Intelligence Part 2

Here is part 2 of the SHTF Intelligence article from Samuel Culper of Forward Observer.

This is the second article in a series about using intelligence for preparedness. I’m starting from square zero, in order to introduce a new crop of Americans to the concept of using intelligence, to prove that there’s a need for intelligence, and to get readers quickly up to speed on how to incorporate it into their security planning. After getting caught up to speed, if you’d like to gain a deeper knowledge and put theory into practice, a book entitled *SHTF Intelligence will show you the way forward. You can find a small homework exercise here.

In the first article, we covered why we need intelligence and an introduction to the Intelligence Cycle. We use this cycle in order to produce early warning intelligence and threat intelligence; those are the top two priorities for the Analysis & Control Element (ACE) in a SHTF situation. Our ACE is the brain where we funnel information and out comes actionable intelligence. The ACE’s job is to inform the leadership about threats in the area, where they might be, and what they might do next. If we can get community involvement and start producing intelligence, then our work will be well worth the effort.

This second article is going to take our intelligence requirements– the things we need to know but don’t– and move on to Phase 2 of the cycle: Collection. (If you haven’t generated any intelligence requirements yet, you can get a start at the homework page.)

In any SHTF situation, we’re going to face one of two problems: either we’re not going to have enough information to make well-informed, time-sensitive decisions, or we’re going to have too much information to wade through, which will slow down our decision-making process. So what’s the lesson? We need to begin developing streams of information now in order to avoid problem number one, and we need to know what to do with that information in order to avoid problem number two. Let’s focus on solving problem number one.

It seems like a poor decision to believe that we’ll have access to lots of information during an SHTF scenario. I’m more than willing to concede that information will not be as inexpensive and easy to collect then as it is now. So the more information we can collect now, the less we’ll have to collect later. For now, while information is inexpensive and easy, we’re going to focus mainly on the Internet and other widely available sources of information.

Inexpensive and Easy Information

Say what you want about Google, but there is no better online tool to collect massive amounts of information. (That obviously goes both ways, as it’s always collecting information about you, so it’s a good idea to use online anonymity tools and an anonymous or pseudonymous email address.) We run into a problem, however, when collecting that information monopolizes our time. Who has time to sit at a desk and search for hours on end for information that may not even exist online? Not me, and that’s why we need to automate collection as much as possible.

Google Alertsis a great resource for automated intelligence collection. Some of my searches include:
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “crime”
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “drug”
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “gang”
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “corruption”
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “violence”
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “Sheriff”
•“Waller County” and “Texas” and “whatever else is relevant to your security”

Etc…

Also, be sure to replace “Waller County” with your own town or county and state, and start getting more local information. You could even do searches for the name of your community or subdivision or for nearby landmarks. If you need help creating searches on Google Alerts, then just refer back to your intelligence requirements, which identify your intelligence gaps. (Caveat: You’re likely going to get some articles or posts that aren’t relevant. Don’t worry about them. Focus on what satisfies your requirements or that you can use to produce area intelligence.)

What Google Alerts does for us is creates a daily roll-up of new articles that Google finds about those subjects. I start my day every morning checking my Google Alerts to find more information about my area, and it saves me a great deal of time. Now, assuming that our searches use quality logic, one problem we may run into is a lack of reporting, especially if you live in a very rural area. If that’s the case, then we have a few options. First, I’d encourage you to go volunteer with your county sheriff’s office or local police department and get to know the crime, drug, and gang information from knowledgeable sources. Second, we could approach our local paper, if they’re not already doing it, to start writing more about crime or drugs or gangs (or all three) in the area. Third, if there’s no area paper or they’re not interested, then we could start doing it ourselves. (Local area “micro-papers” like the Appalachian Messenger are a great way to get our message out to the community, as well.)

I’d also encourage you to search Twitter and other social media for your area. For instance, a search for Hempstead, Texas on Twitter doesn’t seem to reveal much pertinent information immediately. However, I’m identifying people who live nearby posting about what’s important to them, and that’s certainly of some intelligence value. After a little digging, I’ve found a like-minded individual and discovered someone who could be a threat to my community.

If you’re concerned about critical infrastructure in the area, I’d steer you towards the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and their US Energy Mapping System, where you can see the critical infrastructure in your county (or across the country). If you’re interested in the human terrain, sites like City Data are great resources with tons of relevant information and mapping tools.

Of course, we can’t forget about the radio networks. You can rely on your Ham radio guy, or you can study for the technician or general class amateur radio test and begin learning Ham radio yourself. Forget about transmitting for a moment. Our ability to listen into communications, whether they’re from first responders, law enforcement, or a Ham radio operator passing along relevant information, is a mission-critical skill for the ACE. If we don’t have around-the-clock monitoring of at least police scanner, then we’re missing out on potentially a lot of important information.

More Difficult Collection Options

In a grid-down situation, or a scenario where our intelligence requirement can’t be satisfied with open source information, we’re going to rely heavily on other humans to collect for us. Let’s steer clear of calling this “source operations”, because it doesn’t need to be that complex or professional to get us through an emergency. By expanding our circle of friends and acquaintances, we’re expanding our access to information. Building rapport and becoming friends with individuals who are likely to have important information is going to greatly increase our ability to maintain situational awareness.

Beyond that, we should be using the eyes and ears of those in our community. We need to get our neighbors “bought in” to the idea that community security is everyone’s responsibility. I hate to use the phrase “See Something, Say Something”, however, DHS is on track to building lots of channels of information of potential intelligence value. Our message to the community could be as simple as, “Let me know if you see anything suspicious.”

Alternatively, starting (or joining) a neighborhood watch program is a great option. Not only will we get access to law enforcement officers and crime information, but we can also build a reporting system and give our community members a seat at the table. It also gives us a great excuse (something we call “cover for action”) to go door-to-door asking questions and providing information as the block leader of the Neighborhood Watch.

Finally, we absolutely need to be using police scanners and any other technology we have in order to stay on top of the changing security situation. In the Ultimate ACE Startup Guide, I’ve outlined what we need, why we need it, and where to get it.

Last Work On Collection

When we consider all the websites, radio frequencies, and humans to which we have access, there’s virtually no end to the potential for collection. (Just ask the NSA.) Having developed intelligence reporting streams is going to pay dividends for us when we have to navigate our way through an SHTF situation, and it’s going to solve problem number one: not having enough information. That’s a problem we can avoid by doing some homework now and setting our community up for success by developing sources to use later when we need to provide security.

In the next article, we’re moving to Phase Three of the Intelligence Cycle, which is Analysis & Processing. I’ll talk about how we can sort through information and begin building intelligence products that will support our mission of community security.

Samuel Culper is the director of Forward Observer, a threat intelligence service that focuses on domestic SHTF issues. He’s a former military and contract intelligence analyst, and author of SHTF Intelligence: An Intelligence Analyst’s Guide to Community Security. You can find out more about the SHTF Intelligence Center at his website.

Original article here

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Intelligence Part 1

Intelligence is vital for any effective operation. We need to learn about how to gather intel, and how to make use of it for the times ahead of us. Please add this information to your training, you will not regret it in the future. We cannot be effective fighters if we do not know how to scout, gather intel, and know how to make use of it.

Parent Article

This is the first article in a series about using intelligence for preparedness. I’m starting from square zero in order to introduce a new crop of Americans to the concept of using intelligence, to prove that there’s a need for intelligence and to get readers quickly up to speed on how to incorporate it into their security planning. After getting caught up to speed, if you’d like to read more in-depth and put theory into practice, a book entitled SHTF Intelligence will show you the way forward. You can find a small homework exercise here.

Why do I need intelligence?

You need intelligence because everyone has blind spots. A common theme in the preparedness community is beans, bullets, and band-aids. We need food and water to survive, we need medicine to treat injuries and illness, and we need guns and ammo for defense… but against whom?

In a S***-Hits-The-Fan (SHTF) or survival situation, if we’re dumping hundreds or thousands or more dollars into beans, bullets, and baid-aids, doesn’t it stand to reason that we should investigate our surroundings as well?

I think so. I was a military and contract intelligence analyst, and we in this country are likely to face a lot of the same types of situations that we dealt with in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to look at:

•Our neighbors and the populace. Are they for us or against us? What are their politics and attitudes? Which households should we approach to build community security in a SHTF situation? Which households will be adversarial to us?

•Key human terrain. Who wields influence in the area? Where do the nearest tradesmen, engineers, and medical professionals live, in case we need their help?

•Known bad guys. Who are the active criminals and gangs in the area? What are their activities, and how can we identify their indicators?

•Future bad guys. Who’s likely to engage in criminality in the future? Which parts of the population are going to resort to criminal behavior in a time of need? Most importantly, in what areas will they be active, and how will they affect my community?

•Law enforcement. How will they respond to a SHTF situation? If they’re going home, as is often assumed, then where do they live and how can we work with them?

•Critical infrastructure. What keeps the world spinning in our area? Do we have critical infrastructure that would invite armed security or suggest an increase in criminal activity? Where can we get the things we need to maintain our survivability?

These are just a few questions that intelligence can answer. At the heart of intelligence is the ability to reduce uncertainty. If you’re concerned about grid-down or financial collapse or the Golden Horde or some other event or threat, then some basic intelligence work should be at the top of your To Do list. Ultimately, what intelligence brings to the table is an ability to make well-informed, time-sensitive decisions.

Colonel John Boyd, an Air Force fighter pilot, was the first to describe the decision-making process he called the OODA Loop. Because fighter pilots have to make split-second decisions, their ability to Observe a development, Orient to what that means, Decide which course of action they should take, and then Act on it is a critical part of their survivability in combat. Similarly, lots of tactical shooting trainers have incorporated the OODA Loop into their curriculum for the exact same reason.

That ability to Observe and Orient is the informational phase of the decision-making process. Can you imagine getting into a gunfight, if you can’t see or hear your opponent? Yet that’s exactly what many are preparing to do on a larger level. We’re limited by our field of vision and line of sight, but with an intelligence effort, we can begin to see well beyond just our line of sight.

So what intelligence allows us to do during a SHTF scenario is not just see our opponent but potentially observe him before a conflict arises. This is called Early Warning, and it’s one of the two key responsibilities of our community security element.

The second major responsibility is producing Threat Intelligence. Knowing that a gang is active in your area is a good first step. We need to move beyond our intuitive approach to information and start using a structured, methodical process to completely remove our blind spots. In essence, we need to graduate from mere information and start producing intelligence.

The difference between information and intelligence is simple: information is raw data, and intelligence is the evaluated, assessed, and synthesized information that answers, “So what?” Hearing that there was a murder in your community is not intelligence; it’s just information. Identifying the perpetrator and his current location, finding out where and why the murder took place, determining how it’s going to affect the community, and compiling it into a consumable product is intelligence.

Intelligence_Cycle

We do this through the Intelligence Cycle. There are five phases, and I’ll briefly detail them in order. In Phase One, we understand our mission, assign analytic tasks and responsibilities, and begin generating our intelligence requirements (covered in the next section). In Phase Two, we task those requirements out for collection. Once that information is collected and reported, we start with Phase Three, where we analyze the incoming information. After filtering out the bad information and analyzing the good information, we produce the actual intelligence. We provide predictive intelligence, which is describing what might or is likely to happen in the future, or estimative intelligence, which is describing an organization’s strength and capabilities. Finally, once we produce the intelligence, we need to ensure that it gets into the hands of the right people. In Phase Five, we disseminate the intelligence to our leadership, our community security team, or the community at large.

Let’s start with Phase One. We need to generate some intelligence requirements or, in other words, statements or questions that describe intelligence gaps.

Let’s say that you do have a gang in the area. What don’t we know about that gang but need to? Do we know how many members are associated with the gang? Do we know where those gang members hang out? Do we know where those gangs are criminally active? Do we know if certain areas are at a higher risk than others (and have we mapped out those areas)? There are potentially lots of intelligence gaps we have, especially if we expect them to be active in a SHTF scenario.

So we can take these questions and start a list:

1.How many members are in the Leroy Jenkins Gang?
2.What are the known hangout spots for Leroy Jenkins Gang members?
3.Identify all high-risk areas for Leroy Jenkins Gang activity.
4.Et cetera…

If we’re building a house, or in our case an intelligence product, then this list of requirements represents our building materials. This is all the information– the lumber, nails, bolts, roofing shingles, doors, and windows– we need to finish our intelligence estimate. Without knowing what we need, we won’t build a very good house.

And thus ends lesson one. Head on over to our homework page for a practical exercise. I’ve also posted a video that will step you through the process of analyzing your community from multiple angles.

Samuel Culper is the Executive Editor of Forward Observer Magazine

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Deception Operations

Each Deception operation consists of five components:

• Objective
• Enemy Assumptions
• Method Selection and Operational Options
• Execution
• Exploitation

Objective

As with actual military operations, false military operations must have a clear objective. What are you trying to get the enemy to believe? What do you want him to not believe? Do you intend to draw his forces away? The more detail that goes into planning and understanding the objective, the easier the implementation will be.

Enemy Assumptions

People are hungry for information, especially war planners. Feed them a careful diet. You must be careful to understand what they already believe and feed those prejudices. If, for example, your enemy believes you will conduct a blitzkrieg assault across the narrowest part of the English Channel, create a force located in Dover and make its commander your general best known for that tactic: George S. Patton, III. For extra flair points, the Allies could have made the First US Army Group a real force with real men, instead of an entirely fictional force, and used that as the reserve force for Normandy. Let the enemy believe what they want to believe.

Method Selection and Operational Options
AmMerc does a quick job of covering the basics of this, and I won’t repeat those here. Instead I’ll make two observations. First, a deception operation is generally more successful if there is more evidence (read: more methods utilized) to convince the enemy of what you want him to believe. To that end, don’t focus on using just one method; instead use several. Second, whatever method you choose must be accessible to the enemy. The cadaver loaded with false plans would have done the allies no good if the Germans hadn’t found it. Likewise, the press reports in 1991 detailing Marine rehearsals for an amphibious landing would have done no good if Saddam Hussein had no TV tuned to CNN.

Execution

This is where the rubber hits the road, or the metal meets the meat. Execution of the deception operation must be believable in order to be believed. For example, suppose your enemy sees your deception force assembling to his right. If he observes that there is no logistics train supporting it, he could correctly conclude that you’re trying to deceive him. Likewise, if a deception force is too obviously exposed, with no effort at camouflage, it is not likely to be believed.

Exploitation
The primary purpose of deception operations is to get the enemy to continue believing in the deception even after you’ve launched your actual operation. This is difficult, since it requires everything to break your way, including the enemy’s stupidity. But if it can be achieved, it becomes a force multiplier for you, since you now have two things working on the enemy’s OODA loop – your actual operation and your deception operation.

Counterdeceptions

The difficult trick in running a deception operation is detecting the enemy’s own deception operations. If you can’t tell when the enemy is deceiving you, you can’t really tell if your deception operation is working or not, because you can’t tell if he sees your deception and is playing along or is actually being deceived.

Conclusions

Walter Scott was right: “Oh, what a tangled web we weave When first we practise to deceive!” The right metaphor from nature for a deception operation is a web, but it is the web of a black widow – tangled, without order, confusing, with no definite center, as contrasted with the orderly spirals most people think of. You must remember that deceptions are equal parts psychology and salesmanship: know your customer and know what will make him come around to your point of view. A deception is only a supporting operation, but a critical one, for it plays to the fears the enemy manifests while the actual operation works towards his vulnerabilities. Neglect neither and you will master both.

This post is for informational and educational purposes only