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Showing posts with label Resistance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Resistance. Show all posts

Friday, October 21, 2016

Ronald Reagan speach you need to hear


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Monday, October 3, 2016

Mobs vs you in your vehicle

This topic is very timely seeing what has been happening lately many places in our nation. We need to be prepared to deal with this threat. I think the best way to get around this issue is to avoid the situations, and areas where things like this happen.

1) Avoidance is key. Many protests and riots are either predictable or planned in advance. Stay away from the riots if you want to avoid being victimized! When you see masses of people blocking the roadways, STOP. Don’t go any farther. Do whatever necessary to change directions and get out of the area. If you are alert, you should be able to see these masses of people far enough in advance that you can act before being surrounded. It goes without saying that if you are texting, talking on the phone, or watching a DVD while driving, you may not be paying enough attention to save yourself. Don’t get distracted by electronic devices when driving.

2) You can’t just run people over if they are in the road. The safest thing to do in a situation like this is to keep moving, bumping people out of the way with your car. Unfortunately, that isn’t legal. It’s considered vehicular assault. Even if people are illegally blocking the road, you will likely go to jail if you run them down absent a legitimate threat to your life. See why awareness is so important? Getting away from the kill zone both keeps you safe and out of jail.

3) The situation changes, however, once the rioters attack you or your vehicle. With your vehicle surrounded in a manner that you can’t escape and your attackers being trying to burn your car, flip it over, or drag you out, it is reasonable to assume that you will suffer serious injury or death. That’s when you can start striking people with your car. Don’t get out and shoot. You will quickly be overwhelmed and your gun will be taken from you. Instead, accelerate steadily and forcefully, driving away from the surrounding rioters. Steady movement is the key. Hitting folks too hard can disable your vehicle. As John suggests, use your vehicle to push people out of the way rather than striking them.

4) Doors locked and seat belt OFF. It should go without saying that your doors should be locked when driving. If your doors don’t automatically lock, get in the habit of locking them manually as soon as you get inside. You don’t want the crowd to be able to easily open your door and drag you out.
You may not have enough time to do it, but cracking your windows and turning off your ventilation system would also be a good idea when driving in areas where crowds may gather. Windows that are down approximately 1/2″ are actually harder to break than windows that are tightly closed. You want to turn off the ventilation system so you don’t get overcome by any smoke or tear gas that is in the air where you are driving.

Your seat belt should be off. Seat belts will reduce your ability to draw a firearm. They will also prohibit you from making a speedy escape should your vehicle be set on fire or overturned. In general, it’s safer to stay inside the car in a crowd. If Molotov cocktails hit your car, drive quickly away. The wind will likely extinguish the burning liquid before you are hurt. If the car is disabled, and under fire attack, get out. It’s best to take your chances on foot than be trapped inside and burned alive.

5) Tear gas grenades may or may not work. Many people have asked me about the utility of carrying a couple of pepper spray grenades in the car with you for the purpose of keeping large gangs away from your vehicle. I carry a couple in my car, but I would be hesitant to recommend the tactic. In order to deploy the grenades, you’ll have to get out of the car or lower the windows. Both of those actions dramatically increase your risk. The crowd may be wearing gas masks or the like as well. I think the grenades would work better if you were on foot than they would if you are attacked in a vehicle.

6) Carry your gun on your person, not in the car. Some folks like using holsters that mount under the dash or on the steering column for just this type of criminal act. I think it’s a bad idea. If you have to bail out of the car quickly, you may not have a chance to grab the gun. Do you want to abandon a firearm and leave it in the hands of the rioters? I would hope not. Carry your gun on your person. Don’t leave it in your console, glove compartment or special “counter carjacker” holster on the steering wheel.

7) Beware of other forms of roadblocks. The roadblocks designed to make you stop, may not take the form of people. The rioters will steal cars and then purposely abandon them in the middle of roadways. It causes you to stop and also prevents police/fire vehicles from getting to the scene. It’s a common occurrence around the world. Even more notorious are homemade caltrops. A bunch of those strewn across the roadway would cause all kinds of havoc.

Take a look at the tactics used by rioters and protesters around the world. Commit to avoiding areas where such protests are occurring. If you do get caught up in the mob violence, consider some of the tips above to make it out safely.

Original article

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Tuesday, September 27, 2016

Probability of Successful Revolutions?


Brigadier General Samuel Griffith, USMC (Ret.) wrote in-depth about his study of partisan resistance and guerrilla movements. One of the things that I find particularly interesting is how he qualified the execution of guerrilla movements. He describes ten factors that determine the outcome of guerrilla and resistance movements. Each factor should be scored for both the resistance movement and the regime in power. Ten factors with ten points each gives you an index of 100. In a future product, we’ll be breaking down the possibility of domestic insurgencies, both by the left and the right wings of the political spectrum, and judging their regional outcomes should the US experience a domestic conflict.

But before we get into those ten factors, take this into consideration:

Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this “significant segment” will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.

Movements that don’t gain the support of 15 to 25 per cent of the population, regionally if not nationwide, generally result in failure. Further, if a movement reaches that threshold but its tactics or strategy is not supported, the movement is simply doomed to fail. A PEW Research Poll from December 2011 says that while 44% of America supported the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, 49% disagreed with OWS tactics — and that was a largely ‘peaceful’ movement compared to all out revolution! So what happened to the OWS movement? It was forced to abandon its tactics, due both to the police and failure to maintain popular support. For any movement to create real and permanent change, it needs popular support on all fronts, including popular support for its tactics. That starts with the appeal of program.

Appeal of program: Does the populace line up behind a movement? Does the movement represent ideological and moral values to which people not only subscribe but would be willing to risk their lives to support? Does the movement have the moral high ground and do the people believe in what the movement is doing? These are some of the questions we can ask to satisfy this measurement. The ‘appeal of program’ must be internalized by the populace; therefore the program’s goal is to be both simply understood and dynamic. When I say dynamic, think loud, disruptive, explosive, meaningful, and significant. If you want a good illustration of a simple and dynamic appeal of program, just look at the Ron Paul Revolution. It created hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of mini-Ron Paul's. A good appeal to program leads to popular support.

Popular support: Gaining popular support is the keystone of any resistance or guerrilla movement. Resistance cells must depend on the empathy, hospitality, and refuge of the populace because the guerrilla doesn’t go home; he is home. Popular support is the result of one or more of two things: aggrievement and shared sacrifice, or common goals. Aggrievement and shared sacrifice often creates a deeper and more passionate support than a common goal. For instance, in football, there’s popular support for a team because a goal is shared: a national championship or Superbowl. But no one is expected or willing to die to win the Super bowl. On the other hand, let’s look at the revolution in Egypt several years ago. While Egyptians had a shared goal of changing their government, they had been deeply aggrieved through the rule of despotism and corruption. To create popular support, movement leaders need to find those who are aggrieved and identify a common goal towards the solution (appeal of program). People want revenge and sometimes they get it.

Quality of leadership: There’s an old saying that the military doesn’t produce leaders, it refines them. Leadership is sometimes developed in team sports, or in the office, or on the battlefield; sometimes it may lay dormant until necessity requires it to be born. Either way, leadership is required. If we look at Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the Shi’ite insurgent movement in Iraq, we see Muqtada al-Sadr: the militia leader with a strong family name and political clout. Muqtada may have had the name, influence, and fortune required to build the Mahdi Army, but without an organization filled with leaders, JAM would not have been so effective. And where would US military history be without Washington and his capable suboordinates? Were it not for Washington, there may not have been Lee and Grant, or Patton, or Eisenhower. Quality of leadership can determine outcomes so revolutionary movements must identify and choose good leaders.

Quality of troops: Quality of troops includes training and dedication. No amount of whizbang equipment can make up for poorly trained force. Training includes the three basic skills of combat: shooting, moving, communicating. But it doesn’t stop there because revolutionary movements need support functions like intelligence and logistics. There’s a reason why the three-part insurgency includes guerrillas, auxiliary, and the underground. Revolutionary movements who staff themselves with high quality, dedicated soldiers have a much higher likelihood of success, even if their end goal is to wear down an oppressive regime and enforce the area denial of their homelands. Dedication to the mission speaks volumes – just look at Afghanistan for that. Fifteen years after the first boots on ground and the most powerful military in the world is still fighting a bunch of under classed, outgunned, backwards hillbillies. In the early 2000s, the average age of the Taliban fighter was 35. When I left Afghanistan in 2011, the average age was 23. We’ve obliterated an entire generation of Afghans, yet the Taliban is still in control much of the country.

Military efficiency: Quality of leadership, quality of troops, economy of force, and mission success combine to produce military efficiency. ‘Economy of force’ is the concept of completing a task with the least resources required. So how do mission requirements compare to the organization’s fighting capability? What is the force’s supply capability? How quickly can it move from Point A to Point B? Can it achieve the objective and accomplish the mission? Anti-guerrilla and counterinsurgency forces seek to find, fix, finish, and exploit the guerrilla unit; how efficient will it be to evade detection and death/capture? Can the guerrilla unit simultaneously carry out its own activities to achieve and keep the initiative in the conflict? These are all questions with answers that will satisfy this metric. If the guerrilla unit is inefficient; if they cannot accomplish the mission to due poor training or poor leadership; if they cannot replace an effective leader who’s been killed in action; if they have suffered casualties to strength and are combat ineffective; then these deficiencies need to be identified and quickly resolved. Deficiencies affect internal unity and integrity, which affects the mission.

Internal unity: How is the unit’s morale? How well does the unit work together? How well do troops respond to leadership? Is leadership ensuring the troops are cared for? Is leadership putting the unit in undue risk of physical danger? Can all members of the unit be trusted? Unity is typically derived from shared sacrifice or a common goal. Lack of unity often derives from differing opinions of direction or purpose, or a general or specific lack of trust. Unity affects unit cohesion which affects military efficiency and results in mission failure.

Equipment: Good equipment can be a force multiplier. The better equipment (assuming you know how to operate and maintain it) and proper employment, the better military efficiency you’ll have. Aside from a battle rifle with ammunition, NVGs/NODs (like the PVS-14) is the best low-light equipment advantage you can have. Aside from that, will the force have sufficient access to food and water, medical supplies, radios or other communications devices, transport, survival tools and shelter, winter clothing, etc.? Many guerrilla movements are wholly dependent upon support from the populace – the main reason for popular support – for food, medicine, and intelligence. Other equipment can be gained through battlefield recovery. Think about the poor conditions of the Continental Army at Valley Forge where soldiers had little to eat, save the leather of their boots. Now think about the American soldier in Afghanistan with Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), chow tents, and dining facilities. There’s a world of difference there. If we can identify how a revolutionary movement plans to supply itself, what gear they have and how they will employ it, then we can make a more informed determination of how successful they might be against an adversary.

Operational terrain: What’s the operational terrain? This is your Area of Operation, something we refer to as the AO. This is the piece of terrain that a movement attempts to deny to and/or attack the enemy. The movement owns the domain; this is their battle space. The most effective guerrillas have expert knowledge of the surrounding terrain, and uses it to their advantage. For instance, there are caves up in the hills that surround Fort Huachuca, Arizona. During the fort’s early days, Indian raiding parties would attack US cavalry, then lead them up the hills, where the raiding party would enter into the cave system on one side, exit out the back, climb back over the top of the hill, then ambush the winded US soldiers as they entered the same cave entrance. That’s an expert use of the terrain. Whichever side can best use the operational terrain has an advantage.

Operational area communications: How does a revolutionary movement communicate? Hand signals and two-way radios for tactical movement, and physical/digital dead drops for operational communication? Will the terrain permit the use of cell phones or two-way radios? Does the movement’s communications require line of site, and do they have that kind of coverage in the AO? The more ways to securely and effectively communicate, the better the measure of success an organization has. An adversary’s capability to intercept signals may weigh heavily on a commo plan, but consider this: the inability or unwillingness to communicate electronically will remove not only an effective form of communication from the movement, but will also negate the easiest form of intelligence collection a regime has.

Sanctuary: Where is the guerrilla unit’s sanctuary? What’s the escape and evasion plan during the enemy’s Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit targeting cycle? Are there homes or other locations where a guerrilla unit can hide to escape a regime force search? Will the guerrilla unit use a hidden mountain base or does the base move with them? Successful guerrilla units avoid detection by hiding in hard to find or hard to search places. In the case of the original Red Dawn movie and in the case of the Chetniks resisting Nazi occupation during WWII, the mountains were natural sanctuary. In a world with satellite imagery and real-time overhead assets, sanctuary may be hard to come by. The bottom line is that the guerrilla needs a place to hide and blend in with his environment. If physical terrain is not an option, then guerrillas must use the human terrain. The simplest example of masking yourself using the human terrain came via the Taliban. A fighter armed with an AK-47 and engaging in a fire fight thirty seconds ago has now dropped his weapon and is hiding with the populace in the village. Blending in with the human terrain is made easier with smaller guerrilla units of three to five man teams because it’s nearly impossible to disperse a company (40-100) sized guerrilla unit in such a small area. If a revolutionary or guerrilla movement has substantial sanctuary then they have an advantage that may make their movement more successful.\

Conclusion

Those are the ten metrics we can use to judge the potential success of a guerrilla movement, however, keep in mind that most insurgencies end in a stalemate, and many insurgencies use violence as a way to achieve political concessions. Insurgent movements, especially regional ones, may be much more interested in introducing ‘self-rule’ or setting up an autonomous regional government than they would be to topple the existing national government. Furthermore, revolutionary and insurgent movements are aided in areas of weak state control where a power vacuum exists, or where the official government suffers from illegitimacy. The Taliban’s shadow government system in Afghanistan is a prime example, where locals actually use the Taliban’s judicial system. Where the Taliban is the legitimate government as perceived by the people, they are the government.

Original Article

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Tuesday, August 2, 2016

War on Blogs

I found this article that is relevant to a lot of us, and we need to know what is coming, and what to do about it.

Madame President Clinton’s Coming War on the Blogosphere, and Your Countermeasures

By James Wesley Rawles

Now that Hillary (“Hitlery”) Rodham Clinton (HRC) has received the Democratic Party nomination for president, there is a strong likelihood that she will win the election in November and then be enthroned as president in January of 2017. I predict that she will waste no time in launching an onslaught of punitive new policies via executive orders, presidential memoranda, and policy directives promulgated through her cabinet and Federal agencies to eviscerate our Constitutional rights (most notably the 1st and 2nd Amendments). A key goal this campaign will be silencing dissent in the alternative press and the American blogosphere. Given HRC’s history in government “service”, her outlook on life, her socialist agenda, and her vindictiveness, I anticipate that any or all of the following measures will be undertaken by the HRC Administration:

•The Department of Justice (DOJ) will be used to selectively prosecute dissenters for “hate speech”. For instance, simply objecting to illegal immigration or state sponsored relocation of Muslims will be called “evidence of hate.” They will also declare blogs, news sites, and podcasts to be “public accommodations” and hence saddle them with a long list of new restrictions that would effectively muzzle them from making any comments opposed to HRC’s agenda and “protected” classes. Even the use of “trigger words” could be restricted.

•The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) will be used to target dissenters who make any comments about any corporations, mutual funds, or banks, for “operating as unregistered investment advisors”.

•The Federal Election Commission (FEC) will be used to target Libertarians and other dissenters for “unlawful campaigning”.

•The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will use their newly-assumed powers over the Internet to enforce a new radicalized version of the moribund Fairness Doctrine upon bloggers, vloggers (video bloggers), podcasters, as well as newspapermen, magazine writers, and talk radio hosts. Under this new and improved fairness policy, any media outlet that is deemed a public accommodation will be forced to free of charge provide equal space to assorted perverts, leftists, and Social Justice Warriors. Failure to do so will open up these news outlets to both criminal prosecution and costly civil lawsuits.

•The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will be used to selectively audit tax filings, levy bank accounts, garnish wages, and refer criminal prosecution of anyone who voices dissent of HRC’s
statist/collectivist agenda. Lois Lerner’s group was just the precursor!

•The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will be used to target dissenters who own property with seasonal puddles that could be deemed “wetlands” or creeks that could be arbitrarily declared “navigable waters”.

•The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency will be used to target dissenters living within 50 miles of the Mexican or Canadian borders for harassment and intimidation, searching their homes without warrants.

•The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and associated Tribal Police will be used to target dissenters living within 100 miles of any Tribal Reservation for harassment and intimidation.

•The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will crack down on any bloggers who make posts that might be construed as a product review or product endorsement.

•The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) will be used to limit the travel of anyone deemed by HRC’s cronies to be an Enemy of the State (through expansion of the No Fly List, Terror Watch List, and Selectee List).

•The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will crack down on producers of raw milk and nutritional supplements (and also on the bloggers who promote them).

•The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will prosecute anyone operating unlicensed drones weighing more than just a few ounces.

•The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will use both its own agents and paid (or coerced) surrogate agent provocateurs to infiltrate militias, patriot groups, and secessionist organizations. There, they will foment schemes that can be prosecuted under loosely-worded Federal conspiracy laws. (This is precisely what was done with the Bundy Ranch and Malheur Wildlife Refuge protestors.)

•Working in conjunction with the FCC, the U.S. Coast Guard will board any ship within Territorial Waters that they suspect of operating an unlicensed transmitter.

I can see all of this coming, and I refuse to be muzzled. I aim to misbehave. If need be, I will relocate so that I can still blog freely. In anticipation of HRC’s possible upcoming coronation, here are some possible countermeasures for my fellow bloggers to seriously consider:

1.Contract for the use of an offshore server in a country that has minimal influence from the United States government, and move your web pages there.

2.Get set up for encrypted e-mail. (The free GPG software installed on your local PC works quite well. And for those who are less tech savvy, the paid Unseen.is service in Iceland works fine.)

3.Post provisos on your web site that are similar to my own. (Most importantly, these provisos must declare that you do not operate a “public accommodation.”)

4.Buy an Iridium satellite telephone and a set of Iridium international power adapters. (Unlike cell phones or other sat phones, calls made from Iridium constellation phones can be traced only to a particular oval satellite “footprint” that measures hundreds of miles across.)

5.Buy several inexpensive prepaid “burner” cell phones. Pay greenback cash for these phones, and use an assumed name when you eventually activate them.

6.Buy a nondescript camping trailer or RV and quietly (via face-to-face contacts only) develop a “hospitality list” of like-minded families who own parcels of land that you can bounce between, in the event that you need to take refuge.

7.Buy a spare laptop computer (preferably one that is ultra-reliable, such as a Panasonic Toughbook), a 12 VDC car adapter, and a set of international power adapters.

8.Buy a USB external long range Yagi wireless antenna to use with your laptops. (The standoff distance that these provide will make it harder to pinpoint your location when using a public wi-fi hotspot.)

9.Buy a batch of at least 40 inexpensive 2 GB USB memory sticks that you can use to physically mail (or courier) digital content, to keep your locale secret.

10.Make sure that your passport is updated.

11.Do some research to develop a short list of countries where you would consider relocating. Ideally, a country should have respect for the freedom of speech, minimal taxation, minimal influence from the United States government, and NO rendition (extradition) treaty with the United States.

12.Establish an offshore bank account.

13.Beyond just offshore residency, if you can afford it, then buy a second passport. (Typically, this is done with a “Citizenship Through Investment” program.)

14.Via encrypted e-mail, develop contacts with foreign bloggers, and get their tentative agreement to post your ghost-written articles, if circumstances change.

15.Pray hard.

I don’t mean for the foregoing to sound alarmist. Consider me a realist. – JWR

Clinton's coming war on the blogosphere

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Thursday, February 4, 2016

Best Method Of Rebellion Against Tyranny

What Is The Best Method Of Rebellion Against Tyranny?

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Brandon Smith
Alt Market
February 3, 2016

I have heard it often said that there is no one right way to accomplish a goal. I agree. However, I would add that while there is no such thing as “one right way” to achieve an objective, this does not mean there aren’t numerous WRONG ways to achieve an objective.

Doing “something” is not always better than doing nothing if that “something” is based on terrible strategy. Unfortunately, there are people out there with otherwise good intentions, even in the liberty movement, that seem to think that taking action without planning is preferable to patience. They do not understand that there is such a thing as negative returns.

The reality is that action is easy. Patience and planning are difficult. Emotional reaction is simple. Quiet professionalism is complicated.

This is the dynamic that is plaguing the liberty movement today; the battle between our emotional drive to jump headlong into conflict with our progressively corrupt establishment, and the absolute necessity for intelligent strategy and proper timing.

The issue here is not “fighting.” Most of us know and accept the fact that a fight is coming whether we like it or not. I say by all means, let’s fight, but fighting is not enough. If we fight, we must fight TO WIN, and this requires fighting smart.

On the other side of the coin, the weak handed and weak hearted will argue that fighting in any respect is “useless” or “immoral” and will result in failure. This is the pacifist camp, which never produces much in the way of practical solutions. There are very useful and peaceful methods for non-participation and nullification, most of which I am happy to promote. That said, non-participation is only part of the battle. If you are dealing with a psychopathic adversary (which we are), ultimately that adversary will use overt violence to stop you from nullifying their authority. If you are not willing to use active self defense against true evil based on some deluded Gandhi complex, then you and the historical memory of you will be erased. It is perfectly possible for a person to fight in self defense while maintaining his core principles.

If you fight, then there is a chance. If you do not fight, then failure is guaranteed. The “odds” are irrelevant. How you fight (fighting smart) is the only matter of importance.

Recently I have seen a growing contingent of people within the movement that seek a fight but question the concept of planning or waiting. They’ll argue that planning is somehow impractical, or that there will never be a perfect time for action. This way of thinking has only been inflated by the latest events in Burns, Oregon.

The Oregon standoff is a stunning example of how emotional action leads to failure and tragedy. Many will argue over the circumstances surrounding the death of Lavoy Finicum — did he reach into his jacket, or was he reacting to being shot? Were the police officers involved in fear for their lives, or were they out for blood? The majority of liberty activists will undoubtedly assume malicious intent on the part of the government due to their track record of murder and lies. I don’t blame them. That said, I would point out that while Finicum may be dead because of ill intent on the part of trigger happy cops, he was put in that position in the first place due to inadequate planning and leadership.

The argument that the FBI should have never been in Burns in the first place overlooks the fact that Bundy and team, strategically speaking, should not have been there either. They could have been in a far better position if only they had thought their conundrum through.

Oregon and the death of Finicum are not failures on the part of the liberty movement. They are failures on the part of Bundy and team, who refused to listen to scores of people with far more experience and knowledge in such situations; the same people who tried to help the occupiers adjust their tactics and offer them safer ground and safer footing. The failure in Oregon is what happens when amateurs, not just in training but in tactical philosophy, undertake a rebellion.

Some will argue that experienced tacticians within the movement (and there are many) refused to show up for the fight, and thus sentenced the occupiers to defeat. I would argue that the Oregon standoff was FUBAR from the very beginning. From its inception it was doomed. Half the movement saw it plain as day. For me, the end result was obvious.

A team of well-meaning but unorganized and untrained activists thrust themselves into a situation beyond their capabilities and under the potential influence of agents provocateur. There was no vetting for random strangers seeking to join their ranks; no direct goals and no clearly defined strategy, only vague demands and notions. No thought of planning one or two steps ahead, let alone five steps ahead. A circus atmosphere inspiring public ridicule rather than public respect. A complete lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation leading to a false sense of safety and comfort, or in some cases even hubris.

This is why most liberty tacticians had no interest in showing up to the Oregon standoff; not because they were fearful, not because they are “sunshine patriots,” not because they are waiting for a “perfect” moment that will never come to kick off a revolution. They did not show up because it was a scenario that could not be salvaged. It was a carnival. Period.

To compare events to the first American Revolution, I do not see the standoff and the shooting of Finicum as a Lexington Green moment (though it hasn’t fully ended yet). Rather, I see it as a Boston Massacre moment. The Boston Massacre was an absolute tragedy, but also not a cut-and-dry affair. John Adams, acting as legal defense for the British soldiers accused of initiating bloodshed, realized that the Sons Of Liberty were desperate to use the event politically to rally support for direct revolution, but also understood that the timing and the circumstances were utterly wrong. The Sons of Liberty wanted to hold up the Boston Massacre as a symbol of ALL the oppression the colonials suffered under the crown. Adams, though an avid champion of the cause, correctly treated it as a singular tragedy and not an opportunity for exploitation.

The colonials would eventually enter into revolution at Lexington and Concord; clearly defined defensive scenarios in which the militia obstructed the path of British soldiers sent to arrest leaders of the Sons of Liberty (Samuel Adams and John Hancock), as well as to confiscate firearms and black powder caches. The militia had a direct goal (to impede the British from reaching Adams and Hancock) and the British used clear and overt force against them, resulting in an immediate and violent justified response by other militias. This is one right way to start a rebellion.

So if Oregon represents an example of the wrong way to do things, what is a better way? I described alternative methods with a much greater chance of success in my article “Real Strategies For Removing Federal Presence From Western Lands,” but I would like to explore beyond specific tactics and discuss mindset — the overall philosophy behind a winning rebellion in our modern era.

Divided We Win, United We Fall

This might sound counter-intuitive; I’ll explain.

A movement should be united in its stance and its values in order to succeed and I believe the liberty movement is indeed united for the most part on these terms. However, when it comes to concrete action the more centralized our efforts the less we will achieve and the more likely we are to fail.

I find it interesting that whenever a call goes out to the movement to take action it usually involves concentrating large masses of us into a small area with no outlined plan or directives. With the exception of Bundy Ranch, which I believe was entirely organic in how it came about, most of these calls to arms are initiated by questionable personalities or people possibly under the influence of provocateurs who seek to march us all into a box, whether it be a bridge in Washington, D.C. or a scrub brush refuge in Oregon. In the face of a vastly superior opponent in terms of arms and technology, it seems to me that the establishment would prefer us all to be hyper-focused on only one battle space at one time, putting all our eggs in one basket and leaving us vulnerable.

Instead, a rebellion in this day and age must be asymmetric in nature; meaning smaller groups acting covertly on their own initiative everywhere rather than in only one place. Amassing in one small region might be useful under very specific conditions, but if you want to pose an actual threat to a large criminal system, you need hundreds of events, all of them far better planned than Oregon.

Organization Through Localism

If you cannot even secure your own family or your own neighborhood from potential threats, then why would you expect to be successful in projecting out to a whole other state and community and securing it instead? Local organization is more important than national organization or grand posturing on the national stage. If you can strengthen your own community while others do the same across the country, then the effects will be felt nationally by default.

Far more can be accomplished through localism than by rolling the dice on mass theatricality and Alamo-style tactics.

Communications Networking

Unity does not come best through concentrated action but through solid communications. The fact that most of the liberty movement has no coms networks outside of the mainstream grid is a sad state of affairs that will lead to our downfall. As far as my information shows, the Oregon occupiers had no ham radio communications and relied primarily on cell phones. This is a disaster waiting to happen.

When there is a national network of ham operators providing communications to the liberty movement, then and only then can we claim to have the means to organize effectively outside of our own communities. Do not assume for a second that you will have access to mainstream grid communications when you need them.

Prepare To Aid People Outside The Movement

The establishment would like nothing more than for the liberty movement to completely isolate itself from the general public. The more we refuse to interact with our communities the easier it will be to paint us as dangerous outsiders. The more we offer valuable services and training to a community, such as classes on emergency medical response, personal defense against active shooters, food storage and preparedness, etc., the more likely we will be seen as valuable assets to that community in the wake of a crisis.

I have been undertaking such efforts in my own community for the past couple of years and have met many excellent people who are of like mind but not necessarily “activists” in the traditional sense. If you discount efforts to improve your local situation and to build bridges, you do so at your own peril.

Focus On The True Culprits

Eventually, someone is going to have to bring the international banking elites to justice for their direct influence over government corruption and destructive economic policy. Making stands against the Bureau of Land Management and other questionable federal agencies might be a necessary part of this fight, but the fight will never end until the original perpetrators are removed at the root. Beware of any group or “leader” who calls you to action but ignores the money-elite; they are probably more interested in exploiting you than helping you.

Quiet Professionalism

Perhaps most important of all is the need for liberty activists to adopt an attitude of quiet professionalism. This means analyzing situations objectively. This means having one’s heart in the right place without being driven emotionally. This means attaining personal excellence in any field of knowledge that might help you to gain victory.

Winning this fight will require the extraordinary dedication of extraordinary individuals; anything less will result in disaster. Giving our all does not mean simply being willing to sacrifice our lives. That may be what happens, but this cannot be our only trump card. If you are not striving every day to master your own skills and initiative then you are not giving your all. If you are not organizing effectively at the local level because you assume no one will listen to you, then learn to communicate better and try again. If your only plan is to go out guns blazing, then you might as well stay home because you will do more harm for the movement than good.

Become a local pillar rather than a mere complainer. Seek to produce results rather than demanding others do it for you. When you act, act intelligently. Be steady in your resolve and do not let anger or panic rule your thinking. Be fair in your assessments, and above all, once again, if you fight, fight to win. Fighting merely in the name of fighting is a fool’s game.

If the movement had 10,000 individuals of this caliber victory would be assured against any odds.


This article was posted: Wednesday, February 3, 2016 at 7:35 am

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Wednesday, January 6, 2016

Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part One

This topic is what it will all be about soon enough. We need to be ready to form and organize units such as this. This is invaluable information, please read and pass on to your team/buddies that are like minded. We need to organize now before it is too late.

The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part One

John Mosby

This is Part One of a two-part series. Part Two will be posted tomorrow.

Resistance movements generally begin with the desire of individuals or small groups of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed by an unpopular regime. Opposition towards the regime and hatred of existing conditions that conflict with the individual’s or the group’s values, interests, and way of life spread from the individual (or group of individuals comprising the group) to family, close friends, and neighbors. This can result in an entire community cohering in an obsessive hatred for an established regime. Generally, this hatred has historically manifested itself as sporadic, spontaneous, nonviolent and violent acts of resistance towards the regime, or available representatives of the regime. As the discontent grows, natural leaders (historically, former military personnel, clergymen, local political leaders, and community organizers- remember most resistance insurgencies in the last century had a basis in communist/socialist ideals…) emerge to channelize the discontent into an organized resistance movement that promotes its own growth. The population must be convinced by this leadership that it has nothing to lose, or at least, more to gain, by resistance, than by maintaining the status quo.

The ultimate key to progressing from increasing discontent to active insurrection is the belief by the populace that they have nothing to lose by revolting, combined with the belief that they have a genuine chance to succeed. Additionally, there must be some sort of catalyzing trigger that ignites popular support against the regime’s power and a dynamic resistance leadership that can exploit the situation when it arises. (Critical Note: this apparent focus on leadership within the resistance should not be construed to invalidate the concept of “leaderless resistance.” The concept of leadership should not be relegated to some shadowy, mythical central controlling party of the resistance, but rather, individual cells should have the ability and willingness to take advantage of any key trigger events to leverage the already present discontent to begin active operations to win the support of the populace.).

Once the resistance begins to act out against the regime, there are two types of initial resistance: Clandestine resistance and overt resistance.

a) Clandestine Resistance is conducted by people who outwardly appear to follow their normal mode of existence. This type of resistance may or may not be controlled by any level of leadership, and may include the following activities by individuals and/or small groups/cells.

– Political action and campaigning

– Propaganda development and dispersal

– Espionage

– Sabotage (see my previous post on the critical differences between sabotage and terrorism. They are NOT the same thing.)

– Black marketeering

– Intelligence gathering

b) Overt Resistance is conducted by individuals trained along paramilitary lines. This is the guerrilla force and provides the military arm of the resistance. These individuals and groups make no secret of their existence or objectives (once hostilities have begun in earnest), although they may use the leaderless cell approach and compartmentalize information closely to prevent compromise of the entire movement. The guerrilla force will generally be comprised of those individuals who have previously been openly disdainful or antagonistic towards the regime, and recognize the probability that they have been targeted by the security forces anyway (as much as he hates sleeping on the ground, especially in cold weather, your author recognizes that he has probably set himself up to be stuck playing this role if the inevitable happens. This really sucks since I have bad arthritis anyway, courtesy of letting Uncle Sugar convince me what a great idea it was to walk out of perfectly functioning aircraft that were in flight….and carrying a 90-130lb rucksack? Why gee, that sounds swell!)

Part Two (notes the subversive underground, the support auxiliary, and the paramilitary guerrilla force) will be posted tomorrow.

Nous Defions,

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.

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Friday, December 18, 2015

What is your "Red Line"?

I am just thinking out loud here (well, thinking and typing actually, lol) and I was wondering to myself where my "Red Line" is? What I mean is what has to happen for me to "Go Active". I am ready and standing by for when I will be needed (I have no doubt that that day will come), but when are we going to stand up and restore this nation to it's former glory? I am sure we all have our individual "Red Lines", but we need to think about what has all ready happened, and continues to happen.

Our government defiantly falls into the category of "Tyrannical", but if that is the case, why have we not stood up yet? We need to find a point of no return, then be willing to stand up TOGETHER! If we do not stand up together then they will win, and we will be labeled as "Right Wing Extremists", and thrown in jail, or shot by "Law Enforcement" personnel while "Resisting Arrest".

I know that most Patriots will agree that door to door gun confiscations is a definite "Red Line", but what else is to you? I know I am just rambling here, but bear with me, I know this topic is important, and I want you to really think about it.

I know one thing, and that is that we need to have our kit ready to go, and we need to be as trained up as possible so that we are ready to go at a moments notice! We need to be there for our nation when she needs us! Please have your 1st line, 2nd line, and 3rd line gear ready to go, have your magazines loaded, have your vehicles gassed up (do not ever let your fuel drop below 1/2 tank in case you have to get out of dodge), have your contact numbers, frequencies ready to go, ensure you are training on a regular basis, and that you are working on your physical fitness so you are ready to go!

What about the UN Arms Treaty, the TPP, the Globalist agenda, and any other thing that threatens our sovereignty? I feel very strongly about defending our sovereignty, and our national identity! I know that most (hopefully all) people that read this blog agree with me about this. I know you guys and gals are good people that will stand up and do the right thing when you are needed. Just remember this is not just about sitting behind a keyboard in our nice warms comfortable houses, this is about being highly trained under all conditions.

Please think about this, and be ready for when you are needed!


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Friday, October 4, 2013

Bounding Over-Watch

The Bounding Over-Watch reinforces teamwork while moving toward an objective with limited cover. Essentially it is firing on the move and providing cover fire to help the team advance on the objective. To conduct it successfully a wide shooting range is needed of at least 100 yards. Ideally it is conducted with a four man fire team broken down into two groups, although this can be modified to suit your team or department's needs.

Initially, one of the teams will provide cover fire as the other team moves down range. It is important to maintain muzzle discipline at all times when conducting this drill. That means fingers off the trigger with safeties on, as the shooters on the other team may end up in front of you at times.

One two man team will shoot as the other team moves. Initially this can be done in increments of ten yards to develop a feel for it and to institute a level of safety. When the team moving reaches their destination, they alert the shooters that they are “Clear” and take up the task of providing cover until the other team passes them by ten yards.

The roles then switch back and forth until both teams are within 5 feet of the targets.

There is no firing across the range at any time in the interest of safety. Shooters should only engage targets directly in front of them.

It is equally important to vary range conditions with each session, so as not to build or train for complacency. Improvised pieces of cover can be used, such as pallets turned on their sides. In a real world situation, as officers are moving to a position of cover, the suppression fire is to provide them protection while on the move.

In military situations, this drill is conducted in the reverse as well by moving backward from the 10-yard line to the 100-yard line. This has limited use in police situations as the turning and traveling rapidly to the rear of the range is to simulate an egress or an escape.

If you conduct the rearward drill it is best to peel off to the outside. When moving, turn away from the team providing cover so that you never muzzle them with your weapon. Index your trigger finger, keep the muzzle down and safety on; at all times you want to keep as close to 180 degrees from them as possible.

This drill is the most effective way to practice moving over open ground while seeking the next piece of cover at all times. The Bounding Over-Watch is an essential drill to learn how to fight through an ambush and advance rapidly on an objective with one or more active shooters.

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Friday, September 13, 2013

List of possible extremists

Man, about 30 of the items on this list apply to me!


Originally posted and authored by Michael Snyder at The Truth. All credit goes to him.


Are you a conservative, a libertarian, a Christian or a gun owner? Are you opposed to abortion, globalism, Communism, illegal immigration, the United Nations or the New World Order? Do you believe in conspiracy theories, do you believe that we are living in the “end times” or do you ever visit alternative news websites (such as this one)? If you answered yes to any of those questions, you are a “potential terrorist” according to official U.S. government documents. At one time, the term “terrorist” was used very narrowly. The government applied that label to people like Osama bin Laden and other Islamic jihadists. But now the Obama administration is removing all references to Islam from terror training materials, and instead the term “terrorist” is being applied to large groups of American citizens. And if you are a “terrorist”, that means that you have no rights and the government can treat you just like it treats the terrorists that are being held at Guantanamo Bay. So if you belong to a group of people that is now being referred to as “potential terrorists”, please don’t take it as a joke. The first step to persecuting any group of people is to demonize them. And right now large groups of peaceful, law-abiding citizens are being ruthlessly demonized.

Below is a list of 72 types of Americans that are considered to be “extremists” and “potential terrorists” in official U.S. government documents. To see the original source document for each point, just click on the link. As you can see, this list covers most of the country…

1. Those that talk about “individual liberties”

2. Those that advocate for states’ rights

3. Those that want “to make the world a better place”

4. “The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule”

5. Those that are interested in “defeating the Communists”

6. Those that believe “that the interests of one’s own nation are separate from the interests of other nations or the common interest of all nations”

7. Anyone that holds a “political ideology that considers the state to be unnecessary, harmful,or undesirable”

8. Anyone that possesses an “intolerance toward other religions”

9. Those that “take action to fight against the exploitation of the environment and/or animals”

10. “Anti-Gay”

11. “Anti-Immigrant”

12. “Anti-Muslim”

13. “The Patriot Movement”

14. “Opposition to equal rights for gays and lesbians”

15. Members of the Family Research Council

16. Members of the American Family Association

17. Those that believe that Mexico, Canada and the United States “are secretly planning to merge into a European Union-like entity that will be known as the ‘North American Union’”

18. Members of the American Border Patrol/American Patrol

19. Members of the Federation for American Immigration Reform

20. Members of the Tennessee Freedom Coalition

21. Members of the Christian Action Network

22. Anyone that is “opposed to the New World Order”

23. Anyone that is engaged in “conspiracy theorizing”

24. Anyone that is opposed to Agenda 21

25. Anyone that is concerned about FEMA camps

26. Anyone that “fears impending gun control or weapons confiscations”

27. The militia movement

28. The sovereign citizen movement

29. Those that “don’t think they should have to pay taxes”

30. Anyone that “complains about bias”

31. Anyone that “believes in government conspiracies to the point of paranoia”

32. Anyone that “is frustrated with mainstream ideologies”

33. Anyone that “visits extremist websites/blogs”

34. Anyone that “establishes website/blog to display extremist views”

35. Anyone that “attends rallies for extremist causes”

36. Anyone that “exhibits extreme religious intolerance”

37. Anyone that “is personally connected with a grievance”

38. Anyone that “suddenly acquires weapons”

39. Anyone that “organizes protests inspired by extremist ideology”

40. “Militia or unorganized militia”

41. “General right-wing extremist”

42. Citizens that have “bumper stickers” that are patriotic or anti-U.N.

43. Those that refer to an “Army of God”

44. Those that are “fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation)”

45. Those that are “anti-global”

46. Those that are “suspicious of centralized federal authority”

47. Those that are “reverent of individual liberty”

48. Those that “believe in conspiracy theories”

49. Those that have “a belief that one’s personal and/or national ‘way of life’ is under attack”

50. Those that possess “a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training or survivalism”

51. Those that would “impose strict religious tenets or laws on society (fundamentalists)”

52. Those that would “insert religion into the political sphere”

53. Anyone that would “seek to politicize religion”

54. Those that have “supported political movements for autonomy”

55. Anyone that is “anti-abortion”

56. Anyone that is “anti-Catholic”

57. Anyone that is “anti-nuclear”

58. “Rightwing extremists”

59. “Returning veterans”

60. Those concerned about “illegal immigration”

61. Those that “believe in the right to bear arms”

62. Anyone that is engaged in “ammunition stockpiling”

63. Anyone that exhibits “fear of Communist regimes”

64. “Anti-abortion activists”

65. Those that are against illegal immigration

66. Those that talk about “the New World Order” in a “derogatory” manner

67. Those that have a negative view of the United Nations

68. Those that are opposed “to the collection of federal income taxes”

69. Those that supported former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin and Bob Barr

70. Those that display the Gadsden Flag (“Don’t Tread On Me”)

71. Those that believe in “end times” prophecies

72. Evangelical Christians

The groups of people in the list above are considered “problems” that need to be dealt with. In some of the documents referenced above, members of the military are specifically warned not to have anything to do with such groups.

We are moving into a very dangerous time in American history. You can now be considered a “potential terrorist” just because of your religious or political beliefs. Free speech is becoming a thing of the past, and we are rapidly becoming an Orwellian society that is the exact opposite of what our founding fathers intended.

Please pray for the United States of America. We definitely need it.

Leaderless Resistance

This article is about the concept of Leaderless Resistance; the ideas and comments are not my own, I do agree with much of what is said, I just wanted to get this point of veiw out there so people can make their own informed decision about the direction they want to go.


Author: SMB (US Army, Retired)
Edited for content.
A Brief Overview

Nothing defines the blatant ineptitude and rank incompetence of the radical resistance more starkly than the concept of so-called “leaderless resistance” (hereafter, LR). By its very nature LR amounts to little more than anarchy and, as demonstrated by some of the most recent examples, very rapidly degenerates into simple banditry. Furthermore, one notes for the record that the most vociferous proponents of LR have, in common with those to whom that fantastic idea appeals, exactly zero experience in guerrilla warfare, its theory, or practice.

Simply stated, the concept of LR posits that individuals or small, close-knit groups, acting on their own initiative, performing their own targeting and relying on their own resources, can strike at the government’s infrastructure at will without fear of infiltration. Tactically, LR ranges from individual nuisance acts for the sake of causing a nuisance on one end of the spectrum to small unit terrorism for terrorism’s sake on the other. However, nothing can be said about LR’s potential operational impact because, by definition, through rejection of any superior organizational structure, it can have no operational impact.

Strategically, LR is conspicuously absent from any historical examples of successful insurgency. The idea has been advanced by several writers on the subject that LR is essentially a modern version of the Committees of Correspondence of American Revolution fame. I do not think those writers mean to purposely distort the realities of revolutionary organization in the colonies, but their zeal to justify LR apparently overrode their rational faculties. If those writers had simply paused to consider the word “committee” juxtaposed with “correspondence”, the notion that Committees of Correspondence were autonomous bodies acting independently of one another would have collapsed of its own illogic. In fact, the members of the several colonies’ Committees of Correspondence were appointed by their colonies’ legislative bodies, everyone knew who they were, and they coordinated their activities between each other or with the Continental Congress through a chain of command. Hardly an example of leaderless resistance.

There are however several striking examples, discussed below, that demonstrate why LR is fundamentally flawed as a resistance strategy.

The Order

“The Order” is frequently cited as an example (in its early stages, before it began recruiting) of the principle of LR. Given that most members of The Order are either dead or in federal prisons it is also an example of many of the fundamental flaws in the concept.

The Order began as an eight man cell dedicated to creating an Aryan homeland in the Pacific Northwest. How eight men expected to accomplish that objective has never been clearly explained, but following their logic it seems that the organizers of The Order believed that direct action against the government for the purpose of financing other organizations in the racialist resistance would inspire others to imitate their example thus creating an avalanche effect as other self creating “cells” rallied to the cause. Predictably, that “strategy” failed miserably.

Had the organizers of The Order expended half the effort in researching failed insurgencies as they did planning armored car and bank heists they would have found that their strategy (if indeed they ever had one beyond “do things”) had already been tried by no less than Che Guevara. The name of that “strategy” is called the Loco (i.e., focus). The theory is this: Plunk a small band of guerrillas down in an ostensibly “oppressed” countryside, begin maiming, murdering and robbing the oppressors, and the peasants will rise up and flock in proletarian support to the Loco to sweep the bourgeoisie from the political landscape. However, the “oppressed” in whose name Che fought snitched off his band to the oppressors, and Che and his Bolivian Loco bandits were hunted down like animals and killed. End of insurgency.

Aside from robbing banks and armored cars and sharing the loot with phone booth emperors who were vying for the same mailing list, The Order did manage to kill a Jew in Denver, blow up a synagogue in Boise, Idaho, and murder one of their own recruits before they were finally hunted down, killed or arrested.

The Order therefore illustrates Reason #1 LR does not work. “Grass roots” resistance is doomed to failure; there are no examples of it having ever succeeded. Frustrated by any appreciable effect of propaganda on a population so dim it could offer not even neutrality, and impatient with time proven organizational principles, they simply decided to “kick things off” themselves armed with nothing but a single idea that was immediately discredited because (1) the population did not care about the idea, so (2) they possessed no means of enlisting assistance or acceptance for their crime spree. The lesson learned about The Order’s example is that rebelliousness has no place in a resistance.

Eric Rudolph

Personally, my reaction to the bombing of abortion clinics and gay bars is, “Where’s the crime?” In many respects Rudolph exemplifies LR at the individual level. He didn’t make threats or discuss his plans with anybody, he didn’t ask permission, he simply started punctuating his deeply held beliefs with explosions.

If Rudolph has one thing going for him (aside from being the “1997 – 1999 Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) it’s that he has a steep learning curve. Note the successive “product improvements” of his devices. He obviously paid close attention to the official Bomb Damage Assessments of his handiwork, and progressively applied those lessons learned to his subsequent projects, not only mechanically (although he had not yet come to appreciate that nails are crap for shrapnel — ball bearings are much better, having sounder ballistics) but also tactically.

For example, constructive development of Rudolph’s devices progresses to smaller timers, smaller batteries, dynamite instead of pipe bombs and thicker pressure plates. By the time of the Atlanta gay bar and abortion clinic bombings his devices fit very nicely into a book bag, and at the lesbian bar he left behind an 80 pound time delay “present” intended for enthusiastic crime scene investigators. A year later, a Birmingham, Alabama, cop who was guarding an abortion clinic between stints as a guard at a gay bar, poked at a flower pot with his baton causing Rudolph to allegedly command detonate his device (or lose it to the bomb squad). Significantly, the device was directional, the majority of the blast was focused on the front door. Eric’s obvious goal was to abort the abortionist when he arrived, but the cop’s ill considered curiosity preempted the objective of the attack. Nevertheless, Rudolph had progressed from crude pipe bombs to command detonated directional devices in four operations. Not bad.

Rudolph’s problem was that, while his devices advanced both mechanically and in lethality, their basic construction, and therefore their “signature,” remained the same. Because he was driving his own vehicle to and from the target area the feds quickly obtained a description of it and the plate number, and by the time he had driven back in Murphy, North Carolina, the FBI was scouring the city for him. Informed by friends that he was being sought by the FBI as a “material witness” to the Birmingham bombing, he did the next logical thing. He went to Burger King, bought some chow, then disappeared into the mountains.

What is remarkable about Rudolph, as an individual example of LR, is his focus, his dedication, his coolness, his self reliance, and his aggressiveness — and that he is still alive. In fact, by the spring of 1999, the FBI had almost completely retreated out of the mountains and into their compound in Andrews, North Carolina, because, in the words of SSA Terry Turchie, Rudolph manhunt director, “We think he is hunting us.”
But those very qualities that make young Eric so remarkable are precisely those qualities that make him not only the exception to the rule, but also a positive example of why LR on an individual level is again doomed to failure except in the rarest of circumstances. Eric possesses what precious few other individuals who might contemplate the “Rudolph model” of LR possess — the semblance of an infrastructure. Young Eric’s infrastructure is composed entirely of friends of belief in kind, or tacit sympathy for the act even if not for his beliefs. However, that necessarily delimited his operational radius. And even though Rudolph enjoys the active neutrality of the population in his area of operations, his limited circle of friends lacked any infrastructure that would have enabled him wider range in his holy mission.

What Rudolph’s circle of friends were incapable of providing was operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He built his own bombs. He performed his own targeting. He emplaced his own devices. He provided his own transportation. His circle of friends were useless operationally, and the best they could do for him locally when he became a fugitive was turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken coops or delay reporting his presence when he broke into their houses to raid the cupboard.

Eric Rudolph therefore illustrates Reason #2 LR does not work. It has no formal infrastructure, thus its support is at best haphazard and is always uncoordinated. Consequently, such notional “support” is bound to fall apart at the seams at some point. Even though there is not yet any evidence that his network of friends is beginning to crumble, it is painfully obvious that they are incapable of supporting or sustaining any further operations by Eric. The lesson learned about Eric Rudolph’s example is that independence of action means isolation from effective support, hence an inability to sustain operations in the face of determined opposition reaction.

Further Considerations

The above examples of group and individual LR illustrate only a very small number of associated problems. For example, as mentioned in the Eric Rudolph example, the lack of a formal organizational infrastructure means that LR “cells” must provide for themselves everything appertaining their operational requirements. This fact necessarily places the LR “cell” in the unenviable position of being personally involved in all the activities, such as logistics (including financing), communications, targeting and planning, needed to execute their operations. Because of their personal involvement they dramatically raise not only their own “profile,” but also that of the operation. Those named activities in a properly constituted resistance organization would be delegated to cells (unknown to the “direct action” operatives) specifically tasked to perform those functions thus virtually eliminating the operation’s profile — until bodies need to be dug out of the rubble. Traditional procedures also so diffuse the opposition’s post action investigation that it takes months or years, instead of days in the case of an LR “plan,” to unravel all the pre-mission details and thereby identify and begin hunting the operatives.

Furthermore, LR as a “strategy,” if we are to believe what its proponents expect us to believe about it, has specific appeal only to the lowest (or most psychotic) common denominator within any given organization. The fact that the notion of LR is being propagated should give pause to serious minded individuals because those organizations that promote LR almost universally make their appeals for membership to the “proletariat,” as demonstrated by the crudeness of their rhetoric and public manifestations. Nevertheless, the idea that independently conceived and executed “grassroots” action solely for the sake of action can have any appreciable impact as a resistance methodology to the planned destruction of our society is nonsense. And if the history of LR is any indicator it plays right into our enemy’s hand.

Consider the Progressive distorted prosecutive “legal” strategy known as vicarious liability. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence vicarious liability is the “indirect or imputed legal responsibility for the acts of another… as between an employer and employee… or a principle for torts and contracts of an agent.” (Black’s 6th ed.) In a nut shell, the Progressive-contorted version of vicarious liability contends that “hate speech” creates a “climate of hate” that propels small groups or individuals to commit “hate crimes” and that, therefore, any organization that espouses Progressive-defined “hate” is “responsible” for the actions of individuals or groups, employees or not, who commit the “crime.”

Never mind that the Progressive-version of vicarious liability perfectly inverts the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal precedent which places responsibility for crime upon the individual criminal and which reserves vicarious liability to employers whose agents’ (i.e., responsible to the employer) acts result in willful harm to others. In the example of the justifiable murder of the abortionist Sleppian, a web site that listed the names, addresses and photographs of abortionists was ordered to shut down even though there was no proof of any connection between the owners of the web site and the righteous man who dwindled our Progressive infestation by one. The web site had “created a climate of hate,” you see.

The Progressive-twisted version of vicarious liability is reserved solely for Christian men and their organizations. Why? Eric Rudolph serves as another example. Hundreds of FBI agents [has anybody else noticed that the FBI refers to its personnel using the same term intelligence officers understand as “street shit?”] are hunting him, and a million dollar reward has been offered for him, not because he allegedly planted a couple of bombs, but because he committed a politically incorrect crime; he tried to blow up abortionists and gays. His motive is the reason he is being hunted.

In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence motive is merely a mitigating factor. When Progressives are permitted to practice law — or more horrifying, make law — in Anglo-Saxon nations, the law rapidly degenerates into quibbling. In the case of vicarious liability, the extrinsic motive becomes the real crime. In other words, what you were thinking when you committed the crime is more important than what you did, and what you were thinking is the fault of the organization – whether you are a member or not — that espouses what you believe. Ergo, according to Progressive lawyers, the organization is vicariously liable for your crime and can be sued. The most recent Southern Poverty Law Center law suit against the Aryan Nations is only the most recent in a pattern of similar suits.

Why the long winded speech about vicarious liability? Because the organizations that promote LR are being sued in rotation by Progressives when proletarian groups or individuals (employees, members, or not) take them at their word and begin practicing it. Significantly, organizations that demand at least a modicum of discipline from their members and which prefer to recruit from the bourgeoisie, have so far been spared the embarrassment of “loose cannons” in their ranks. Think about it.

How “It” Is Really Done

What often amazes me is the simple-mindedness of those who propose to wage one or the other of many forms of armed resistance against the government. Because the sheer scale of the proposition cannot be grasped by minds conditioned to think in terms of snappy political slogans and time frames rarely exceeding seven minutes between commercial breaks, I often find that when the scale is explained to them their response is blank incomprehension. This inability to grasp the complexity and magnitude of the proposition is but one reason why such ideas as Leaderless Resistance gain currency.

Among all the outpourings about LR, the only comprehensible rationale given for promoting anarcho-resistance is the fear of opposition infiltration and penetration of properly constituted organizations. That rationale is the very reason LR should be dismissed out of hand as the drivel of flagrant neophytes who possess just enough comic book knowledge about armed resistance to be dangerously stupid (emphasis added –JM); and who are irresponsible enough to share their “knowledge” with others.

The reason advocates of LR advance the fear of infiltration as their only comprehensible rationale for promoting anarcho-resistance is because, like every other band of proletarian dissidents, they believe that resistance begins with armed groups. In other words, they organize everything backwards, from the bottom up. This does, as they fear, leave them vulnerable to penetration when they finally discover that they cannot support or sustain their own operations and of necessity need to recruit new members or organize some semblance of a support apparatus.

Armed resistance is only one subset of what is properly defined as Political Warfare. Policy making in Political Warfare encompasses ideological warfare, organizational warfare, psychological warfare (wherein falls armed resistance), intelligence warfare, and mass warfare. Within the subset of armed resistance we find planned political violence (assassination, kidnapping, bombing), which is employed as a tactic of both disruptive and coercive terrorism. The disruptive nature of terrorism is the repression of and reprisals against the general population that it provokes from government. As a coercive measure terrorism enforces obedience from noncombatants or punctuates the demands of the terrorists.

Note the words “policy” and “planned.” That means there must be a policy making body who turn their deliberated decisions over to another organizational element which plans the implementation of those policies, in turn delegating responsibility for executing the plan to further subordinate elements. This requires not only a centralized command element that makes decisions, but also a staff who turn those decisions into mission taskings to the staffs of subordinate resistance activities. In descending order of manpower and complexity of organization those activities are, (1) the underground, (2) the auxiliary, and (3) the guerrillas.

Mission tasking, broadly speaking, covers five basic categories; (1) action, (2) security, (3) cover and logistics, (4) surveillance and intelligence, and (5) communications. Each category is serviced by in independent element. Each element’s requirements are then forwarded to management who assemble the information into a mission planning guide and requirements list. Once this information is assembled, planning follows an ordered sequence.

The Intelligence Cycle sets into motion collection operations in response to the informational needs expressed in the requirements list. Targeting is highly discriminatory, begins very early in the planning process, and includes consideration of both primary and sub-targets. Wargaming, which considers the action to be taken and the probability of success of several courses of action. Protection, which prevents discovery, prevention of arrest, and provision for building and maintaining cover. Operational Support falls into five broad categories; (1) communications, (2) accommodations, (3) transportation, (4) technological support, and (5) supply. Planning of the final phase, Action, does not begin until all other planning requirements have been met.

LR objections to the foregoing model are, as already stated, the fear of infiltration and betrayal by government informants or penetration of the organization by government spies. The reason I mentioned my disdain for the tendency among the various proletarian organizations to organize armed cells first (i.e., do the whole thing backward) earlier in this essay is because organizing backward creates the very condition that leaves their groups open to infiltration and betrayal — their eventual necessity to organize some form of support. To do this they need to recruit from outside their immediate circle.

Tim McVeigh & Co. is an excellent example. When they realized they could not pull off their operation on their own they began enlisting support from people and organizations who really had no business knowing what they were up to. Within hours of the OKC bombing the FBI was all over them like flies on dung (and there is considerable evidence that the FBI began manipulating the operation about midway through their “planning”).

The point I am making is this: In a properly organized resistance one of the first things constituted is an overarching counterintelligence body that permeates the very fabric of the organization at all levels. Coincident with counterintelligence is the compartmentalization of the resistance organization and planning — something almost totally lacking in LR “cells.”

Furthermore, for those among you who think that resistance warfare is some type of free-booting tryst where “rugged individuals” can “get some back” from their oppressors, I suggest you stay home with the women. The authoritarianism and regulation of the standing military pales in comparison to the rigid authoritarianism, regulation and submission to duty found in resistance organizations.

Although some small measure of disjointed disruption may be achieved by LR, and although LR may exert some paltry degree of temporary coercion, its lack of far ranging planning, organizational discipline, coordination with other elements, or a support net designed to sustain operations will find them littering the streets with their corpses.

If there is a single good thing to be said about LR, it is that while LR “cells” are distracting the Enemy, the grown-ups can go about their more serious business.

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Thursday, September 12, 2013

Resistance Tactics


Raids, ambushes, sniper attacks (a form of ambush, really), and sabotage, ARE the fundamental tactics of guerrilla/insurgent/resistance combat, but a sound grasp of the fundamental realities of these methods, as well as a solid grasp of strategic target selection and analysis is critical to prevent a waste of limited material and manpower resources on tactical level targets of insignificant worth. The level of potential effectiveness of offensive operations against a regime that can be sustained over time depends largely on the guerrilla base camp support and auxiliary support available to the resistance (it is hard after all, to sustain on-going combat operations, when your fighting men haven’t eaten in two weeks, have been barefoot all winter, due to a lack of footwear, and have nowhere to hide long enough to get some sleep after weeks of continuous combat. The guerrilla base MUST be located in order to maximize isolation, as well as difficulty of approach by regime forces thus precluding the use of a suburban neighborhood as an effective guerrilla base). The base camp area must be inherently defensible, and tenaciously defended by well-trained, highly-motivated forces. This provides the resistance’s fighting elements with a safe haven to operate from, ensuring they have the time and ability to properly plan offensive operations (this does NOT mean that irregular forces will be conducting their offensive operations in remote, rural areas, if that is not where the enemy is concentrating his forces).



Guerrilla element leaders must consider the nature of the terrain in their operational area (OAKOC), as well as the level of training and tactical expertise of their forces, when considering suitable targets for offensive operations (sending a bunch of 40-somethings with no combat experience and little realistic, tactical training, up against an AFV-equipped security forces element, with close-air support and reinforcements only a radio call and helicopter ride away would be a ridiculous waste of assets, regardless of their marksmanship abilities and/or motivation levels).



The current doctrinal method of target analysis/selection is the CARVER matrix. An analysis of any potential target, using this matrix will provide a planning organization with a method to categorize the cost-benefit value of potential regime targets in a hierarchical manner, allowing the greatest emphasis to be placed on the targets that offer the greatest political value to the resistance’s efforts (i.e. hitting as fuel depot that re-supplies occupation force Strykers or BMPs will be of much greater value to the resistance than ambushing a squad-sized element of conscripted infantrymen. In turn however, a sniper attack that assassinates key members of a special operations element within the regime security forces may have greater value than a raid on a vehicle park that results in destruction of a half-dozen armored vehicles).



Criticality. A potential target can be considered critical when its destruction or severe damage will create a SIGNIFICANT negative impact on the enemy’s ability to continue projecting military force in the operational area. Criticality is dependent on several key factors:

1.How rapidly/soon will the destruction/damage of this target impact and affect enemy operations in the operational area? Will it happen immediately (i.e. the destruction of his armored vehicles may preclude continued mounted patrolling the next day, especially in areas that require lengthy, time-consuming travel, such as in much of the western U.S.A.) or will there be a noticeable delay (destruction of a fuel storage depot might negatively impact the enemy’s ability to continue operations, but not until the fuel supplies maintained at the unit level are expended…and they may be able to replace the fuel depot before that happens)?
2.What percentage of enemy operations will be curtailed by target damage or destruction? What level of damage must be incurred in order to ensure a given percentage of curtailment (if I destroy ALL of their vehicles, will it curtail operations 100%, or will they continue with foot-mobile operations? If I destroy x percentage of rotary-wing assets, will it create a y percentage reduction in their operating ability)?
3.Do substitutes for the damaged/destroyed material/manpower assets exist within the enemy’s logistics trail? How long will it take for those to be put into place?

4.How many targets exist, and what is their position/value within the greater scheme of the enemy’s order of battle?



Accessibility. The target, in order to realistically be the subject of a planned attack, must be accessible. While it has been accurately stated that NO target is completely inaccessible, some high-value targets must, after being weighed on an objective cost-benefit basis, be considered as practically inaccessible, due to the cost involved with actually damaging/destroying them, in terms of resistance force manpower/material assets. A target can be considered accessible to resistance attack when it is possible for the maneuver element to physically infiltrate the target’s immediate area, or the target can be successfully engaged via direct or indirect fire weapons (the current focus on the development of open-source UAV technology by some elements within the liberty movement will greatly expand the accessibility of future targets for the resistance, due to the inherent “guided missile” nature of these force multipliers).



Critical concerns when considering the accessibility of a potential target include infiltration and exfiltration routes/methods, route security concerns for the maneuver element, the requirements for barrier penetration, obstacle negotiation, and survival/evasion considerations during exfiltration of the maneuver element.



Recuperability. The ability of the enemy to repair and return the target to service should be a critical element in target selection and analysis. This will vary, depending on the target, as well as other variables present only during the planning process. The effects of economic downturns/depressions, sabotage by the subversive underground in the manufacturing facilities that build the necessary repair parts, and the ability of the resistance to continue interdiction missions to prevent repair of the damaged/destroyed targets are all factors that must be considered when determining the recuperability of a given target.



Vulnerability. The vulnerability of a specific target refers to the actual ability of the maneuver element, given its organic or available inorganic weapons and assets, to actually cause the requisite damage/destruction needed to accomplish the stated mission (if a unit is limited to individual small arms, a tank unit in a vehicle park will not be particularly vulnerable, while a unit that has access to stockpiled HE munitions, or battlefield recovered munitions and/or anti-tank weapons will be much more dangerous to those vehicles. On the same hand, while an in-flight UAV will not be particularly vulnerable to resistance threats, the personnel that run the UAV, and the UAV itself, while grounded, may be particularly vulnerable to various resistance threats). A target can ultimately only be considered vulnerable if the maneuver element has the capability and expertise (or can acquire/borrow the expertise) to successfully attack the target. Vulnerability will be predicated on the nature and construction of the target (soft-skinned patrol vehicles will be inherently more vulnerable than armored vehicles. Personnel are often more vulnerable than material assets), the amount of damage required to affect it’s recuperability (it’s a lot easier to slash tires and punch holes in the oil pan of a soft-skinned vehicle than it is to damage a M1A2 Abrams MBT), and the assets available to the resistance force (the use of open-source UAV technology to provide the resistance an indirect-fire/air support mechanism, locally-manufactured HE weapons, and the availability of heavy-caliber, long-range sniper systems all provide interesting force multipliers to future resistance elements).



Effects. The positive or negative influence on the civilian population of the operational area, as well as the PSYOP value on enemy personnel is defined as the effect of a specific targeting operation. The effects paragraph of the CARVER format must consider public perception of the destruction of the target (i.e. destruction of a critical bridge in the area may have a severely detrimental effect on the ability of the local civilian population to continue their daily lives. While it will also impact the ability of the enemy to conduct vehicle-borne patrolling operations, it will more negatively impact the civilian population, since the security forces can always resort to airborne transportation methods, using rotary-wing assets, while the local civilian population is simply out-of-luck. Obviously, this would be a negative effect when looked at from the PSYOP angle, since it would negatively impact the public opinion towards the resistance). The effects paragraph must also consider the regime’s reaction to the destruction of a specific target, in relation to their actions towards the local civilian population however.

1.Will regime forces retaliate against the local civilian population? To what degree? Will that impact the civilian population’s willingness/ability to aid the resistance (harsh enough reprisals may terrorize the local population enough that they no longer feel the risk is worth the potential rewards of aiding the resistance. On the other hand, reprisals that result in the death of family members may drive some members of the civilian population to more actively support the resistance. There is an extremely fine balance that must be considered during all operational planning)?
2.Will the resistance’s PSYOP themes be reinforced by the destruction of this target (is one of the major themes that the regime cannot protect themselves, let alone the public? Is a theme that the government is inept, and so the people have no reason to fear reprisals)?
3.Will the local civilian population be alienated from the regime, or more closely supportive of the regime? There is a fine balance that must be kept in the forefront of all planning during UW missions, with the effect on the local civilian population being at the forefront of everyone’s mind, from the highest planner, to the lowest trigger-puller (For the record, doing things that are inherently inimical to the civilian population’s core beliefs….say, pissing on corpses, or burning religious items/texts, or murdering a dozen innocent non-combatants…is ALWAYS going to have a negative effect…just sayin’).


Recognizability. This pertains to the degree to which a target can be easily identified under adverse conditions, including inclement weather, low-light conditions, and other factors, without being confused for other nearby targets (a mission to assassinate a critical member of the regime’s local leadership will be difficult to effect if he has a member of his staff with a close physical resemblance who may be accidentally targeted due to low recognizability. On the same hand, a raid on a commandeered local home used by regime leadership may backfire if the next-door neighbor has a similar-looking house, full of kids, and it gets hit instead. This happens…a lot. For one simple example, look at the number of LEO warrants served on the “wrong house.”).



Once the evaluation criteria for a specific target has been established, the guerrilla planning cell use a numerical ranking system to to rate the CARVER factors for each potential target. In a 1-10 rating, a 10 indicates a highly desirable factor (from the insurgent’s PoV), while a 1 means the target is fundamentally off the chart for mission success. The analysts must tailor the criteria and rating system to suit the particular strategic/tactical situation in their operational area, for their elements, as well as the particular target(s) being analyzed.



Leadership within the guerrilla element must consider the potential adverse effects of a particular target selection, on both future resistance operations and the civilian population. Targets that will hinder civilian population life must be attacked ONLY AS A LAST RESORT!!! The goal is to diminish the regime’s ability to project military force in the operational area, not to piss off the locals. Similarly, unsuccessful guerrilla operations will have a tremendously bad impact on fighter morale within the resistance, probably leading to desertion by less committed individuals. Successful operations, on the other hand, will raise morale, even in the face of other morale-crushing factors, such as insufficient material re-supply, as well as raising the status of the resistance in the perception of the civilian population.



For the resistance element training to conduct necessary future offensive operations to ensure the adequate defense of their community against incursions by regime security forces, proper target analysis/selection, utilizing the doctrinal CARVER process, is a critical element in maximizing the cost-benefit application of necessarily limited manpower/material assets. Think strategically, plan operationally, act tactically.

Article from The Mountain Guerrilla http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/target-analysis-and-selection-criteria-for-irregular-forces/