Probability of Successful Revolutions?

Brigadier General Samuel Griffith, USMC (Ret.) wrote in-depth about his study of partisan resistance and guerrilla movements. One of the things that I find particularly interesting is how he qualified the execution of guerrilla movements. He describes ten factors that determine the outcome of guerrilla and resistance movements. Each factor should be scored for both the resistance movement and the regime in power. Ten factors with ten points each gives you an index of 100. In a future product, we’ll be breaking down the possibility of domestic insurgencies, both by the left and the right wings of the political spectrum, and judging their regional outcomes should the US experience a domestic conflict.

But before we get into those ten factors, take this into consideration:

Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this “significant segment” will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.

Movements that don’t gain the support of 15 to 25 per cent of the population, regionally if not nationwide, generally result in failure. Further, if a movement reaches that threshold but its tactics or strategy is not supported, the movement is simply doomed to fail. A PEW Research Poll from December 2011 says that while 44% of America supported the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, 49% disagreed with OWS tactics — and that was a largely ‘peaceful’ movement compared to all out revolution! So what happened to the OWS movement? It was forced to abandon its tactics, due both to the police and failure to maintain popular support. For any movement to create real and permanent change, it needs popular support on all fronts, including popular support for its tactics. That starts with the appeal of program.

Appeal of program: Does the populace line up behind a movement? Does the movement represent ideological and moral values to which people not only subscribe but would be willing to risk their lives to support? Does the movement have the moral high ground and do the people believe in what the movement is doing? These are some of the questions we can ask to satisfy this measurement. The ‘appeal of program’ must be internalized by the populace; therefore the program’s goal is to be both simply understood and dynamic. When I say dynamic, think loud, disruptive, explosive, meaningful, and significant. If you want a good illustration of a simple and dynamic appeal of program, just look at the Ron Paul Revolution. It created hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of mini-Ron Paul's. A good appeal to program leads to popular support.

Popular support: Gaining popular support is the keystone of any resistance or guerrilla movement. Resistance cells must depend on the empathy, hospitality, and refuge of the populace because the guerrilla doesn’t go home; he is home. Popular support is the result of one or more of two things: aggrievement and shared sacrifice, or common goals. Aggrievement and shared sacrifice often creates a deeper and more passionate support than a common goal. For instance, in football, there’s popular support for a team because a goal is shared: a national championship or Superbowl. But no one is expected or willing to die to win the Super bowl. On the other hand, let’s look at the revolution in Egypt several years ago. While Egyptians had a shared goal of changing their government, they had been deeply aggrieved through the rule of despotism and corruption. To create popular support, movement leaders need to find those who are aggrieved and identify a common goal towards the solution (appeal of program). People want revenge and sometimes they get it.

Quality of leadership: There’s an old saying that the military doesn’t produce leaders, it refines them. Leadership is sometimes developed in team sports, or in the office, or on the battlefield; sometimes it may lay dormant until necessity requires it to be born. Either way, leadership is required. If we look at Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the Shi’ite insurgent movement in Iraq, we see Muqtada al-Sadr: the militia leader with a strong family name and political clout. Muqtada may have had the name, influence, and fortune required to build the Mahdi Army, but without an organization filled with leaders, JAM would not have been so effective. And where would US military history be without Washington and his capable suboordinates? Were it not for Washington, there may not have been Lee and Grant, or Patton, or Eisenhower. Quality of leadership can determine outcomes so revolutionary movements must identify and choose good leaders.

Quality of troops: Quality of troops includes training and dedication. No amount of whizbang equipment can make up for poorly trained force. Training includes the three basic skills of combat: shooting, moving, communicating. But it doesn’t stop there because revolutionary movements need support functions like intelligence and logistics. There’s a reason why the three-part insurgency includes guerrillas, auxiliary, and the underground. Revolutionary movements who staff themselves with high quality, dedicated soldiers have a much higher likelihood of success, even if their end goal is to wear down an oppressive regime and enforce the area denial of their homelands. Dedication to the mission speaks volumes – just look at Afghanistan for that. Fifteen years after the first boots on ground and the most powerful military in the world is still fighting a bunch of under classed, outgunned, backwards hillbillies. In the early 2000s, the average age of the Taliban fighter was 35. When I left Afghanistan in 2011, the average age was 23. We’ve obliterated an entire generation of Afghans, yet the Taliban is still in control much of the country.

Military efficiency: Quality of leadership, quality of troops, economy of force, and mission success combine to produce military efficiency. ‘Economy of force’ is the concept of completing a task with the least resources required. So how do mission requirements compare to the organization’s fighting capability? What is the force’s supply capability? How quickly can it move from Point A to Point B? Can it achieve the objective and accomplish the mission? Anti-guerrilla and counterinsurgency forces seek to find, fix, finish, and exploit the guerrilla unit; how efficient will it be to evade detection and death/capture? Can the guerrilla unit simultaneously carry out its own activities to achieve and keep the initiative in the conflict? These are all questions with answers that will satisfy this metric. If the guerrilla unit is inefficient; if they cannot accomplish the mission to due poor training or poor leadership; if they cannot replace an effective leader who’s been killed in action; if they have suffered casualties to strength and are combat ineffective; then these deficiencies need to be identified and quickly resolved. Deficiencies affect internal unity and integrity, which affects the mission.

Internal unity: How is the unit’s morale? How well does the unit work together? How well do troops respond to leadership? Is leadership ensuring the troops are cared for? Is leadership putting the unit in undue risk of physical danger? Can all members of the unit be trusted? Unity is typically derived from shared sacrifice or a common goal. Lack of unity often derives from differing opinions of direction or purpose, or a general or specific lack of trust. Unity affects unit cohesion which affects military efficiency and results in mission failure.

Equipment: Good equipment can be a force multiplier. The better equipment (assuming you know how to operate and maintain it) and proper employment, the better military efficiency you’ll have. Aside from a battle rifle with ammunition, NVGs/NODs (like the PVS-14) is the best low-light equipment advantage you can have. Aside from that, will the force have sufficient access to food and water, medical supplies, radios or other communications devices, transport, survival tools and shelter, winter clothing, etc.? Many guerrilla movements are wholly dependent upon support from the populace – the main reason for popular support – for food, medicine, and intelligence. Other equipment can be gained through battlefield recovery. Think about the poor conditions of the Continental Army at Valley Forge where soldiers had little to eat, save the leather of their boots. Now think about the American soldier in Afghanistan with Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), chow tents, and dining facilities. There’s a world of difference there. If we can identify how a revolutionary movement plans to supply itself, what gear they have and how they will employ it, then we can make a more informed determination of how successful they might be against an adversary.

Operational terrain: What’s the operational terrain? This is your Area of Operation, something we refer to as the AO. This is the piece of terrain that a movement attempts to deny to and/or attack the enemy. The movement owns the domain; this is their battle space. The most effective guerrillas have expert knowledge of the surrounding terrain, and uses it to their advantage. For instance, there are caves up in the hills that surround Fort Huachuca, Arizona. During the fort’s early days, Indian raiding parties would attack US cavalry, then lead them up the hills, where the raiding party would enter into the cave system on one side, exit out the back, climb back over the top of the hill, then ambush the winded US soldiers as they entered the same cave entrance. That’s an expert use of the terrain. Whichever side can best use the operational terrain has an advantage.

Operational area communications: How does a revolutionary movement communicate? Hand signals and two-way radios for tactical movement, and physical/digital dead drops for operational communication? Will the terrain permit the use of cell phones or two-way radios? Does the movement’s communications require line of site, and do they have that kind of coverage in the AO? The more ways to securely and effectively communicate, the better the measure of success an organization has. An adversary’s capability to intercept signals may weigh heavily on a commo plan, but consider this: the inability or unwillingness to communicate electronically will remove not only an effective form of communication from the movement, but will also negate the easiest form of intelligence collection a regime has.

Sanctuary: Where is the guerrilla unit’s sanctuary? What’s the escape and evasion plan during the enemy’s Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit targeting cycle? Are there homes or other locations where a guerrilla unit can hide to escape a regime force search? Will the guerrilla unit use a hidden mountain base or does the base move with them? Successful guerrilla units avoid detection by hiding in hard to find or hard to search places. In the case of the original Red Dawn movie and in the case of the Chetniks resisting Nazi occupation during WWII, the mountains were natural sanctuary. In a world with satellite imagery and real-time overhead assets, sanctuary may be hard to come by. The bottom line is that the guerrilla needs a place to hide and blend in with his environment. If physical terrain is not an option, then guerrillas must use the human terrain. The simplest example of masking yourself using the human terrain came via the Taliban. A fighter armed with an AK-47 and engaging in a fire fight thirty seconds ago has now dropped his weapon and is hiding with the populace in the village. Blending in with the human terrain is made easier with smaller guerrilla units of three to five man teams because it’s nearly impossible to disperse a company (40-100) sized guerrilla unit in such a small area. If a revolutionary or guerrilla movement has substantial sanctuary then they have an advantage that may make their movement more successful.\

Conclusion

Those are the ten metrics we can use to judge the potential success of a guerrilla movement, however, keep in mind that most insurgencies end in a stalemate, and many insurgencies use violence as a way to achieve political concessions. Insurgent movements, especially regional ones, may be much more interested in introducing ‘self-rule’ or setting up an autonomous regional government than they would be to topple the existing national government. Furthermore, revolutionary and insurgent movements are aided in areas of weak state control where a power vacuum exists, or where the official government suffers from illegitimacy. The Taliban’s shadow government system in Afghanistan is a prime example, where locals actually use the Taliban’s judicial system. Where the Taliban is the legitimate government as perceived by the people, they are the government.

Original Article

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Army Field Manuals

The link below takes you to a great source of manuals to use to train your group, or to increase your own knowledge. Print them off and keep them in your "Prepper Library" for when they will be needed. This is an invaluable source of tons of information, please take the time to read the most relevant of these, and spread the knowledge to your buddies/group.

Army Field Manuals

I know there is so much to learn and not enough time to learn it all, but please take some time and read/print/study these manuals. We will need the skills in these manuals soon enough guys!

Here is another thing I just thought of, it is the FEMA site for a ton of online trainings that they offer. Yes, I know... should we be going to "THEM" for training? I say, hey use what you can, and if it is available then take advantage of it.

FEMA Emergency Management Institute

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Watch Out for Don't-Tread-on-Me Flags

I am posting this as a warning to my fellow patriots. We might think again about putting stickers like this on our vehicles. It could lead to issues for us, and may be better to stay on the down low. But then again, maybe we should put them on all vehicles we have, and encourage our friends and family to do the same. Then they will have to take a look at a bunch of vehicles with them on them, which would create more work for them. So I am posting this just to let you guys know about it, take it at whatever value you want to.

Utah Fusion Center Warns Cops: Watch Out for Don't-Tread-on-Me Flags

With LaVoy Finicum's funeral being held today, Utah police are on the lookout for "armed extremists." What sort of advice are they getting?

Jesse Walker | Feb. 5, 2016 10:42 am

It's your Malheur, it's none of my own.

USFWS Pacific

Funeral services will be held today in Kanab, Utah, for LaVoy Finicum, the rancher killed last month during the occupation of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in Oregon. In a bulletin distributed this week to cops across the region, the Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center—one of the dozens of intelligence-sharing "fusion centers" around the country that get funds from the Department of Homeland Security—warns that "extremists may utilize such a high profile funeral for media attention or to further ideological beliefs." Although "no credible threats to law enforcement are present at this time," the authors still think police should be wary: "Caravans of individuals traveling to the funeral services may be comprised of one or more armed extremists. Law enforcement should remain vigilant and aware that confrontation with these potentially volatile persons, may include more than one individual. These individuals may adhere to a sovereign citizen ideology, and may not recognize law enforcement as a legitimate authority."

The report includes several "visual indicators" to help police determine whether they're dealing with "extremist and disaffected individuals." These range from images associated with specific political groups, such as the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters, to a more generic patriotic symbol, the Gadsden flag—a famous Revolutionary War banner featuring a coiled rattlesnake and the slogan "Don't Tread on Me." One of the "indicators" is a slightly altered version of a picture popular with fans of the Grateful Dead; the guide does not note this potential source of confusion, describing it only as "common sovereign citizen imagery."

Although "some or parts of these symbols are representative of patriotic and American revolutionary themes," the report says, "they are often associated with extremism." There is little effort to apply even that much nuance to the individual symbols. The Gadsden flag is associated with several political movements, such as the Tea Party protests; it has also been adapted by apolitical subcultures, such as the fans of U.S. Soccer. But the bulletin simply declares that it is "commonly displayed by sovereign citizen extremists."

One private-sector security professional who received the bulletin worries that it could lead to a kind of profiling. "I work with a young man, 24 years old, three associate's degrees, volunteer fire fighter, dreams of becoming a police officer," he says. "He's also an Armenian-Russian immigrant who just earned his American citizenship. He sports a Gadsden flag on his car because of what it represents in our country's history." If a cop sees that car today, the security worker worries, the officer's "thoughts will automatically flip to profiling him" as a violent extremist.

Mike German, a former FBI agent who infiltrated far-right groups in the 1990s, has a similar objection. "I always try to look at these alerts from the perspective of the police officer on the street," he says. "What will the officers know after reading this that they didn't before? Here all they know is to be afraid if they see a Gadsden flag, which could result in an unnecessarily hostile encounter that would increase the chances of violence. There's nothing here that would help them correctly identify someone who held these beliefs, understand what might trigger hostile reactions, or how to talk to them in a way that would defuse any unnecessary tension." He also worries that the bulletin "improperly implies holding such beliefs makes them dangerous"; most of the people involved in these movements are nonviolent, he says, and treating them all like budding terrorists just makes a confrontation more likely.

German, who is now based at New York University's Brennan Center for Justice, thinks it's "perfectly reasonable for the fusion center to make law enforcement aware of the situation regarding the Oregon standoff and police shooting, and how the upcoming funeral might make those out-of-state events more pertinent to local enforcement needs and officer safety." But he feels the report's approach "is unhelpful because it is overgeneralized in describing a threat and lacking in any useful advice. It seems almost like CYA, so they can say 'we warned 'em' if anything bad happens."

https://reason.com/blog/2016/02/05/utah-fusion-center-warns-cops-watch-out

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Leaderless Resistance

This article is about the concept of Leaderless Resistance; the ideas and comments are not my own, I do agree with much of what is said, I just wanted to get this point of veiw out there so people can make their own informed decision about the direction they want to go.


Author: SMB (US Army, Retired)
Edited for content.
A Brief Overview

Nothing defines the blatant ineptitude and rank incompetence of the radical resistance more starkly than the concept of so-called “leaderless resistance” (hereafter, LR). By its very nature LR amounts to little more than anarchy and, as demonstrated by some of the most recent examples, very rapidly degenerates into simple banditry. Furthermore, one notes for the record that the most vociferous proponents of LR have, in common with those to whom that fantastic idea appeals, exactly zero experience in guerrilla warfare, its theory, or practice.

Simply stated, the concept of LR posits that individuals or small, close-knit groups, acting on their own initiative, performing their own targeting and relying on their own resources, can strike at the government’s infrastructure at will without fear of infiltration. Tactically, LR ranges from individual nuisance acts for the sake of causing a nuisance on one end of the spectrum to small unit terrorism for terrorism’s sake on the other. However, nothing can be said about LR’s potential operational impact because, by definition, through rejection of any superior organizational structure, it can have no operational impact.

Strategically, LR is conspicuously absent from any historical examples of successful insurgency. The idea has been advanced by several writers on the subject that LR is essentially a modern version of the Committees of Correspondence of American Revolution fame. I do not think those writers mean to purposely distort the realities of revolutionary organization in the colonies, but their zeal to justify LR apparently overrode their rational faculties. If those writers had simply paused to consider the word “committee” juxtaposed with “correspondence”, the notion that Committees of Correspondence were autonomous bodies acting independently of one another would have collapsed of its own illogic. In fact, the members of the several colonies’ Committees of Correspondence were appointed by their colonies’ legislative bodies, everyone knew who they were, and they coordinated their activities between each other or with the Continental Congress through a chain of command. Hardly an example of leaderless resistance.

There are however several striking examples, discussed below, that demonstrate why LR is fundamentally flawed as a resistance strategy.

The Order

“The Order” is frequently cited as an example (in its early stages, before it began recruiting) of the principle of LR. Given that most members of The Order are either dead or in federal prisons it is also an example of many of the fundamental flaws in the concept.

The Order began as an eight man cell dedicated to creating an Aryan homeland in the Pacific Northwest. How eight men expected to accomplish that objective has never been clearly explained, but following their logic it seems that the organizers of The Order believed that direct action against the government for the purpose of financing other organizations in the racialist resistance would inspire others to imitate their example thus creating an avalanche effect as other self creating “cells” rallied to the cause. Predictably, that “strategy” failed miserably.

Had the organizers of The Order expended half the effort in researching failed insurgencies as they did planning armored car and bank heists they would have found that their strategy (if indeed they ever had one beyond “do things”) had already been tried by no less than Che Guevara. The name of that “strategy” is called the Loco (i.e., focus). The theory is this: Plunk a small band of guerrillas down in an ostensibly “oppressed” countryside, begin maiming, murdering and robbing the oppressors, and the peasants will rise up and flock in proletarian support to the Loco to sweep the bourgeoisie from the political landscape. However, the “oppressed” in whose name Che fought snitched off his band to the oppressors, and Che and his Bolivian Loco bandits were hunted down like animals and killed. End of insurgency.

Aside from robbing banks and armored cars and sharing the loot with phone booth emperors who were vying for the same mailing list, The Order did manage to kill a Jew in Denver, blow up a synagogue in Boise, Idaho, and murder one of their own recruits before they were finally hunted down, killed or arrested.

The Order therefore illustrates Reason #1 LR does not work. “Grass roots” resistance is doomed to failure; there are no examples of it having ever succeeded. Frustrated by any appreciable effect of propaganda on a population so dim it could offer not even neutrality, and impatient with time proven organizational principles, they simply decided to “kick things off” themselves armed with nothing but a single idea that was immediately discredited because (1) the population did not care about the idea, so (2) they possessed no means of enlisting assistance or acceptance for their crime spree. The lesson learned about The Order’s example is that rebelliousness has no place in a resistance.

Eric Rudolph

Personally, my reaction to the bombing of abortion clinics and gay bars is, “Where’s the crime?” In many respects Rudolph exemplifies LR at the individual level. He didn’t make threats or discuss his plans with anybody, he didn’t ask permission, he simply started punctuating his deeply held beliefs with explosions.

If Rudolph has one thing going for him (aside from being the “1997 – 1999 Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) it’s that he has a steep learning curve. Note the successive “product improvements” of his devices. He obviously paid close attention to the official Bomb Damage Assessments of his handiwork, and progressively applied those lessons learned to his subsequent projects, not only mechanically (although he had not yet come to appreciate that nails are crap for shrapnel — ball bearings are much better, having sounder ballistics) but also tactically.

For example, constructive development of Rudolph’s devices progresses to smaller timers, smaller batteries, dynamite instead of pipe bombs and thicker pressure plates. By the time of the Atlanta gay bar and abortion clinic bombings his devices fit very nicely into a book bag, and at the lesbian bar he left behind an 80 pound time delay “present” intended for enthusiastic crime scene investigators. A year later, a Birmingham, Alabama, cop who was guarding an abortion clinic between stints as a guard at a gay bar, poked at a flower pot with his baton causing Rudolph to allegedly command detonate his device (or lose it to the bomb squad). Significantly, the device was directional, the majority of the blast was focused on the front door. Eric’s obvious goal was to abort the abortionist when he arrived, but the cop’s ill considered curiosity preempted the objective of the attack. Nevertheless, Rudolph had progressed from crude pipe bombs to command detonated directional devices in four operations. Not bad.

Rudolph’s problem was that, while his devices advanced both mechanically and in lethality, their basic construction, and therefore their “signature,” remained the same. Because he was driving his own vehicle to and from the target area the feds quickly obtained a description of it and the plate number, and by the time he had driven back in Murphy, North Carolina, the FBI was scouring the city for him. Informed by friends that he was being sought by the FBI as a “material witness” to the Birmingham bombing, he did the next logical thing. He went to Burger King, bought some chow, then disappeared into the mountains.

What is remarkable about Rudolph, as an individual example of LR, is his focus, his dedication, his coolness, his self reliance, and his aggressiveness — and that he is still alive. In fact, by the spring of 1999, the FBI had almost completely retreated out of the mountains and into their compound in Andrews, North Carolina, because, in the words of SSA Terry Turchie, Rudolph manhunt director, “We think he is hunting us.”
But those very qualities that make young Eric so remarkable are precisely those qualities that make him not only the exception to the rule, but also a positive example of why LR on an individual level is again doomed to failure except in the rarest of circumstances. Eric possesses what precious few other individuals who might contemplate the “Rudolph model” of LR possess — the semblance of an infrastructure. Young Eric’s infrastructure is composed entirely of friends of belief in kind, or tacit sympathy for the act even if not for his beliefs. However, that necessarily delimited his operational radius. And even though Rudolph enjoys the active neutrality of the population in his area of operations, his limited circle of friends lacked any infrastructure that would have enabled him wider range in his holy mission.

What Rudolph’s circle of friends were incapable of providing was operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He built his own bombs. He performed his own targeting. He emplaced his own devices. He provided his own transportation. His circle of friends were useless operationally, and the best they could do for him locally when he became a fugitive was turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken coops or delay reporting his presence when he broke into their houses to raid the cupboard.

Eric Rudolph therefore illustrates Reason #2 LR does not work. It has no formal infrastructure, thus its support is at best haphazard and is always uncoordinated. Consequently, such notional “support” is bound to fall apart at the seams at some point. Even though there is not yet any evidence that his network of friends is beginning to crumble, it is painfully obvious that they are incapable of supporting or sustaining any further operations by Eric. The lesson learned about Eric Rudolph’s example is that independence of action means isolation from effective support, hence an inability to sustain operations in the face of determined opposition reaction.

Further Considerations

The above examples of group and individual LR illustrate only a very small number of associated problems. For example, as mentioned in the Eric Rudolph example, the lack of a formal organizational infrastructure means that LR “cells” must provide for themselves everything appertaining their operational requirements. This fact necessarily places the LR “cell” in the unenviable position of being personally involved in all the activities, such as logistics (including financing), communications, targeting and planning, needed to execute their operations. Because of their personal involvement they dramatically raise not only their own “profile,” but also that of the operation. Those named activities in a properly constituted resistance organization would be delegated to cells (unknown to the “direct action” operatives) specifically tasked to perform those functions thus virtually eliminating the operation’s profile — until bodies need to be dug out of the rubble. Traditional procedures also so diffuse the opposition’s post action investigation that it takes months or years, instead of days in the case of an LR “plan,” to unravel all the pre-mission details and thereby identify and begin hunting the operatives.

Furthermore, LR as a “strategy,” if we are to believe what its proponents expect us to believe about it, has specific appeal only to the lowest (or most psychotic) common denominator within any given organization. The fact that the notion of LR is being propagated should give pause to serious minded individuals because those organizations that promote LR almost universally make their appeals for membership to the “proletariat,” as demonstrated by the crudeness of their rhetoric and public manifestations. Nevertheless, the idea that independently conceived and executed “grassroots” action solely for the sake of action can have any appreciable impact as a resistance methodology to the planned destruction of our society is nonsense. And if the history of LR is any indicator it plays right into our enemy’s hand.

Consider the Progressive distorted prosecutive “legal” strategy known as vicarious liability. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence vicarious liability is the “indirect or imputed legal responsibility for the acts of another… as between an employer and employee… or a principle for torts and contracts of an agent.” (Black’s 6th ed.) In a nut shell, the Progressive-contorted version of vicarious liability contends that “hate speech” creates a “climate of hate” that propels small groups or individuals to commit “hate crimes” and that, therefore, any organization that espouses Progressive-defined “hate” is “responsible” for the actions of individuals or groups, employees or not, who commit the “crime.”

Never mind that the Progressive-version of vicarious liability perfectly inverts the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal precedent which places responsibility for crime upon the individual criminal and which reserves vicarious liability to employers whose agents’ (i.e., responsible to the employer) acts result in willful harm to others. In the example of the justifiable murder of the abortionist Sleppian, a web site that listed the names, addresses and photographs of abortionists was ordered to shut down even though there was no proof of any connection between the owners of the web site and the righteous man who dwindled our Progressive infestation by one. The web site had “created a climate of hate,” you see.

The Progressive-twisted version of vicarious liability is reserved solely for Christian men and their organizations. Why? Eric Rudolph serves as another example. Hundreds of FBI agents [has anybody else noticed that the FBI refers to its personnel using the same term intelligence officers understand as “street shit?”] are hunting him, and a million dollar reward has been offered for him, not because he allegedly planted a couple of bombs, but because he committed a politically incorrect crime; he tried to blow up abortionists and gays. His motive is the reason he is being hunted.

In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence motive is merely a mitigating factor. When Progressives are permitted to practice law — or more horrifying, make law — in Anglo-Saxon nations, the law rapidly degenerates into quibbling. In the case of vicarious liability, the extrinsic motive becomes the real crime. In other words, what you were thinking when you committed the crime is more important than what you did, and what you were thinking is the fault of the organization – whether you are a member or not — that espouses what you believe. Ergo, according to Progressive lawyers, the organization is vicariously liable for your crime and can be sued. The most recent Southern Poverty Law Center law suit against the Aryan Nations is only the most recent in a pattern of similar suits.

Why the long winded speech about vicarious liability? Because the organizations that promote LR are being sued in rotation by Progressives when proletarian groups or individuals (employees, members, or not) take them at their word and begin practicing it. Significantly, organizations that demand at least a modicum of discipline from their members and which prefer to recruit from the bourgeoisie, have so far been spared the embarrassment of “loose cannons” in their ranks. Think about it.

How “It” Is Really Done

What often amazes me is the simple-mindedness of those who propose to wage one or the other of many forms of armed resistance against the government. Because the sheer scale of the proposition cannot be grasped by minds conditioned to think in terms of snappy political slogans and time frames rarely exceeding seven minutes between commercial breaks, I often find that when the scale is explained to them their response is blank incomprehension. This inability to grasp the complexity and magnitude of the proposition is but one reason why such ideas as Leaderless Resistance gain currency.

Among all the outpourings about LR, the only comprehensible rationale given for promoting anarcho-resistance is the fear of opposition infiltration and penetration of properly constituted organizations. That rationale is the very reason LR should be dismissed out of hand as the drivel of flagrant neophytes who possess just enough comic book knowledge about armed resistance to be dangerously stupid (emphasis added –JM); and who are irresponsible enough to share their “knowledge” with others.

The reason advocates of LR advance the fear of infiltration as their only comprehensible rationale for promoting anarcho-resistance is because, like every other band of proletarian dissidents, they believe that resistance begins with armed groups. In other words, they organize everything backwards, from the bottom up. This does, as they fear, leave them vulnerable to penetration when they finally discover that they cannot support or sustain their own operations and of necessity need to recruit new members or organize some semblance of a support apparatus.

Armed resistance is only one subset of what is properly defined as Political Warfare. Policy making in Political Warfare encompasses ideological warfare, organizational warfare, psychological warfare (wherein falls armed resistance), intelligence warfare, and mass warfare. Within the subset of armed resistance we find planned political violence (assassination, kidnapping, bombing), which is employed as a tactic of both disruptive and coercive terrorism. The disruptive nature of terrorism is the repression of and reprisals against the general population that it provokes from government. As a coercive measure terrorism enforces obedience from noncombatants or punctuates the demands of the terrorists.

Note the words “policy” and “planned.” That means there must be a policy making body who turn their deliberated decisions over to another organizational element which plans the implementation of those policies, in turn delegating responsibility for executing the plan to further subordinate elements. This requires not only a centralized command element that makes decisions, but also a staff who turn those decisions into mission taskings to the staffs of subordinate resistance activities. In descending order of manpower and complexity of organization those activities are, (1) the underground, (2) the auxiliary, and (3) the guerrillas.

Mission tasking, broadly speaking, covers five basic categories; (1) action, (2) security, (3) cover and logistics, (4) surveillance and intelligence, and (5) communications. Each category is serviced by in independent element. Each element’s requirements are then forwarded to management who assemble the information into a mission planning guide and requirements list. Once this information is assembled, planning follows an ordered sequence.

The Intelligence Cycle sets into motion collection operations in response to the informational needs expressed in the requirements list. Targeting is highly discriminatory, begins very early in the planning process, and includes consideration of both primary and sub-targets. Wargaming, which considers the action to be taken and the probability of success of several courses of action. Protection, which prevents discovery, prevention of arrest, and provision for building and maintaining cover. Operational Support falls into five broad categories; (1) communications, (2) accommodations, (3) transportation, (4) technological support, and (5) supply. Planning of the final phase, Action, does not begin until all other planning requirements have been met.

LR objections to the foregoing model are, as already stated, the fear of infiltration and betrayal by government informants or penetration of the organization by government spies. The reason I mentioned my disdain for the tendency among the various proletarian organizations to organize armed cells first (i.e., do the whole thing backward) earlier in this essay is because organizing backward creates the very condition that leaves their groups open to infiltration and betrayal — their eventual necessity to organize some form of support. To do this they need to recruit from outside their immediate circle.

Tim McVeigh & Co. is an excellent example. When they realized they could not pull off their operation on their own they began enlisting support from people and organizations who really had no business knowing what they were up to. Within hours of the OKC bombing the FBI was all over them like flies on dung (and there is considerable evidence that the FBI began manipulating the operation about midway through their “planning”).

The point I am making is this: In a properly organized resistance one of the first things constituted is an overarching counterintelligence body that permeates the very fabric of the organization at all levels. Coincident with counterintelligence is the compartmentalization of the resistance organization and planning — something almost totally lacking in LR “cells.”

Furthermore, for those among you who think that resistance warfare is some type of free-booting tryst where “rugged individuals” can “get some back” from their oppressors, I suggest you stay home with the women. The authoritarianism and regulation of the standing military pales in comparison to the rigid authoritarianism, regulation and submission to duty found in resistance organizations.

Although some small measure of disjointed disruption may be achieved by LR, and although LR may exert some paltry degree of temporary coercion, its lack of far ranging planning, organizational discipline, coordination with other elements, or a support net designed to sustain operations will find them littering the streets with their corpses.

If there is a single good thing to be said about LR, it is that while LR “cells” are distracting the Enemy, the grown-ups can go about their more serious business.

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