The Art of Camouflage

Here is a really good playlist of camouflage videos. Check it out, use it for training for yourself, your family, or your group.

More training videos

Now this is what I am talking about! This is the kind of training we all should be doing, along with other forms also. This is a really good example of some seriously effective training.

Lifting the veil

Video shedding some light on and lifting the veil on militias. What they are, and why militia is not a bad word. The liberal main stream media has tried as hard as they can to demonize the militia and turn it into a negative term. The militia is called out for in the US Constitution, and almost all State Constitutions.

Fight the Tyrants

I just wanted to post something today, I found this, I think you will enjoy it.

Gunfighting Safetly

Here is another great post by Max Velocity about an important topic we should all know about, and train on. None of us want to hit our friends, or family while in a tactical engagement. So we all need to keep these ideas and concepts in mind while training.

I left in the parts where Max talks about his tactical training because I highly recommend as many of you as can, attend his training. Unfortunately I have not been able to, up to this point, but I am trying to find time to attend, and recommend you do also.

Max Velocity Blog

I wrote the post ‘Buddy Position Awareness‘ on July 28 2015. I’m going to revisit that topic here, particularly in light of the comments I made on a student review yesterday:

If you have been reading the blog lately, you will have seen my post on the development of the Rifle Skills and Combat Team Tactics Classes (‘Adjustments to the Rifle Skills / Combat Team Tactics Lineup‘). We have also scheduled a number of the Combat Rifle Skills classes for those who want a shallower learning curve. We have moved zeroing entirely to the optional Rifle Skills day prior to Combat Team Tactics. This has freed up training time on the Friday of CTT. We have made some adjustments to that square range day to introduce some of the visual concepts early, so that they are not first encountered on the Saturday morning, as part of the introduction to fire and movement. This is done in a somewhat ‘monkey see, monkey do’ format on the square range, to put visuals of safe distances, angles, spacing and such into the mind of the student, so that when they are taken through explanations and rehearsal on the tactical ranges the following day, they have a better reference point. This is working very well so far. We had limited time this past class for this pre-concept training, because we still had to do some check zero, but for future classes the absence of zeroing has been made clear (unless you show up for RS) and we will have more time available.

If you haven’t been paying attention, the CTT class has been dropped from $600 to $500 (3 days), and RS from $200 to $100 (1 day), to allow students to complete the full 4 days of training for the same price as the previous 3 day CTT class. Don’t tell me I never give you incentives to train!

I am going to partially re-post the ‘Buddy Position Awareness‘ post below. Before I do, here is some additional comment:

We have been developing and improving the Combat Team Tactics class over the last three years. It went from a 2 day ‘CRCD” class, to a 3 day CTT class, to the option of making it a 4 day RS/CTT class. We often have to deal with the tendency of students to have past training scars from other ‘tactical’ training classes, and a general theme is the need to move people on from square range focused training to realistic combat training. This is something that we are working hard to achieve with the most effect possible. Does this mean I don’t like square ranges? Of course not, I have two! The point is that the square range should properly be viewed as a part of the progression to live field firing. Much training, in particular the stuff that can be viewed all over YouTube, is both unrealistic and dives into a rabbit hole because it has nowhere to go beyond the square range itself.

This amuses me, along the same lines of dealing with the obvious ‘You Don’t Know What You Don’t Know’ (DKWYDK) comments that I see. It amuses me because the training progression and focus that we work so hard on at MVT actually makes things safer for you to operate in a live fire / combat environment, whereas the focus on the pure (usually close range) target shooting of a square range environment makes it more dangerous. In fact, if this country does ever go to a full collapse shooting war, I’m going to get into a low crawl and simply crawl the hell out of it! It beggars belief the amount of friendly and not so friendly fire casualties that will likely be generated, and people shooting their own families and teams, as everyone is running aimlessly round in a panic.

I’m pulling a video out of the original post and putting it here, by way of an example of this chaos even among trained soldiers on deployment. This is the best example I could find on YouTube. Watch the video below for the first few seconds, and realize how close it came to a friendly fire incident, as the soldier runs across from right to left. After that, there is no safety angle as the helmet cam guy fires over the top of his buddies taking cover behind the low wall. Be prepared for random acts in combat! Unless you have effectively trained in a realistic live fire training environment, which develops an understanding of real world safety angles, you will make mistakes like this. This training should also be backed by solid rehearsal and drills in react to contact.

There a various things we tell students at MVT training. Among them:

•Scan, all the time. Scan means actually scan.
•Get your head out of your weapon.
•It’s not about you, it’s about your buddies.
•It’s not about your personal relationship with Ivan, but knowing where your buddies are first.
•Break that tunnel vision.

What does this even mean? Well if you focus only on square range training, including competition style training, or shot timers, or whatever, then it is all about you, and your target. It is about that personal relationship between you and Ivan (the target). I’ve even heard of training so naval gazing that it is all about filming the shooter and reviewing second by second technique.

Here’s the thing – you only have to shoot SO WELL. There is a limit of accuracy, a balance of speed and effect on target versus perfect technique. Yes, don’t conflate this with an argument about poor shooting being better, because it is not. It is about practical accuracy balanced with the need for relevant training, building situational awareness. If I get rounds on target to protect my team, that accuracy is good enough. If I have no awareness of where my buddies are as this firefight commences, and I put rounds into them instead of the target, as everyone runs around in a disorganized panic, then that is a fail. So it is a balance between individual proficiency and the awareness and ability to operate within and with a team. I’m not making these comments in an unlimited theoretical training time vacuum: Most people have limited training time, and thus the focus on training to become the ultimate-AR-driving-wizard is probably not as useful as spending your time learning how to get rounds effectively on target, take cover, and not kill your buddies while doing so – because if you put rounds into your friends or family, there is no undoing that. That is why you can learn good skills on the square range, but you must progress beyond it to learn the team tactics. Or, your ‘team’ will die, either by enemy or friendly fire, probably both.

This is the reason, precisely, that I harp on about this, and many who have not progressed beyond the square range simply do not understand it. I am trying to explain it here, in this post.

Consider these conceptual points, which may help you understand this:

On a square range, you are already on a firing line. Other firers are to the left and right of you, and the targets are downrange. It is safe. No other firer is within an acceptable safety angle from the muzzle of any other firer’s rifle.

When we teach you team tactics, and we have a 4 man team reacting to effective enemy fire (i.e. an Ivan target exposure) , we are teaching you drills to move from whatever formation you were walking in, to create an immediate firing line, just like on the square range. Thus, as you react, no one firer is within an unsafe angle from any other firers muzzle. Whatever direction the contact comes from, front, left, right, rear, you are adapting into a safe firing line to engage the target(s). This happens when you conduct individual and team RTR drills.

Other safety training, such as active muzzle awareness, how to move with the weapon, “Don’t go faster than you can go,” “Don’t be in a hurry to rush to your death,” “identify cover before you move to it,” head-body-weapon, and other team drills that are taught, are all to reinforce the awareness of what is safe and what is not safe: until you are sure where your buddies are (scan-head-body-weapon) you are not bringing your rifle up to engage the target. This is why we need to break that square range indoctrination of me-target-me-target.

If we are going to maneuver in the face of the enemy, either towards, away (break contact) or to the flank, then we now have to move that firing line. For this, we teach fire and movement (maneuver). Think about this as simply moving segments of the firing line, whether those segments are individuals or buddy pairs, in such as way that we maneuver to where we want to go, while suppressing the enemy, and while never moving into an unsafe position relative to the safety angle of other firer’s muzzles.

Now imagine this: 4 firers lined up on a square range, facing the targets. Maybe quite close, perhaps the firing line is 10 yards from the targets. Imagine there are 10 targets lined up in front of them, running from #1 on the left, thru #10 to the right. The shooters are only 10 yards from the targets and 5 yards from each other, so #1 is off to the left, #10 off to the right, and #5 is directly front in the center of the 4 man line. It’s safe to say that the 4 man line can probably engage #5, and targets to the left and right of #5, without causing any safety angle problems. Those targets are pretty much directly front. Now, if we call target #1, we have a problem. The left shooter can engage, by swiveling (head-body-weapon) to the left and engaging #1. When the other firers do their scan-head, before they even move their body, they will realize that the angle to the left, for them to shoot at #1, is too steep, and that they will be unsafely muzzling firers to their left (i.e. those firers would be at an unsafe angle to their muzzle if they engaged the target). In this case, the only solution is for the line to angle to the left, to create a new firing line aligned on Target #1. If target #10 were called, you get the opposite.

If a buddy engages a target and has not immediately called distance-direction-description, and you are trying to identify it, then you can easily see how he is oriented by looking at the direction of his barrel, and the angle of his shoulders, and thus know what position is safe relative to him before you can even think about bringing your weapon up towards a target you have not even seen yet. Whether you immediately see the target or not, and you want to bring your weapon up, but a buddy is in the way, you have to push left/right/up in order to move him out of your safety angle, and thus allow your weapon to come up.

All of the above seems very obvious, but it is not for those who have been conditioned to the me-target-me-target mindset of much of the shooting sports world. You have to also consider that on a tactical range there is much going on, stress inoculation is part of the objective, and the formation is moving relative to the targets and the ground, and thus it is easy for new shooters to become sucked into the target, tunnel vision, and lose the ability to scan. That what the safety cadre are there for!

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Buddy Awareness & Scanning

There is plenty of talk out there about ‘training,’ but unless you are incorporating professional live fire training into your overall training plan, you will probably not understand, in a practical sense, what I am discussing here. In the same way that it is easy to talk about ‘shoot, move and communicate’ on the internet, but harder to actually conduct it for real. You need to be building real ‘operant conditioning’ via the right training.

Buddy awareness and scanning, seems so simple. However, on training classes we spend a deal of time drilling this into people, and first drilling bad habits out of them. Unfortunately some of these bad habits come from individual focused training on basic shooting and weapons manipulation on the square range. When it’s all about ‘driving your AR’ and your INDIVIDUAL shooting skills, scans can become notional, robotic. This is one of the chief problems with training when it never makes it off the square range: it is an individual sport, not a team activity. This causes big problems when trying to operate as a team in a live fire environment.

At MVT, we run live fire training with movement. This means that shooters are not always ‘on line’ – something that is alien to many who have grown up on solely on ranges with no movement. We have specific safety procedures that will not translate well if I try and describe them here in writing. Suffice to say, there are safety angles and procedures that include mantras such as ‘head-body-weapon,’ ways to move (absolutely no pirouetting, ever), safety angles off your muzzle, and active muzzle awareness. The way weapons are carried and movement is conducted is operational safety, i.e. it translates to real situations when you are on patrol, or moving with weapons. Not ‘over safe’ procedures such as seen on many ranges, which actually end up being less safe (such as moving backwards with weapons). Patrol ready, active muzzle awareness, finger outside trigger guard, safety on at all times except when not engaging the enemy.

Buddy awareness:

This is vital. If a target pops up, the important thing is not to engage the target, but to know where your buddies are before engaging the target. You are always scanning and conducting a version of ‘head-body-weapon.’ The weapon part of the mantra applies equally to ‘ready ups’ when bringing the weapon on to target prior to firing, such as with an RTR drill, or equally to active muzzle awareness if you are conducting the manta as part of a move from one piece of cover to another.

When running training and safety, we are always fighting tunnel vision and students being glued to their sights. It is important to pull your head away from the sights every couple of rounds, to locate your buddies and maintain spacial awareness. This is a hard thing for new shooters to grasp. You need to turn your head towards your buddies and yell in their direction when yelling is needed (i.e. MOVE!) otherwise your yell will be lost into the stock of your weapon. Is your buddy moving to the next cover? Is he beating at his weapon because he has not yet grasped the muscle memory to conduct weapon manipulation under stress? Is he writhing on the ground, bleeding? Is he laying there silent?

Imagine you are lined up with your buddies on the firing line on a square range. Weapons will all be aligned facing down the range to the targets. Shoulders will be roughly aligned, assuming we are adapting dynamic shooting positions, and not ‘blading off’ to the targets. You are now ‘on line.’ Now, in a realistic combat environment it would not matter if you and your buddies were a little misaligned, perhaps due to the positions of cover, and the line was not exactly straight. So long as no one was inside the muzzle safety angle of each others weapons, we are good to go. That’s what happens in fire and movement.

Now, take that target away straight down the range and put one up half-left to the firing line. Because the enemy gets a vote, and will try and flank you. Now, everyone’s weapons and shoulders swing (although they wouldn’t swing, like a turret, they would scan and acquire the target and then go ‘head-body-weapon’) to the left by 45 degrees. This may have an impact on the safety angle. If there are two of you, and you are the right hand guy, then when you acquire the target with ‘head’ and scan, then you will also need to note the location of your buddy. As the angle of the target moves more to the flank, it may be that you cannot bring your weapon up to engage, because your buddy would be within the safety angle of your muzzle. This would mean you would have to ‘push right’ or ‘push up’ depending, in order to clear that safety angle and safely acquire the target. In a dynamic situation, it is always important to note your buddies as you acquire a target, keep both eyes open, and also be ready for when they may make an unpredictable movement, perhaps to adjust their position of cover. If they do this, be ready to drop your muzzle. The key is simply to avoid the herd mentality and keep spread out from your buddies, in order to open up the safety angle. Do not, and we do not allow, people to be firing past each others ears!

It is vital to always maintain awareness of where your buddies are, and to keep the scan going throughout the engagement as positions move and the team fires and moves. If you do not have a shot angle that is not going to potentially kill your buddy, then you need to move.

Scanning:

As alluded to above, scanning is a constant activity. You are looking for cover, for the enemy, for your buddies. It is more important to know where your buddies are than it is to get that shot off. We struggle with ‘square-range-isms’ at MVT, otherwise known as re-training the training scars out of people, acquired from tacticool training. We notice the tendency to try and scan with the weapon glued to the eyeball, or to perform that fake-robotic-square-range-scan. Or to not scan at all, or to just take quick tunnel glances, like to the left, to the center, to the right, down a ‘tunnel’ in the trees.

To Scan:

•Lower the weapon out of your face.
•Get your eye out of the optic.
•If you have a magnified optic, it is OK to use it as a monocular to check out an item of interest, but don’t be glued to it.
•Scan by looking THROUGH the vegetation.
•Scan in a ‘S’ near-middle-far left-center-right.
•Cover your sector!
•Look from your buddy on one side to your buddy on the other side, particularly after an engagement. What is their position and are they OK? Does anyone need to move, including you?

As you move towards the enemy position, or away from it in a break contact drill, you are always looking for your next position of cover. You are always running ‘head-body-weapon’ and practicing active muzzle awareness. You are scanning for your buddies and moving your position as necessary in order to engage the target safely. As you locate your next cover, locate your buddies so that you don’t run the wrong way, into their safety angle. Communicate if necessary – “I’m on your left!”

It is always better to run the lanes slower and under control, than faster and out of control/unsafe. It is better to maintain a steady momentum of fire and movement on the enemy, as you press closer and closer to his position, that it is to run about the woods like headless chickens, causing a safety STOP.

And here is the kicker: those students who train at MVT learn this all under controlled conditions. It is vital that you learn these things at a reputable school that conducts actual live fire movement training. Otherwise you really don’t know what you don’t know. We have an expression at MVT which is students ‘going bluescreen.’ By attending battle inoculation live fire training with movement, under controlled and safe conditions, you are pushing back the point at which you will become exhausted and ‘go bluescreen.’

“Shoot, move and communicate” sounds good on the internet. It’s not so easy to practice in the real world.

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Gear for the American Patriot: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Training Plan Part 2b

After my first magazine, and establishment of a par time, I’ll move up the 50 meter line and do the exact same thing, on the same target. Now, the target appears to be twice as large. While it would be nice if my times were twice as fast, the reality of how the human brain works means that my par time for 50 meters averages around .6-.7 seconds. Then, I step up to the 25 meter line for a magazine. Now, I’m looking at sold half-second par times, occasionally dropping one to 0.45 seconds. I’ve gotten a 0.39 second shot, exactly once, as I recall, without poring through my shooting log (In the interest of intellectual honesty, that was a fluke. I actually called that shot a “miss” before I heard the steel ring). My tested “pure reaction speed” is generally around 0.18 seconds (I test this by running the timer. With the weapon pointed in a safe direction, safety selector switch on “FIRE,” and finger already on the trigger, not even worrying about actually hitting a target, all I have to do when the timer sounds is squeeze the trigger. Testing this in classes, the average has been between 0.19 and 0.22, with three or four people total, over the course of a dozen classes, being faster than 0.16. I’ve seen TWO people that were at 0.14. One was a former fighter pilot). That means, even at a 0.5 average, I’m moving the gun into position, recognizing an adequate sight picture, and breaking the shot in roughly 3/10ths of a second. In my forties? I’ll take that.

Finally, I’ll step back to the 100 meter line and push myself to go as absolutely fast as possible. While I—obviously—want all of my rounds to hit the target, I don’t get upset if I miss either. I’m trying to push the limits of my ability. I EXPECT to miss! On this iteration, again working my way through an entire magazine, I only record the times on shots that hit. The average may only drop 0.01 seconds, but guess what? That’s 0.01 second faster than I was before. Over time, that will increase. I’ll be faster, but still hitting an acceptably challenging accuracy and precision standard.
Realistically, being able to get fast, accurate hits on targets, inside of 100 meters is the most important aspect of real-world combat shooting with a rifle, that we need to be focusing on. It is the NUMBER ONE priority for your carbine/rifle training. If I have time afterwards, and the range is long enough to make it possible, I’ll step back to 200 meters and beyond, and I’ll work snap shots from positions other than standing. At 200 meters, I’ll drop to the squatting and work on breaking my shots in less than 1.5-2.0 seconds. I’ll push out to 300, 400, and 500, and working on dropping into the prone and breaking my first shot in less than 3.0 seconds.

This standard is based on the doctrinal “3-5 second rush.” Assuming the guy I’m fighting is trained, I’m going to assume he’s well-trained, practiced, and disciplined. From the moment he moves, when I have an opportunity to notice him moving, and move to acquire a sight picture and snap my first shot, to get a hit, I have…three to five seconds…
That is ALL I do for my rifle live-fire range work, once a week, the first two weeks of a quarterly training cycle. I’m not going to lie to you. It is BORING! Not that I’m super-gifted, because I’m not. I’ve worked very hard to develop those abilities. If you do the work, you will get the results you need to get.

The last two weeks of the first month of the training cycle, dedicated to marksmanship-specific training, I’ll continue doing the snaps, but I’ll generally just fire ten shots at each line, finishing the magazine with controlled pairs instead. This reinforces that my positions are not only adequate to get me on target, but are robust enough to allow follow-on shots, if necessary. The catch is, I do these the EXACT SAME WAY that I do the single shot snaps, and I record my times meticulously, just like the single shot snaps. The thing is, while I think a 0.15-0.2 split time between the first round and the second round in the controlled pair is eminently achievable at 100 meters, your split times only matter indirectly. If you punch a round into a dude’s head, or groin, with a rifle, inside of 100 meters, you’re going to have time to get a second one into him. The reason I note and record my split times is because it is indicative of the strength or weaknesses in my shooting position. If it is taking me longer this week to get my sights back into alignment to break my second shot, that tells me that my position is loose, because I’m not managing my recoil adequately.

For the handgun, “snap shooting” isn’t really “snap shooting” of course. We don’t—generally—walk around with a pistol in our hands. That’s why we carry them, every day, everywhere we go, right? Because, we can have it, in the holster, ready at hand, but out of sight to avoid scaring people, or giving away to a potential bad guy that we’re armed and prepared to respond. All Walter Mitty, Red Dawn fantasies of the coming conflagration aside—seriously, does anyone NOT realize we’re living in the midst of TEOTWAWKI, right now? Seriously—for the vast, majority of us, in the event that we have to (get to?) use a firearm in a contemporary context, outside of LEO or mil work, it’s going to be our concealed carry sidearm. Sure, I keep my MK18 in the truck with us, everywhere we go. But…I don’t carry it into the grocery store. I don’t walk into my mother’s house with my rifle slung over my shoulder (the poor woman is uncomfortable enough knowing that her “baby” is walking around with a Glock concealed somewhere on his person).

Being able to get to—and use—your pistol, at an expert level is, by any reasonable measure, inarguably more important than whatever your skill with a rifle. Most importantly is the FACT that you’re actually likely to have the pistol with you when Jamal Jihadi or Carlos Cartel kicks in the front door and starts shooting people. Second, skill with the pistol transfers across to the carbine a lot better than the reverse.

What is involved with “snap shooting” with the pistol? Obviously, sight picture/sight alignment and maintaining them via a steady position still matter, but just as important—perhaps more important—is being able to get the thing out, and into your hand, in a manner that will allow you to make your first shot break within the time standard you establish, and is robust enough to allow for rapid follow-up shot (because, it’s a pistol, and follow-up shots are WAY more likely to be needed than with any rifle).

“Snap shooting” with the pistol is the drawstroke to first shot break. Period. While a sub-1.0 second drawstroke from concealment, inside of 10 meters/30 feet (yeah, it’s actually 33 feet, I know.) is easily achievable with practice, I think being able to draw and hit a 3×5 index card, on demand, in less than 1.25 seconds is a reasonable standard. Yes, the “vital zone” of an adult male is significantly larger than that. If you’re happy with a six-inch circle, or an eight-inch circle, that’s fine, but a 3×5, working to develop the ability to put it into a 3×3 or even a 2×2 circle, at speed, especially at closer ranges (call it, inside of 15 feet?). It also gives you a greater margin for error when your hands are sweaty, and your shaking with nerves, because it just got real, and you’re concerned about not missing the bad guy and hitting the wrong person…

After shooting my groups with the pistol, I’ll start at the ten meter line, and do a simple draw from concealment to first shot break, on the timer. With a double-stack Glock 19 or 17, I’ll run through two full magazines. The first will be with both hands working the gun. The second is shot, still from a drawstroke, strong-hand only.

I do the exact same thing with the pistol that I did with the carbine, except I’m drawing the gun from concealment, instead of coming from a ready position. I’ll move up to the seven meter line, and then the three meter line. Finally, I’ll move back to the ten meter line.

I’ll finish up shooting a group at 25 meters, just to reinforce precision and accuracy, before winding up.

Like the rifle/carbine, this is the entirety of my live-fire range visit with the pistol for the first two weeks of the training cycle. The second two weeks of the cycle, I’ll split the first magazine at each distance, shooting half the magazine, one drawstroke at a time, with both hands, before transitioning to the strong-hand only for the second half of the magazine. The second magazine at each distance is dedicated solely to controlled pairs, for the exact same reason I do it with the carbine.

Conclusions

The single most important shot you can fire in a gunfight is the first shot you fire. It’s going to determine the course of the rest of the fight. You can either make it hit, on time, or you’re going to spend the rest of your life trying to catch up and fix your mistakes…

Spending a significant portion of your training cycle doing nothing but working snap shooting and first shot breaks from the concealed carry drawstroke will go a very, very long way towards ensuring that your first shot does what you need it to do.

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Gear for the American Patriot: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Common hand signals

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Gear for the American Patriot: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Implications in an Insurgency

When "IT" does go down, there will be a lot of implications to such an even on our soil. This article by Samuel Culper at Forward Observer Magazine talks about some of the things that will come up. We need to know this stuff and to think about what it will be like so we will be better prepared to be part of the solution for our nation. We will need a lot of people participating in the "Restoration" if it is going to go the Constitutional route.


Here are a number of points to consider in the event that an insurgent conflict breaks in in America.

1. Whenever we talk about conflict, we have to consider the implications on both sides of collateral damage and civilian casualties. A common practice for the US Army and Marine Corps is to remove civilians from military objectives, so we can kill bad guys and seize the objectives. We saw a lot of information operations targeting the populace of Iraq, warning them that a US/Coalition military operation was imminent, and they should leave the area, or stay indoors, or not carry weapons on the street. These operations were aimed at minimizing civilian casualties by keeping them off our battlefield. During the invasion of Iraq, General Tommy Franks estimated that 28 million leaflets were dropped over the country. How are you going to protect innocent people in your community?

2. There were quite a few places in Iraq and Afghanistan where we didn’t go. We didn’t patrol, we didn’t plan operations there; these places were just basically denied terrain for us. There are some parts of America where police officers don’t go. Why? The juice isn’t worth the squeeze. No police officer wants to die enforcing the law that’s basically unenforceable given the manpower and resources. What implication does that have for us?

Simple: organize your communities and turn them into denied terrain for the police state. If you live in an area where unconstitutional laws will be enforced, then the best time to start is yesterday. If unconstitutional laws are or will be unpopular in your community, then begin the work now of convincing your neighbors that their children’s only hope are acts of resistance. (Hearts & Minds, cough, cough. If they support you, they won’t turn you in.) If unconstitutional laws will be accepted and supported in your community, then you have three options: move now, move later, or die in place, hopefully in an act of resistance. What can you do this week to help build denied terrain for the police state?

3. The populace are a significant part of the terrain, and just like any physical terrain feature, the human terrain can be used by you or be used against you. There are several people credited with the quote, “In war, truth is the first casualty.” This is a really good reason why Hearts & Minds is important. The US media is actively involved in running information operations targeting the populace, and their ability to sway the public is a persistent threat to the future of the Liberty movement.

Go read The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The media is considered an asset of the enemy. And put quite simply, the populace is a tool. Aim them in one direction and pull the trigger; that’s exactly what happened after poor, little, seven year old Trayvon and the huggable, lovable, innocent little angel Dindu Nuffins-who-wouldn’t-hurt-a-fly were killed. As an alternative, look at Alex Jones who infects the internet with lots of speculation and conspiracy theories, which is its own form of propaganda, and those pieces of information get disseminated among the Liberty and Patriot communities. According to some people, a Russian invasion on US soil is imminent. Information, whether accurate or inaccurate, controls people. How can you influence your community to support you in your fight against tyranny? (Pro Tip: The populace can support your cause, but reject your actions. Before you act, better double check that those who support your cause also support your actions.)

4. David Galula was a French Army company commander during the Algerian insurgency (1954-1962) and saw counterinsurgency on three continents. In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Galula writes:

To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become . . . a social worker, a civil engineer, a school-teacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.

In a conflict where the human terrain plays a factor, as with most low intensity conflicts, security elements or militias may have to be more than riflemen. Although they may fight in wars, the militia’s mission is to protect the populace and community. It would, therefore, behoove them to build a strong relationship with the populace, so the populace will offer them unbridled support. Sometimes they’re going to have to offer their knowledge to the populace and fix things and make life better for the populace.

In one sentence: the more you do for the community, the more they will do for you and the more they will do to keep you around. What can you do for your community to make them want to keep you around? Answer that question and then start winning some Hearts & Minds. Because if you don’t win their Hearts & Minds, then the State will turn them against you (though coercion or benefits, not that it matters), and you will lose.

There’s an endless list of considerations if hostilities break out. Focus on your family, build tribe in your community, foster cooperation among yourselves, and get prepared. And, if the time comes, then we can deal with each of these factors when necessary.

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Why You Need Tactical Training

Here is another great one from John Mosby at the Mountain Guerrilla blog. I cannot stress this topic enough, the need is great for each and every one of us to get the best training we can, and to do so continually. Without training no amount of cool gear will make you better. Just do it! Go out and get yourself, your family, or your group some really good quality tactical training.


Why You Need Tactical Training

“Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets.” General George S. Patton

Many people in the world today, and most especially in the United States of America, suffer from a delusion. Brainwashed by the intellectual conceit of the modern nation-state, they accept a romanticized image of the guerrilla fighter created by poet, painter, and photographer, that encompasses either the dashing cavalier of the 18th and 19th century, or the high-tech “superman” of the modern “Tier One” Special Operations operator. This image of what could accurately be called, from a historical perspective, the “modern” guerrilla, is one who is shaped–directly or indirectly–by the organized, state-sponsored military that has armed, equipped, trained, and/or fought him. This image, while obviously valid on some levels, is a far cry from what is often erroneously labeled the “Fourth Generation Warfare” guerrilla, but could more correctly be labeled the “classical” or “tribal” guerrilla. This type of local fighter has existed far longer than civilized society or the “conventional” military concept that civilization endorses as “regular.”

What we refer to as “unconventional” or “irregular” warfare is far older than so-called “conventional warfare, despite the intellectual conceit of western military hubris. The currently fashionable idea that 4GW is somehow new or novel is a product of a belief system created by the formal military educational system that views anything that does not correlate to the established nation-state endorse view of “proper” warfare as being “unconventional” or even “irrelevant.” The average prepared citizen, whether he served an enlistment in the military or not, can be forgiven for the understandable practice of deferring to his more professionally educated fellow citizens in uniform, and should not feel bad for this misunderstanding, as even–perhaps especially–professionally educated military officers and NCOs, including many within the Special Forces community, also suffer from this institutional conceit.

In order to understand the fallacies and shortcomings of this hubris, and hopefully move past it, we need to understand the foundations of the 4GW view, and look past it to see why what is “new” is actually very, very, very old. In brief, 4GW theory holds that warfare has evolved through four basic intellectual generations:

The era of massed formations, most clearly evidenced by the ancient Greeks and Romans.

The era of massed firepower, characterized by the Napoleonic-era formations with musket and bayonet, but also by the WWI concept of trenches, tanks, and machine guns.

The era of maneuver warfare, characterized by smaller, more mobile elements of uniformed, regular forces leveraging mobility and more efficient weapons, to destroy the enemy’s ability and/or will to fight.

The “post-modern” fourth generation of non-state actors using networks in the political, social, military, and economic spheres, to convince a more powerful nation-state enemy that their strategic goals cannot be achieved without paying an unbearably expensive cost.

(I recognize of course, that different theorists offer different arbitrary divisions between the different generations.–JM)

Well regarded military theorist John Robb (and I’m a big fan, so don’t think I’m being disrespectful to the guy) defines 4GW as a method of warfare that uses three basic tools to inflict what he terms a “moral victory” over an enemy. These include:

Undermining enemy strengths. This can be as simple as using primitive TTPs to undermine the enemy’s ability to leverage technological advantages to their benefit. Using couriers for communications, in order to avoid electronic signals intercept eavesdropping would be an effective example of this.

Exploiting enemy weaknesses, such as the use of IEDs to target risk-averse American military forces who confine their travels to heavily armored vehicles, along established roadways, in order to avoid the inherent risks of gunfights, would be one example. Blending in with the local civilian populace, in order to reduce the ability to effectively leverage the lack of cultural awareness training of most American troops, by reducing their ability to determine friend vs. foe, is another, when you consider the (rightful) American prejudice against killing non-combatants.

Using asymmetric operations.

Robb cites several very valid reasons for the returning prevalence of what is mistakenly labeled 4GW methods of warfare:

The loss of the organized nation-state monopoly on political violence.

The rise in cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict as a result of weakening nation-state influence on populations.

Globalization of industry and communications making the tools and methods of the guerrilla more readily available to non-state actors.

Finally, Robb describes some of the tools that characterize this “new” way of warfare:

Rear area operations that target the civil society of the enemy, rather than his armed forces.

The use of terror as a psychological weapon.

Ad hoc improvisation, to use the enemy’s strength against himself.


The problem with this idea that “4GW” is somehow novel is that it is fundamentally flawed, as soon as we shed the biases of our institutional conceit, and look back through history without the filter of modern, nation-state arrogance. Even many of the “differences” between 4GW and “traditional” guerrilla conflict that Robb cites are really just differences between the “tribal” guerrilla of antiquity and the modern nation-state influenced guerrilla.

While the “4GW” guerrilla has access to global media/internet dissemination of TTPs, the fundamental tactics of the guerrilla, including ambushes, raids, sabotage, and assassination, have been used since antiquity. Sure, the “post-modern” guerrillas has access to explosives and automatic weapons, night vision technology, and satellite communications, but those are force multipliers, not force creators. Without a fundamental understanding of the underlying tactical concepts of small-unit warfare, which have been common to all societies, prior to the development of the modern nation-state, they amount to nothing of substance. Multiplying anything by zero still results in a net gain of zero.

The prevalence of guerrilla warfare, as the influence of the organized nation-state wanes, is certainly nothing new. While it seems so to people who cannot grasp a world without the security of the organized nation-state, guerrilla warfare is not new. The nation-state concept and even the formal military of the ancient empires are really historically young. The use of guerrilla warfare TTPs, in the absence of nation-state influence is older than civilization itself.

The idea that survival is only viable for small groups means conflicts are fought by small-unit elements is likewise neither new nor novel. Whether this granularity results from a need to avoid decisive engagement by numerically or technologically superior enemy forces, or because subsistence living realities mean that you are limited in tribal manpower is irrelevant. The fact is, the use of small groups of fighters to influence the actions of an enemy goes back to antiquity.

Likewise, the vulnerability of open societies and economies to attack by “irregular” forces is novel only if you ignore history even as obvious as the Roman empire.

Technological advances may make it easier for the non-state actor to leverage the weaknesses of the enemy, such as the aforementioned use of IEDs, but the guerrilla throughout history has used whatever technology was available to do the exact same thing. It’s the technology available that has changed, not the fundamental principle of leveraging those weaknesses. Technology has always been changing.

What we, as modern, “civilized” people see as 4GW would more accurately be described as “first generation warfare,” or 1GW. It is far older than any other form of human conflict, and in fact never really ceased to exist, other than in the collective imagination of people too arrogant to see that the nation-state concept was experimental at best, from the beginning. Guerrilla warfare is, in fact, older than civilization itself.

Long before the advent of agriculture and the resulting formation of farming societies that provided the ability to produce quantities of excess food per laborer that are required to support a standing army of trained, professional warriors, tribes of hunter-gatherers existed in close proximity to one another. These tribes competed with one another for access to limited resources like game animals and fresh water, no differently than modern man competes for limited resources like raw petroleum: with violence.

Throughout the vast majority of our species’ spectacularly bloody existence on this little blue sphere we call home, both before and since the rise of civilization, most conflicts have not been resolved by well-equipped, nattily-dressed parade ground puppets of conventional military forces. On the contrary, for most of humanity’s existence, wars, rivalries, and grudges have been settled by small bands of haphazardly armed, ill-disciplined, and poorly trained or even untrained friends and neighbors banding together to protect their own turf, or to expand their control over finite resources by invading their neighbor’s turn and killing or enslaving the competition. Our modern use of “conventional” and “unconventional” labels for conflict is a reversal of the historical precedent. From the historical perspective, guerrilla warfare is far more “conventional” than formal armies are.

Like the modern interpretation of the guerrilla, the classical tribal guerrilla used hit-and-run, asymmetric methods, choosing the survival advantage of fleeing before a stronger enemy, unless the fight could be clearly leveraged into his own favor. While many psychologists and revisionist historians have adopted the feel-good, New Age humanist view that animal species, including mankind, possess a natural aversion to intra-species killing, at least in the case of humankind, the archaeological and historical record demonstrates that they are wrong. Using the idea that inter-tribal battles were largely “ceremonial” affairs that actually resulted in little bloodshed or killing are patently absurd. The important factor that these pseudo-scientist “experts” overlook, or else pointedly ignore in the interest of a preconceived political position, is that “battles” are not the guerrilla’s fight. Instead, like his modern equivalent, the tribal guerrilla was more inclined to use the raid in the quiet, dark of the night, to kill his enemies in their bed, by burning the damned lodges down around him, followed by quickly fleeing before the victim’s friends and family could mount an effective counterattack. Only a sucker sticks around for a “fair fight.”

That is the “way” of the classical guerrilla, just like it is the way of the “4GW” guerrilla. The idea of constraints being placed on the behavior of the guerrilla, or that he must fight according to the accepted rules of “conventional” military thought is also a cultural conceit without historical or archaeological relevance. “Mercy” in tribal guerrilla wars is seldom given or expected. Just like a modern US soldier, captured by so-called 4GW Al Qaeda fighters can expect to be sodomized, beheaded, or both, before being killed, a captured tribesman, through history, could look forward to being burned, castrated, beheaded, sodomized, or sold into slavery, if in fact, he wasn’t simply eaten. His women could expect to be raped and then killed, or sold into slavery. Even children would be either killed outright, or enslaved. Villages would be razed, crops destroyed, and livestock stolen. While we may naively expect the “modern” guerrilla to be constrained in his behavior by cultural background or training, or the demands of his nation-state sponsors, the use of this type of terror by the classical guerrilla sheds further light on the fact that the use of terror by “4GW” terrorist is in fact, not new at all.

Guerrilla warfare, whether referred to for what it is, or given some cute new label to make it more marketable, is neither pretty nor romantic. The tribal guerrilla wasn’t interested in playing by opponent’s rules, if in fact, his opponent had any rules to play by. For the guerrilla, classical or modern, warfare is not an extension of politics. Warfare is simply survival.

In his 1996 book illustrating the advantages of modern civilization and the nation-state that resulted, “War Before Civilization,” archeology professor Lawrence Keely points out that the evidence indicates that tribal societies engaged in inter-tribal “guerrilla” conflict suffer an average of 0.5% loss of their total population per year in directly conflict-related deaths. For the current US population, that would be the equivalent of 1.5 million deaths per year–more than all combat deaths in American military history, from 1775 until today (just under 850,000 according to the sources I checked).

The absolute truth is, fighting as a guerrilla, whether modern or classical/tribal, pretty much sucks. You don’t get to go home and sleep in your soft bed, wrapped up around momma every night. Perhaps not for any nights for months or years at a time. You may never get to go home, since it may very well end up burned down by rivals who want your territory for themselves. You may not be around to protect your wife and children. Even if you are around, sniper fire can come out of the blue, at the least expected time and place. Kidnappings, rapes, and destruction of property are the norms in guerrilla conflicts. If you think, because this is “Amurrika!” that things will somehow be different, you’re fucking deluded, and missing the point of the entire preparedness conversation. People you love are going to die. Your wife may die. Your children may die. Whether you pick up a gun, or don’t pick up a gun, you will probably die.

Life as a guerrilla, regardless of the overall impact of the conflict, will suck. It will not be comfortable. Many people in the liberty and preparedness movement cite the fact that some Taliban-aligned Pashtun tribal fighters in the mountains of Afghanistan were discovered to be fighting against US/Coalition forces clad in “man-jammies” and sandals, equipped with little more than a wool blanket and a single spare Kalashnikov magazine. The apparent lesson “learned” by these aspiring American guerrillas is that this guerrilla shit must be easy. Unfortunately for these folks, their ignorance is demonstrated by the fact that they’ve overlooked two critical facts:

The equipment load-out of those Pashtun fighters was discovered during battle damage assessment (BDA) studies. In other words, they were dead…Guess that load-out maybe wasn’t so ideal after all? (A gross oversimplification, I know, but it’s valid enough to make the point worth paying attention to)

A Pashtun tribal fighter from the mountains of Afghanistan is considerably tougher, physically and mentally, than you and I put together. Arguing otherwise isn’t even as benign as ignorance. It’s sheer stupidity and bravado. When you grow up sleeping on a blanket or two thrown on a packed dirt floor, in a mud hut with no window or door coverings except maybe a blanket or old hide tacked up, subsisting on rice, beans, and a handful of half-cooked, spoiled meat, while running up and down mountains all day, and fighting from the time you’re old enough to pick up a Kalasknikov rifle, and never advance to sleeping in a protected environment like a real house, with a soft mattress under you, then maybe you can convincingly argue otherwise. In the meantime, sleeping on a soft bed, in a warm house, with your biggest fear being whether the cable bill can be paid this month does not make you guerrilla warfare tough.

When I was a young Ranger private, one of my mentors was a very skilled martial artist and a pioneer in what would become MMA. Knowing of my profound interest in all things combatives related, he once told me, “Ranger Mosby, a lot of guys come to the Regiment because they think they’re going to learn some high-speed karate shit. They get disappointed when they don’t, because we simply don’t have the time in the training calendar for that silliness. When we do have time, we focus on stuff they think is too simple to be effective. What those idiots don’t recognize is, interpersonal violence is interpersonal violence. Regardless of the scale of the battlefield, the fundamentals of victory remain the same. I don’t care if it’s a brawl behind the bar, two rifle squads slugging it out in the jungle, or the armies of Good and Evil battling it out on the plains of Meggido, in the end, it all boils down to speed, surprise, and violence of action! The concepts you learn here, whether as a rifleman, a SAW gunner, or on a machine gun team, will do more for your “martial arts” knowledge than all the shoulder throws you will ever do in the dojo.”

Being the highly motivated young Airborne Ranger that I was, and hungry for any knowledge that could glean from my wiser, slightly older, but vastly more experienced mentors, I remembered those words. In fact, I went back to my room in the barracks, almost immediately (I think it was after he allowed me to recover from the front leaning rest position for asking some sort of dumb-ass question about combatives…), and copied them into my ever-present journal. It wasn’t however, until I was considerably further along in my military career, while serving as a junior SF weapons sergeant, that I really began to understand what he meant. It wasn’t simply a matter of being faster, sneakier, and meaner than the other guy, although those certainly help. It wasn’t just about being more fit and stronger than the enemy, although that damned sure helped too. The truth was, the same tactics, techniques, and procedures that helped us successfully prosecute a small-scale fight against the Taliban in a tight canyon in Afghanistan, were the same TTPs that would allow me to prosecute a fight anywhere, against anyone.

Whether you expect your fight to come in the bush, crawling around on your belly, eating bugs and drinking water from a stagnant, muddy pool, or you expect your fight to come in a large urban area, in fast moving sports cars, with pistols and stolen MP5s, or you expect your fight to come in your living room, against an up-armored FEMA or DHS entry team (in which case, you’re a dumbass for being there when they arrive), the same fundamental concepts apply, if you actually hope to win and survive.

You need training, regardless of what you think. If you’ve served in a combat arms unit, in combat, you probably possess the fundamental skills to survive the initial bursts of violence as well as anyone, providing you the ability to learn as you go about how to modify the TTPs you already know, for surviving without the benefits of air support, indirect fire support, and a long support train behind you. If you’ve never worn a uniform though, or even if you have, if you’ve never performed in a profession that required you to mentally and physically prepare to look another human being in the face, while shoving eight inches of steel into their flesh, and dealing with the psychology of that, while still being able to provide leadership to others, you have no idea what you don’t know.

What you don’t know is, you need tactical training. Being an effective fighter does not come naturally to anyone, I don’t care what anyone tells you. The fact that you can out shoot all the guys in your local pistol club, or all of the local cops who bother to come to the range doesn’t mean shit. The fact that you’ve won every fist fight you’ve ever been in at the local watering hole doesn’t mean shit. Being a big fish in a little pond is not the same thing as being a big fish in the ocean. The sharks aren’t going to fight you on your terms, regardless of your fantasies.

While a Special Forces soldier should doctrinally be a subject-matter expert on guerrilla warfare, I don’t know many of us who are so bold or naive as to presume that we have all the answers. I certainly don’t. Whether looking at SF UW doctrine, or “traditional” light infantry doctrine at the team, squad, and platoon level, the doctrine, as it stands, may not fit a future conflict strictly. The doctrine may not even necessarily be how things actually get done today (it certainly hasn’t been for most of the GWOT in the SF community. Only recently has the SF community collectively returned to its UW roots after spending the better part of a decade focused on direct-action, door-kicking HVT missions better suited for the Ranger Regiment and SMUs). What the doctrine does, whether SF UW, or Light Infantry, is provide a frame of reference to begin to gain an understanding of the nature of the beast we’re dealing with. It is a reflection of the combat arms community’s collective self-image of how we hope to prosecute these types of operations, or at least how the authors of the appropriate manuals hope we fight.

When considering the future application of this doctrine, whether in training or real-world applications, it is crucial to recognize two critical factors in regards to the doctrine, and choose to either apply the lessons that the doctrine teaches, or modify them to your perceived image of what is going to happen:

At some level, despite the best efforts otherwise, a trainer’s own intellectual conceits, as a product of a 20th century upbringing in a largely Judeo-Christian culture, as well as subsequent professional military education and experience, will necessarily influence the conclusions that we reach, regarding the effectiveness and applicability of doctrinal considerations.

A good trainer, with intellectual honesty, will recognize the existence of these prejudices and conceits, and strive heartily to overcome them.

There is a very sad condition that exists in people everywhere, that is especially apparent in the gun and preparedness communities, for men to delude themselves into believing that they know more than they do. There's even an “official” name for it, developed by a head-shrinking psychiatrist somewhere. It’s called “competency bias.” We all (and yes, I’m including myself in that “we all.”)want to believe that we’re naturally competent at anything we might ever want to do, and we tend to conveniently ignore or dismiss any evidence that would disprove our delusions.

Unfortunately for both ourselves and our families, in the long term, we often get away with this in trivial matters. “Oh, I’m a good carpenter!” says the accountant who’s never swung a hammer for wages in his life, and the last thing he built was a birdhouse in Cub Scouts. His delusions won’t harm anyone, as long as he limits himself to building birdhouses. When he decides that he knows how to build a human house though, and absolutely refuses to even consider the help or advice of professionals, while he might get lucky, the house is likely to fall down around him. Even in a best case scenario, and he does manage to build it solid enough to not fall down in his lifetime, the roof and seams leak, the windows and doors sag and stick, and the whole building settles, because birdhouses don’t have foundations to worry about.

“Hell, I’m a great driver!” says every man everywhere, who refuses to take a defensive driving or high-performance driving class, despite repeated fender benders and traffic tickets. That even works out well for him, until he’s staring into the eyes of a 600lb elk, in the middle of a two-lane blacktop, as he comes around a blind corner at 75MPH, at 0300. He either ends up with an elk in his lap, or the family minivan, along with the whole family, ends up on its roof, in the bottom of a ravine, unseen by passers-by on the road above the next day.

“I know how to shoot! I’m better than any soldier at shooting! I shot my elk last year at 1500 yards, with my .30-06, holding two inches over his back!” says the hillbilly (actual statement, made to my face in a hunting camp!) Never mind the fact that the hillbilly obviously lacks an understanding of even the most elementary ballistics, and has absolutely no range estimation abilities whatsoever, while being too cheap to invest in a decent laser range finder.

“I’ve read all the field manuals and I’m an expert in infantry tactics. It doesn’t matter that I can’t actually execute them because I’m forty pounds overweight though, because I’m going to be a 4GW ninja master, so I don’t need that stuff anyway!” says the 5’8″ 230 lb computer programmer turned militia commander, who really couldn’t even tell you what range his rifle is zeroed at, because he doesn’t understand that an 8″ group, at 100 yards, from the prone supported position, is not something you admit to, let along use as a standard for marksmanship, at even the most elementary levels of shooting.

Competency bias, in mundane matters, is humorous. In life-and-death situations though, it results in the wrong people dying, because egos and pride are too important to some important. The comfort of sitting on the computer, blathering on blogs and forums about your prowess as a 4GW guerrilla commando ninja expert, and master of post-modern urban warfare, is far easier, and more comfortable than crawling around in the woods, sprinting from position to position, getting sweaty, tired, and bug-bitten while actually learning to be a novice guerrilla commando ninja expert. Sipping a Coke and whiskey, while typing about your incredible physical prowess in crawling up storm drains, and leaping rooftop-to-rooftop, three stories up, like a “Tier One” commando, is less miserable than being hungry, thirsty, dirty, smelling like you haven’t bathed in a month, and physically and mentally exhausted to the point of tears, from realistic, effective training. Who cares that it might actually keep you alive in a fight? That shit is hard work!

Do you actually know how to develop and set up a multi-layered, in-depth security program, utilizing LP/OPs and roving security patrols correctly? Do you know how to plan and perform those security patrols? Do you know what to look for when planning a security patrol? Do you know how to hit a realistic, partially-obscured target, at 200 meters, with your rifle? When you’ve been moving under the weight of your fighting and sustainment loads for the last week, and have just sprinted three hundred yards?

You need tactical training. You know, in your heart of hearts and soul of souls, that you need training. You just have to turn your ego down and listen to your brain for a change.

Realistic, effective tactical training will teach you how to shoot, move, and communicate effectively. If you’re twenty pounds overweight, with a bodyfat percentage higher than 15%, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you are not capable of moving tactically, correctly. If you cannot shoot a 2MOA group, from the prone, under field conditions, with your choice of fighting rifle, while rested, you do not know how to shoot effectively. If you cannot perform a speed reload, or immediate action, with your choice of fighting rifle, while in full gear, winded from running sprints or individual movement techniques, and blinded by the sweat running into your eyes, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you do not know how to shoot effectively. If you’ve never performed a live-fire hasty assault or break contact battle drill, with multiple small teams moving over the battle space, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you do not know how to communicate effectively.

Realistic, effective tactical training, in today’s environment, is about more than shoot-move-communicate though. It will teach you leadership skills, under field conditions. It’s about mission-planning and troop-leading procedures, even in four-man cells. It’s about preparing yourself and others for future survival.

Realistic, effective tactical training will teach you, better than anyone can ever tell you, exactly how dismally out-of-shape you actually are. Good training is a suckfest and a gut-check. It will require you to reach down the front of your pants to grab your nuts, and confirm that you really do have the intestinal fortitude to man the fuck up and do the right thing, by getting yourself in shape, so you can do what you need to do, instead of just talking about it.

Realistic, effective tactical training will open your eyes to the importance of your spouse not only being accepting of your preparedness plans and actions, but of her being an active, willing participant. You’ll begin to understand that your partner really is your partner, and that you are not the only one in your family who needs to be trained. Your wife and even your kids of weapons-handling age, should be trained.

Realistic, effective tactical training, planned and executed by someone who knows what they are doing, will teach you how to think about security, not just for your family, but for your home and your community, against a broader range of threats, in ways that are cost-effective, as well as simply effective. Planning just for home defense, or just for your personal or family retreat security is not enough. That’s the equivalent of saying, “I’ve got a gun in my nightstand, so I can leave the doors and windows unlocked, with bundles of cash sitting out on tables, even though I live in South Central Los Angeles. I mean, fuck, I own a gun!” That works great…right up until a crew of bad guys are coming through your front door with Kalashnikovs and hand grenades, while you’re sitting on the couch with the wife and kids, watching “The X Factor” and your gun is still in the nightstand. You need to learn to plan for security, at home and retreat, in a holistic manner, and good tactical training will give you the tools to do that.

If you believe a fight is coming, whether you think it will be against the security forces of a tyrannical regime, or whether you think it will be against outlaw bands of cannibalistic San Franciscans, it doesn’t matter how many books you’ve read. If doesn’t matter how many times you’ve earned the Appleseed “Rifleman” patch. It doesn’t matter how many “Advanced Urban Combat” courses you’ve attended. Until you get quality training in the application of those skills in small-unit tactics, you’re just a lonely dude with a gun. Realistic, effective tactical training is a force multiplier you can’t live without, because you won’t live without it. If you don’t want to, or can’t, get to training with one of the guys in this collective “preparedness/liberty” community who are teaching, that’s okay. Go talk to your old high school buddy who just ETS’d after multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, and convince him to help you develop some training plans. You need the training.

Regardless of the existence of educational and cultural biases, based on the established military orthodoxy of the organized, formal nation-state military, the reality is, small-unit tactics are small-unit tactics. The same underlying principles have worked since the time of antiquity, to leverage available technology (bows and arrows versus massed formations to precision rifle fire versus small-unit formations; burning a lodge down around the enemy’s family with torches and animal fat versus using a thermite charge to accomplish the same thing; sabotage of enemy food supplies via poisoning livestock or water sources versus blowing a rail line to interdict mass transport of supplies) against an enemy. While the current doctrine, SF or infantry, may not be perfect, it really is the best idea that the collective experience of fighters and historians can come up with for what will work to prosecute the fight. As the man said, don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Get the training and you can begin to develop a frame of reference for what works and what doesn’t, so you can make intelligent, informed decisions about how to modify what is already known to work, versus what you think might work in the future.

Now, when it comes to training, be like Nike and “Just Do It.”

John Mosby

Mountain Guerilla

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The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two

Here is the second part in the two part series by John Mosby, like I said at the beginning of part one, this is vital information that we need to start performing now. We need to be organized and ready to go before it is too late. We need to be part of the solution, not the problem. If we as patriots do not perform the necessary actions needed to be ready to perform our part this nation will cease to exist as a Constitutional Republic (which it really does not resemble any more).

The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two

John Mosby

This is part two of a two-part series.

There are three necessary components to a successful insurgency. The subversive underground is always present and is the first component of the resistance to form and begin active operations. The strategic goals of the resistance movement will determine the level of development for all three components:

The subversive underground
The support auxiliary
The paramilitary guerrilla force

The subversive underground.

The subversive underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are practicably inaccessible to the paramilitary guerrilla force, such as populated areas that are under tight control of the regime’s security forces. The underground maintains the ability to operate in these denied areas because it operates clandestinely, returning to innocuous “day jobs” when not performing missions.

Typical tasks for the subversive underground include, but may not be limited to:

-Gathering intelligence and the development of intelligence networks.

-The development and operation of subversive “pirate” broadcast systems that control the dissemination of propaganda through radio, newspaper and leaflet distribution, and/or internet communications and web page development.

-The fabrication of special materials, such as false identification, weapons, and munitions.

-Black market networks and safe houses for transport of personnel and logistics.

-Sabotage by individuals and/or small units in urban centers.

-Operation of clandestine medical facilities to treat injured/wounded resistance personnel.

Members of the underground are normally active, productive members of their community, and their ability to function as part of the resistance is a product of their daily life and/or position within the community. They operate by maintaining a strict compartmentalization and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the subversive underground are what allow the resistance to have a noticeable effect within urban or built-up areas.

The underground operational cell should typically be comprised of a leader and a few cell members who operate directly as a unit to conduct direct-action missions for the underground. The intelligence cell is different in that the cell leader should seldom, if ever, be in direct contact with the subordinate members of his cell, and the members of the cell are rarely in contact with one another. All communications of the intelligence cell would typically be conducted through dead-drop and other covert/clandestine methods of tradecraft.

It is imperative for the potential future guerrilla fighter to understand that, until he sees and recognizes these actions being undertaken by unknown parties, there is little point to “going to guns.” Doing so will only accelerate the actions of the regime to hunt down such “extremist” outlaws. Since the security forces will not be forced to deal with hunting down members of the subversive underground at the same time, there will be little to prevent them from focusing extensive assets to hunting down the “bandits hiding out in the woods.” If you have friends, whom you trust enough to discuss these matters and potential future issues with, who are not outspoken and openly critical of the current demise, educate them on the need for future subversives. They need to remain quiet and simply prepare for the day they need to wire a couple cans of ether to some douchebag’s engine manifold…(I’ve actually never tried it, but I’m pretty well convinced that it would be an extremely effective anti-vehicle/anti-personnel device to be utilized by a mechanic who happens to secretly support the resistance. If anyone has a junk vehicle that will still run, they should try it and let me know how it works out…Don’t run out and try it on a local police cruiser, please. I am not saying do it now. I’m saying consider such possible weapons in case they are needed in the future.

The auxiliary.

This term refers to members of the population who provide very limited clandestine support to the subversive underground and/or the paramilitary guerrilla force. Very seldom will they be “active” members of the movement and, as such, offer little intelligence value to the regime if compromised. Functions of the auxiliary may take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their specific function or service that supports the network. They may not even realize they are actively supporting the resistance. They should certainly never be asked to perform a job by a valuable member of the subversive underground cadre, face-to-face. Even in the modern environment of credit card payments and billing services, there are ways to accomplish such chores remotely. Until they are trusted, they do not learn the names or identities of the resistance.

In many ways however, the auxiliary personnel are at the greatest risk of compromise (thus the importance of their not offering intelligence value to the regime if compromised). Typical functions of the auxiliary include:

-Logistics procurement (either through stealing from a workplace, or purchasing on the black market, or open market, if it can be done without compromising their security or that of the movement.)

-Logistics distribution (transporting goods and dropping them in pre-determined cache locations for later pick-up by resistance forces.)

-Labor for special material fabrication (in some instances, the fabrication will be conducted in assembly-line fashion, to preclude any one group of auxiliaries from recognizing what they are manufacturing).

-Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases (obviously, this is a task that must be reserved for well-trusted and very secure members of the auxiliary…cooks in regime mess halls/dining facilities who may overhear conversations regarding upcoming operations, mechanics who notice an increase in the request for pre-mission checks on vehicles, etc…)

-Intelligence collection (intentional or otherwise)

-Recruitment (obviously, in this case, the auxiliary member knows his part, but can still be compartmentalized to reduce risk to the actual underground or guerrilla force).

-Communications networks staff such as couriers and/or messengers.

-Propaganda distribution.

-Safe house management.

-Logistics and personnel transport (if functioning as part of the black market, the auxiliary member may never realize he is actively supporting the resistance).

The paramilitary guerrilla force.

The paramilitary guerrilla force is the overt military arm of the resistance. As individuals who actively engage the conventional military in combat operations, guerrillas have traditionally held a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment, and firepower (it should be noted that, in the event of an U.S. resistance movement, these would not necessarily be the case. That’s the purpose, after all, of this blog). For all their disadvantages, however, the guerrilla force has one distinct advantage that can offset any unfavorable balance – the initiative. In any operational planning, the guerrilla leader must strive to maintain and exploit this advantage.

The guerrilla element only attacks when it can develop and maintain a relative, if temporary, state of superiority of force. The element avoids any sort of decisive engagement, thus denying the conventional force military of the regime the opportunity to recover, regain their superiority, and use it against the guerrilla force (the application of conventional small-unit tactics, such as raids and ambushes, in an unconventional manner, such as an IED/EFP-initiated ambush, followed by selective targeting of personnel, then an exfiltration, or a rapid, snatch-and-grab raid to kidnap a key enemy leader, are the definition of guerrilla warfare tactics). The guerrilla element is only capable of generating this type of tactical success in areas where they possess a significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection to the local civilian population that allows them to harness clandestine support for security and intelligence-gathering purposes. Don’t ever allow yourself or your unit to suffer the terminal disease of testosterone poisoning and think you’re going to survive, let alone win, a toe-to-toe slugfest with a conventional force rifle platoon. You might have better riflemen, and even bigger numbers, but they have indirect-fire support, close air support, and a faster Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to call on for reinforcements.

Depending on the degree of control over the local area, a guerrilla force element may range in size from fire-team size all the way up to a brigade-level force. In the initial stages of a resistance, the guerrilla force, regardless of size, will generally be limited to stand-off attacks that we typically think of as “guerrilla warfare.” This may include the aforementioned raids and ambushes, albeit on a slightly larger scale. As the guerrilla force grows, however, so should its ability to engage the regime’s conventional military forces on a larger scale, allowing some degree of parity with the enemy. In these cases, formerly isolated bands of guerrillas may be able to connect and coalesce, forming liberated territory that allows for the development of a larger, more conventional military force to face the regime’s conventional force.

It is critical to delineate the difference between a true resistance guerrilla fighter, and other small-unit, irregular force operatives that may appear similar but in fact, are drastically different, such as militias (although the local militia may operate as a part of the guerrilla force in liberated territories), mercenaries, and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs. The militia’s only intent should be to provide security for the local community and its residents. Mercenaries and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs will seldom hold themselves to any sort of moral construct similar to that of the resistance-force guerrilla. It is critical for the guerrilla force insurgent to recognize that only uniformed personnel of the enemy regime are legitimate targets for the guerrilla force. Key political personnel, civilian population sympathizers and informants, etc, must be dealt with solely by the subversive underground. This is critical to the PSYOP campaign for the resistance, since conduct of assassinations/kidnappings, etc., by the underground can be plausibly blamed on the regime’s security apparatus if it is not conducted by organized paramilitary forces of the guerrilla.

Nous Defion,
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains

John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.

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Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part One

This topic is what it will all be about soon enough. We need to be ready to form and organize units such as this. This is invaluable information, please read and pass on to your team/buddies that are like minded. We need to organize now before it is too late.

The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part One

John Mosby

This is Part One of a two-part series. Part Two will be posted tomorrow.

Resistance movements generally begin with the desire of individuals or small groups of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed by an unpopular regime. Opposition towards the regime and hatred of existing conditions that conflict with the individual’s or the group’s values, interests, and way of life spread from the individual (or group of individuals comprising the group) to family, close friends, and neighbors. This can result in an entire community cohering in an obsessive hatred for an established regime. Generally, this hatred has historically manifested itself as sporadic, spontaneous, nonviolent and violent acts of resistance towards the regime, or available representatives of the regime. As the discontent grows, natural leaders (historically, former military personnel, clergymen, local political leaders, and community organizers- remember most resistance insurgencies in the last century had a basis in communist/socialist ideals…) emerge to channelize the discontent into an organized resistance movement that promotes its own growth. The population must be convinced by this leadership that it has nothing to lose, or at least, more to gain, by resistance, than by maintaining the status quo.

The ultimate key to progressing from increasing discontent to active insurrection is the belief by the populace that they have nothing to lose by revolting, combined with the belief that they have a genuine chance to succeed. Additionally, there must be some sort of catalyzing trigger that ignites popular support against the regime’s power and a dynamic resistance leadership that can exploit the situation when it arises. (Critical Note: this apparent focus on leadership within the resistance should not be construed to invalidate the concept of “leaderless resistance.” The concept of leadership should not be relegated to some shadowy, mythical central controlling party of the resistance, but rather, individual cells should have the ability and willingness to take advantage of any key trigger events to leverage the already present discontent to begin active operations to win the support of the populace.).

Once the resistance begins to act out against the regime, there are two types of initial resistance: Clandestine resistance and overt resistance.

a) Clandestine Resistance is conducted by people who outwardly appear to follow their normal mode of existence. This type of resistance may or may not be controlled by any level of leadership, and may include the following activities by individuals and/or small groups/cells.

– Political action and campaigning

– Propaganda development and dispersal

– Espionage

– Sabotage (see my previous post on the critical differences between sabotage and terrorism. They are NOT the same thing.)

– Black marketeering

– Intelligence gathering

b) Overt Resistance is conducted by individuals trained along paramilitary lines. This is the guerrilla force and provides the military arm of the resistance. These individuals and groups make no secret of their existence or objectives (once hostilities have begun in earnest), although they may use the leaderless cell approach and compartmentalize information closely to prevent compromise of the entire movement. The guerrilla force will generally be comprised of those individuals who have previously been openly disdainful or antagonistic towards the regime, and recognize the probability that they have been targeted by the security forces anyway (as much as he hates sleeping on the ground, especially in cold weather, your author recognizes that he has probably set himself up to be stuck playing this role if the inevitable happens. This really sucks since I have bad arthritis anyway, courtesy of letting Uncle Sugar convince me what a great idea it was to walk out of perfectly functioning aircraft that were in flight….and carrying a 90-130lb rucksack? Why gee, that sounds swell!)

Part Two (notes the subversive underground, the support auxiliary, and the paramilitary guerrilla force) will be posted tomorrow.

Nous Defions,

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.

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