply to me!


Originally posted and authored by Michael Snyder at The Truth. All credit goes to him.


Are you a conservative, a libertarian, a Christian or a gun owner? Are you opposed to abortion, globalism, Communism, illegal immigration, the United Nations or the New World Order? Do you believe in conspiracy theories, do you believe that we are living in the “end times” or do you ever visit alternative news websites (such as this one)? If you answered yes to any of those questions, you are a “potential terrorist” according to official U.S. government documents. At one time, the term “terrorist” was used very narrowly. The government applied that label to people like Osama bin Laden and other Islamic jihadists. But now the Obama administration is removing all references to Islam from terror training materials, and instead the term “terrorist” is being applied to large groups of American citizens. And if you are a “terrorist”, that means that you have no rights and the government can treat you just like it treats the terrorists that are being held at Guantanamo Bay. So if you belong to a group of people that is now being referred to as “potential terrorists”, please don’t take it as a joke. The first step to persecuting any group of people is to demonize them. And right now large groups of peaceful, law-abiding citizens are being ruthlessly demonized.

Below is a list of 72 types of Americans that are considered to be “extremists” and “potential terrorists” in official U.S. government documents. To see the original source document for each point, just click on the link. As you can see, this list covers most of the country…

1. Those that talk about “individual liberties”

2. Those that advocate for states’ rights

3. Those that want “to make the world a better place”

4. “The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule”

5. Those that are interested in “defeating the Communists”

6. Those that believe “that the interests of one’s own nation are separate from the interests of other nations or the common interest of all nations”

7. Anyone that holds a “political ideology that considers the state to be unnecessary, harmful,or undesirable”

8. Anyone that possesses an “intolerance toward other religions”

9. Those that “take action to fight against the exploitation of the environment and/or animals”

10. “Anti-Gay”

11. “Anti-Immigrant”

12. “Anti-Muslim”

13. “The Patriot Movement”

14. “Opposition to equal rights for gays and lesbians”

15. Members of the Family Research Council

16. Members of the American Family Association

17. Those that believe that Mexico, Canada and the United States “are secretly planning to merge into a European Union-like entity that will be known as the ‘North American Union’”

18. Members of the American Border Patrol/American Patrol

19. Members of the Federation for American Immigration Reform

20. Members of the Tennessee Freedom Coalition

21. Members of the Christian Action Network

22. Anyone that is “opposed to the New World Order”

23. Anyone that is engaged in “conspiracy theorizing”

24. Anyone that is opposed to Agenda 21

25. Anyone that is concerned about FEMA camps

26. Anyone that “fears impending gun control or weapons confiscations”

27. The militia movement

28. The sovereign citizen movement

29. Those that “don’t think they should have to pay taxes”

30. Anyone that “complains about bias”

31. Anyone that “believes in government conspiracies to the point of paranoia”

32. Anyone that “is frustrated with mainstream ideologies”

33. Anyone that “visits extremist websites/blogs”

34. Anyone that “establishes website/blog to display extremist views”

35. Anyone that “attends rallies for extremist causes”

36. Anyone that “exhibits extreme religious intolerance”

37. Anyone that “is personally connected with a grievance”

38. Anyone that “suddenly acquires weapons”

39. Anyone that “organizes protests inspired by extremist ideology”

40. “Militia or unorganized militia”

41. “General right-wing extremist”

42. Citizens that have “bumper stickers” that are patriotic or anti-U.N.

43. Those that refer to an “Army of God”

44. Those that are “fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation)”

45. Those that are “anti-global”

46. Those that are “suspicious of centralized federal authority”

47. Those that are “reverent of individual liberty”

48. Those that “believe in conspiracy theories”

49. Those that have “a belief that one’s personal and/or national ‘way of life’ is under attack”

50. Those that possess “a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training or survivalism”

51. Those that would “impose strict religious tenets or laws on society (fundamentalists)”

52. Those that would “insert religion into the political sphere”

53. Anyone that would “seek to politicize religion”

54. Those that have “supported political movements for autonomy”

55. Anyone that is “anti-abortion”

56. Anyone that is “anti-Catholic”

57. Anyone that is “anti-nuclear”

58. “Rightwing extremists”

59. “Returning veterans”

60. Those concerned about “illegal immigration”

61. Those that “believe in the right to bear arms”

62. Anyone that is engaged in “ammunition stockpiling”

63. Anyone that exhibits “fear of Communist regimes”

64. “Anti-abortion activists”

65. Those that are against illegal immigration

66. Those that talk about “the New World Order” in a “derogatory” manner

67. Those that have a negative view of the United Nations

68. Those that are opposed “to the collection of federal income taxes”

69. Those that supported former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin and Bob Barr

70. Those that display the Gadsden Flag (“Don’t Tread On Me”)

71. Those that believe in “end times” prophecies

72. Evangelical Christians

The groups of people in the list above are considered “problems” that need to be dealt with. In some of the documents referenced above, members of the military are specifically warned not to have anything to do with such groups.

We are moving into a very dangerous time in American history. You can now be considered a “potential terrorist” just because of your religious or political beliefs. Free speech is becoming a thing of the past, and we are rapidly becoming an Orwellian society that is the exact opposite of what our founding fathers intended.

Please pray for the United States of America. We definitely need it.

Leaderless Resistance

This article is about the concept of Leaderless Resistance; the ideas and comments are not my own, I do agree with much of what is said, I just wanted to get this point of veiw out there so people can make their own informed decision about the direction they want to go.


Author: SMB (US Army, Retired)
Edited for content.
A Brief Overview

Nothing defines the blatant ineptitude and rank incompetence of the radical resistance more starkly than the concept of so-called “leaderless resistance” (hereafter, LR). By its very nature LR amounts to little more than anarchy and, as demonstrated by some of the most recent examples, very rapidly degenerates into simple banditry. Furthermore, one notes for the record that the most vociferous proponents of LR have, in common with those to whom that fantastic idea appeals, exactly zero experience in guerrilla warfare, its theory, or practice.

Simply stated, the concept of LR posits that individuals or small, close-knit groups, acting on their own initiative, performing their own targeting and relying on their own resources, can strike at the government’s infrastructure at will without fear of infiltration. Tactically, LR ranges from individual nuisance acts for the sake of causing a nuisance on one end of the spectrum to small unit terrorism for terrorism’s sake on the other. However, nothing can be said about LR’s potential operational impact because, by definition, through rejection of any superior organizational structure, it can have no operational impact.

Strategically, LR is conspicuously absent from any historical examples of successful insurgency. The idea has been advanced by several writers on the subject that LR is essentially a modern version of the Committees of Correspondence of American Revolution fame. I do not think those writers mean to purposely distort the realities of revolutionary organization in the colonies, but their zeal to justify LR apparently overrode their rational faculties. If those writers had simply paused to consider the word “committee” juxtaposed with “correspondence”, the notion that Committees of Correspondence were autonomous bodies acting independently of one another would have collapsed of its own illogic. In fact, the members of the several colonies’ Committees of Correspondence were appointed by their colonies’ legislative bodies, everyone knew who they were, and they coordinated their activities between each other or with the Continental Congress through a chain of command. Hardly an example of leaderless resistance.

There are however several striking examples, discussed below, that demonstrate why LR is fundamentally flawed as a resistance strategy.

The Order

“The Order” is frequently cited as an example (in its early stages, before it began recruiting) of the principle of LR. Given that most members of The Order are either dead or in federal prisons it is also an example of many of the fundamental flaws in the concept.

The Order began as an eight man cell dedicated to creating an Aryan homeland in the Pacific Northwest. How eight men expected to accomplish that objective has never been clearly explained, but following their logic it seems that the organizers of The Order believed that direct action against the government for the purpose of financing other organizations in the racialist resistance would inspire others to imitate their example thus creating an avalanche effect as other self creating “cells” rallied to the cause. Predictably, that “strategy” failed miserably.

Had the organizers of The Order expended half the effort in researching failed insurgencies as they did planning armored car and bank heists they would have found that their strategy (if indeed they ever had one beyond “do things”) had already been tried by no less than Che Guevara. The name of that “strategy” is called the Loco (i.e., focus). The theory is this: Plunk a small band of guerrillas down in an ostensibly “oppressed” countryside, begin maiming, murdering and robbing the oppressors, and the peasants will rise up and flock in proletarian support to the Loco to sweep the bourgeoisie from the political landscape. However, the “oppressed” in whose name Che fought snitched off his band to the oppressors, and Che and his Bolivian Loco bandits were hunted down like animals and killed. End of insurgency.

Aside from robbing banks and armored cars and sharing the loot with phone booth emperors who were vying for the same mailing list, The Order did manage to kill a Jew in Denver, blow up a synagogue in Boise, Idaho, and murder one of their own recruits before they were finally hunted down, killed or arrested.

The Order therefore illustrates Reason #1 LR does not work. “Grass roots” resistance is doomed to failure; there are no examples of it having ever succeeded. Frustrated by any appreciable effect of propaganda on a population so dim it could offer not even neutrality, and impatient with time proven organizational principles, they simply decided to “kick things off” themselves armed with nothing but a single idea that was immediately discredited because (1) the population did not care about the idea, so (2) they possessed no means of enlisting assistance or acceptance for their crime spree. The lesson learned about The Order’s example is that rebelliousness has no place in a resistance.

Eric Rudolph

Personally, my reaction to the bombing of abortion clinics and gay bars is, “Where’s the crime?” In many respects Rudolph exemplifies LR at the individual level. He didn’t make threats or discuss his plans with anybody, he didn’t ask permission, he simply started punctuating his deeply held beliefs with explosions.

If Rudolph has one thing going for him (aside from being the “1997 – 1999 Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) it’s that he has a steep learning curve. Note the successive “product improvements” of his devices. He obviously paid close attention to the official Bomb Damage Assessments of his handiwork, and progressively applied those lessons learned to his subsequent projects, not only mechanically (although he had not yet come to appreciate that nails are crap for shrapnel — ball bearings are much better, having sounder ballistics) but also tactically.

For example, constructive development of Rudolph’s devices progresses to smaller timers, smaller batteries, dynamite instead of pipe bombs and thicker pressure plates. By the time of the Atlanta gay bar and abortion clinic bombings his devices fit very nicely into a book bag, and at the lesbian bar he left behind an 80 pound time delay “present” intended for enthusiastic crime scene investigators. A year later, a Birmingham, Alabama, cop who was guarding an abortion clinic between stints as a guard at a gay bar, poked at a flower pot with his baton causing Rudolph to allegedly command detonate his device (or lose it to the bomb squad). Significantly, the device was directional, the majority of the blast was focused on the front door. Eric’s obvious goal was to abort the abortionist when he arrived, but the cop’s ill considered curiosity preempted the objective of the attack. Nevertheless, Rudolph had progressed from crude pipe bombs to command detonated directional devices in four operations. Not bad.

Rudolph’s problem was that, while his devices advanced both mechanically and in lethality, their basic construction, and therefore their “signature,” remained the same. Because he was driving his own vehicle to and from the target area the feds quickly obtained a description of it and the plate number, and by the time he had driven back in Murphy, North Carolina, the FBI was scouring the city for him. Informed by friends that he was being sought by the FBI as a “material witness” to the Birmingham bombing, he did the next logical thing. He went to Burger King, bought some chow, then disappeared into the mountains.

What is remarkable about Rudolph, as an individual example of LR, is his focus, his dedication, his coolness, his self reliance, and his aggressiveness — and that he is still alive. In fact, by the spring of 1999, the FBI had almost completely retreated out of the mountains and into their compound in Andrews, North Carolina, because, in the words of SSA Terry Turchie, Rudolph manhunt director, “We think he is hunting us.”
But those very qualities that make young Eric so remarkable are precisely those qualities that make him not only the exception to the rule, but also a positive example of why LR on an individual level is again doomed to failure except in the rarest of circumstances. Eric possesses what precious few other individuals who might contemplate the “Rudolph model” of LR possess — the semblance of an infrastructure. Young Eric’s infrastructure is composed entirely of friends of belief in kind, or tacit sympathy for the act even if not for his beliefs. However, that necessarily delimited his operational radius. And even though Rudolph enjoys the active neutrality of the population in his area of operations, his limited circle of friends lacked any infrastructure that would have enabled him wider range in his holy mission.

What Rudolph’s circle of friends were incapable of providing was operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He built his own bombs. He performed his own targeting. He emplaced his own devices. He provided his own transportation. His circle of friends were useless operationally, and the best they could do for him locally when he became a fugitive was turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken coops or delay reporting his presence when he broke into their houses to raid the cupboard.

Eric Rudolph therefore illustrates Reason #2 LR does not work. It has no formal infrastructure, thus its support is at best haphazard and is always uncoordinated. Consequently, such notional “support” is bound to fall apart at the seams at some point. Even though there is not yet any evidence that his network of friends is beginning to crumble, it is painfully obvious that they are incapable of supporting or sustaining any further operations by Eric. The lesson learned about Eric Rudolph’s example is that independence of action means isolation from effective support, hence an inability to sustain operations in the face of determined opposition reaction.

Further Considerations

The above examples of group and individual LR illustrate only a very small number of associated problems. For example, as mentioned in the Eric Rudolph example, the lack of a formal organizational infrastructure means that LR “cells” must provide for themselves everything appertaining their operational requirements. This fact necessarily places the LR “cell” in the unenviable position of being personally involved in all the activities, such as logistics (including financing), communications, targeting and planning, needed to execute their operations. Because of their personal involvement they dramatically raise not only their own “profile,” but also that of the operation. Those named activities in a properly constituted resistance organization would be delegated to cells (unknown to the “direct action” operatives) specifically tasked to perform those functions thus virtually eliminating the operation’s profile — until bodies need to be dug out of the rubble. Traditional procedures also so diffuse the opposition’s post action investigation that it takes months or years, instead of days in the case of an LR “plan,” to unravel all the pre-mission details and thereby identify and begin hunting the operatives.

Furthermore, LR as a “strategy,” if we are to believe what its proponents expect us to believe about it, has specific appeal only to the lowest (or most psychotic) common denominator within any given organization. The fact that the notion of LR is being propagated should give pause to serious minded individuals because those organizations that promote LR almost universally make their appeals for membership to the “proletariat,” as demonstrated by the crudeness of their rhetoric and public manifestations. Nevertheless, the idea that independently conceived and executed “grassroots” action solely for the sake of action can have any appreciable impact as a resistance methodology to the planned destruction of our society is nonsense. And if the history of LR is any indicator it plays right into our enemy’s hand.

Consider the Progressive distorted prosecutive “legal” strategy known as vicarious liability. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence vicarious liability is the “indirect or imputed legal responsibility for the acts of another… as between an employer and employee… or a principle for torts and contracts of an agent.” (Black’s 6th ed.) In a nut shell, the Progressive-contorted version of vicarious liability contends that “hate speech” creates a “climate of hate” that propels small groups or individuals to commit “hate crimes” and that, therefore, any organization that espouses Progressive-defined “hate” is “responsible” for the actions of individuals or groups, employees or not, who commit the “crime.”

Never mind that the Progressive-version of vicarious liability perfectly inverts the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal precedent which places responsibility for crime upon the individual criminal and which reserves vicarious liability to employers whose agents’ (i.e., responsible to the employer) acts result in willful harm to others. In the example of the justifiable murder of the abortionist Sleppian, a web site that listed the names, addresses and photographs of abortionists was ordered to shut down even though there was no proof of any connection between the owners of the web site and the righteous man who dwindled our Progressive infestation by one. The web site had “created a climate of hate,” you see.

The Progressive-twisted version of vicarious liability is reserved solely for Christian men and their organizations. Why? Eric Rudolph serves as another example. Hundreds of FBI agents [has anybody else noticed that the FBI refers to its personnel using the same term intelligence officers understand as “street shit?”] are hunting him, and a million dollar reward has been offered for him, not because he allegedly planted a couple of bombs, but because he committed a politically incorrect crime; he tried to blow up abortionists and gays. His motive is the reason he is being hunted.

In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence motive is merely a mitigating factor. When Progressives are permitted to practice law — or more horrifying, make law — in Anglo-Saxon nations, the law rapidly degenerates into quibbling. In the case of vicarious liability, the extrinsic motive becomes the real crime. In other words, what you were thinking when you committed the crime is more important than what you did, and what you were thinking is the fault of the organization – whether you are a member or not — that espouses what you believe. Ergo, according to Progressive lawyers, the organization is vicariously liable for your crime and can be sued. The most recent Southern Poverty Law Center law suit against the Aryan Nations is only the most recent in a pattern of similar suits.

Why the long winded speech about vicarious liability? Because the organizations that promote LR are being sued in rotation by Progressives when proletarian groups or individuals (employees, members, or not) take them at their word and begin practicing it. Significantly, organizations that demand at least a modicum of discipline from their members and which prefer to recruit from the bourgeoisie, have so far been spared the embarrassment of “loose cannons” in their ranks. Think about it.

How “It” Is Really Done

What often amazes me is the simple-mindedness of those who propose to wage one or the other of many forms of armed resistance against the government. Because the sheer scale of the proposition cannot be grasped by minds conditioned to think in terms of snappy political slogans and time frames rarely exceeding seven minutes between commercial breaks, I often find that when the scale is explained to them their response is blank incomprehension. This inability to grasp the complexity and magnitude of the proposition is but one reason why such ideas as Leaderless Resistance gain currency.

Among all the outpourings about LR, the only comprehensible rationale given for promoting anarcho-resistance is the fear of opposition infiltration and penetration of properly constituted organizations. That rationale is the very reason LR should be dismissed out of hand as the drivel of flagrant neophytes who possess just enough comic book knowledge about armed resistance to be dangerously stupid (emphasis added –JM); and who are irresponsible enough to share their “knowledge” with others.

The reason advocates of LR advance the fear of infiltration as their only comprehensible rationale for promoting anarcho-resistance is because, like every other band of proletarian dissidents, they believe that resistance begins with armed groups. In other words, they organize everything backwards, from the bottom up. This does, as they fear, leave them vulnerable to penetration when they finally discover that they cannot support or sustain their own operations and of necessity need to recruit new members or organize some semblance of a support apparatus.

Armed resistance is only one subset of what is properly defined as Political Warfare. Policy making in Political Warfare encompasses ideological warfare, organizational warfare, psychological warfare (wherein falls armed resistance), intelligence warfare, and mass warfare. Within the subset of armed resistance we find planned political violence (assassination, kidnapping, bombing), which is employed as a tactic of both disruptive and coercive terrorism. The disruptive nature of terrorism is the repression of and reprisals against the general population that it provokes from government. As a coercive measure terrorism enforces obedience from noncombatants or punctuates the demands of the terrorists.

Note the words “policy” and “planned.” That means there must be a policy making body who turn their deliberated decisions over to another organizational element which plans the implementation of those policies, in turn delegating responsibility for executing the plan to further subordinate elements. This requires not only a centralized command element that makes decisions, but also a staff who turn those decisions into mission taskings to the staffs of subordinate resistance activities. In descending order of manpower and complexity of organization those activities are, (1) the underground, (2) the auxiliary, and (3) the guerrillas.

Mission tasking, broadly speaking, covers five basic categories; (1) action, (2) security, (3) cover and logistics, (4) surveillance and intelligence, and (5) communications. Each category is serviced by in independent element. Each element’s requirements are then forwarded to management who assemble the information into a mission planning guide and requirements list. Once this information is assembled, planning follows an ordered sequence.

The Intelligence Cycle sets into motion collection operations in response to the informational needs expressed in the requirements list. Targeting is highly discriminatory, begins very early in the planning process, and includes consideration of both primary and sub-targets. Wargaming, which considers the action to be taken and the probability of success of several courses of action. Protection, which prevents discovery, prevention of arrest, and provision for building and maintaining cover. Operational Support falls into five broad categories; (1) communications, (2) accommodations, (3) transportation, (4) technological support, and (5) supply. Planning of the final phase, Action, does not begin until all other planning requirements have been met.

LR objections to the foregoing model are, as already stated, the fear of infiltration and betrayal by government informants or penetration of the organization by government spies. The reason I mentioned my disdain for the tendency among the various proletarian organizations to organize armed cells first (i.e., do the whole thing backward) earlier in this essay is because organizing backward creates the very condition that leaves their groups open to infiltration and betrayal — their eventual necessity to organize some form of support. To do this they need to recruit from outside their immediate circle.

Tim McVeigh & Co. is an excellent example. When they realized they could not pull off their operation on their own they began enlisting support from people and organizations who really had no business knowing what they were up to. Within hours of the OKC bombing the FBI was all over them like flies on dung (and there is considerable evidence that the FBI began manipulating the operation about midway through their “planning”).

The point I am making is this: In a properly organized resistance one of the first things constituted is an overarching counterintelligence body that permeates the very fabric of the organization at all levels. Coincident with counterintelligence is the compartmentalization of the resistance organization and planning — something almost totally lacking in LR “cells.”

Furthermore, for those among you who think that resistance warfare is some type of free-booting tryst where “rugged individuals” can “get some back” from their oppressors, I suggest you stay home with the women. The authoritarianism and regulation of the standing military pales in comparison to the rigid authoritarianism, regulation and submission to duty found in resistance organizations.

Although some small measure of disjointed disruption may be achieved by LR, and although LR may exert some paltry degree of temporary coercion, its lack of far ranging planning, organizational discipline, coordination with other elements, or a support net designed to sustain operations will find them littering the streets with their corpses.

If there is a single good thing to be said about LR, it is that while LR “cells” are distracting the Enemy, the grown-ups can go about their more serious business.

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Thursday, September 12, 2013

Resistance Tactics


Raids, ambushes, sniper attacks (a form of ambush, really), and sabotage, ARE the fundamental tactics of guerrilla/insurgent/resistance combat, but a sound grasp of the fundamental realities of these methods, as well as a solid grasp of strategic target selection and analysis is critical to prevent a waste of limited material and manpower resources on tactical level targets of insignificant worth. The level of potential effectiveness of offensive operations against a regime that can be sustained over time depends largely on the guerrilla base camp support and auxiliary support available to the resistance (it is hard after all, to sustain on-going combat operations, when your fighting men haven’t eaten in two weeks, have been barefoot all winter, due to a lack of footwear, and have nowhere to hide long enough to get some sleep after weeks of continuous combat. The guerrilla base MUST be located in order to maximize isolation, as well as difficulty of approach by regime forces thus precluding the use of a suburban neighborhood as an effective guerrilla base). The base camp area must be inherently defensible, and tenaciously defended by well-trained, highly-motivated forces. This provides the resistance’s fighting elements with a safe haven to operate from, ensuring they have the time and ability to properly plan offensive operations (this does NOT mean that irregular forces will be conducting their offensive operations in remote, rural areas, if that is not where the enemy is concentrating his forces).



Guerrilla element leaders must consider the nature of the terrain in their operational area (OAKOC), as well as the level of training and tactical expertise of their forces, when considering suitable targets for offensive operations (sending a bunch of 40-somethings with no combat experience and little realistic, tactical training, up against an AFV-equipped security forces element, with close-air support and reinforcements only a radio call and helicopter ride away would be a ridiculous waste of assets, regardless of their marksmanship abilities and/or motivation levels).



The current doctrinal method of target analysis/selection is the CARVER matrix. An analysis of any potential target, using this matrix will provide a planning organization with a method to categorize the cost-benefit value of potential regime targets in a hierarchical manner, allowing the greatest emphasis to be placed on the targets that offer the greatest political value to the resistance’s efforts (i.e. hitting as fuel depot that re-supplies occupation force Strykers or BMPs will be of much greater value to the resistance than ambushing a squad-sized element of conscripted infantrymen. In turn however, a sniper attack that assassinates key members of a special operations element within the regime security forces may have greater value than a raid on a vehicle park that results in destruction of a half-dozen armored vehicles).



Criticality. A potential target can be considered critical when its destruction or severe damage will create a SIGNIFICANT negative impact on the enemy’s ability to continue projecting military force in the operational area. Criticality is dependent on several key factors:

1.How rapidly/soon will the destruction/damage of this target impact and affect enemy operations in the operational area? Will it happen immediately (i.e. the destruction of his armored vehicles may preclude continued mounted patrolling the next day, especially in areas that require lengthy, time-consuming travel, such as in much of the western U.S.A.) or will there be a noticeable delay (destruction of a fuel storage depot might negatively impact the enemy’s ability to continue operations, but not until the fuel supplies maintained at the unit level are expended…and they may be able to replace the fuel depot before that happens)?
2.What percentage of enemy operations will be curtailed by target damage or destruction? What level of damage must be incurred in order to ensure a given percentage of curtailment (if I destroy ALL of their vehicles, will it curtail operations 100%, or will they continue with foot-mobile operations? If I destroy x percentage of rotary-wing assets, will it create a y percentage reduction in their operating ability)?
3.Do substitutes for the damaged/destroyed material/manpower assets exist within the enemy’s logistics trail? How long will it take for those to be put into place?

4.How many targets exist, and what is their position/value within the greater scheme of the enemy’s order of battle?



Accessibility. The target, in order to realistically be the subject of a planned attack, must be accessible. While it has been accurately stated that NO target is completely inaccessible, some high-value targets must, after being weighed on an objective cost-benefit basis, be considered as practically inaccessible, due to the cost involved with actually damaging/destroying them, in terms of resistance force manpower/material assets. A target can be considered accessible to resistance attack when it is possible for the maneuver element to physically infiltrate the target’s immediate area, or the target can be successfully engaged via direct or indirect fire weapons (the current focus on the development of open-source UAV technology by some elements within the liberty movement will greatly expand the accessibility of future targets for the resistance, due to the inherent “guided missile” nature of these force multipliers).



Critical concerns when considering the accessibility of a potential target include infiltration and exfiltration routes/methods, route security concerns for the maneuver element, the requirements for barrier penetration, obstacle negotiation, and survival/evasion considerations during exfiltration of the maneuver element.



Recuperability. The ability of the enemy to repair and return the target to service should be a critical element in target selection and analysis. This will vary, depending on the target, as well as other variables present only during the planning process. The effects of economic downturns/depressions, sabotage by the subversive underground in the manufacturing facilities that build the necessary repair parts, and the ability of the resistance to continue interdiction missions to prevent repair of the damaged/destroyed targets are all factors that must be considered when determining the recuperability of a given target.



Vulnerability. The vulnerability of a specific target refers to the actual ability of the maneuver element, given its organic or available inorganic weapons and assets, to actually cause the requisite damage/destruction needed to accomplish the stated mission (if a unit is limited to individual small arms, a tank unit in a vehicle park will not be particularly vulnerable, while a unit that has access to stockpiled HE munitions, or battlefield recovered munitions and/or anti-tank weapons will be much more dangerous to those vehicles. On the same hand, while an in-flight UAV will not be particularly vulnerable to resistance threats, the personnel that run the UAV, and the UAV itself, while grounded, may be particularly vulnerable to various resistance threats). A target can ultimately only be considered vulnerable if the maneuver element has the capability and expertise (or can acquire/borrow the expertise) to successfully attack the target. Vulnerability will be predicated on the nature and construction of the target (soft-skinned patrol vehicles will be inherently more vulnerable than armored vehicles. Personnel are often more vulnerable than material assets), the amount of damage required to affect it’s recuperability (it’s a lot easier to slash tires and punch holes in the oil pan of a soft-skinned vehicle than it is to damage a M1A2 Abrams MBT), and the assets available to the resistance force (the use of open-source UAV technology to provide the resistance an indirect-fire/air support mechanism, locally-manufactured HE weapons, and the availability of heavy-caliber, long-range sniper systems all provide interesting force multipliers to future resistance elements).



Effects. The positive or negative influence on the civilian population of the operational area, as well as the PSYOP value on enemy personnel is defined as the effect of a specific targeting operation. The effects paragraph of the CARVER format must consider public perception of the destruction of the target (i.e. destruction of a critical bridge in the area may have a severely detrimental effect on the ability of the local civilian population to continue their daily lives. While it will also impact the ability of the enemy to conduct vehicle-borne patrolling operations, it will more negatively impact the civilian population, since the security forces can always resort to airborne transportation methods, using rotary-wing assets, while the local civilian population is simply out-of-luck. Obviously, this would be a negative effect when looked at from the PSYOP angle, since it would negatively impact the public opinion towards the resistance). The effects paragraph must also consider the regime’s reaction to the destruction of a specific target, in relation to their actions towards the local civilian population however.

1.Will regime forces retaliate against the local civilian population? To what degree? Will that impact the civilian population’s willingness/ability to aid the resistance (harsh enough reprisals may terrorize the local population enough that they no longer feel the risk is worth the potential rewards of aiding the resistance. On the other hand, reprisals that result in the death of family members may drive some members of the civilian population to more actively support the resistance. There is an extremely fine balance that must be considered during all operational planning)?
2.Will the resistance’s PSYOP themes be reinforced by the destruction of this target (is one of the major themes that the regime cannot protect themselves, let alone the public? Is a theme that the government is inept, and so the people have no reason to fear reprisals)?
3.Will the local civilian population be alienated from the regime, or more closely supportive of the regime? There is a fine balance that must be kept in the forefront of all planning during UW missions, with the effect on the local civilian population being at the forefront of everyone’s mind, from the highest planner, to the lowest trigger-puller (For the record, doing things that are inherently inimical to the civilian population’s core beliefs….say, pissing on corpses, or burning religious items/texts, or murdering a dozen innocent non-combatants…is ALWAYS going to have a negative effect…just sayin’).


Recognizability. This pertains to the degree to which a target can be easily identified under adverse conditions, including inclement weather, low-light conditions, and other factors, without being confused for other nearby targets (a mission to assassinate a critical member of the regime’s local leadership will be difficult to effect if he has a member of his staff with a close physical resemblance who may be accidentally targeted due to low recognizability. On the same hand, a raid on a commandeered local home used by regime leadership may backfire if the next-door neighbor has a similar-looking house, full of kids, and it gets hit instead. This happens…a lot. For one simple example, look at the number of LEO warrants served on the “wrong house.”).



Once the evaluation criteria for a specific target has been established, the guerrilla planning cell use a numerical ranking system to to rate the CARVER factors for each potential target. In a 1-10 rating, a 10 indicates a highly desirable factor (from the insurgent’s PoV), while a 1 means the target is fundamentally off the chart for mission success. The analysts must tailor the criteria and rating system to suit the particular strategic/tactical situation in their operational area, for their elements, as well as the particular target(s) being analyzed.



Leadership within the guerrilla element must consider the potential adverse effects of a particular target selection, on both future resistance operations and the civilian population. Targets that will hinder civilian population life must be attacked ONLY AS A LAST RESORT!!! The goal is to diminish the regime’s ability to project military force in the operational area, not to piss off the locals. Similarly, unsuccessful guerrilla operations will have a tremendously bad impact on fighter morale within the resistance, probably leading to desertion by less committed individuals. Successful operations, on the other hand, will raise morale, even in the face of other morale-crushing factors, such as insufficient material re-supply, as well as raising the status of the resistance in the perception of the civilian population.



For the resistance element training to conduct necessary future offensive operations to ensure the adequate defense of their community against incursions by regime security forces, proper target analysis/selection, utilizing the doctrinal CARVER process, is a critical element in maximizing the cost-benefit application of necessarily limited manpower/material assets. Think strategically, plan operationally, act tactically.

Article from The Mountain Guerrilla http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/target-analysis-and-selection-criteria-for-irregular-forces/

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Wheat information

Here is some really good information about wheat for food storage.


Wheat is the cornerstone of any emergency storage supply. Approximately 150 lbs will supply an adult for one year. A three-week emergency supply is approximately 5-10 lbs per adult. Children under 8 years old would need half those amounts. Wheat has been separated into several commercial classes based on color, hardness of the kernel, and growing season. The hard wheat classes are produced in areas that have dry-temperate climates. The kernels are usually small, red, and have a hard texture.
The white wheat classes are usually produced in areas where winters are relatively mild and there is adequate moisture. White wheat kernels are more plump and larger than red wheat kernels and have a softer texture than hard wheat. Wheat kernels are also known as wheat “berries”. Gluten is a wheat protein that giving flours the ability to retain gases produced by bread yeast to permit dough leavening. The hard red wheat varieties are high in gluten and make the best bread flour. Gluten will degrade during storage and lose half its raising power after several years of storage. Gluten can be purchased and added to poor quality flour in order to produce better quality bread.

Quality and Purchase. Whole wheat berries can be purchased from a producer (farmer). These grains are almost always not cleaned and may have been bulk stored for many months. Grains may also be purchased from a processor. In this case they may have been cleaned and packaged. Do not purchase “seed” wheat for storage, since these products may have toxic chemical treatments. Lastly, grains may be purchased cleaned and packaged from a retailer. Please call your local county Cooperative Extension Office for local outlets to purchase grains for storage.

Variety: Hard red spring , Hard red winter & Hard white spring
Protein: 11-15%
Best Use: bread flour (high gluten)

Variety: Soft red winter, Soft white winter & Soft white spring
Protein: 9-12%
Best Use: pasta, cake, biscuit, cracker, and pastry flours (low gluten)



Packaging.

Store wheat in moisture-proof, food-grade packaging, such as Mylar-type bags, polyethylene bags, plastic buckets, or #10 cans. Be aware that rodents can chew through plastic bags. Wheat stored in ~10 pound bags is easy to manipulate, facilitates rotation, allows easy inspection of the grain, and compartmentalizes the grain so contamination of one lot does not expose large quantities of stored grain to contamination. Several bags can be placed inside a 5-gallon plastic bucket. It is not necessary to store wheat in the absence of oxygen unless insects are present.

Storage Conditions.

Storage at 40-60°F is optimal for most home stored grains but is usually impractical in most homes except during winter months. Freezing or sub-zero temperatures do not damage stored grains. Storage at temperatures above 60°F causes a more rapid decline in seed viability (ability to germinate) but only a slightly faster loss in food value. A moisture level over 12% encourages mold growth and chemical degradation of all grains (barley, corn, millets, oats, rice, rye, sorghum, triticale, and wheat). Moisture above 12% may allow grains to start to respire causing chemical degradation. Moisture above 15% will allow molds to grow. When the moisture reaches 20% some bacteria can start to grow. The result is spoiled grain unfit for use. Store containers off the floor-- especially off concrete floors. Concrete can wick moisture to stored containers very easily. Inspect grain often for insect activity. Treat for insects (see below) or discard affected lots.

Method
Insect Control Recommendation

Insecticides

NOT RECOMMENDED, may be toxic if not correctly used

Heating

NOT RECOMMENDED, too difficult to control the correct amount of heat to apply.

Bay leaves, nails or salt

NOT RECOMMENDED, these have absolutely no effect on insects or insect eggs.

Freezing

Freeze 1-15 lb bags of wheat for 2-3 days. Allow to warm for 24 hours. Freezing kills live pests, but not insect eggs. Multiple freezing and warming cycles may be needed to kill all insects and hatching eggs.

Vacuum Sealing

Seal wheat in vacuum bags using follow vacuum sealer instructions. Regular polyethylene bags are not suitable to maintain a vacuum.

Dry Ice (CO2)

Place 3-4” of grain in the bottom of a 5-gallon plastic bucket. Use gloves when handling dry ice. Add 2-3 oz. crushed dry ice. Fill the container to the full height. Place the lid on top slightly askew. After 30 minutes, seal the lid air-tight. Dry ice will control most adult and larval insects present, but usually will not destroy eggs or pupae. If properly applied, a single treatment with dry ice is sufficient for long-term storage. Annual dry ice treatments are not necessary unless an infestation is recognized in the stored grain. Treating grain with dry ice does not reduce its ability to sprout or its food value.

Oxygen absorbers

Seal wheat in Mylar-type bags or #10 cans along with appropriate number of oxygen absorber packets to create an oxygen-free atmosphere. This will kill adult insects and prevent larval insects from surviving.

No treatment

Choose insect-free sources for wheat. Store them in clean and dry containers impermeable to insects.

* Polyethylene bags and 5-gallon plastic buckets will not maintain an oxygen-free environment after dry-ice or oxygen absorber treatment. Over time oxygen will re-enter the container and this may allow larvae to grow to adults and cause an infestation during storage.



Nutrition and Allergies.

A typical serving of whole wheat is 16 grams. It is recommended that adults get at least three servings (48g) per day. Wheat grain is high in protein, fiber, calcium and iron. Spouting wheat can obtain small amounts of vitamins A, B, C, and E not present in whole grain wheat. Other health claims for sprouted wheat remain unsubstantiated and lack science-based credibility.

Wheat Nutrition

16 g serving

Hard Red
Hard White
Soft White
Soft Red

Calories
57
53
53
53

Cal. From fat
3
1.5
3
2

Fat
0.35
0.15
0.35
0.25

Tot. Carbohydrates
11
11
11
12

Dietary Fiber
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.0

Protein
2.3
2.0
2.3
1.7

Some people are allergic to wheat proteins. The allergy can cause a variety of symptoms due to an autoimmune inflammation of the digestive system, such as diarrhea, bloating, constipation, and pain. Ulcerative colitis and irritable bowel syndrome may be caused by a food allergy. A severe allergy can result in life-threatening anaphylactic shock. In some the allergy is life-long and non-reversible and is called “celiac’s disease”. Other people may be simply “intolerant” to wheat. In this case they suffer from symptoms, but there is not an immune response. People with minor allergic reactions or intolerances can lose them over time. Always seek the advice of a physician to help with any allergies. All varieties of wheat and processed wheat (flour, germ, cracked, etc) contain the allergy proteins.

Shelf life.

Develop a program to utilize stored wheat on a regular basis. As stored wheat is used, replace it with containers of new wheat. Identify each container for variety and storage date. A good rule of thumb is to rotate wheat so that no stored product is older than 5 years. However, older stored wheat did make acceptable bread. A B.Y.U. study indicated that, regardless of headspace oxygen level, wheat packaged in No. 10 cans throughout 32 years of storage at ambient or cooler temperatures made bread acceptable to a majority of consumers.
Use from storage. Stored wheat can be ground for flour, popped (like popcorn), steamed, or cracked and cooked. Some like to germinate and sprout wheat for wheat grass.

References.

Brennand and Hendricks. 1988. “Food Storage in the Home.” USU Extension Circular 257, Logan, Utah. 16 p.

Cuperus, G. (coordinator). 1989. Wheat Pest Management, a Guide to Profitable and Environmentally Sound Production. Extension Service/United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Industry Resource Committee, and The National Association of Wheat Growers Foundation. 59 p.

Green, D. J. Rose, L. V. Ogden, and O. A. Pike. 2005. Department of Nutrition, Dietetics and Food Science, Brigham Young University, S221 ESC, Provo, UT 84602. Poster: IFT Annual Meeting, July 15-20 - New Orleans, Louisiana.

Hilfliger, E. (editor). 1980. Wheat-documenta: CIBA-GEIGY, Technical Monograph. CIBA¬GEIGY Ltd., Basle, Switzerland. 95 p.

Martin, J. H., W. H. Leonard, and D. L. Stamp. 1976. Principles of Field Crop Production, 3rd edition. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York. 1118 p.

USDA Nutrition Database. Obtained via Esha Genesis Software.

http://www.wheatfoods.org for recipes using wheat

Monday, June 24, 2013

Building Your SHTF Combat Overwatch Rifle

By: Brandon Smith
http://www.alt-market.com/articles/1557-building-your-shtf-combat-overwatch-rifle

After several years in the Liberty Movement working with various survivalists, you begin to realize that there are as many viewpoints and opinions on self defense tactics as there are people. This is because each individual survivalist’s environmental circumstances are a little different, and unique problems call for unique solutions. That said, there are certain universal elements that every survivalist should consider, and certain pieces of gear that can aid us greatly regardless of our particular situation. I believe the concept of the “overwatch rifle” is one of these universal elements, and an often overlooked combat necessity.

Preparing for a fight, in general terms, is about understanding one’s own weaknesses better than one’s opponent. This means rigorously examining your capabilities and rounding them out as much as possible. Are you strong in close quarters but terrible at a distance? Are you able to engage an enemy regardless of his position, or, do you have to risk closing the gap while he waits comfortably for you? Are you ready mentally and technically for surprises?

The overwatch rifle is not just a tool, it is also a strategy, and when I refer to “overwatch”, I am referring to a guerrilla methodology, not the standard military usage involving sniper support.

This strategy revolves around adaptability, movement, and creative offense. You have to be physically fit and ready to move quickly from one engagement to the next in a sequence that creates the utmost advantage for you and your team. You have to be willing to move from a rear supporting role to a forward scouting role at a moments notice. Sometimes, you have to operate at the very center of it all, coordinating supporting elements and removing obstacles in their path.

Not everyone can serve this role within their team. The overwatch rifle does not automatically make a survivalist overwatch ready. It is the man that makes the rifle effective, not the rifle that makes the man effective.

But before I discuss overwatch rifle design ideas, I want to address a question that ALWAYS comes up when I write an article dealing with any defensive measures:

“Who do you plan to fight?”

The question often insinuates that there is “no one” to fight and that such prepping articles are based in “paranoia”, or, that the enemy will be so technologically advanced that it is “foolish” of us to believe that we can fight them.

My answer is simple – I will fight anyone who attempts to undermine my individual freedom and safety, the individual freedom and safety of the people I care about, innocent citizens, and even future generations I will never meet. Anyone who suggests that such threats do not exist - foreign, domestic, and internationalist - must have been living under a rotting log for the past several years (or they’ve been mesmerized by Facebook and “reality” television, which is very similar). The superiority of these very real threats is irrelevant. I’ve been a fighter for most of my life, and I know well that the biggest and most intimidating opponents are often the easiest to topple in the end, as long as you have the will to press forward, and the intelligence to engage them in a way they cannot predict.

If you are an enemy of liberty and the constitutional philosophy of natural law, then you are my enemy, and if you push me, I will push back. Count on it…

This principle goes for tyrannical political systems as well. When a society loses its ability to regulate and restrict government, when all authority is derived through backroom brokered deals between the money elite and puppet politicians on both sides of the aisle, when individual liberties are deemed expendable in the name of illusory “collective safety”, and when the establishment proclaims that the only way for the public to be prosperous is for the bureaucracy to be prosperous, a war is soon at hand.

The elites will never walk away quietly and neither will we. There are Americans who still respect the virtues of freedom, and there are people in this world whose only goal is to dominate and enslave. We are at a dangerous impasse, and I believe there may be only one way left to fully resolve it…

Of course, when one discusses citizen armament and preparation for combat, the assumption is that every survivalist has already undertaken the correct prerequisite steps to make himself an effective fighter. Before anyone even considers combat preparedness, they should have already:

1) Stockpiled ample food and water.
2) Stockpiled proper medical and emergency first aid.
3) Stockpiled ample ammunition.
4) Chosen a retreat location and hardened their home for defense.
5) Been diligent in their personal health.
6) Trained their bodies for the most terrible rigors imaginable.
7) Trained their minds to be psychologically ready for combat.
8) Trained to control the jarring fight-or-flight response caused by the influx of adrenaline.
9) Fired hundreds if not thousands of rounds through each of the weapons they intend to use in combat until they know them intimately.
10) Studied the history of combat tactics and war strategy (especially asymmetric warfare).
11) Built up a community of like minded individuals who are also prepared.

If you have not at least begun to pursue all of these goals then you are not ready to pull the trigger. Period. If you don’t respect yourself enough to prepare in a practical way, the enemy certainly won’t respect you either, and why should he? You’ll be the punchline of a sad joke, the bullseye on the target, and just another notch in his rifle stock.

If you have at least initiated preparations in all of the above areas, THEN it is time to take a look at your rifle setup…

The Overwatch Concept In Asymmetric Warfare

The term “overwatch” is most often applied when a sniper team is placed in a supporting role during a major offensive. However, the concept has expanded into other areas, especially where guerrilla warfare is concerned, and I would like to use the broader definition here. A person on “overwatch” could be a sniper, or a general team member who is able to place precision fire almost anywhere on the battlefield at vectors difficult for the enemy to spot. This means being in a central position covering not one sector, but all sectors of fire, and striking the enemy from one angle while he is distracted by another.

Being in an overwatch role would mean a certain freedom of movement. You are often designating your own targets and your own fields of fire as you go, and as your teammates push forward. But, it also means you have to be highly adaptable, quick thinking, creative and imaginative in your strategy, and be willing to cause enough damage during a fight to sometimes draw the majority of enemy fire. You become the fulcrum of your team’s initiative.

Ideally, you would want every person you work with to be able to fill the overwatch position, and be able to think in terms of creative combat. The overwatch strategy is meant to stall an enemy advance, destroy enemy sniper positions, create openings in enemy lines, and thus, create targets of opportunity for other team members.

Designing Your Overwatch Rifle

The weapons system you use for overwatch will depend greatly on what you find works best for you as an individual. However, here are some issues you need to take into consideration before building your weapon:

Short Range, Medium Range, Long Range: Your overwatch rifle must be able to engage targets at almost any range (between 0 – 800 yards would be ideal). You must also be able to shift from medium and long range opponents to close range surprise attacks quickly and efficiently.

Penetration And Distance: The caliber you choose should not only be able to travel long distances, but also maintain strong penetration ability at those distances.

Precision: The rifle should fire consistent groups of less than 1 MOA (at least 1” groups at 100 yards).

Frequency Of Fire: The more fire you can put down range quickly and accurately, the better. This means semi-auto rather than bolt action.

Adaptable To Optics: The weapon should have a rail system that accommodates a number of optics, making it adaptable to almost any situation. Or, at least modifiable for a rail.

Rifle Systems

I have found that the .308 military caliber tends to be the most practical for overwatch requirements. The bullet has long range capabilities and far greater penetration than the AR-15’s .223 caliber, or the AK-47’s 7.62 × 39 caliber. The AR and AK are great for close range, room-to-room fighting, and some medium range targets without cover, but they have many limitations and are not useful for overwatch. I have also chosen .308 rifles that are semi-automatic, and that can be fitted with comprehensive rail systems. A common complaint concerning .308 tactical rifles is that they are "too heavy" and slow to aim. All I can say is, if you can't wield the weapon effectively, do some push-ups until you can.

Here is a short list of possible rifle platforms:

AR-10
FN FAL
Springfield M1A
FN SCAR
FNAR
Saiga .308
Heckler & Koch PTR-91

I’m sure there are few more that could be added here, and I recommend all readers carefully research and fire the weapon they are interested in before purchasing it (especially at today’s prices).

Optics

Next, you need to devise an optics system that allows you to engage at a distance AND up-close and personal. There are many ways of setting up a rifle for this, but most involve a combination of a scope and red dot, or a scope and iron sights. Here are some ideas…

Variable Scope: A variable scope, as opposed to a fixed power, makes it possible to shift your focus from a wider field of view to narrow longer distance shot with a twist of a dial. But such a scope alone will not enable the kind of speed you will require for overwatch. Buying a cheap hunting variable is also not advised. Make sure the glass is good, and the body can take a beating. Spend the extra cash…

Mini-Red Dot / Variable Scope Combo: Mini-Red Dots are very versatile and new mounting systems make it possible to tie one to your scope at any angle you wish. Some mounts place the red dot directly above the scope, but this often forces the shooter to sacrifice his cheek weld in order to take aim. I prefer angled mounts to the side of the scope. A very quick shift of the rifle to the inside and you can immediately fire without ever taking your cheek away from the stock. Red dots have no magnification, and thus no vision box. Both eyes can be used to target the enemy, and your peripheral vision can be utilized to acquire the next target before firing at the first. My favorite mini-red dot sights are made by Trijicon and Aimpoint, because of their proven durability in the field.

Pre-Designed Multi-Mounts: Multi-railed ring systems like the Burris P.E.P.R. Mount create a solid platform for you to attach a scope and red dot package to your rifle quickly and easily. Many of these systems are meant for AR-15 enthusiasts, but I have seen them adapted for use on .308 caliber rifles.

Short Dot Variable Scope: Short dot scopes (or CQB scopes) usually come in the 1-4 or 1-6 power variety. The concept was to make a single optics system that combined the speed and wide field view of a red dot with the magnification of a variable scope. Some of the more affordable short dots are made by Burris, Leupold, Vortex, and SWFA, and even these models can be pricey. If you have the cash, they are an excellent investment. Many models include an illuminated reticle that can be used in combination with night vision. Short dot scopes are popular in 3-gun competitions because of their versatility, and are beginning to see more use in the military. They can be very effective for overwatch purposes. I recommend 1-6 scopes in second focal plane, which prevents the red dot reticle from being magnified as power is increased, causing a loss of precision.

Night Vision: Overwatch includes nighttime operations. The tactical rail on your rifle should be long enough to accommodate a scope and a night vision system. Or, a red dot and night vision combo. Quick-detach mounts like those produced by LaRue Tactical are perfect for switching out sights and scopes quickly without losing your zero.

In any lopsided contest to the death, the less technologically advanced opponent must inevitably turn to asymmetric warfare; meaning, he must fight smarter, and be more effective with fewer tools at his disposal. He has to turn his weaknesses into strengths, and make the smallest weapon devastating to his seemingly invincible enemy. Taking on the role of overwatch rifleman means you must understand all the intricacies of asymmetrics, and be able to apply them in real time in the midst of a battle frenzy. It is a very ugly mission.

Above all, you have to have the will and the courage to stand against what you know are incredible odds. You have to be unwavering. You have to have a clear understanding of why you picked up that rifle in the first place, and maintain a deep belief in your cause despite the seeming impossibility of the task before you. Otherwise, fear will be your guide, and the fearful can never provide adequate overwatch.

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Thursday, June 20, 2013

Tactical Use of Terrain/Ground

By: Max Velocity


I am going to concentrate on the offense. Mainly because I have covered defense, types of terrain and the principles of defense in detail in 'Contact' and although I have covered offense, there is more detail that can be gone into about use of ground in the assault, rather than just the mechanics of an assault. I have also covered use of terrain for navigation and movement, which is itself a separate topic. So for now, I will hone in on offense and use as a vehicle for the discussion either hasty or deliberate attacks (or raids) to go through a terrain analysis process.

Straight up I am going to launch into one of the old faithful U.S. Army mnemonics. These are all well and good as an aide memoir but must be understood rather than trotted out as a standard answer (METT-TC anyone?) A standard approach that you may find useful is to use the mnemonic OCOKA:

O – Observation and Fields of Fire
C – Cover and Concealment
O - Obstacles
K – Key Terrain
A – Avenues of Approach

If you are attacking, you will need to consider these from the point of view of the enemy position you are attacking i.e. what are the enemy's observation and fields of fire from their position....? How will I apply that to a covered approach?

OK, after my foray into standard U.S. Army doctrine, moving swiftly on:

When considering terrain, or as I prefer to say, ground, you must consider it in conjunction with the enemy. Thus you do not think about ground as its own thing, but as enemy/ground (enemy & ground). You will then relate that to your position. It is a spacial relation and application of fire problem that is up to you to solve. The position of the enemy on the ground, related to the position of friendly forces and how the lay of the land falls between the two will inform your decision making.

I have put in a chapter on the 'Combat Estimate' in 'Contact': this is a planning tool that also acts as a 'mental trainer' for real situation when you don't have time to actually conduct a written estimate. It follows the process of going though factors such as enemy/ground and making decisions that will lead to potential 'courses of action' and finally a plan. Such a tool can be used in slower time when planning a deliberate attack/raid or off the cuff if engaged in a reaction to contact and hasty attack.

(I do cover MDMP, mainly as an explanation of what it is, and then I largely steer clear of it. My advice: once you get a basic understanding, stay largely away from set military doctrine i.e. trotting out the old faithful key words and mnemonics, it will bog you down. Free your mind!)

Dead Ground: this is a positional concept that applies to ground that cannot be seen from a position i.e. it is not covered by observation or direct fire from the enemy position. In a macro sense, I can't see the valley behind the ridge, so that is 'dead ground' to me. This dead ground concept is really important and goes to cover and concealment. You must try to develop a 'soldier’s eye for the ground' which basically means that when you view terrain, it’s not pretty, it's a relationship of slopes and angles that will either provide cover or it will not. In the micro sense, you can apply the concept of dead ground as related to the enemy position and your position. A simple angled slope may therefore provide you cover, and thus be dead ground from the enemy perspective. Even if it is only useful if you are in a low crawl, it may be the difference between life and death.

Cover & Concealment: Cover will protect you from enemy fire and observation (i.e. in a ditch) while concealment will only protect you from enemy observation, (i.e. behind a bush) and if the enemy fires through the concealment they may well hit you. Clearly cover is preferable to concealment but you may have to use a mixture of both.

Smoke: you can use smoke as a form of concealment. The enemy can fire through it. It may also be used as a form of deception. You can buy very effective smoke grenades for the air soft market. If you have the reach it is always better to smoke off the enemy position, rather than your position. With a handheld smoke grenade you are limited in range. Remember also that smoke can interfere with your accurate suppression fire. With a civilian smoke grenade, the smoke generation is not instant and thus you will have to wait for the smoke to 'build' before you can use its concealment; smoke also has to be thrown to take account of wind direction. You could perhaps use the smoke grenade to conceal the movement of your flanking assault element, while not screening off your fire support element.

Smoke can therefore be used to help when natural cover and concealment is lacking, perhaps when you have to move off 'the X', which is the enemy killing area, or to conceal movement across an area of open ground. Remember though, it is a double edged weapon - once you pop smoke, you will indicate what you are doing - thus consider it also as a form of deception, and have someone pop it on the right flank, for example, when you went left.

Thermal Smoke: used as a form of concealment from aerial thermal surveillance, or ground thermal surveillance. Burning suitable materials, such as oil drums, tires, brush, grassland or whatever, can create a thermal smokescreen that will drift across the area of operations, wind dependent, to screen off your operation and even your approach to an attack. This will work against visual and thermal observation. You may even just burn the enemy out of their positions.

Darkness: like smoke, darkness can be used as a form of concealment. However, consider the night vision capabilities of the enemy balanced against your own before making decisions on night attacks. You may also employ judicious use of white light, such as parachute illumination flares, either the handheld rocket type or fired from mortars if you have it. But also remember that darkness may have other advantages, such as surprise and the enemy having perhaps let their guard down/asleep, depending who they are. As usual, balance the factors and make a decision. If using white light, you can employ it as you wish, lighting up and then going dark to cover movement etc. The murky light and moving shadows will always add to the confusion and terror of a night attack.

Key Terrain: this is ground or position that provides a marked advantage to whichever side holds it. For example, if the enemy is defending a small farm complex, and there is a little knoll behind it, perhaps upon which they have an observation post (OP) then taking this key terrain (the knoll) may afford you a distinct advantage in assaulting the enemy complex. Not only because you destroy their OP/fire support position/sharpshooter hide, but you may also be able to position your own fire support elements there to support your assault onto the complex. Conversely, if the enemy continues to hold the knoll, they can not only observe and call fire onto your assault elements as they maneuver onto the farm complex, but they can also disrupt your attack from the knoll itself, with support fire. A preliminary surprise attack on the knoll would allow you to position a support by fire element there and consequently assault onto the farm complex. 

There is a difference between a deliberate attack/raid and a hasty attack. The main difference is that with a deliberate attack you retain the initiative because you plan it, move to the enemy position and initiate the attack from a position and at a time of your own choosing. So long as you can approach the enemy position undetected you will have a choice of where to position your fire support element and where to move your assault elements, where to concentrate force to achieve the break-in and your sequence of assault. Remember that 'no plan survives contact with the enemy' and there will always be a need to maintain flexibility and adapt to changing circumstance. That is why it is best to adopt a 'mission command' mindset where it is the achievement of a mission/task and the 'reason why' behind it that is important, rather than just simply doing exactly as you were told in orders.

A brief explanation on mission command (also covered in 'Contact'): although missions/tasks should be given in the form of a task(s) followed by a unifying purpose (reason why) this is not to let your guys go and do whatever they want to do on the objective. There needs to be a plan and a sequence, and that will be tied in with control measures to allow best utilization of support by fire, sequencing, and to prevent fratricide. So stick to the plan as much as possible and improvise in accordance with the 'reason why' if things start to go wrong.

For example, 2nd squad was supposed to echelon (i.e. move in sequence) through 1st Squad to move on and assault objective 2. However, an unseen/unknown mutually supporting enemy position has opened fire. 2nd Squad has taken casualties and is now totally involved in a firefight tying to suppress this new enemy position, which is to a flank. The platoon leader now makes a decision out of the original plan to move a machine gun team from the fire support element out to a flank to a position where it can suppress this new enemy position. While he is engaged with giving orders for that, 3rd squad did not wait for orders. They were in reserve (part of the assault cycle) and took the opportunity to push through 1st squad, past 2nd squad, and seize 2nd squads initial objective, thus getting the plan back on track but with different elements doing the planned tasks. Now that we are at this point, and the new enemy position is being successfully suppressed, the platoon leader can now view the assault on this new position as an unplanned hasty attack and give quick battle orders (QBOs) for a squad to assault, now that the enemy are suppressed.

With a deliberate attack, you are looking for various key positions. These should be found in your recce of the enemy position, before you give orders and conduct the mission. You need an ORP (objective rally point) which is where you will patrol to before dispersing to the various assault positions. This should be on a covered approach to the enemy position. Your fire support position will be covered and allow a sufficient range for your weapon systems to engage and suppress the enemy. Don't be too close; if you have the range and accuracy - use it. If you can get an elevated position overlooking the enemy objective, with decent fields of fire not obscured by too much vegetation, then you are getting a good fire support location. Your weapon systems, and also the ground, will decide ranges. If you have tripod mounted machine guns, you could be pushing back out to as far as maybe 800 meters, but balance this against the ability to accurately observe and 'fire in' the assaulting elements. For standard small arms, given suitable ground, you may be 100 meters away in fire support; you don't ideally want to be more than 300 meters away.

Your fire support element will need to be able to switch fire ahead of the assaulting elements and engage depth and mutually supporting positions as the assault elements work through the enemy position. Because of this, and because of ballistics, you ideally want to have an angle of 90 degrees between your fire support and your assaulting elements. So your assaulting elements will come in from either the left or the right of the fire support elements, which will be firing across their front and then switching away from them onto enemy depth as the assault progresses. Don't have an angle beyond 90 degrees where your assault elements are heading towards your fire support. If the angle is less than 90 degrees then your assault elements will obscure the enemy position sooner as they advance. Real life is never ideal.

So when planning for your deliberate attack you need to have a covered approach for the assault elements to move to a forming up position (FUP) which is where they will shake out into assault formation before crossing the line of departure (LD) into the assault. They will approach, assault and fight through the enemy positions in sequence and each element will be controlled by a limit of exploitation (LOE). This applies to any type of objective, such as trenches, bunkers, buildings, small complexes, compounds or a camp attack. The difference is the specifics of the assault techniques (don't get me started on 'CQB'!)

Once you spatially assess the enemy position you will be able to position your locations for the approaches, FUP, LD, fire support etc. and sequence how your elements will assault onto and through the enemy objective. Remember that although you will have a fire support element, each assault element will be providing its own integral fire support and fire and movement as it moves through the objective, and each assault element will be supporting the others as they cycle through the various enemy positions.

When considering the assault, think about distances that your guys will have to cross from the LD to the first objective, how the objectives (buildings/trenches etc) lay related to each other, how you will move from one to another and where will you position integral fire support elements. Are you able to assault downhill, or will it have to be uphill? If you come from a certain direction, are there any good options for fire support locations? Once you understand the spatial relations of ballistics, how an element covers another element and the characteristics of obscuring and unsafe fire support, you will be able to spatially plan such an assault.

The best use of ground comes into this when you are looking for covered approaches to move between one location and another and to close distances and open ground that you have to cross. Any movement in the open risks enemy fire. Of course, when in contact there is never movement without supporting fire. The more open the ground is the more supporting fire you will need to be able to survive across that open area. The more cover you can utilize the less fire you will need. Moving on a football field is totally reliant on the effectiveness of your accurate suppression fire. Movement in a ditch can be done if your suppression fire is not totally effective.

How does this apply to a hasty attack? A hasty attack will usually take place after a surprise contact when your element has been 'advancing to contact'. It may also take place when you are hit on a patrol. Depending on your patrol orders/SOPs you will either conduct immediate action break contact drills or you will be in an offensive mission mode. Even if you are in an offensive mode you will still go through immediate action contact/battle drills to take cover and return fire, locate the enemy and begin to suppress. The difference here between a deliberate and hasty attack is that with the latter the enemy has the initiative and has opened fire on you at a point of their choosing. You are therefore in their killing area (the X) and you must seize back the initiative and prosecute an assault with speed, aggression and surprise.

(I am not going to bog down in the difference in U.S. Army doctrine between 'near' and 'far' ambush. In simple terms, a near ambush is within grenade range (30 yards) and the suggested reaction for a near ambush is a standard immediate action drill for the closest team to assault onto the enemy. The far ambush should be taken care of as I describe below. I disagree in general terms about this immediate reaction to a near ambush simply determined based on distance. If the team leader under contact decides to assault immediately, then so be it and he must be supported as much as possible. However 30 yards is a long way under fire and still depends a lot on the ground. The contacted team may well be pinned down with casualties. If possible always try and bring an element, the rear team, to a flank to either assault or at least support by fire).

This means that after initial contact and everyone having done their individual react to contact drills, the squad leader for the element that comes under contact will most likely maneuver his element off the immediate X into a better position to begin to win the firefight with the enemy. This will be done by basic fire and movement, either forwards, to the flank, or rearward, into better position of cover and concealment. This could be a single squad/element or it could be one element of a larger force, such as a platoon. The squad leader that came under contact, if part of a larger force, will make a decision, based on his assessment of enemy location and strength, to either put in a hasty squad attack or defer to the platoon leader if the enemy is too strong. If he hands it over to the platoon leader, he may well become the fire support squad, or the platoon leader may move elements around into better positions, supporting each by fire to do so. It's another spatial/mechanical action.

If you are a squad leader who has come under fire and moved off the X or at least into better cover, and you are contemplating a hasty attack, you will hand over the control of the firefight to your second in command and conduct a quick combat estimate. This is where you are looking at the spatial combination of enemy/ground. as it relates to the enemy position, your position and the ground in between. It is vital at this point to observe as best as you can and identify enemy positions, numbers and firepower.

You are looking for:

- A fire support location. In a hasty attack that is often simply leaving a team in support where you are right now. If you have to put a team into a better location, then that will be conducted by fire and movement in a series of preliminary moves to get them where you need them.

- A covered approach to a flank. Concealed if not covered. 

- A forming up position (FUP) & line of departure (LD).

- A sequence of assault onto the enemy objective. For a squad, you are only really going to be assaulting with one team and thus onto a single enemy fighting position/trench/bunker.

When assessing the ground, it is helpful to divide it into left, center and right. Center is not usually a good idea unless very close to the enemy. Best to go either left or right flanking. So you are effectively looking for a left or right flanking approach. Decide on the best one depending on your assessment of the various factors. Once you decide, go with it. There may be a couple of options to a flank, such as far left and near left. Decide on the best one as it relates to the spatial problem.

As you plan to take your assault team left or right flanking, you will also need to consider the need for further suppression of the enemy as you get closer, using one of your buddy pairs in the assault team to either be a 'point of fire' to provide closer suppression on the enemy as you approach from the flank, or to be a point of fire as outward looking flank protection, facing out to cover any depth or mutually supporting enemy positions. Remember flank protection as you move through that covered route - you may run into another enemy position, which was holding its fire in anticipation of your move or simply out of sector for your initial contact location, and in that case you may want to reconsider the odds. It may already be too late and you are committed to following the fight through to its conclusion. 'Finish the fight!'

If you are assaulting enemy in the open you will usually simply fight through in a skirmish line by fire and movement in buddy teams. If you are assaulting a fighting position such as a trench or bunker, then you may use the point of fire method to drop off one buddy pair as intimate fire support and assault with a buddy pair. 
If you have to use a point of fire to screen off a depth position that you came across in the assault, then once you have taken care of the initial position, continue to suppress the depth. Then, bring in the team that you used as fire support and have them assault the depth. That is one way to skin the cat.

When you have cleared the enemy position, you will need to have your fire support team join you. Potentially you will be send them through to destroy that depth position your point of fire was suppressing, but assuming you are not they will rejoin you on the enemy objective. The way to do this has changed - it used to be that they would follow the route you took, all the way to the flank, on the basis that you just came up there and so it should be clear of booby traps and further enemy etc. Modern thinking says they can just take the shortest route. Make your own mind up what is best for you.

Obstacles are something that you must consider when planning your flanking approach - are there any and how do they affect that approach? Wire, concertina wire, walls, fences, buildings, ditches, creeks, rivers etc are all things that may make you decide against one route and for another. Punji pits - can you even identify/see them before you are on them? Maybe even other booby traps such as mines and IEDs.

Once on the enemy position, you also need to consider the ground where you are at as you conduct your reorganization post-assault. Are you best where you are or do you need to move to a better defended or covered position? Is there a danger of counter-attack or even indirect fire? If so, get into a defended covered position and even start digging. Often it is best to get off and away from the objective as soon as possible to avoid retaliation.

Another thing related to the direction of your assault and the lay of the land is what options are you giving the enemy? Will you trap them and force them to fight or do you give them a route to withdraw on? What do you intend - kill, capture, just seize the ground, or destroy them all? This also applies to a raid or deliberate attack where you may leave the enemy 'open door' opportunities to escape or you may deliberately place cut-off groups along egress routes to kill/capture any escaping enemy. If you do put such groups out, just like cut-off groups in an ambush you must use terrain to screen them from your direct fire as you conduct the assault, as they will likely be positioned 'downrange ' from your assault.

Live hard, die free.

MV

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Tuesday, June 11, 2013

Sick and tired of political correctness

Sorry, but this is my rant about being sick and tired of having to watch everything I say, so I do not offend anyone.

Since when did the 1st Amendment say that we only have the freedom of speech if we are not offending anyone? I have not read that anywhere in the Constitution. I think that we should be able to say what we want to, and have the backing of the 1st Amendment.

In this country today the Constitution is about worthless, it has been trampled on, ignored, and mocked. WAKE UP PEOPLE! these are our rights. What is it going to take for people to stand up and do something about defending the Constitution?

I am so sick of how the Constitution, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the Bible are looked upon as things we cannot talk about, or discuss. Why can we not talk about religion, but people can talk about their homosexual lovers? Why is it that when people talk about how our liberties are being trampled that people do not get it, they ask you what you mean. Seriously? People are so asleep in this country it is sad.

This is the time to be AWAKE people, if you are, spread the word, educate your friends, co-workers, etc... Oh, yeah I forgot you probably cannot talk about those things at work, because our Bill of Rights is SO controversial... lol No really, it is sad, we cannot talk about things the way we want to, we cannot say things on the phone in fear that black SUVs will pull up in our driveways with DHS storm troopers piling out of them.

We are in a Totalitarian Police State because people are so concerned with security, but do not give a crap about the rights they are giving up to achieve a level of security. What is worth more to you, security, or freedom. The government can make you safe... you will not have any rights, freedoms, or privacy, you will be secure, but you will no longer be FREE.

I for one am not willing to give up the principals that made our nation great just to be more secure.

I want to feel free to say what I want, to stand up for what is right, to be part of the solution, not the problem, I am a Sheep Dog, and will continue to fight the good fight!

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

What to wear in a post event world

So the SHTF, you are part of the resistance, or you just want to survive. Should you wear camo, or civilian clothes? Well, this depends on how and what has happened, it depends on whether you are still integrated into society, or you are part of a group that heads for the hills and is part of an active resistance movement.

I feel that it is a personal choice, and one that you would be changing due to mission parameters, and the local atmosphere. If resistance groups are being hunted and fought by a professional force, then you have the option of using camo to increase your survivability in an active combat environment. But if you still desire to be part of society, then you would need to tailor your kit to take that into account.

One way you could go is to wear civilian work clothes in muted natural colors, then wear your kit over them. This way you could fight the fight, but then if need be ditch your gear and just walk down the street and fit in. Another option for this scenario is to wear what I call "Redneck Camo" which is any of the commercially available patterns that hunters wear. This type of clothing is effective in the woods, but also acceptable by society in many areas. If you were walking down the street in this type of camo, not many people would even give you a second glance.

So the options as I see it are: military camos, redneck camos, or muted civilian clothes. The way to go about this that I see as the most effective is to wear browns and greens in civilian style clothes (not tactical clothes) then wear a gillie suit or shroud and your kit when you are in the crap, or in an active combat situation. This approach gives you the ability to be effective in the fight, but then to ditch your kit and gillie, then just walk down the street for your exfiltration (exfil).

Another aspect of this debate is that if you and your group have a uniform standard and maybe a unit patch you will build esprit de corps, or pride in your unit, this is all good and fine pre-event, but when you are engaged as a fighting force living is the best morale builder. Another way to look at it is the ability to recognize your guys so you do not have any friendly fire incidents, well come on, if you are in a situation and you do not know the location of all of your buddies, then you should have had more training. We are not talking about large groups of soldiers with guys spread out all over the place. One of the good things about having a small unit is that you will be set up in a coordinated well planned ambush type of fight. If you are not, then you need to get the hell out of there as fast as you can.

I am not going to get into what is the best camo pattern, this battle is like the timely debate of AR vs AK, there is no right answer, just your personal preference. What I will say is that it is a good idea to not be wearing the same pattern that the forces you are fighting is wearing. I say this because of what I mentioned above about the ability to differentiate your guys from the enemy.

What you wear also depends on what you can afford and what you already have. If you can afford it, get the best stuff you can, but do not take money from your ammo, weapon, or survival gear budget. I feel that this should be the last priority, put your money into good gear, mags, ammo, good quality firearms, food, water, medical supplies and such. You can fight in whatever if you have to, but you could have the fanciest camo uniform and crappy gear and you will fail when your gear does, or when you do not have an item you need because you spent your money on the latest camo instead of where you should have spent it.

Remember you are a guerrilla style fighter, you hit hard, hit fast, and get the hell out of there. You are like a shadow in the mist, you confuse, instill terror, and break the enemy force down over time. You do not engage in full scale battles, you prefer small, planned, short duration fights that you pick the parameters of.

With that said, think about what is really important to you, set up your clothing, kit and weapons for realistic scenarios, be smart, think about the way that things will do down. Maybe you should have one of each of these types of clothing and then determine which ones you will employ based on the type of mission you will be conducting.

Remember to stay strong, keep up the fight, and never give up!