Counter Ambush Tactics thanks to The Bunker
Are you an accident just waiting to happen by blindly walking into an ambush, or do you take the tactical “high ground” to avoid such an event?
Rarely do the “bad guys” announce their intended attack upon you. Rather, they lie in wait to seize the element of surprise. They pounce when you are least aware. A burglar creeping through your house won’'t turn on the lights or make unnecessary noise to give you a chance to arm yourself. A mugger won'’t stand in the middle of the sidewalk and risk you taking a detour away from the “fatal funnel.” And, you won'’t find a person about to carjack you leaning up against your car as you approach. Although many violent attacks occur as a result of an ambush, does your training include counter-ambush tactics?
It should. Most martial arts training start with two opponents facing each other and giving the proper salutations. Western boxers come up to each other before a bout and knock gloves together as a sign of good sportsmanship before the first round. Asian based fighters sharply bow or bring their hands together in a Yin Yang fashion then slip into a combative stance. European Fencers salute one another with their naked blades, as do Filipino Kali practitioners. Although this practice is very colorful and rich in tradition it can negatively condition fighters who are in it for purely survival reasons. Subconsciously this practice sends a message to the fighter that there is a preparatory period just prior to combat. To many my statement may sound ludicrous, but ANYTHING we do in training can carry over into actual combat. Let me give you a startling example.
In law enforcement training many Defensive Tactics (hand-to-hand combat) programs use a hard plastic red colored handgun when practicing gun retention techniques, car stops or subject stops (police contact with a person or arrests). The “red guns” are used in place of real firearms to avoid a possible Negligent Discharge (ND). They are red so that at first glance everyone involved in the training knows that they are a training tool and not the real thing. Using real firearms is also a common practice, but it requires weapon safety checks, and marking the barrel with colored tape. The colored guns makes for an overall safer training environment. However, after repeated use of these colored replicas many officers became so conditioned to the red color that on occasion, actors who played the role of the contactee (the person being stopped by the police) pulled out a red wallet or other red object and suddenly found themselves being “shot.” Why? because, the officers associated the color red with a threat. It'’s for this very reason that many agencies paint their training guns black or silver, or buy products that are already colored similar to that of actual firearms.
Rituals in training, salutations before combative encounters, are very much like the conditioning of the red guns. Although innocent at first, they can lock a person into a potentially dangerous behavioral pattern. In this article we will examine training methods that will prepare you for sudden violent ambushes. Before the ambush Throughout my law enforcement career, and even today in my current duties, one of my biggest concerns is walking into an ambush. Just last year an officer in my department was killed in an ambush. A man armed with an AK47 assault rifle waited at a mini market frequented by police officers. When the officer drove up to get a cup of coffee the suspect came out of the store and sprayed the patrol car with bullets. The officer never had a chance to exit his vehicle. He was cut down before he knew what hit him. However, you don'’t have to be wearing a uniform to walk into the center of an ambush. If you'’re not paying attention you can end up walking into a store or a bank and find yourself right in the middle of a robbery as you are doing your errands; many people have.
Whenever you are going up to an ATM machine, inside a bank, airport, or other potential “targets” you should always observe the surroundings as you make your approach. For example, as you walk up to a liquor store you should scan the immediate area for suspicious vehicles. If somebody is in a vehicle nearby the exit with the engine running it could possible be a “getaway car”. Another telltale sign of a crime in progress, or about to occur, is someone “posted” on the inside who is nervously watching the door and parking lot. This person could be a “lookout” for the accomplices inside.
A few years ago, while off duty, my wife and I were about to enter a drug store for some eye infection medication. As we were about to enter through the double doors I noticed a young woman holding the electronic doors open by standing still in the sensor area. At first I thought she was just being polite and holding the doors open for us, but it soon was apparent that she was looking past us and nervously scanning the parking lot. I sensed that something was wrong and grabbed my wife'’s arm to pull her back. Just then two men jumped the store guardrails and were about to run right over the top of us. They had just committed a commercial burglary and were making their escape. Without thinking I pushed my wife aside, sidestepped, and purposely tripped the first suspect with a sweep. The case of beers that the suspect was clutching onto tumbled in front end over end of him on the sidewalk as he skidded to a stop on his palms. The second suspect in hot pursuit leaped over his fallen partner in crime like a clumsy hurdle runner, then turned around to “take care” of me. I pulled my concealed pistol from my pancake holster and ordered him to stop. The surprised attacker, dressed in gang attire, decided that dying for a few beers was not worth it, turned and fled, leaving his accomplices. In the commotion the other two scurried off. I wasn’'t about to stop them without a radio, vest, or back up. Plus, a violent encounter was not worth it for some stolen bottles, and my wife standing next to me. I decided to be a good witness instead. When approaching, or walking through a potential ambush area, always follow the first tactical rule – Stop, Look, Listen. In my example of the drug store incident, the moment I sensed something “unusual” or “out of place” I stopped, I looked, and I only had a split second to decide what I was going to do when the two men came running at me. Had I not been paying attention as I was walking to the entrance of the store the thieves would have plowed me and my wife over.
Whether you’'re in a military unit walking through hostile territory or you are walking through a dark city alley, you should stop, look and listen every few minutes, even if there is no apparent danger. If is quiet, move on. If you hear or see something, prepare yourself. Stop, Look, Listen exercises In the Australian military manual, Patrolling and Tracking, Section 5 No. 74 it reads, “Patrol leaders must try to anticipate where contact with the enemy (ambush) is probable. Action to be taken must be planned and rehearsed before the patrol moves out.” In a martial arts training environment you can do a simple exercise that will help you learn to “anticipate” contact with the “enemy.”
I call this exercise Walking the Gauntlet. It will develop alertness, mobility, and attack. Have several participants line up, spread out evenly, on each side of the room facing inward. Place a student (the trainee) in the middle of the two lines and have him or her walk down the center through the two lines. Prior to conducting the exercise the trainee faces the wall as the instructor selects a couple of attackers on each side of the line. Each trainee that will walk through the Gauntlet will receive a different configuration of attackers. The trainee is then told to turn around and walk through the midst of the participants. The trainee, unaware of who was selected for the attack, cautiously moves through the “crowd” until a noise or aggressive movement from one of the selected attackers catches his or her attention. The trainee quickly defends against the sudden attack. After the appropriate action has been taken against the attacker (be it knife defense training, hand-to-hand, etc.), the trainee returns to the place where the attacked had just occurred, and picks up where they left off to walk the rest of the Gauntlet.
I do this exercise often to prepare police officers for walking through agitated crowds, such as parties, labor strikes, bars, etc. Not everyone in a crowd is going to jump you, but you have to be prepared for those few who might. It makes for a very nervous trainee, but it helps them get use to possible ambushes. Attack the attacker In an ambush the ambusher has the tactical advantage. Whether it’s a military operation or a crook waiting to jump you, the ambusher will have done their homework prior to the attack; they will have studied the terrain in which you will pass, note the fields of fire and observation, cover, concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach and withdrawal. Then, when you come walking into the “killing zone” the attack is launched. In the case of an attempted rape, robbery, or other criminal assault the ambush will be what we call a “near ambush.” In other words, the attack is right on top of you, as opposed to a “far ambush” such as a sniper attack. In a near assault the US military teaches its personnel to attack the enemy if caught in an ambush. By doing an immediate action drill, suddenly counterattacking the enemy even under concentrated close-range fire, moves you out of the killing zone, and prevents other ambushers from closing in on you.
Although each incident must be weighed separately, most criminals expect their victims to comply when faced with the threat of violence or with violence itself. Whenever you submit to a criminal you can never know the outcome. You are at the mercy of the criminal. Although fighting back can get you hurt, a sudden violent counterattack may catch the attacker off guard affording you the opportunity to move out of the “killing zone.” In any ambush the natural instinct is to take cover and save your skin. However, that’'s exactly what the enemy is hoping for and picks you off as you cower in a defensive position. For survival, sometimes you must go opposite your instincts and meet the danger head on.
As the famous Chinese guerilla fighter, Mao Tse-tung, once said, “In every apparent disadvantage, some advantage is to be found.” When I am training correctional personnel how to survive a jail or prison riot, I purposely put them at a disadvantage in order for them to find some advantage. I have an exercise where I simulate a worst-case scenario – a group of hostile inmates have blocked the escape route for the correction staff. The natural tendency is for officers to separate from one another and push directly to the exit or to huddle in a corner and fight defensively. However, these methods are almost always doomed to failure. The proper tactic is to stick together and follow a wall so the inmates cannot come up from behind. In order to have a chance of getting out they have to move together as a group and violently push through. To do the exercise I usually put five officers on one side of a room (fitted with protective gear) and seven “inmates” (also geared up) on the other side of the room blocking the exit. The goal of the exercise is to move as a team and get all five officers past the inmates and out the door. Students learn very quickly that if they do not push for the door and attack the inmates with what the Marines call “violence of action,” they never make it to safety. Of course this exercise can carry over into civilian applications, such as training your family to stick together and push through as a unit. Think like the crook Of course, to outsmart an ambusher you have to think like one. When you walk anywhere, especially high-risk areas, you should always ask yourself these questions:
1. Where would someone most likely be hiding?
2. Should an attack occur where are my avenues of escape?
3. What would the best tactics be – counterattack, submit, run?
A good exercise to run, in order to sharpen your reaction skills in sudden ambush situations, is an exercise I named Door number 1, 2 or 3. Stack cardboard boxes up vertically to create a few “walls” the attacker can hide behind, or hang a few sheets of black painters plastic from the ceiling to the floor. As the trainee makes their way from one end of the room to the other, the attacker lies in wait behind one of the walls. When the trainee comes within range, the attacker, or attackers (it’'s good to sometimes have multiple attackers) launch an attack; be it a hold-up, knife attack, a fist fight, or whatever other realistic simulation you can come up with.
The trainee will soon learn some valuable lessons in avoiding, or reducing the consequences of an ambush:
1. When turning corners, make wide turns to give more reaction time.
2. Use “noise discipline” (don'’t make noise) as you approach a hostile area, so the bad guy can’'t hear you coming.
3. Anticipate likely hiding areas that an attacker may take.
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Tuesday, February 2, 2016
Thursday, January 28, 2016
Magazine Test/Review
Praxis: Gun Tests Magazine - May 2014 Issue - AR-15 mags by brand with torture testing results."
Received this via email from a faithful reader and supporter. with the note: "All mags they rated below an 'A' have been edited from this post."
"Troy Industries Battlemag Magazine AR-15 30-Round Polymer, $14.29 (MidwayUSA.com #859891) The Troy Industries Battlemag is an advanced polymer 30-round magazine. The polymers used in the magazine are chemical, biological and impact resistant. The feed lips have been reinforced and the mag uses an anti-tilt follower. The mag body features a aggressive scale texture that provides a sure grip but will also extract from magazine pouches easily. The spine of the magazine is designed to prevent over-insertion common with some polymer mags. The floor plate features a shock absorbing pull tab, or can be used with the flush locking plate. Functions with all M4, M16, AR-15, HK416, and FN SCAR rifles.
The Troy magazine made it to the top of the list just below the NHMTG, PMag and OKAY magazines. This is based upon the fact that the Troy Mag lost more average rounds — a total of 9 — during drop testing. It did not crack, however and remained functional. It lost no rounds during the vehicle testing. Having passed all other testing and surviving until the firing test, the Troy Mag is a robust and reliable magazine. Gun Tests Grade: A-
OKAY Industries USGI 30-Round Mag, $8.99 (Gunsamerica.com) The OKAY magazines gave excellent results. They were tied with the NHMGT magazines, and the Brownells in practical terms was no better. The only slight mark against the OKAY was that in corrosion testing, these magazines picked up a light dusting of red rust the others did not, but function wasn’t affected. The OKAY magazines may have been older than the others tested. Gun Tests Grade: A-
NHMTG AR-15/M16 30-Round Magazine MA02L, $19.99 (Brownells.com, #100-012-166WB) We tested both 20-round and 30-round NHMTG magazines, both of which made it to the end of the test. However, by the time this issue came out, the 20-round versions were no longer available from Brownells. Function was good and so was durability. These magazines, the OKAY magazine, and the PMag tied for second place by a narrow margin, based on the aggregate number of rounds they lost during various phases of testing. Gun Tests Grade: A
Magpul AR-15/M16 PMag Gen M3 MAG557BLK, $14.20 (Brownells.com #100-011-220WB) The PMag was the top performer among the polymer magazines. Ease of disassembly and general handling were a big plus. Gun Tests Grade: A
Magpul PMag 30 AR/M4 Window Gen M3 MAG556BLK, $17.05 (Brownells.com #100-011-219WB) Despite the use of a slide window, which theoretically weakens the magazine body according to some opinions, the PMag with window actually performed slightly better than the standard PMag, losing fewer total rounds during the test program. When run over by vehicles, this unit and the window did not crack. Gun Tests Grade: A
Brownells 30-Round Gray AR-15/M16 Magazine w/SS Spring 200200, $9.99(Brownells.com #078-000-113WB) These magazines are very similar to the models that Brownells supplies to the US Military. All components are made of mil-spec materials and are manufactured under strict, ISO quality control standards. The heat-treated, welded aluminum body is hard-anodized for superior corrosion resistance, then given a tough, dry-lube coating to eliminate the need for additional lubricants that would attract dust, sand, or dirt. The latest military-type, glass-fiber reinforced composite follower further guarantees flawless feeding in the harshest tactical conditions. We tested the mil-spec stainless-steel spring, but a version with a high lubricity dry-lube-coated chrome silicon spring is also available. They are affordable, well made, and reliable. Gun Tests Grade: A
Our Team Said: "Test 12 was the final test we ran, taking the winners through the first 11 rounds and leaving them fully loaded for a month at full compression. Then we ran more shooting function tests and found there were no feed or fire issues with any of the remaining magazines."
"In our view, the Brownells, NHMTG, and OKAY magazines are excellent examples of aluminum magazines. All of them were easy to maintain, proven to be reliable, and are competitively priced."
"If you prefer polymer bodies, the PMags were both top choices, with the cartridge-counter window option giving that model the edge over the regular PMag. The Troy was also a good choice. If we were buying AR-15 magazines, we would decide whether we wanted aluminum or polymer bodies, then shop the top-ranked items for the best price."
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Check out this site for all your tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Received this via email from a faithful reader and supporter. with the note: "All mags they rated below an 'A' have been edited from this post."
"Troy Industries Battlemag Magazine AR-15 30-Round Polymer, $14.29 (MidwayUSA.com #859891) The Troy Industries Battlemag is an advanced polymer 30-round magazine. The polymers used in the magazine are chemical, biological and impact resistant. The feed lips have been reinforced and the mag uses an anti-tilt follower. The mag body features a aggressive scale texture that provides a sure grip but will also extract from magazine pouches easily. The spine of the magazine is designed to prevent over-insertion common with some polymer mags. The floor plate features a shock absorbing pull tab, or can be used with the flush locking plate. Functions with all M4, M16, AR-15, HK416, and FN SCAR rifles.
The Troy magazine made it to the top of the list just below the NHMTG, PMag and OKAY magazines. This is based upon the fact that the Troy Mag lost more average rounds — a total of 9 — during drop testing. It did not crack, however and remained functional. It lost no rounds during the vehicle testing. Having passed all other testing and surviving until the firing test, the Troy Mag is a robust and reliable magazine. Gun Tests Grade: A-
OKAY Industries USGI 30-Round Mag, $8.99 (Gunsamerica.com) The OKAY magazines gave excellent results. They were tied with the NHMGT magazines, and the Brownells in practical terms was no better. The only slight mark against the OKAY was that in corrosion testing, these magazines picked up a light dusting of red rust the others did not, but function wasn’t affected. The OKAY magazines may have been older than the others tested. Gun Tests Grade: A-
NHMTG AR-15/M16 30-Round Magazine MA02L, $19.99 (Brownells.com, #100-012-166WB) We tested both 20-round and 30-round NHMTG magazines, both of which made it to the end of the test. However, by the time this issue came out, the 20-round versions were no longer available from Brownells. Function was good and so was durability. These magazines, the OKAY magazine, and the PMag tied for second place by a narrow margin, based on the aggregate number of rounds they lost during various phases of testing. Gun Tests Grade: A
Magpul AR-15/M16 PMag Gen M3 MAG557BLK, $14.20 (Brownells.com #100-011-220WB) The PMag was the top performer among the polymer magazines. Ease of disassembly and general handling were a big plus. Gun Tests Grade: A
Magpul PMag 30 AR/M4 Window Gen M3 MAG556BLK, $17.05 (Brownells.com #100-011-219WB) Despite the use of a slide window, which theoretically weakens the magazine body according to some opinions, the PMag with window actually performed slightly better than the standard PMag, losing fewer total rounds during the test program. When run over by vehicles, this unit and the window did not crack. Gun Tests Grade: A
Brownells 30-Round Gray AR-15/M16 Magazine w/SS Spring 200200, $9.99(Brownells.com #078-000-113WB) These magazines are very similar to the models that Brownells supplies to the US Military. All components are made of mil-spec materials and are manufactured under strict, ISO quality control standards. The heat-treated, welded aluminum body is hard-anodized for superior corrosion resistance, then given a tough, dry-lube coating to eliminate the need for additional lubricants that would attract dust, sand, or dirt. The latest military-type, glass-fiber reinforced composite follower further guarantees flawless feeding in the harshest tactical conditions. We tested the mil-spec stainless-steel spring, but a version with a high lubricity dry-lube-coated chrome silicon spring is also available. They are affordable, well made, and reliable. Gun Tests Grade: A
Our Team Said: "Test 12 was the final test we ran, taking the winners through the first 11 rounds and leaving them fully loaded for a month at full compression. Then we ran more shooting function tests and found there were no feed or fire issues with any of the remaining magazines."
"In our view, the Brownells, NHMTG, and OKAY magazines are excellent examples of aluminum magazines. All of them were easy to maintain, proven to be reliable, and are competitively priced."
"If you prefer polymer bodies, the PMags were both top choices, with the cartridge-counter window option giving that model the edge over the regular PMag. The Troy was also a good choice. If we were buying AR-15 magazines, we would decide whether we wanted aluminum or polymer bodies, then shop the top-ranked items for the best price."
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Check out this site for all your tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Tuesday, January 26, 2016
AR-15 100% Lower Mold!
Now this is crazy! This is going to be awesome for patriots to be able to make their own AR-15s outside of the un-constitutional system we have to use to gain access to firearms. I cannot wait to learn more about this, and to get one myself and start making lowers.
We need this ability to produce our own lowers, then our own firearms. We will be called upon sooner rather than later to defend our nation, and to restore our Constitutional Republic. When called on to be there for this as patriots, we will need to have plenty of capable firearms. I think this may be one way we can ensure that we are ready, even if they try to take our firearms, we would be able to replace them. Of course if they tried to come and take them, they would have some serious issues, and it would cause the start of things to come.
Here is a YouTube video about them.
Here is the homepage for them.
Video about how to pour the polymer in the mold: Video
De-mold the lower from the kit: Video
Check into this guys and gals, this could be a really great option for us to make our own lowers.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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We need this ability to produce our own lowers, then our own firearms. We will be called upon sooner rather than later to defend our nation, and to restore our Constitutional Republic. When called on to be there for this as patriots, we will need to have plenty of capable firearms. I think this may be one way we can ensure that we are ready, even if they try to take our firearms, we would be able to replace them. Of course if they tried to come and take them, they would have some serious issues, and it would cause the start of things to come.
Here is a YouTube video about them.
Here is the homepage for them.
Video about how to pour the polymer in the mold: Video
De-mold the lower from the kit: Video
Check into this guys and gals, this could be a really great option for us to make our own lowers.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Tuesday, January 19, 2016
Ruger American Pro 9mm Review
This is an interesting review of a new handgun, that might very well be a good option for some people as a good secondary weapon system.
Pat Cascio’s Product Review: Ruger’s New American Pro 9mm
I’ve been a huge fan of Ruger firearms since 1979, when I bought my first Ruger centerfire rifle in .300 Winchester Mag. Everyone anticipated the first cernterfire semiauto pistol from Ruger in 1985, when it was first announced. Alas, there were problems, and the Ruger P85 didn’t actually come out until 1987. I lived in Colorado Springs, CO at the time and operated a small gun business with a friend out of his gas station as well as gun shows, but we couldn’t get our hands on a P85. One gun shop in the entire city had received one sample, and it wasn’t for sale, but there was literally a line of guys waiting to handle it and place their order for one. The P85 was ugly as sin; it was big and bulky, too. I loved it!
I didn’t get my own P85 until we had moved back to Oregon in 1988, and in one week I actually received two P85s. I was in heaven. However, one of the guns had a problem I couldn’t figure out. The slide would lock halfway open during firing and I had to remove the magazine and pound the slide closed. For the life of me, I couldn’t see what the problem was. The gun was sent to Ruger and repaired, without an explanation, and returned to me. Since this time, I’ve owned every P-series pistol that Ruger has made over the years. Several years ago, Ruger came out with a completely different pistol in their SR-series– striker fired, and once again I owned all the different models.
The P-85 developed a problem with the firing pin breaking, and it could have potentially fired when you decocked the gun. In short order, to Ruger’s credit, they recalled those guns, corrected the problem, and stamped MKII on the slides, so you knew the problem was taken care of. I applaud Ruger for this. They are fast to jump on a problem and take care of it, unlike some other gun makers who want to hide the problem, hoping it will go away. Ruger came out with the P-89 in 1989, basically the P-85 without any problems. Since then, Ruger has had a whole host of centerfire pistols over the years, and every last one was a winner in my book.
A few days before New Years Day, 2015, I received a press release from Ruger, introducing their brand-new, striker-fired “American” semiauto pistol. I loved what I saw and read. The gun is very sleek, very up-to-date, and modern looking. I hate boring our readers with all the specs on guns, so go to the Ruger website, where they will give you all that information.
The new American from Ruger is only being produced in 9mm and .45ACP, with no plans on coming out with one in .40S&W anytime soon. The .40 S&W is falling out of favor these days, especially with law enforcement. They are going back to the 9mm in droves. With new developments in JHP 9mm ammunition these days, the 9mm is supposedly right up there in stopping power with the .40 S&W, and it is easier to shoot. There is a lot less recoil, and police qualifying scores are going up since they switched back to the 9mm; hits and hits only are what count. So, we may not see a Ruger American in .40 S&W.
I didn’t receive my Ruger American Pro 9mm sample until more than two weeks after I ordered it. Ruger is slammed with orders. Demand is outstripping production right now. That’s how popular the American is, right out of the gate. Of course, my local gun shop got in their order for the American a day before I got my sample, and needless to say they really rubbed it in that they, once again, got a new gun before I did. It doesn’t happen often, but when it does, they really get on my case about it.
Over the course of three days I put more than 500-rds though my Ruger sample. Unlike most blogs out there, SurvivalBlog.com will never report on a new product based solely on a press release. Yeah, a lot of gun and survival blogs were 2½ weeks ahead of us reporting on a gun they didn’t have. They simply wrote on their blogs what was on the Ruger press release. That’s not fair to their readers, and we won’t do that, EVER!
The new Ruger American Pro 9 is a striker-fired handgun, which is the trend these days. It has a black polymer frame, and the slide is blackened stainless steel. The frame has several Picatinny rails for mounting lights and/or lasers; previous Ruger’s didn’t have but one rail mounting point. The slide is very sleek looking, and it has cocking serrations on the rear of the slide. There is also a massive external extractor right in front on the right side of the gun. Funny thing is, there is nothing on my sample with the “American” moniker on it. On the front of the slide on either side, it simply has “Ruger” on it. We also have a genuine Novake rear sight on the slide, which is nice, real nice. Two white dots on the rear sight, and one white dot on the front sight make it very fast and easy to pick-up. There is a lot of light between the front and rear sight on either side of the front sight, which makes it great for combat work but not for precise target shooting . Then again, this isn’t a target gun; keep that in mind!
Gone is the big “flag” that Ruger was putting on their SR series, alerting you that there was a round in the chamber. No one liked it. Instead, we have a cut in the rear of the barrel’s chamber, where you can see if there is a round in there. It seems like everyone is going to this sort of thing, and many states require it, if you want to sell a handgun in their state. Moving down to the frame, there is no manual safety, instead it has the little lever in the front of the trigger. That is popular; the gun can’t fire if you don’t have pressure on the trigger, pushing the lever backwards. There is also several internal, passive safeties that won’t allow the gun to fire if dropped. There is a full-time ambi slide release, and on the left side is the take down lever. Remove the magazine, lock the slide open, and rotate the lever down, and then carefully, while holding the slide, release it and the slide comes off, and you can then remove the recoil spring and barrel. It’s just that simple and fast.
Moving down on the frame, we have a full-time magazine release, one triangular button on either side of the frame, right behind the trigger guard. And, as already mentioned, the frame has Picatinny rails for mounting lights and/or lasers. The front strap of the frame has several different diamond patterns on it, for a sure grip; I love it. The back strap has diamond patterns on it, but they’re different. (See the pics.) Now, here is where things get interesting. The back strap is removable/replaceable. My sample came with the medium-sized back strap; however, included in the nice black polymer case the American came in is two more back straps– one smaller/thinner and one bigger front to back and thicker. A Torx head tool is included for changing out the back straps. I tried all three, and settled on the medium-sized one that was on the gun. However, quite honestly, I could live with any of the three back straps. They all felt good to my hands. We also have a lanyard attachment on the rear of the butt of the gun. This is obviously geared toward law enforcement. A lot of cops in foreign countries have their guns attached to a lanyard so it can’t be taken from them.
The trigger guard is not quite square-ish but is very nicely done with none of those silly serrations or checkering on the front that used to be in favor, for those who placed the trigger finger of their off-hand on the front of the trigger guard. Plus, the trigger guard is large enough for a gloved hand, which is another nice touch. We also want to mention the extended “beaver tail” on the frame. On some guns, especially a GLOCK, if you are wearing heavy gloves in the winter and your have a high hold on the gun with your gun hand, the slide can and does get caught on the gloves, producing a malfunction. On the Ruger American, the beaver tail is placed perfectly, still giving you a high hand hold on the gun, but the slide won’t catch your thick-gloved hand. A lot of thought went into the feature.
The American comes with two nickel/Teflon coated 17-rd magazines, and needless to say you won’t see any on the market for a while. You’ll have to purchase them directly from Ruger for the time being. I placed an order for another mag at www.shopruger.com. Mags are in short supply right now. The magazines have viewing holes, starting at hole #4 and ending with hole #17, so you have a good idea of how many rounds are left in your mag. The mags were easy to load, until I got to the 16th and 17th rounds; they were a bugger to stuff into the mags. Then again, many handgun mags are hard to fully load. What I do is load my mags to full-capacity and let them sit for a couple weeks. After that, those last few rounds are easy to insert. So then you have a fully loaded magazine, not a problem!
The American has been tested for sustained +P fire, and I have no doubts the gun will hold up to all the +P ammo you want to shoot through it, if you can afford the price tag for +P ammo. To be sure, no gun makers recommend that you run +P+ ammo through their guns; some of this ammo is really hot-loaded to “proof” loading pressures, so be advised.
BTW, Ruger advertises the trigger return as crisp, with a short take-up. The take-up before firing is short, and the trigger reset is very positive. The trigger pull on my sample broke at 5.5-lbs, but it didn’t feel that heavy in the least. The trigger is actually more of a two-stage one with some take-up and then you feel some resistance before the gun fires. This is much better than many other striker-fired handguns I’ve used over the years. I like it.
The Ruger American weighs in at 30-oz for the 9mm version and only an ounce more for the .45ACP version, which is a little bit heavier than some other polymer framed handguns, but this is a full-sized, duty gun. My crystal ball is working and I predict we will start seeing these guns in duty holsters at various law enforcement agencies and without a doubt, in military holsters all over the world. Ruger is going to put a serious dent in GLOCK and S&W M&P sales. Full retain is $589, but once supply catches up with demand you’ll see the Ruger American selling for under $500; that’s a lot less than a GLOCK and about the same as a S&W M&P. Based on my testing, I’d pick the American over the GLOCK or M&P for a duty gun, if I were a cop again!
If you check out Ruger’s website, you will find that they already have a list of holster makers who have holsters in-stock and ready to ship that will fit the American. I have more holsters than I care to admit, so I started experimenting with them and the American. I found that the Blackhawk Products leather Askins holster, for concealed carry, fit my American sample perfectly. Also, I have some old Uncle Mike’s duty and concealed holsters that also fit the American. So, unlike many new handguns that come on the market with no one making holsters for them, Ruger saw to it that you won’t have a problem finding a holster to fit their new handguns.
As soon as I received my Ruger American Pro 9mm sample, I ran out to my usual shooting spot to run some ammo through the sample. I had an outstanding supply of 9mm from Black Hills Ammunition and Buffalo Bore Ammunition for my testing. Of course, it had to be pouring down rain, but rain doesn’t stop my shooting; extreme summer heat does though.
From Black Hills, I had their 100-gr Frangible load– factor seconds. This load isn’t sold to the public. I had forgotten I had some left from a few years ago and only had a couple boxes. This ammo breaks apart when it hits something solid, like a steel backstop at a firing range. I also had their 115-gr JHP +P, 124-gr JHP +P, 115-gr FMJ, 124-gr JHP, 115-gr Barnes TAC –XP +P loads – a great assortment. From Buffalo Bore, I had their 147-gr Hard Cast FN +P load, 147-gr JHP sub sonic JHP load, 147-gr FMJ sub sonic, 115-gr Barnes TAC XP +P+, and the Barnes loads from Black Hills and Buffalo Bore are an all-copper hollow point load. I had the 124-gr FMJ FN +P+ Penetrator round and their 115-gr JHP +P+ load. It was quite an assortment of different loads and different bullet weights to test in the American.
I had a strange thing happen during the first three 17-rd mags I fired, and that was that the empty brass was being flung in all directions. After those first three mags, the empties were all going in a nice little pile to the right of the gun. I guess things needed to settle down in the new gun. I’ve had this same thing happen with some other brand-new guns; the brass would go every place to start with. Then the gun would settle down. Eventually, the brass was going where it needed to go, so don’t think this is a “problem” with any new gun. I just wanted to mention it.
My second day of shooting was fairly nice weather with no rain. My beautiful wife helped me with the shooting but not loading magazines. She always leaves that job to me for some reason. Throughout my testing those last two rounds, in both magazines, were a real bugger to get loaded, but as I said before load-up those mags and let ‘em sit for two weeks. Then, the last two rounds will slide right in there. I’ve been there and done that with many brand-new magazines. Again, it’s not a “problem” to the Ruger magazines, not in the least. On my third day of testing, we had clouds and it was chilly. I was out shooting alone. The thumb on my right hand was taking a beating from loading those magazines, and it was bruised and sore, real sore. I wanted to get all my shooting in as soon as I could, so I could give our readers a real report on the new Ruger, not just copying from the press release, like so many other blogs have done.
There was not a single malfunction in all my testing, not even a hint of a problem, other than those first three magazines I fired, with the empty brass being flung all over the place. The American chugged along without any problems. Then, it dawned on me that I never lubed the gun. It was pretty dry with just some packing oils on it. I broke the gun down, before I fired it the first time, to check things out but didn’t lube the gun in all my shooting and there were no problems. Yes!!
At 25-yards, I could keep my groups around 3-inches or less, if I did my part, and when I was getting tired, the groups opened-up to 4-inches. My accuracy testing was done over a rolled up sleeping bag, over the hood of my pickup truck. Honestly, I didn’t test all the various ammo during my testing for accuracy. There was just too big of a selection to pick from, and I wanted to get this article out to our readers. If I was on my game and fresh, the Black Hills 124-gr JHP load was the winner with groups slightly under 3-inches, but I think the Ruger can do better. Right on the heels of that load was the Bufflo Bore 147-gr FMJ sub sonic load. Tied for third place was the Black Hills 115-gr JHP +P and the Buffalo Bore 147-gr Hard Cast FN +P load. There were no losers in the accuracy department, and as mentioned, I think the Ruger can go even better, when I take some time to really wring it out for accuracy. Still, three inch groups for a “duty” handgun, that’s more than acceptable, much more than acceptable!
Without a doubt, the Ruger designers took some serious time to design this gun, and they listened to shooters, too. It has all the features you need and nothing you don’t. Night sights would be nice, and I’m sure the after-market folks will come out with some, if Ruger doesn’t.
We’ve come a long, long way since the Ruger P-85 came out in 1987, and along the way I’ve seen each new model that Ruger came out with get better and better. I don’t know how Ruger is going to top themselves with their next centerfire semiauto pistol. They are going to have to work extra hard at it. The new Ruger American is a total winner in my book. Now the only problem I have is trying to talk myself out of not getting one in 9mm. No sooner do I get close to getting Ruger paid-off on gun samples I kept, then they go and do this to me. Here’s another new gun that I’m going to keep and pay for, but now I want one in .45ACP, too. Ruger, you did it up right this time, 110% right. We all appreciate it!
– Senior Product Review Editor, Pat Cascio
From: Survival Blog
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Pat Cascio’s Product Review: Ruger’s New American Pro 9mm
I’ve been a huge fan of Ruger firearms since 1979, when I bought my first Ruger centerfire rifle in .300 Winchester Mag. Everyone anticipated the first cernterfire semiauto pistol from Ruger in 1985, when it was first announced. Alas, there were problems, and the Ruger P85 didn’t actually come out until 1987. I lived in Colorado Springs, CO at the time and operated a small gun business with a friend out of his gas station as well as gun shows, but we couldn’t get our hands on a P85. One gun shop in the entire city had received one sample, and it wasn’t for sale, but there was literally a line of guys waiting to handle it and place their order for one. The P85 was ugly as sin; it was big and bulky, too. I loved it!
I didn’t get my own P85 until we had moved back to Oregon in 1988, and in one week I actually received two P85s. I was in heaven. However, one of the guns had a problem I couldn’t figure out. The slide would lock halfway open during firing and I had to remove the magazine and pound the slide closed. For the life of me, I couldn’t see what the problem was. The gun was sent to Ruger and repaired, without an explanation, and returned to me. Since this time, I’ve owned every P-series pistol that Ruger has made over the years. Several years ago, Ruger came out with a completely different pistol in their SR-series– striker fired, and once again I owned all the different models.
The P-85 developed a problem with the firing pin breaking, and it could have potentially fired when you decocked the gun. In short order, to Ruger’s credit, they recalled those guns, corrected the problem, and stamped MKII on the slides, so you knew the problem was taken care of. I applaud Ruger for this. They are fast to jump on a problem and take care of it, unlike some other gun makers who want to hide the problem, hoping it will go away. Ruger came out with the P-89 in 1989, basically the P-85 without any problems. Since then, Ruger has had a whole host of centerfire pistols over the years, and every last one was a winner in my book.
A few days before New Years Day, 2015, I received a press release from Ruger, introducing their brand-new, striker-fired “American” semiauto pistol. I loved what I saw and read. The gun is very sleek, very up-to-date, and modern looking. I hate boring our readers with all the specs on guns, so go to the Ruger website, where they will give you all that information.
The new American from Ruger is only being produced in 9mm and .45ACP, with no plans on coming out with one in .40S&W anytime soon. The .40 S&W is falling out of favor these days, especially with law enforcement. They are going back to the 9mm in droves. With new developments in JHP 9mm ammunition these days, the 9mm is supposedly right up there in stopping power with the .40 S&W, and it is easier to shoot. There is a lot less recoil, and police qualifying scores are going up since they switched back to the 9mm; hits and hits only are what count. So, we may not see a Ruger American in .40 S&W.
I didn’t receive my Ruger American Pro 9mm sample until more than two weeks after I ordered it. Ruger is slammed with orders. Demand is outstripping production right now. That’s how popular the American is, right out of the gate. Of course, my local gun shop got in their order for the American a day before I got my sample, and needless to say they really rubbed it in that they, once again, got a new gun before I did. It doesn’t happen often, but when it does, they really get on my case about it.
Over the course of three days I put more than 500-rds though my Ruger sample. Unlike most blogs out there, SurvivalBlog.com will never report on a new product based solely on a press release. Yeah, a lot of gun and survival blogs were 2½ weeks ahead of us reporting on a gun they didn’t have. They simply wrote on their blogs what was on the Ruger press release. That’s not fair to their readers, and we won’t do that, EVER!
The new Ruger American Pro 9 is a striker-fired handgun, which is the trend these days. It has a black polymer frame, and the slide is blackened stainless steel. The frame has several Picatinny rails for mounting lights and/or lasers; previous Ruger’s didn’t have but one rail mounting point. The slide is very sleek looking, and it has cocking serrations on the rear of the slide. There is also a massive external extractor right in front on the right side of the gun. Funny thing is, there is nothing on my sample with the “American” moniker on it. On the front of the slide on either side, it simply has “Ruger” on it. We also have a genuine Novake rear sight on the slide, which is nice, real nice. Two white dots on the rear sight, and one white dot on the front sight make it very fast and easy to pick-up. There is a lot of light between the front and rear sight on either side of the front sight, which makes it great for combat work but not for precise target shooting . Then again, this isn’t a target gun; keep that in mind!
Gone is the big “flag” that Ruger was putting on their SR series, alerting you that there was a round in the chamber. No one liked it. Instead, we have a cut in the rear of the barrel’s chamber, where you can see if there is a round in there. It seems like everyone is going to this sort of thing, and many states require it, if you want to sell a handgun in their state. Moving down to the frame, there is no manual safety, instead it has the little lever in the front of the trigger. That is popular; the gun can’t fire if you don’t have pressure on the trigger, pushing the lever backwards. There is also several internal, passive safeties that won’t allow the gun to fire if dropped. There is a full-time ambi slide release, and on the left side is the take down lever. Remove the magazine, lock the slide open, and rotate the lever down, and then carefully, while holding the slide, release it and the slide comes off, and you can then remove the recoil spring and barrel. It’s just that simple and fast.
Moving down on the frame, we have a full-time magazine release, one triangular button on either side of the frame, right behind the trigger guard. And, as already mentioned, the frame has Picatinny rails for mounting lights and/or lasers. The front strap of the frame has several different diamond patterns on it, for a sure grip; I love it. The back strap has diamond patterns on it, but they’re different. (See the pics.) Now, here is where things get interesting. The back strap is removable/replaceable. My sample came with the medium-sized back strap; however, included in the nice black polymer case the American came in is two more back straps– one smaller/thinner and one bigger front to back and thicker. A Torx head tool is included for changing out the back straps. I tried all three, and settled on the medium-sized one that was on the gun. However, quite honestly, I could live with any of the three back straps. They all felt good to my hands. We also have a lanyard attachment on the rear of the butt of the gun. This is obviously geared toward law enforcement. A lot of cops in foreign countries have their guns attached to a lanyard so it can’t be taken from them.
The trigger guard is not quite square-ish but is very nicely done with none of those silly serrations or checkering on the front that used to be in favor, for those who placed the trigger finger of their off-hand on the front of the trigger guard. Plus, the trigger guard is large enough for a gloved hand, which is another nice touch. We also want to mention the extended “beaver tail” on the frame. On some guns, especially a GLOCK, if you are wearing heavy gloves in the winter and your have a high hold on the gun with your gun hand, the slide can and does get caught on the gloves, producing a malfunction. On the Ruger American, the beaver tail is placed perfectly, still giving you a high hand hold on the gun, but the slide won’t catch your thick-gloved hand. A lot of thought went into the feature.
The American comes with two nickel/Teflon coated 17-rd magazines, and needless to say you won’t see any on the market for a while. You’ll have to purchase them directly from Ruger for the time being. I placed an order for another mag at www.shopruger.com. Mags are in short supply right now. The magazines have viewing holes, starting at hole #4 and ending with hole #17, so you have a good idea of how many rounds are left in your mag. The mags were easy to load, until I got to the 16th and 17th rounds; they were a bugger to stuff into the mags. Then again, many handgun mags are hard to fully load. What I do is load my mags to full-capacity and let them sit for a couple weeks. After that, those last few rounds are easy to insert. So then you have a fully loaded magazine, not a problem!
The American has been tested for sustained +P fire, and I have no doubts the gun will hold up to all the +P ammo you want to shoot through it, if you can afford the price tag for +P ammo. To be sure, no gun makers recommend that you run +P+ ammo through their guns; some of this ammo is really hot-loaded to “proof” loading pressures, so be advised.
BTW, Ruger advertises the trigger return as crisp, with a short take-up. The take-up before firing is short, and the trigger reset is very positive. The trigger pull on my sample broke at 5.5-lbs, but it didn’t feel that heavy in the least. The trigger is actually more of a two-stage one with some take-up and then you feel some resistance before the gun fires. This is much better than many other striker-fired handguns I’ve used over the years. I like it.
The Ruger American weighs in at 30-oz for the 9mm version and only an ounce more for the .45ACP version, which is a little bit heavier than some other polymer framed handguns, but this is a full-sized, duty gun. My crystal ball is working and I predict we will start seeing these guns in duty holsters at various law enforcement agencies and without a doubt, in military holsters all over the world. Ruger is going to put a serious dent in GLOCK and S&W M&P sales. Full retain is $589, but once supply catches up with demand you’ll see the Ruger American selling for under $500; that’s a lot less than a GLOCK and about the same as a S&W M&P. Based on my testing, I’d pick the American over the GLOCK or M&P for a duty gun, if I were a cop again!
If you check out Ruger’s website, you will find that they already have a list of holster makers who have holsters in-stock and ready to ship that will fit the American. I have more holsters than I care to admit, so I started experimenting with them and the American. I found that the Blackhawk Products leather Askins holster, for concealed carry, fit my American sample perfectly. Also, I have some old Uncle Mike’s duty and concealed holsters that also fit the American. So, unlike many new handguns that come on the market with no one making holsters for them, Ruger saw to it that you won’t have a problem finding a holster to fit their new handguns.
As soon as I received my Ruger American Pro 9mm sample, I ran out to my usual shooting spot to run some ammo through the sample. I had an outstanding supply of 9mm from Black Hills Ammunition and Buffalo Bore Ammunition for my testing. Of course, it had to be pouring down rain, but rain doesn’t stop my shooting; extreme summer heat does though.
From Black Hills, I had their 100-gr Frangible load– factor seconds. This load isn’t sold to the public. I had forgotten I had some left from a few years ago and only had a couple boxes. This ammo breaks apart when it hits something solid, like a steel backstop at a firing range. I also had their 115-gr JHP +P, 124-gr JHP +P, 115-gr FMJ, 124-gr JHP, 115-gr Barnes TAC –XP +P loads – a great assortment. From Buffalo Bore, I had their 147-gr Hard Cast FN +P load, 147-gr JHP sub sonic JHP load, 147-gr FMJ sub sonic, 115-gr Barnes TAC XP +P+, and the Barnes loads from Black Hills and Buffalo Bore are an all-copper hollow point load. I had the 124-gr FMJ FN +P+ Penetrator round and their 115-gr JHP +P+ load. It was quite an assortment of different loads and different bullet weights to test in the American.
I had a strange thing happen during the first three 17-rd mags I fired, and that was that the empty brass was being flung in all directions. After those first three mags, the empties were all going in a nice little pile to the right of the gun. I guess things needed to settle down in the new gun. I’ve had this same thing happen with some other brand-new guns; the brass would go every place to start with. Then the gun would settle down. Eventually, the brass was going where it needed to go, so don’t think this is a “problem” with any new gun. I just wanted to mention it.
My second day of shooting was fairly nice weather with no rain. My beautiful wife helped me with the shooting but not loading magazines. She always leaves that job to me for some reason. Throughout my testing those last two rounds, in both magazines, were a real bugger to get loaded, but as I said before load-up those mags and let ‘em sit for two weeks. Then, the last two rounds will slide right in there. I’ve been there and done that with many brand-new magazines. Again, it’s not a “problem” to the Ruger magazines, not in the least. On my third day of testing, we had clouds and it was chilly. I was out shooting alone. The thumb on my right hand was taking a beating from loading those magazines, and it was bruised and sore, real sore. I wanted to get all my shooting in as soon as I could, so I could give our readers a real report on the new Ruger, not just copying from the press release, like so many other blogs have done.
There was not a single malfunction in all my testing, not even a hint of a problem, other than those first three magazines I fired, with the empty brass being flung all over the place. The American chugged along without any problems. Then, it dawned on me that I never lubed the gun. It was pretty dry with just some packing oils on it. I broke the gun down, before I fired it the first time, to check things out but didn’t lube the gun in all my shooting and there were no problems. Yes!!
At 25-yards, I could keep my groups around 3-inches or less, if I did my part, and when I was getting tired, the groups opened-up to 4-inches. My accuracy testing was done over a rolled up sleeping bag, over the hood of my pickup truck. Honestly, I didn’t test all the various ammo during my testing for accuracy. There was just too big of a selection to pick from, and I wanted to get this article out to our readers. If I was on my game and fresh, the Black Hills 124-gr JHP load was the winner with groups slightly under 3-inches, but I think the Ruger can do better. Right on the heels of that load was the Bufflo Bore 147-gr FMJ sub sonic load. Tied for third place was the Black Hills 115-gr JHP +P and the Buffalo Bore 147-gr Hard Cast FN +P load. There were no losers in the accuracy department, and as mentioned, I think the Ruger can go even better, when I take some time to really wring it out for accuracy. Still, three inch groups for a “duty” handgun, that’s more than acceptable, much more than acceptable!
Without a doubt, the Ruger designers took some serious time to design this gun, and they listened to shooters, too. It has all the features you need and nothing you don’t. Night sights would be nice, and I’m sure the after-market folks will come out with some, if Ruger doesn’t.
We’ve come a long, long way since the Ruger P-85 came out in 1987, and along the way I’ve seen each new model that Ruger came out with get better and better. I don’t know how Ruger is going to top themselves with their next centerfire semiauto pistol. They are going to have to work extra hard at it. The new Ruger American is a total winner in my book. Now the only problem I have is trying to talk myself out of not getting one in 9mm. No sooner do I get close to getting Ruger paid-off on gun samples I kept, then they go and do this to me. Here’s another new gun that I’m going to keep and pay for, but now I want one in .45ACP, too. Ruger, you did it up right this time, 110% right. We all appreciate it!
– Senior Product Review Editor, Pat Cascio
From: Survival Blog
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Wednesday, January 13, 2016
More on why we need to be trained
I wanted to write more on this topic because I feel that it is the single most important thing we can do as patriots to be there in our nation's time of need. This is the entire point of this blog; to better prepare it's readers for what is coming. Tough times are coming, that is a fact; things are getting worse by the day. Economically we are hurting, our debt is at unsustainable levels, our morals are degrading as a nation, and it will all come to a head at some point. I feel that it will be sooner rather than later.
With that said, I want to provide at least some good information for my readers so that you might be just that much more ready for what is coming, and have a better ability to stand up for what is right, and be there to restore our once great nation to the Constitutional Republic that it was intended to be.
I encourage everyone to get some form of tactical training, if you have or know of a combat veteran, then if they are willing, get them to train you. If you do not know anyone, and you are not trained yourself and you wish to become trained, then here is a list (not comprehensive) of some of the tactical training schools/academies, that you might be able to attend. I know that the cost of some of them seems high, but how much is your life worth? How much are your family members lives worth? Bite the bullet and get the training, it will save your life some day soon.
Here are some of the tactical training places in the United States:
Max Velocity Tactical
Active Response Training
Mountain Guerrilla (John Mosby)
Firearms Academy of Seattle
Insights Training
Spartan Tactical
Texas Tactical
Tactical Response
On Point Tactical
Tactical U
Northern Virginia Tactical
Fulcrum Tactical
Rattlesnake Ridge
Marauders Tactical
Gunsite
Defensive Concepts
Ohio Valley Tactical
Warrior School
I know there are tons more out there, but hopefully these will help you out.
Please take this seriously, and get out there and train with your group, yourself, your family, whatever, just train!
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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With that said, I want to provide at least some good information for my readers so that you might be just that much more ready for what is coming, and have a better ability to stand up for what is right, and be there to restore our once great nation to the Constitutional Republic that it was intended to be.
I encourage everyone to get some form of tactical training, if you have or know of a combat veteran, then if they are willing, get them to train you. If you do not know anyone, and you are not trained yourself and you wish to become trained, then here is a list (not comprehensive) of some of the tactical training schools/academies, that you might be able to attend. I know that the cost of some of them seems high, but how much is your life worth? How much are your family members lives worth? Bite the bullet and get the training, it will save your life some day soon.
Here are some of the tactical training places in the United States:
Max Velocity Tactical
Active Response Training
Mountain Guerrilla (John Mosby)
Firearms Academy of Seattle
Insights Training
Spartan Tactical
Texas Tactical
Tactical Response
On Point Tactical
Tactical U
Northern Virginia Tactical
Fulcrum Tactical
Rattlesnake Ridge
Marauders Tactical
Gunsite
Defensive Concepts
Ohio Valley Tactical
Warrior School
I know there are tons more out there, but hopefully these will help you out.
Please take this seriously, and get out there and train with your group, yourself, your family, whatever, just train!
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Tuesday, January 12, 2016
Why You Need Tactical Training
Here is another great one from John Mosby at the Mountain Guerrilla blog. I cannot stress this topic enough, the need is great for each and every one of us to get the best training we can, and to do so continually. Without training no amount of cool gear will make you better. Just do it! Go out and get yourself, your family, or your group some really good quality tactical training.
Why You Need Tactical Training
“Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets.” General George S. Patton
Many people in the world today, and most especially in the United States of America, suffer from a delusion. Brainwashed by the intellectual conceit of the modern nation-state, they accept a romanticized image of the guerrilla fighter created by poet, painter, and photographer, that encompasses either the dashing cavalier of the 18th and 19th century, or the high-tech “superman” of the modern “Tier One” Special Operations operator. This image of what could accurately be called, from a historical perspective, the “modern” guerrilla, is one who is shaped–directly or indirectly–by the organized, state-sponsored military that has armed, equipped, trained, and/or fought him. This image, while obviously valid on some levels, is a far cry from what is often erroneously labeled the “Fourth Generation Warfare” guerrilla, but could more correctly be labeled the “classical” or “tribal” guerrilla. This type of local fighter has existed far longer than civilized society or the “conventional” military concept that civilization endorses as “regular.”
What we refer to as “unconventional” or “irregular” warfare is far older than so-called “conventional warfare, despite the intellectual conceit of western military hubris. The currently fashionable idea that 4GW is somehow new or novel is a product of a belief system created by the formal military educational system that views anything that does not correlate to the established nation-state endorse view of “proper” warfare as being “unconventional” or even “irrelevant.” The average prepared citizen, whether he served an enlistment in the military or not, can be forgiven for the understandable practice of deferring to his more professionally educated fellow citizens in uniform, and should not feel bad for this misunderstanding, as even–perhaps especially–professionally educated military officers and NCOs, including many within the Special Forces community, also suffer from this institutional conceit.
In order to understand the fallacies and shortcomings of this hubris, and hopefully move past it, we need to understand the foundations of the 4GW view, and look past it to see why what is “new” is actually very, very, very old. In brief, 4GW theory holds that warfare has evolved through four basic intellectual generations:
The era of massed formations, most clearly evidenced by the ancient Greeks and Romans.
The era of massed firepower, characterized by the Napoleonic-era formations with musket and bayonet, but also by the WWI concept of trenches, tanks, and machine guns.
The era of maneuver warfare, characterized by smaller, more mobile elements of uniformed, regular forces leveraging mobility and more efficient weapons, to destroy the enemy’s ability and/or will to fight.
The “post-modern” fourth generation of non-state actors using networks in the political, social, military, and economic spheres, to convince a more powerful nation-state enemy that their strategic goals cannot be achieved without paying an unbearably expensive cost.
(I recognize of course, that different theorists offer different arbitrary divisions between the different generations.–JM)
Well regarded military theorist John Robb (and I’m a big fan, so don’t think I’m being disrespectful to the guy) defines 4GW as a method of warfare that uses three basic tools to inflict what he terms a “moral victory” over an enemy. These include:
Undermining enemy strengths. This can be as simple as using primitive TTPs to undermine the enemy’s ability to leverage technological advantages to their benefit. Using couriers for communications, in order to avoid electronic signals intercept eavesdropping would be an effective example of this.
Exploiting enemy weaknesses, such as the use of IEDs to target risk-averse American military forces who confine their travels to heavily armored vehicles, along established roadways, in order to avoid the inherent risks of gunfights, would be one example. Blending in with the local civilian populace, in order to reduce the ability to effectively leverage the lack of cultural awareness training of most American troops, by reducing their ability to determine friend vs. foe, is another, when you consider the (rightful) American prejudice against killing non-combatants.
Using asymmetric operations.
Robb cites several very valid reasons for the returning prevalence of what is mistakenly labeled 4GW methods of warfare:
The loss of the organized nation-state monopoly on political violence.
The rise in cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict as a result of weakening nation-state influence on populations.
Globalization of industry and communications making the tools and methods of the guerrilla more readily available to non-state actors.
Finally, Robb describes some of the tools that characterize this “new” way of warfare:
Rear area operations that target the civil society of the enemy, rather than his armed forces.
The use of terror as a psychological weapon.
Ad hoc improvisation, to use the enemy’s strength against himself.
The problem with this idea that “4GW” is somehow novel is that it is fundamentally flawed, as soon as we shed the biases of our institutional conceit, and look back through history without the filter of modern, nation-state arrogance. Even many of the “differences” between 4GW and “traditional” guerrilla conflict that Robb cites are really just differences between the “tribal” guerrilla of antiquity and the modern nation-state influenced guerrilla.
While the “4GW” guerrilla has access to global media/internet dissemination of TTPs, the fundamental tactics of the guerrilla, including ambushes, raids, sabotage, and assassination, have been used since antiquity. Sure, the “post-modern” guerrillas has access to explosives and automatic weapons, night vision technology, and satellite communications, but those are force multipliers, not force creators. Without a fundamental understanding of the underlying tactical concepts of small-unit warfare, which have been common to all societies, prior to the development of the modern nation-state, they amount to nothing of substance. Multiplying anything by zero still results in a net gain of zero.
The prevalence of guerrilla warfare, as the influence of the organized nation-state wanes, is certainly nothing new. While it seems so to people who cannot grasp a world without the security of the organized nation-state, guerrilla warfare is not new. The nation-state concept and even the formal military of the ancient empires are really historically young. The use of guerrilla warfare TTPs, in the absence of nation-state influence is older than civilization itself.
The idea that survival is only viable for small groups means conflicts are fought by small-unit elements is likewise neither new nor novel. Whether this granularity results from a need to avoid decisive engagement by numerically or technologically superior enemy forces, or because subsistence living realities mean that you are limited in tribal manpower is irrelevant. The fact is, the use of small groups of fighters to influence the actions of an enemy goes back to antiquity.
Likewise, the vulnerability of open societies and economies to attack by “irregular” forces is novel only if you ignore history even as obvious as the Roman empire.
Technological advances may make it easier for the non-state actor to leverage the weaknesses of the enemy, such as the aforementioned use of IEDs, but the guerrilla throughout history has used whatever technology was available to do the exact same thing. It’s the technology available that has changed, not the fundamental principle of leveraging those weaknesses. Technology has always been changing.
What we, as modern, “civilized” people see as 4GW would more accurately be described as “first generation warfare,” or 1GW. It is far older than any other form of human conflict, and in fact never really ceased to exist, other than in the collective imagination of people too arrogant to see that the nation-state concept was experimental at best, from the beginning. Guerrilla warfare is, in fact, older than civilization itself.
Long before the advent of agriculture and the resulting formation of farming societies that provided the ability to produce quantities of excess food per laborer that are required to support a standing army of trained, professional warriors, tribes of hunter-gatherers existed in close proximity to one another. These tribes competed with one another for access to limited resources like game animals and fresh water, no differently than modern man competes for limited resources like raw petroleum: with violence.
Throughout the vast majority of our species’ spectacularly bloody existence on this little blue sphere we call home, both before and since the rise of civilization, most conflicts have not been resolved by well-equipped, nattily-dressed parade ground puppets of conventional military forces. On the contrary, for most of humanity’s existence, wars, rivalries, and grudges have been settled by small bands of haphazardly armed, ill-disciplined, and poorly trained or even untrained friends and neighbors banding together to protect their own turf, or to expand their control over finite resources by invading their neighbor’s turn and killing or enslaving the competition. Our modern use of “conventional” and “unconventional” labels for conflict is a reversal of the historical precedent. From the historical perspective, guerrilla warfare is far more “conventional” than formal armies are.
Like the modern interpretation of the guerrilla, the classical tribal guerrilla used hit-and-run, asymmetric methods, choosing the survival advantage of fleeing before a stronger enemy, unless the fight could be clearly leveraged into his own favor. While many psychologists and revisionist historians have adopted the feel-good, New Age humanist view that animal species, including mankind, possess a natural aversion to intra-species killing, at least in the case of humankind, the archaeological and historical record demonstrates that they are wrong. Using the idea that inter-tribal battles were largely “ceremonial” affairs that actually resulted in little bloodshed or killing are patently absurd. The important factor that these pseudo-scientist “experts” overlook, or else pointedly ignore in the interest of a preconceived political position, is that “battles” are not the guerrilla’s fight. Instead, like his modern equivalent, the tribal guerrilla was more inclined to use the raid in the quiet, dark of the night, to kill his enemies in their bed, by burning the damned lodges down around him, followed by quickly fleeing before the victim’s friends and family could mount an effective counterattack. Only a sucker sticks around for a “fair fight.”
That is the “way” of the classical guerrilla, just like it is the way of the “4GW” guerrilla. The idea of constraints being placed on the behavior of the guerrilla, or that he must fight according to the accepted rules of “conventional” military thought is also a cultural conceit without historical or archaeological relevance. “Mercy” in tribal guerrilla wars is seldom given or expected. Just like a modern US soldier, captured by so-called 4GW Al Qaeda fighters can expect to be sodomized, beheaded, or both, before being killed, a captured tribesman, through history, could look forward to being burned, castrated, beheaded, sodomized, or sold into slavery, if in fact, he wasn’t simply eaten. His women could expect to be raped and then killed, or sold into slavery. Even children would be either killed outright, or enslaved. Villages would be razed, crops destroyed, and livestock stolen. While we may naively expect the “modern” guerrilla to be constrained in his behavior by cultural background or training, or the demands of his nation-state sponsors, the use of this type of terror by the classical guerrilla sheds further light on the fact that the use of terror by “4GW” terrorist is in fact, not new at all.
Guerrilla warfare, whether referred to for what it is, or given some cute new label to make it more marketable, is neither pretty nor romantic. The tribal guerrilla wasn’t interested in playing by opponent’s rules, if in fact, his opponent had any rules to play by. For the guerrilla, classical or modern, warfare is not an extension of politics. Warfare is simply survival.
In his 1996 book illustrating the advantages of modern civilization and the nation-state that resulted, “War Before Civilization,” archeology professor Lawrence Keely points out that the evidence indicates that tribal societies engaged in inter-tribal “guerrilla” conflict suffer an average of 0.5% loss of their total population per year in directly conflict-related deaths. For the current US population, that would be the equivalent of 1.5 million deaths per year–more than all combat deaths in American military history, from 1775 until today (just under 850,000 according to the sources I checked).
The absolute truth is, fighting as a guerrilla, whether modern or classical/tribal, pretty much sucks. You don’t get to go home and sleep in your soft bed, wrapped up around momma every night. Perhaps not for any nights for months or years at a time. You may never get to go home, since it may very well end up burned down by rivals who want your territory for themselves. You may not be around to protect your wife and children. Even if you are around, sniper fire can come out of the blue, at the least expected time and place. Kidnappings, rapes, and destruction of property are the norms in guerrilla conflicts. If you think, because this is “Amurrika!” that things will somehow be different, you’re fucking deluded, and missing the point of the entire preparedness conversation. People you love are going to die. Your wife may die. Your children may die. Whether you pick up a gun, or don’t pick up a gun, you will probably die.
Life as a guerrilla, regardless of the overall impact of the conflict, will suck. It will not be comfortable. Many people in the liberty and preparedness movement cite the fact that some Taliban-aligned Pashtun tribal fighters in the mountains of Afghanistan were discovered to be fighting against US/Coalition forces clad in “man-jammies” and sandals, equipped with little more than a wool blanket and a single spare Kalashnikov magazine. The apparent lesson “learned” by these aspiring American guerrillas is that this guerrilla shit must be easy. Unfortunately for these folks, their ignorance is demonstrated by the fact that they’ve overlooked two critical facts:
The equipment load-out of those Pashtun fighters was discovered during battle damage assessment (BDA) studies. In other words, they were dead…Guess that load-out maybe wasn’t so ideal after all? (A gross oversimplification, I know, but it’s valid enough to make the point worth paying attention to)
A Pashtun tribal fighter from the mountains of Afghanistan is considerably tougher, physically and mentally, than you and I put together. Arguing otherwise isn’t even as benign as ignorance. It’s sheer stupidity and bravado. When you grow up sleeping on a blanket or two thrown on a packed dirt floor, in a mud hut with no window or door coverings except maybe a blanket or old hide tacked up, subsisting on rice, beans, and a handful of half-cooked, spoiled meat, while running up and down mountains all day, and fighting from the time you’re old enough to pick up a Kalasknikov rifle, and never advance to sleeping in a protected environment like a real house, with a soft mattress under you, then maybe you can convincingly argue otherwise. In the meantime, sleeping on a soft bed, in a warm house, with your biggest fear being whether the cable bill can be paid this month does not make you guerrilla warfare tough.
When I was a young Ranger private, one of my mentors was a very skilled martial artist and a pioneer in what would become MMA. Knowing of my profound interest in all things combatives related, he once told me, “Ranger Mosby, a lot of guys come to the Regiment because they think they’re going to learn some high-speed karate shit. They get disappointed when they don’t, because we simply don’t have the time in the training calendar for that silliness. When we do have time, we focus on stuff they think is too simple to be effective. What those idiots don’t recognize is, interpersonal violence is interpersonal violence. Regardless of the scale of the battlefield, the fundamentals of victory remain the same. I don’t care if it’s a brawl behind the bar, two rifle squads slugging it out in the jungle, or the armies of Good and Evil battling it out on the plains of Meggido, in the end, it all boils down to speed, surprise, and violence of action! The concepts you learn here, whether as a rifleman, a SAW gunner, or on a machine gun team, will do more for your “martial arts” knowledge than all the shoulder throws you will ever do in the dojo.”
Being the highly motivated young Airborne Ranger that I was, and hungry for any knowledge that could glean from my wiser, slightly older, but vastly more experienced mentors, I remembered those words. In fact, I went back to my room in the barracks, almost immediately (I think it was after he allowed me to recover from the front leaning rest position for asking some sort of dumb-ass question about combatives…), and copied them into my ever-present journal. It wasn’t however, until I was considerably further along in my military career, while serving as a junior SF weapons sergeant, that I really began to understand what he meant. It wasn’t simply a matter of being faster, sneakier, and meaner than the other guy, although those certainly help. It wasn’t just about being more fit and stronger than the enemy, although that damned sure helped too. The truth was, the same tactics, techniques, and procedures that helped us successfully prosecute a small-scale fight against the Taliban in a tight canyon in Afghanistan, were the same TTPs that would allow me to prosecute a fight anywhere, against anyone.
Whether you expect your fight to come in the bush, crawling around on your belly, eating bugs and drinking water from a stagnant, muddy pool, or you expect your fight to come in a large urban area, in fast moving sports cars, with pistols and stolen MP5s, or you expect your fight to come in your living room, against an up-armored FEMA or DHS entry team (in which case, you’re a dumbass for being there when they arrive), the same fundamental concepts apply, if you actually hope to win and survive.
You need training, regardless of what you think. If you’ve served in a combat arms unit, in combat, you probably possess the fundamental skills to survive the initial bursts of violence as well as anyone, providing you the ability to learn as you go about how to modify the TTPs you already know, for surviving without the benefits of air support, indirect fire support, and a long support train behind you. If you’ve never worn a uniform though, or even if you have, if you’ve never performed in a profession that required you to mentally and physically prepare to look another human being in the face, while shoving eight inches of steel into their flesh, and dealing with the psychology of that, while still being able to provide leadership to others, you have no idea what you don’t know.
What you don’t know is, you need tactical training. Being an effective fighter does not come naturally to anyone, I don’t care what anyone tells you. The fact that you can out shoot all the guys in your local pistol club, or all of the local cops who bother to come to the range doesn’t mean shit. The fact that you’ve won every fist fight you’ve ever been in at the local watering hole doesn’t mean shit. Being a big fish in a little pond is not the same thing as being a big fish in the ocean. The sharks aren’t going to fight you on your terms, regardless of your fantasies.
While a Special Forces soldier should doctrinally be a subject-matter expert on guerrilla warfare, I don’t know many of us who are so bold or naive as to presume that we have all the answers. I certainly don’t. Whether looking at SF UW doctrine, or “traditional” light infantry doctrine at the team, squad, and platoon level, the doctrine, as it stands, may not fit a future conflict strictly. The doctrine may not even necessarily be how things actually get done today (it certainly hasn’t been for most of the GWOT in the SF community. Only recently has the SF community collectively returned to its UW roots after spending the better part of a decade focused on direct-action, door-kicking HVT missions better suited for the Ranger Regiment and SMUs). What the doctrine does, whether SF UW, or Light Infantry, is provide a frame of reference to begin to gain an understanding of the nature of the beast we’re dealing with. It is a reflection of the combat arms community’s collective self-image of how we hope to prosecute these types of operations, or at least how the authors of the appropriate manuals hope we fight.
When considering the future application of this doctrine, whether in training or real-world applications, it is crucial to recognize two critical factors in regards to the doctrine, and choose to either apply the lessons that the doctrine teaches, or modify them to your perceived image of what is going to happen:
At some level, despite the best efforts otherwise, a trainer’s own intellectual conceits, as a product of a 20th century upbringing in a largely Judeo-Christian culture, as well as subsequent professional military education and experience, will necessarily influence the conclusions that we reach, regarding the effectiveness and applicability of doctrinal considerations.
A good trainer, with intellectual honesty, will recognize the existence of these prejudices and conceits, and strive heartily to overcome them.
There is a very sad condition that exists in people everywhere, that is especially apparent in the gun and preparedness communities, for men to delude themselves into believing that they know more than they do. There's even an “official” name for it, developed by a head-shrinking psychiatrist somewhere. It’s called “competency bias.” We all (and yes, I’m including myself in that “we all.”)want to believe that we’re naturally competent at anything we might ever want to do, and we tend to conveniently ignore or dismiss any evidence that would disprove our delusions.
Unfortunately for both ourselves and our families, in the long term, we often get away with this in trivial matters. “Oh, I’m a good carpenter!” says the accountant who’s never swung a hammer for wages in his life, and the last thing he built was a birdhouse in Cub Scouts. His delusions won’t harm anyone, as long as he limits himself to building birdhouses. When he decides that he knows how to build a human house though, and absolutely refuses to even consider the help or advice of professionals, while he might get lucky, the house is likely to fall down around him. Even in a best case scenario, and he does manage to build it solid enough to not fall down in his lifetime, the roof and seams leak, the windows and doors sag and stick, and the whole building settles, because birdhouses don’t have foundations to worry about.
“Hell, I’m a great driver!” says every man everywhere, who refuses to take a defensive driving or high-performance driving class, despite repeated fender benders and traffic tickets. That even works out well for him, until he’s staring into the eyes of a 600lb elk, in the middle of a two-lane blacktop, as he comes around a blind corner at 75MPH, at 0300. He either ends up with an elk in his lap, or the family minivan, along with the whole family, ends up on its roof, in the bottom of a ravine, unseen by passers-by on the road above the next day.
“I know how to shoot! I’m better than any soldier at shooting! I shot my elk last year at 1500 yards, with my .30-06, holding two inches over his back!” says the hillbilly (actual statement, made to my face in a hunting camp!) Never mind the fact that the hillbilly obviously lacks an understanding of even the most elementary ballistics, and has absolutely no range estimation abilities whatsoever, while being too cheap to invest in a decent laser range finder.
“I’ve read all the field manuals and I’m an expert in infantry tactics. It doesn’t matter that I can’t actually execute them because I’m forty pounds overweight though, because I’m going to be a 4GW ninja master, so I don’t need that stuff anyway!” says the 5’8″ 230 lb computer programmer turned militia commander, who really couldn’t even tell you what range his rifle is zeroed at, because he doesn’t understand that an 8″ group, at 100 yards, from the prone supported position, is not something you admit to, let along use as a standard for marksmanship, at even the most elementary levels of shooting.
Competency bias, in mundane matters, is humorous. In life-and-death situations though, it results in the wrong people dying, because egos and pride are too important to some important. The comfort of sitting on the computer, blathering on blogs and forums about your prowess as a 4GW guerrilla commando ninja expert, and master of post-modern urban warfare, is far easier, and more comfortable than crawling around in the woods, sprinting from position to position, getting sweaty, tired, and bug-bitten while actually learning to be a novice guerrilla commando ninja expert. Sipping a Coke and whiskey, while typing about your incredible physical prowess in crawling up storm drains, and leaping rooftop-to-rooftop, three stories up, like a “Tier One” commando, is less miserable than being hungry, thirsty, dirty, smelling like you haven’t bathed in a month, and physically and mentally exhausted to the point of tears, from realistic, effective training. Who cares that it might actually keep you alive in a fight? That shit is hard work!
Do you actually know how to develop and set up a multi-layered, in-depth security program, utilizing LP/OPs and roving security patrols correctly? Do you know how to plan and perform those security patrols? Do you know what to look for when planning a security patrol? Do you know how to hit a realistic, partially-obscured target, at 200 meters, with your rifle? When you’ve been moving under the weight of your fighting and sustainment loads for the last week, and have just sprinted three hundred yards?
You need tactical training. You know, in your heart of hearts and soul of souls, that you need training. You just have to turn your ego down and listen to your brain for a change.
Realistic, effective tactical training will teach you how to shoot, move, and communicate effectively. If you’re twenty pounds overweight, with a bodyfat percentage higher than 15%, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you are not capable of moving tactically, correctly. If you cannot shoot a 2MOA group, from the prone, under field conditions, with your choice of fighting rifle, while rested, you do not know how to shoot effectively. If you cannot perform a speed reload, or immediate action, with your choice of fighting rifle, while in full gear, winded from running sprints or individual movement techniques, and blinded by the sweat running into your eyes, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you do not know how to shoot effectively. If you’ve never performed a live-fire hasty assault or break contact battle drill, with multiple small teams moving over the battle space, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you do not know how to communicate effectively.
Realistic, effective tactical training, in today’s environment, is about more than shoot-move-communicate though. It will teach you leadership skills, under field conditions. It’s about mission-planning and troop-leading procedures, even in four-man cells. It’s about preparing yourself and others for future survival.
Realistic, effective tactical training will teach you, better than anyone can ever tell you, exactly how dismally out-of-shape you actually are. Good training is a suckfest and a gut-check. It will require you to reach down the front of your pants to grab your nuts, and confirm that you really do have the intestinal fortitude to man the fuck up and do the right thing, by getting yourself in shape, so you can do what you need to do, instead of just talking about it.
Realistic, effective tactical training will open your eyes to the importance of your spouse not only being accepting of your preparedness plans and actions, but of her being an active, willing participant. You’ll begin to understand that your partner really is your partner, and that you are not the only one in your family who needs to be trained. Your wife and even your kids of weapons-handling age, should be trained.
Realistic, effective tactical training, planned and executed by someone who knows what they are doing, will teach you how to think about security, not just for your family, but for your home and your community, against a broader range of threats, in ways that are cost-effective, as well as simply effective. Planning just for home defense, or just for your personal or family retreat security is not enough. That’s the equivalent of saying, “I’ve got a gun in my nightstand, so I can leave the doors and windows unlocked, with bundles of cash sitting out on tables, even though I live in South Central Los Angeles. I mean, fuck, I own a gun!” That works great…right up until a crew of bad guys are coming through your front door with Kalashnikovs and hand grenades, while you’re sitting on the couch with the wife and kids, watching “The X Factor” and your gun is still in the nightstand. You need to learn to plan for security, at home and retreat, in a holistic manner, and good tactical training will give you the tools to do that.
If you believe a fight is coming, whether you think it will be against the security forces of a tyrannical regime, or whether you think it will be against outlaw bands of cannibalistic San Franciscans, it doesn’t matter how many books you’ve read. If doesn’t matter how many times you’ve earned the Appleseed “Rifleman” patch. It doesn’t matter how many “Advanced Urban Combat” courses you’ve attended. Until you get quality training in the application of those skills in small-unit tactics, you’re just a lonely dude with a gun. Realistic, effective tactical training is a force multiplier you can’t live without, because you won’t live without it. If you don’t want to, or can’t, get to training with one of the guys in this collective “preparedness/liberty” community who are teaching, that’s okay. Go talk to your old high school buddy who just ETS’d after multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, and convince him to help you develop some training plans. You need the training.
Regardless of the existence of educational and cultural biases, based on the established military orthodoxy of the organized, formal nation-state military, the reality is, small-unit tactics are small-unit tactics. The same underlying principles have worked since the time of antiquity, to leverage available technology (bows and arrows versus massed formations to precision rifle fire versus small-unit formations; burning a lodge down around the enemy’s family with torches and animal fat versus using a thermite charge to accomplish the same thing; sabotage of enemy food supplies via poisoning livestock or water sources versus blowing a rail line to interdict mass transport of supplies) against an enemy. While the current doctrine, SF or infantry, may not be perfect, it really is the best idea that the collective experience of fighters and historians can come up with for what will work to prosecute the fight. As the man said, don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Get the training and you can begin to develop a frame of reference for what works and what doesn’t, so you can make intelligent, informed decisions about how to modify what is already known to work, versus what you think might work in the future.
Now, when it comes to training, be like Nike and “Just Do It.”
John Mosby
Mountain Guerilla
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Why You Need Tactical Training
“Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets.” General George S. Patton
Many people in the world today, and most especially in the United States of America, suffer from a delusion. Brainwashed by the intellectual conceit of the modern nation-state, they accept a romanticized image of the guerrilla fighter created by poet, painter, and photographer, that encompasses either the dashing cavalier of the 18th and 19th century, or the high-tech “superman” of the modern “Tier One” Special Operations operator. This image of what could accurately be called, from a historical perspective, the “modern” guerrilla, is one who is shaped–directly or indirectly–by the organized, state-sponsored military that has armed, equipped, trained, and/or fought him. This image, while obviously valid on some levels, is a far cry from what is often erroneously labeled the “Fourth Generation Warfare” guerrilla, but could more correctly be labeled the “classical” or “tribal” guerrilla. This type of local fighter has existed far longer than civilized society or the “conventional” military concept that civilization endorses as “regular.”
What we refer to as “unconventional” or “irregular” warfare is far older than so-called “conventional warfare, despite the intellectual conceit of western military hubris. The currently fashionable idea that 4GW is somehow new or novel is a product of a belief system created by the formal military educational system that views anything that does not correlate to the established nation-state endorse view of “proper” warfare as being “unconventional” or even “irrelevant.” The average prepared citizen, whether he served an enlistment in the military or not, can be forgiven for the understandable practice of deferring to his more professionally educated fellow citizens in uniform, and should not feel bad for this misunderstanding, as even–perhaps especially–professionally educated military officers and NCOs, including many within the Special Forces community, also suffer from this institutional conceit.
In order to understand the fallacies and shortcomings of this hubris, and hopefully move past it, we need to understand the foundations of the 4GW view, and look past it to see why what is “new” is actually very, very, very old. In brief, 4GW theory holds that warfare has evolved through four basic intellectual generations:
The era of massed formations, most clearly evidenced by the ancient Greeks and Romans.
The era of massed firepower, characterized by the Napoleonic-era formations with musket and bayonet, but also by the WWI concept of trenches, tanks, and machine guns.
The era of maneuver warfare, characterized by smaller, more mobile elements of uniformed, regular forces leveraging mobility and more efficient weapons, to destroy the enemy’s ability and/or will to fight.
The “post-modern” fourth generation of non-state actors using networks in the political, social, military, and economic spheres, to convince a more powerful nation-state enemy that their strategic goals cannot be achieved without paying an unbearably expensive cost.
(I recognize of course, that different theorists offer different arbitrary divisions between the different generations.–JM)
Well regarded military theorist John Robb (and I’m a big fan, so don’t think I’m being disrespectful to the guy) defines 4GW as a method of warfare that uses three basic tools to inflict what he terms a “moral victory” over an enemy. These include:
Undermining enemy strengths. This can be as simple as using primitive TTPs to undermine the enemy’s ability to leverage technological advantages to their benefit. Using couriers for communications, in order to avoid electronic signals intercept eavesdropping would be an effective example of this.
Exploiting enemy weaknesses, such as the use of IEDs to target risk-averse American military forces who confine their travels to heavily armored vehicles, along established roadways, in order to avoid the inherent risks of gunfights, would be one example. Blending in with the local civilian populace, in order to reduce the ability to effectively leverage the lack of cultural awareness training of most American troops, by reducing their ability to determine friend vs. foe, is another, when you consider the (rightful) American prejudice against killing non-combatants.
Using asymmetric operations.
Robb cites several very valid reasons for the returning prevalence of what is mistakenly labeled 4GW methods of warfare:
The loss of the organized nation-state monopoly on political violence.
The rise in cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict as a result of weakening nation-state influence on populations.
Globalization of industry and communications making the tools and methods of the guerrilla more readily available to non-state actors.
Finally, Robb describes some of the tools that characterize this “new” way of warfare:
Rear area operations that target the civil society of the enemy, rather than his armed forces.
The use of terror as a psychological weapon.
Ad hoc improvisation, to use the enemy’s strength against himself.
The problem with this idea that “4GW” is somehow novel is that it is fundamentally flawed, as soon as we shed the biases of our institutional conceit, and look back through history without the filter of modern, nation-state arrogance. Even many of the “differences” between 4GW and “traditional” guerrilla conflict that Robb cites are really just differences between the “tribal” guerrilla of antiquity and the modern nation-state influenced guerrilla.
While the “4GW” guerrilla has access to global media/internet dissemination of TTPs, the fundamental tactics of the guerrilla, including ambushes, raids, sabotage, and assassination, have been used since antiquity. Sure, the “post-modern” guerrillas has access to explosives and automatic weapons, night vision technology, and satellite communications, but those are force multipliers, not force creators. Without a fundamental understanding of the underlying tactical concepts of small-unit warfare, which have been common to all societies, prior to the development of the modern nation-state, they amount to nothing of substance. Multiplying anything by zero still results in a net gain of zero.
The prevalence of guerrilla warfare, as the influence of the organized nation-state wanes, is certainly nothing new. While it seems so to people who cannot grasp a world without the security of the organized nation-state, guerrilla warfare is not new. The nation-state concept and even the formal military of the ancient empires are really historically young. The use of guerrilla warfare TTPs, in the absence of nation-state influence is older than civilization itself.
The idea that survival is only viable for small groups means conflicts are fought by small-unit elements is likewise neither new nor novel. Whether this granularity results from a need to avoid decisive engagement by numerically or technologically superior enemy forces, or because subsistence living realities mean that you are limited in tribal manpower is irrelevant. The fact is, the use of small groups of fighters to influence the actions of an enemy goes back to antiquity.
Likewise, the vulnerability of open societies and economies to attack by “irregular” forces is novel only if you ignore history even as obvious as the Roman empire.
Technological advances may make it easier for the non-state actor to leverage the weaknesses of the enemy, such as the aforementioned use of IEDs, but the guerrilla throughout history has used whatever technology was available to do the exact same thing. It’s the technology available that has changed, not the fundamental principle of leveraging those weaknesses. Technology has always been changing.
What we, as modern, “civilized” people see as 4GW would more accurately be described as “first generation warfare,” or 1GW. It is far older than any other form of human conflict, and in fact never really ceased to exist, other than in the collective imagination of people too arrogant to see that the nation-state concept was experimental at best, from the beginning. Guerrilla warfare is, in fact, older than civilization itself.
Long before the advent of agriculture and the resulting formation of farming societies that provided the ability to produce quantities of excess food per laborer that are required to support a standing army of trained, professional warriors, tribes of hunter-gatherers existed in close proximity to one another. These tribes competed with one another for access to limited resources like game animals and fresh water, no differently than modern man competes for limited resources like raw petroleum: with violence.
Throughout the vast majority of our species’ spectacularly bloody existence on this little blue sphere we call home, both before and since the rise of civilization, most conflicts have not been resolved by well-equipped, nattily-dressed parade ground puppets of conventional military forces. On the contrary, for most of humanity’s existence, wars, rivalries, and grudges have been settled by small bands of haphazardly armed, ill-disciplined, and poorly trained or even untrained friends and neighbors banding together to protect their own turf, or to expand their control over finite resources by invading their neighbor’s turn and killing or enslaving the competition. Our modern use of “conventional” and “unconventional” labels for conflict is a reversal of the historical precedent. From the historical perspective, guerrilla warfare is far more “conventional” than formal armies are.
Like the modern interpretation of the guerrilla, the classical tribal guerrilla used hit-and-run, asymmetric methods, choosing the survival advantage of fleeing before a stronger enemy, unless the fight could be clearly leveraged into his own favor. While many psychologists and revisionist historians have adopted the feel-good, New Age humanist view that animal species, including mankind, possess a natural aversion to intra-species killing, at least in the case of humankind, the archaeological and historical record demonstrates that they are wrong. Using the idea that inter-tribal battles were largely “ceremonial” affairs that actually resulted in little bloodshed or killing are patently absurd. The important factor that these pseudo-scientist “experts” overlook, or else pointedly ignore in the interest of a preconceived political position, is that “battles” are not the guerrilla’s fight. Instead, like his modern equivalent, the tribal guerrilla was more inclined to use the raid in the quiet, dark of the night, to kill his enemies in their bed, by burning the damned lodges down around him, followed by quickly fleeing before the victim’s friends and family could mount an effective counterattack. Only a sucker sticks around for a “fair fight.”
That is the “way” of the classical guerrilla, just like it is the way of the “4GW” guerrilla. The idea of constraints being placed on the behavior of the guerrilla, or that he must fight according to the accepted rules of “conventional” military thought is also a cultural conceit without historical or archaeological relevance. “Mercy” in tribal guerrilla wars is seldom given or expected. Just like a modern US soldier, captured by so-called 4GW Al Qaeda fighters can expect to be sodomized, beheaded, or both, before being killed, a captured tribesman, through history, could look forward to being burned, castrated, beheaded, sodomized, or sold into slavery, if in fact, he wasn’t simply eaten. His women could expect to be raped and then killed, or sold into slavery. Even children would be either killed outright, or enslaved. Villages would be razed, crops destroyed, and livestock stolen. While we may naively expect the “modern” guerrilla to be constrained in his behavior by cultural background or training, or the demands of his nation-state sponsors, the use of this type of terror by the classical guerrilla sheds further light on the fact that the use of terror by “4GW” terrorist is in fact, not new at all.
Guerrilla warfare, whether referred to for what it is, or given some cute new label to make it more marketable, is neither pretty nor romantic. The tribal guerrilla wasn’t interested in playing by opponent’s rules, if in fact, his opponent had any rules to play by. For the guerrilla, classical or modern, warfare is not an extension of politics. Warfare is simply survival.
In his 1996 book illustrating the advantages of modern civilization and the nation-state that resulted, “War Before Civilization,” archeology professor Lawrence Keely points out that the evidence indicates that tribal societies engaged in inter-tribal “guerrilla” conflict suffer an average of 0.5% loss of their total population per year in directly conflict-related deaths. For the current US population, that would be the equivalent of 1.5 million deaths per year–more than all combat deaths in American military history, from 1775 until today (just under 850,000 according to the sources I checked).
The absolute truth is, fighting as a guerrilla, whether modern or classical/tribal, pretty much sucks. You don’t get to go home and sleep in your soft bed, wrapped up around momma every night. Perhaps not for any nights for months or years at a time. You may never get to go home, since it may very well end up burned down by rivals who want your territory for themselves. You may not be around to protect your wife and children. Even if you are around, sniper fire can come out of the blue, at the least expected time and place. Kidnappings, rapes, and destruction of property are the norms in guerrilla conflicts. If you think, because this is “Amurrika!” that things will somehow be different, you’re fucking deluded, and missing the point of the entire preparedness conversation. People you love are going to die. Your wife may die. Your children may die. Whether you pick up a gun, or don’t pick up a gun, you will probably die.
Life as a guerrilla, regardless of the overall impact of the conflict, will suck. It will not be comfortable. Many people in the liberty and preparedness movement cite the fact that some Taliban-aligned Pashtun tribal fighters in the mountains of Afghanistan were discovered to be fighting against US/Coalition forces clad in “man-jammies” and sandals, equipped with little more than a wool blanket and a single spare Kalashnikov magazine. The apparent lesson “learned” by these aspiring American guerrillas is that this guerrilla shit must be easy. Unfortunately for these folks, their ignorance is demonstrated by the fact that they’ve overlooked two critical facts:
The equipment load-out of those Pashtun fighters was discovered during battle damage assessment (BDA) studies. In other words, they were dead…Guess that load-out maybe wasn’t so ideal after all? (A gross oversimplification, I know, but it’s valid enough to make the point worth paying attention to)
A Pashtun tribal fighter from the mountains of Afghanistan is considerably tougher, physically and mentally, than you and I put together. Arguing otherwise isn’t even as benign as ignorance. It’s sheer stupidity and bravado. When you grow up sleeping on a blanket or two thrown on a packed dirt floor, in a mud hut with no window or door coverings except maybe a blanket or old hide tacked up, subsisting on rice, beans, and a handful of half-cooked, spoiled meat, while running up and down mountains all day, and fighting from the time you’re old enough to pick up a Kalasknikov rifle, and never advance to sleeping in a protected environment like a real house, with a soft mattress under you, then maybe you can convincingly argue otherwise. In the meantime, sleeping on a soft bed, in a warm house, with your biggest fear being whether the cable bill can be paid this month does not make you guerrilla warfare tough.
When I was a young Ranger private, one of my mentors was a very skilled martial artist and a pioneer in what would become MMA. Knowing of my profound interest in all things combatives related, he once told me, “Ranger Mosby, a lot of guys come to the Regiment because they think they’re going to learn some high-speed karate shit. They get disappointed when they don’t, because we simply don’t have the time in the training calendar for that silliness. When we do have time, we focus on stuff they think is too simple to be effective. What those idiots don’t recognize is, interpersonal violence is interpersonal violence. Regardless of the scale of the battlefield, the fundamentals of victory remain the same. I don’t care if it’s a brawl behind the bar, two rifle squads slugging it out in the jungle, or the armies of Good and Evil battling it out on the plains of Meggido, in the end, it all boils down to speed, surprise, and violence of action! The concepts you learn here, whether as a rifleman, a SAW gunner, or on a machine gun team, will do more for your “martial arts” knowledge than all the shoulder throws you will ever do in the dojo.”
Being the highly motivated young Airborne Ranger that I was, and hungry for any knowledge that could glean from my wiser, slightly older, but vastly more experienced mentors, I remembered those words. In fact, I went back to my room in the barracks, almost immediately (I think it was after he allowed me to recover from the front leaning rest position for asking some sort of dumb-ass question about combatives…), and copied them into my ever-present journal. It wasn’t however, until I was considerably further along in my military career, while serving as a junior SF weapons sergeant, that I really began to understand what he meant. It wasn’t simply a matter of being faster, sneakier, and meaner than the other guy, although those certainly help. It wasn’t just about being more fit and stronger than the enemy, although that damned sure helped too. The truth was, the same tactics, techniques, and procedures that helped us successfully prosecute a small-scale fight against the Taliban in a tight canyon in Afghanistan, were the same TTPs that would allow me to prosecute a fight anywhere, against anyone.
Whether you expect your fight to come in the bush, crawling around on your belly, eating bugs and drinking water from a stagnant, muddy pool, or you expect your fight to come in a large urban area, in fast moving sports cars, with pistols and stolen MP5s, or you expect your fight to come in your living room, against an up-armored FEMA or DHS entry team (in which case, you’re a dumbass for being there when they arrive), the same fundamental concepts apply, if you actually hope to win and survive.
You need training, regardless of what you think. If you’ve served in a combat arms unit, in combat, you probably possess the fundamental skills to survive the initial bursts of violence as well as anyone, providing you the ability to learn as you go about how to modify the TTPs you already know, for surviving without the benefits of air support, indirect fire support, and a long support train behind you. If you’ve never worn a uniform though, or even if you have, if you’ve never performed in a profession that required you to mentally and physically prepare to look another human being in the face, while shoving eight inches of steel into their flesh, and dealing with the psychology of that, while still being able to provide leadership to others, you have no idea what you don’t know.
What you don’t know is, you need tactical training. Being an effective fighter does not come naturally to anyone, I don’t care what anyone tells you. The fact that you can out shoot all the guys in your local pistol club, or all of the local cops who bother to come to the range doesn’t mean shit. The fact that you’ve won every fist fight you’ve ever been in at the local watering hole doesn’t mean shit. Being a big fish in a little pond is not the same thing as being a big fish in the ocean. The sharks aren’t going to fight you on your terms, regardless of your fantasies.
While a Special Forces soldier should doctrinally be a subject-matter expert on guerrilla warfare, I don’t know many of us who are so bold or naive as to presume that we have all the answers. I certainly don’t. Whether looking at SF UW doctrine, or “traditional” light infantry doctrine at the team, squad, and platoon level, the doctrine, as it stands, may not fit a future conflict strictly. The doctrine may not even necessarily be how things actually get done today (it certainly hasn’t been for most of the GWOT in the SF community. Only recently has the SF community collectively returned to its UW roots after spending the better part of a decade focused on direct-action, door-kicking HVT missions better suited for the Ranger Regiment and SMUs). What the doctrine does, whether SF UW, or Light Infantry, is provide a frame of reference to begin to gain an understanding of the nature of the beast we’re dealing with. It is a reflection of the combat arms community’s collective self-image of how we hope to prosecute these types of operations, or at least how the authors of the appropriate manuals hope we fight.
When considering the future application of this doctrine, whether in training or real-world applications, it is crucial to recognize two critical factors in regards to the doctrine, and choose to either apply the lessons that the doctrine teaches, or modify them to your perceived image of what is going to happen:
At some level, despite the best efforts otherwise, a trainer’s own intellectual conceits, as a product of a 20th century upbringing in a largely Judeo-Christian culture, as well as subsequent professional military education and experience, will necessarily influence the conclusions that we reach, regarding the effectiveness and applicability of doctrinal considerations.
A good trainer, with intellectual honesty, will recognize the existence of these prejudices and conceits, and strive heartily to overcome them.
There is a very sad condition that exists in people everywhere, that is especially apparent in the gun and preparedness communities, for men to delude themselves into believing that they know more than they do. There's even an “official” name for it, developed by a head-shrinking psychiatrist somewhere. It’s called “competency bias.” We all (and yes, I’m including myself in that “we all.”)want to believe that we’re naturally competent at anything we might ever want to do, and we tend to conveniently ignore or dismiss any evidence that would disprove our delusions.
Unfortunately for both ourselves and our families, in the long term, we often get away with this in trivial matters. “Oh, I’m a good carpenter!” says the accountant who’s never swung a hammer for wages in his life, and the last thing he built was a birdhouse in Cub Scouts. His delusions won’t harm anyone, as long as he limits himself to building birdhouses. When he decides that he knows how to build a human house though, and absolutely refuses to even consider the help or advice of professionals, while he might get lucky, the house is likely to fall down around him. Even in a best case scenario, and he does manage to build it solid enough to not fall down in his lifetime, the roof and seams leak, the windows and doors sag and stick, and the whole building settles, because birdhouses don’t have foundations to worry about.
“Hell, I’m a great driver!” says every man everywhere, who refuses to take a defensive driving or high-performance driving class, despite repeated fender benders and traffic tickets. That even works out well for him, until he’s staring into the eyes of a 600lb elk, in the middle of a two-lane blacktop, as he comes around a blind corner at 75MPH, at 0300. He either ends up with an elk in his lap, or the family minivan, along with the whole family, ends up on its roof, in the bottom of a ravine, unseen by passers-by on the road above the next day.
“I know how to shoot! I’m better than any soldier at shooting! I shot my elk last year at 1500 yards, with my .30-06, holding two inches over his back!” says the hillbilly (actual statement, made to my face in a hunting camp!) Never mind the fact that the hillbilly obviously lacks an understanding of even the most elementary ballistics, and has absolutely no range estimation abilities whatsoever, while being too cheap to invest in a decent laser range finder.
“I’ve read all the field manuals and I’m an expert in infantry tactics. It doesn’t matter that I can’t actually execute them because I’m forty pounds overweight though, because I’m going to be a 4GW ninja master, so I don’t need that stuff anyway!” says the 5’8″ 230 lb computer programmer turned militia commander, who really couldn’t even tell you what range his rifle is zeroed at, because he doesn’t understand that an 8″ group, at 100 yards, from the prone supported position, is not something you admit to, let along use as a standard for marksmanship, at even the most elementary levels of shooting.
Competency bias, in mundane matters, is humorous. In life-and-death situations though, it results in the wrong people dying, because egos and pride are too important to some important. The comfort of sitting on the computer, blathering on blogs and forums about your prowess as a 4GW guerrilla commando ninja expert, and master of post-modern urban warfare, is far easier, and more comfortable than crawling around in the woods, sprinting from position to position, getting sweaty, tired, and bug-bitten while actually learning to be a novice guerrilla commando ninja expert. Sipping a Coke and whiskey, while typing about your incredible physical prowess in crawling up storm drains, and leaping rooftop-to-rooftop, three stories up, like a “Tier One” commando, is less miserable than being hungry, thirsty, dirty, smelling like you haven’t bathed in a month, and physically and mentally exhausted to the point of tears, from realistic, effective training. Who cares that it might actually keep you alive in a fight? That shit is hard work!
Do you actually know how to develop and set up a multi-layered, in-depth security program, utilizing LP/OPs and roving security patrols correctly? Do you know how to plan and perform those security patrols? Do you know what to look for when planning a security patrol? Do you know how to hit a realistic, partially-obscured target, at 200 meters, with your rifle? When you’ve been moving under the weight of your fighting and sustainment loads for the last week, and have just sprinted three hundred yards?
You need tactical training. You know, in your heart of hearts and soul of souls, that you need training. You just have to turn your ego down and listen to your brain for a change.
Realistic, effective tactical training will teach you how to shoot, move, and communicate effectively. If you’re twenty pounds overweight, with a bodyfat percentage higher than 15%, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you are not capable of moving tactically, correctly. If you cannot shoot a 2MOA group, from the prone, under field conditions, with your choice of fighting rifle, while rested, you do not know how to shoot effectively. If you cannot perform a speed reload, or immediate action, with your choice of fighting rifle, while in full gear, winded from running sprints or individual movement techniques, and blinded by the sweat running into your eyes, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you do not know how to shoot effectively. If you’ve never performed a live-fire hasty assault or break contact battle drill, with multiple small teams moving over the battle space, I can categorically state, with absolute certainty, that you do not know how to communicate effectively.
Realistic, effective tactical training, in today’s environment, is about more than shoot-move-communicate though. It will teach you leadership skills, under field conditions. It’s about mission-planning and troop-leading procedures, even in four-man cells. It’s about preparing yourself and others for future survival.
Realistic, effective tactical training will teach you, better than anyone can ever tell you, exactly how dismally out-of-shape you actually are. Good training is a suckfest and a gut-check. It will require you to reach down the front of your pants to grab your nuts, and confirm that you really do have the intestinal fortitude to man the fuck up and do the right thing, by getting yourself in shape, so you can do what you need to do, instead of just talking about it.
Realistic, effective tactical training will open your eyes to the importance of your spouse not only being accepting of your preparedness plans and actions, but of her being an active, willing participant. You’ll begin to understand that your partner really is your partner, and that you are not the only one in your family who needs to be trained. Your wife and even your kids of weapons-handling age, should be trained.
Realistic, effective tactical training, planned and executed by someone who knows what they are doing, will teach you how to think about security, not just for your family, but for your home and your community, against a broader range of threats, in ways that are cost-effective, as well as simply effective. Planning just for home defense, or just for your personal or family retreat security is not enough. That’s the equivalent of saying, “I’ve got a gun in my nightstand, so I can leave the doors and windows unlocked, with bundles of cash sitting out on tables, even though I live in South Central Los Angeles. I mean, fuck, I own a gun!” That works great…right up until a crew of bad guys are coming through your front door with Kalashnikovs and hand grenades, while you’re sitting on the couch with the wife and kids, watching “The X Factor” and your gun is still in the nightstand. You need to learn to plan for security, at home and retreat, in a holistic manner, and good tactical training will give you the tools to do that.
If you believe a fight is coming, whether you think it will be against the security forces of a tyrannical regime, or whether you think it will be against outlaw bands of cannibalistic San Franciscans, it doesn’t matter how many books you’ve read. If doesn’t matter how many times you’ve earned the Appleseed “Rifleman” patch. It doesn’t matter how many “Advanced Urban Combat” courses you’ve attended. Until you get quality training in the application of those skills in small-unit tactics, you’re just a lonely dude with a gun. Realistic, effective tactical training is a force multiplier you can’t live without, because you won’t live without it. If you don’t want to, or can’t, get to training with one of the guys in this collective “preparedness/liberty” community who are teaching, that’s okay. Go talk to your old high school buddy who just ETS’d after multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, and convince him to help you develop some training plans. You need the training.
Regardless of the existence of educational and cultural biases, based on the established military orthodoxy of the organized, formal nation-state military, the reality is, small-unit tactics are small-unit tactics. The same underlying principles have worked since the time of antiquity, to leverage available technology (bows and arrows versus massed formations to precision rifle fire versus small-unit formations; burning a lodge down around the enemy’s family with torches and animal fat versus using a thermite charge to accomplish the same thing; sabotage of enemy food supplies via poisoning livestock or water sources versus blowing a rail line to interdict mass transport of supplies) against an enemy. While the current doctrine, SF or infantry, may not be perfect, it really is the best idea that the collective experience of fighters and historians can come up with for what will work to prosecute the fight. As the man said, don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Get the training and you can begin to develop a frame of reference for what works and what doesn’t, so you can make intelligent, informed decisions about how to modify what is already known to work, versus what you think might work in the future.
Now, when it comes to training, be like Nike and “Just Do It.”
John Mosby
Mountain Guerilla
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Wednesday, January 6, 2016
The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two
Here is the second part in the two part series by John Mosby, like I said at the beginning of part one, this is vital information that we need to start performing now. We need to be organized and ready to go before it is too late. We need to be part of the solution, not the problem. If we as patriots do not perform the necessary actions needed to be ready to perform our part this nation will cease to exist as a Constitutional Republic (which it really does not resemble any more).
The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two
John Mosby
This is part two of a two-part series.
There are three necessary components to a successful insurgency. The subversive underground is always present and is the first component of the resistance to form and begin active operations. The strategic goals of the resistance movement will determine the level of development for all three components:
The subversive underground
The support auxiliary
The paramilitary guerrilla force
The subversive underground.
The subversive underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are practicably inaccessible to the paramilitary guerrilla force, such as populated areas that are under tight control of the regime’s security forces. The underground maintains the ability to operate in these denied areas because it operates clandestinely, returning to innocuous “day jobs” when not performing missions.
Typical tasks for the subversive underground include, but may not be limited to:
-Gathering intelligence and the development of intelligence networks.
-The development and operation of subversive “pirate” broadcast systems that control the dissemination of propaganda through radio, newspaper and leaflet distribution, and/or internet communications and web page development.
-The fabrication of special materials, such as false identification, weapons, and munitions.
-Black market networks and safe houses for transport of personnel and logistics.
-Sabotage by individuals and/or small units in urban centers.
-Operation of clandestine medical facilities to treat injured/wounded resistance personnel.
Members of the underground are normally active, productive members of their community, and their ability to function as part of the resistance is a product of their daily life and/or position within the community. They operate by maintaining a strict compartmentalization and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the subversive underground are what allow the resistance to have a noticeable effect within urban or built-up areas.
The underground operational cell should typically be comprised of a leader and a few cell members who operate directly as a unit to conduct direct-action missions for the underground. The intelligence cell is different in that the cell leader should seldom, if ever, be in direct contact with the subordinate members of his cell, and the members of the cell are rarely in contact with one another. All communications of the intelligence cell would typically be conducted through dead-drop and other covert/clandestine methods of tradecraft.
It is imperative for the potential future guerrilla fighter to understand that, until he sees and recognizes these actions being undertaken by unknown parties, there is little point to “going to guns.” Doing so will only accelerate the actions of the regime to hunt down such “extremist” outlaws. Since the security forces will not be forced to deal with hunting down members of the subversive underground at the same time, there will be little to prevent them from focusing extensive assets to hunting down the “bandits hiding out in the woods.” If you have friends, whom you trust enough to discuss these matters and potential future issues with, who are not outspoken and openly critical of the current demise, educate them on the need for future subversives. They need to remain quiet and simply prepare for the day they need to wire a couple cans of ether to some douchebag’s engine manifold…(I’ve actually never tried it, but I’m pretty well convinced that it would be an extremely effective anti-vehicle/anti-personnel device to be utilized by a mechanic who happens to secretly support the resistance. If anyone has a junk vehicle that will still run, they should try it and let me know how it works out…Don’t run out and try it on a local police cruiser, please. I am not saying do it now. I’m saying consider such possible weapons in case they are needed in the future.
The auxiliary.
This term refers to members of the population who provide very limited clandestine support to the subversive underground and/or the paramilitary guerrilla force. Very seldom will they be “active” members of the movement and, as such, offer little intelligence value to the regime if compromised. Functions of the auxiliary may take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their specific function or service that supports the network. They may not even realize they are actively supporting the resistance. They should certainly never be asked to perform a job by a valuable member of the subversive underground cadre, face-to-face. Even in the modern environment of credit card payments and billing services, there are ways to accomplish such chores remotely. Until they are trusted, they do not learn the names or identities of the resistance.
In many ways however, the auxiliary personnel are at the greatest risk of compromise (thus the importance of their not offering intelligence value to the regime if compromised). Typical functions of the auxiliary include:
-Logistics procurement (either through stealing from a workplace, or purchasing on the black market, or open market, if it can be done without compromising their security or that of the movement.)
-Logistics distribution (transporting goods and dropping them in pre-determined cache locations for later pick-up by resistance forces.)
-Labor for special material fabrication (in some instances, the fabrication will be conducted in assembly-line fashion, to preclude any one group of auxiliaries from recognizing what they are manufacturing).
-Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases (obviously, this is a task that must be reserved for well-trusted and very secure members of the auxiliary…cooks in regime mess halls/dining facilities who may overhear conversations regarding upcoming operations, mechanics who notice an increase in the request for pre-mission checks on vehicles, etc…)
-Intelligence collection (intentional or otherwise)
-Recruitment (obviously, in this case, the auxiliary member knows his part, but can still be compartmentalized to reduce risk to the actual underground or guerrilla force).
-Communications networks staff such as couriers and/or messengers.
-Propaganda distribution.
-Safe house management.
-Logistics and personnel transport (if functioning as part of the black market, the auxiliary member may never realize he is actively supporting the resistance).
The paramilitary guerrilla force.
The paramilitary guerrilla force is the overt military arm of the resistance. As individuals who actively engage the conventional military in combat operations, guerrillas have traditionally held a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment, and firepower (it should be noted that, in the event of an U.S. resistance movement, these would not necessarily be the case. That’s the purpose, after all, of this blog). For all their disadvantages, however, the guerrilla force has one distinct advantage that can offset any unfavorable balance – the initiative. In any operational planning, the guerrilla leader must strive to maintain and exploit this advantage.
The guerrilla element only attacks when it can develop and maintain a relative, if temporary, state of superiority of force. The element avoids any sort of decisive engagement, thus denying the conventional force military of the regime the opportunity to recover, regain their superiority, and use it against the guerrilla force (the application of conventional small-unit tactics, such as raids and ambushes, in an unconventional manner, such as an IED/EFP-initiated ambush, followed by selective targeting of personnel, then an exfiltration, or a rapid, snatch-and-grab raid to kidnap a key enemy leader, are the definition of guerrilla warfare tactics). The guerrilla element is only capable of generating this type of tactical success in areas where they possess a significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection to the local civilian population that allows them to harness clandestine support for security and intelligence-gathering purposes. Don’t ever allow yourself or your unit to suffer the terminal disease of testosterone poisoning and think you’re going to survive, let alone win, a toe-to-toe slugfest with a conventional force rifle platoon. You might have better riflemen, and even bigger numbers, but they have indirect-fire support, close air support, and a faster Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to call on for reinforcements.
Depending on the degree of control over the local area, a guerrilla force element may range in size from fire-team size all the way up to a brigade-level force. In the initial stages of a resistance, the guerrilla force, regardless of size, will generally be limited to stand-off attacks that we typically think of as “guerrilla warfare.” This may include the aforementioned raids and ambushes, albeit on a slightly larger scale. As the guerrilla force grows, however, so should its ability to engage the regime’s conventional military forces on a larger scale, allowing some degree of parity with the enemy. In these cases, formerly isolated bands of guerrillas may be able to connect and coalesce, forming liberated territory that allows for the development of a larger, more conventional military force to face the regime’s conventional force.
It is critical to delineate the difference between a true resistance guerrilla fighter, and other small-unit, irregular force operatives that may appear similar but in fact, are drastically different, such as militias (although the local militia may operate as a part of the guerrilla force in liberated territories), mercenaries, and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs. The militia’s only intent should be to provide security for the local community and its residents. Mercenaries and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs will seldom hold themselves to any sort of moral construct similar to that of the resistance-force guerrilla. It is critical for the guerrilla force insurgent to recognize that only uniformed personnel of the enemy regime are legitimate targets for the guerrilla force. Key political personnel, civilian population sympathizers and informants, etc, must be dealt with solely by the subversive underground. This is critical to the PSYOP campaign for the resistance, since conduct of assassinations/kidnappings, etc., by the underground can be plausibly blamed on the regime’s security apparatus if it is not conducted by organized paramilitary forces of the guerrilla.
Nous Defion,
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains
John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two
John Mosby
This is part two of a two-part series.
There are three necessary components to a successful insurgency. The subversive underground is always present and is the first component of the resistance to form and begin active operations. The strategic goals of the resistance movement will determine the level of development for all three components:
The subversive underground
The support auxiliary
The paramilitary guerrilla force
The subversive underground.
The subversive underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are practicably inaccessible to the paramilitary guerrilla force, such as populated areas that are under tight control of the regime’s security forces. The underground maintains the ability to operate in these denied areas because it operates clandestinely, returning to innocuous “day jobs” when not performing missions.
Typical tasks for the subversive underground include, but may not be limited to:
-Gathering intelligence and the development of intelligence networks.
-The development and operation of subversive “pirate” broadcast systems that control the dissemination of propaganda through radio, newspaper and leaflet distribution, and/or internet communications and web page development.
-The fabrication of special materials, such as false identification, weapons, and munitions.
-Black market networks and safe houses for transport of personnel and logistics.
-Sabotage by individuals and/or small units in urban centers.
-Operation of clandestine medical facilities to treat injured/wounded resistance personnel.
Members of the underground are normally active, productive members of their community, and their ability to function as part of the resistance is a product of their daily life and/or position within the community. They operate by maintaining a strict compartmentalization and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the subversive underground are what allow the resistance to have a noticeable effect within urban or built-up areas.
The underground operational cell should typically be comprised of a leader and a few cell members who operate directly as a unit to conduct direct-action missions for the underground. The intelligence cell is different in that the cell leader should seldom, if ever, be in direct contact with the subordinate members of his cell, and the members of the cell are rarely in contact with one another. All communications of the intelligence cell would typically be conducted through dead-drop and other covert/clandestine methods of tradecraft.
It is imperative for the potential future guerrilla fighter to understand that, until he sees and recognizes these actions being undertaken by unknown parties, there is little point to “going to guns.” Doing so will only accelerate the actions of the regime to hunt down such “extremist” outlaws. Since the security forces will not be forced to deal with hunting down members of the subversive underground at the same time, there will be little to prevent them from focusing extensive assets to hunting down the “bandits hiding out in the woods.” If you have friends, whom you trust enough to discuss these matters and potential future issues with, who are not outspoken and openly critical of the current demise, educate them on the need for future subversives. They need to remain quiet and simply prepare for the day they need to wire a couple cans of ether to some douchebag’s engine manifold…(I’ve actually never tried it, but I’m pretty well convinced that it would be an extremely effective anti-vehicle/anti-personnel device to be utilized by a mechanic who happens to secretly support the resistance. If anyone has a junk vehicle that will still run, they should try it and let me know how it works out…Don’t run out and try it on a local police cruiser, please. I am not saying do it now. I’m saying consider such possible weapons in case they are needed in the future.
The auxiliary.
This term refers to members of the population who provide very limited clandestine support to the subversive underground and/or the paramilitary guerrilla force. Very seldom will they be “active” members of the movement and, as such, offer little intelligence value to the regime if compromised. Functions of the auxiliary may take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their specific function or service that supports the network. They may not even realize they are actively supporting the resistance. They should certainly never be asked to perform a job by a valuable member of the subversive underground cadre, face-to-face. Even in the modern environment of credit card payments and billing services, there are ways to accomplish such chores remotely. Until they are trusted, they do not learn the names or identities of the resistance.
In many ways however, the auxiliary personnel are at the greatest risk of compromise (thus the importance of their not offering intelligence value to the regime if compromised). Typical functions of the auxiliary include:
-Logistics procurement (either through stealing from a workplace, or purchasing on the black market, or open market, if it can be done without compromising their security or that of the movement.)
-Logistics distribution (transporting goods and dropping them in pre-determined cache locations for later pick-up by resistance forces.)
-Labor for special material fabrication (in some instances, the fabrication will be conducted in assembly-line fashion, to preclude any one group of auxiliaries from recognizing what they are manufacturing).
-Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases (obviously, this is a task that must be reserved for well-trusted and very secure members of the auxiliary…cooks in regime mess halls/dining facilities who may overhear conversations regarding upcoming operations, mechanics who notice an increase in the request for pre-mission checks on vehicles, etc…)
-Intelligence collection (intentional or otherwise)
-Recruitment (obviously, in this case, the auxiliary member knows his part, but can still be compartmentalized to reduce risk to the actual underground or guerrilla force).
-Communications networks staff such as couriers and/or messengers.
-Propaganda distribution.
-Safe house management.
-Logistics and personnel transport (if functioning as part of the black market, the auxiliary member may never realize he is actively supporting the resistance).
The paramilitary guerrilla force.
The paramilitary guerrilla force is the overt military arm of the resistance. As individuals who actively engage the conventional military in combat operations, guerrillas have traditionally held a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment, and firepower (it should be noted that, in the event of an U.S. resistance movement, these would not necessarily be the case. That’s the purpose, after all, of this blog). For all their disadvantages, however, the guerrilla force has one distinct advantage that can offset any unfavorable balance – the initiative. In any operational planning, the guerrilla leader must strive to maintain and exploit this advantage.
The guerrilla element only attacks when it can develop and maintain a relative, if temporary, state of superiority of force. The element avoids any sort of decisive engagement, thus denying the conventional force military of the regime the opportunity to recover, regain their superiority, and use it against the guerrilla force (the application of conventional small-unit tactics, such as raids and ambushes, in an unconventional manner, such as an IED/EFP-initiated ambush, followed by selective targeting of personnel, then an exfiltration, or a rapid, snatch-and-grab raid to kidnap a key enemy leader, are the definition of guerrilla warfare tactics). The guerrilla element is only capable of generating this type of tactical success in areas where they possess a significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection to the local civilian population that allows them to harness clandestine support for security and intelligence-gathering purposes. Don’t ever allow yourself or your unit to suffer the terminal disease of testosterone poisoning and think you’re going to survive, let alone win, a toe-to-toe slugfest with a conventional force rifle platoon. You might have better riflemen, and even bigger numbers, but they have indirect-fire support, close air support, and a faster Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to call on for reinforcements.
Depending on the degree of control over the local area, a guerrilla force element may range in size from fire-team size all the way up to a brigade-level force. In the initial stages of a resistance, the guerrilla force, regardless of size, will generally be limited to stand-off attacks that we typically think of as “guerrilla warfare.” This may include the aforementioned raids and ambushes, albeit on a slightly larger scale. As the guerrilla force grows, however, so should its ability to engage the regime’s conventional military forces on a larger scale, allowing some degree of parity with the enemy. In these cases, formerly isolated bands of guerrillas may be able to connect and coalesce, forming liberated territory that allows for the development of a larger, more conventional military force to face the regime’s conventional force.
It is critical to delineate the difference between a true resistance guerrilla fighter, and other small-unit, irregular force operatives that may appear similar but in fact, are drastically different, such as militias (although the local militia may operate as a part of the guerrilla force in liberated territories), mercenaries, and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs. The militia’s only intent should be to provide security for the local community and its residents. Mercenaries and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs will seldom hold themselves to any sort of moral construct similar to that of the resistance-force guerrilla. It is critical for the guerrilla force insurgent to recognize that only uniformed personnel of the enemy regime are legitimate targets for the guerrilla force. Key political personnel, civilian population sympathizers and informants, etc, must be dealt with solely by the subversive underground. This is critical to the PSYOP campaign for the resistance, since conduct of assassinations/kidnappings, etc., by the underground can be plausibly blamed on the regime’s security apparatus if it is not conducted by organized paramilitary forces of the guerrilla.
Nous Defion,
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains
John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.
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