A how-to guide for counterinsurgency

A guest post from Roland Bartetzko, a former soldier in the German army and Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), offers key observations about counterinsurgency from the insurgent’s point of view.

Many books and manuals have been written about counterinsurgency strategies. But looking at the current situations in Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan, it seems that either nobody has read any of these writings, or the given advice is wrong or not applicable.

It is often said that to understand counterinsurgency, one first has to know insurgent’s point of view. Having been a guerrilla fighter myself and having interviewed a number of insurgents from the war in Syria and Iraq for a study on radical Islam, there are several aspects of counterinsurgency that seem to be misunderstood – not only by the public, but by militaries as well. Here are some key points to consider.

Air strikes damage assessment

When it comes to fighting an insurgency, air strikes don’t work the same way they do against a conventional army. Although it is indeed impressive to watch the big explosions on our TV screens, when the dust is settled surprisingly many insurgents come out of the rubble alive. “The bigger their bombs the deeper our caves” says the guerrilla.

If the purpose of these air raids was to cause panic or to lower the morale of the enemy, it seldom works. You can’t “shock and awe” someone who is not afraid to die, but on the contrary desires to do so on the battlefield. Never underestimate the resilience of your opponent: As late as of March 2016, after having been on the receiving end of a massive air campaign, the Islamic State in Iraq was still capable of launching armored assaults against Kurdish positions.

Tactics vs strategy

Unconventional wars are often won by tactics rather than strategy. The insurgent’s only strategy is to win the war. In order to successfully combat guerrillas, a military force has to have very capable and flexible infantry squad and platoon commanders. This is the infantry’s war, not that of the generals. Still, NATO’s militaries are very inflexible and it takes them forever to plan and to execute even a small size operation. To change this more autonomy must be given to smaller units.

In an unconventional conflict, the participants have to learn to apply unconventional methods. “Out of the box” thinking is not enough. The soldier or law enforcement officer also has to learn to act against his or her intuition.

This includes ignoring enemy activity because of a religious holiday, or condoning drug trade and other illicit activities in order to make deals with local warlords. This type of behavior comes naturally to the insurgents, but might be hard to accept for a Western professional career soldier. The aim is not to make the world a better place, but to win the war. Instead, counterinsurgency should tackle the political roots of the problem: What is driving locals into the arms of the insurgents?

Allies or political lackeys?

It is appalling to see how the United States and European treat their allies. This observation is especially true for the Afghan National Army, but extends even to smaller NATO partners that were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Although it is widely acknowledged that winning the sympathies of the local population is a key element to a successful counterinsurgency strategy, this will be difficult to achieve when the local military is not fully respected.

For the Iraqi Army, the problem is more that of training and recruitment. Both armies in Iraq and Afghanistan appoint high grade officers with the aim of trying to “respect the ethnic/religious diversity” of the country. This thinking has turned out to be disastrous.

This issue is not only about morale support and training; If you’re relying on local allies to bear the brunt of the fighting, they should receive the best equipment that is available. This has been especially true in regards to the Afghan forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) Main Battle Tanks (MBT), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), and most helicopters are Soviet made. Even their Special Forces (SF), although having somehow better material, can’t compare with Western SF.


Instead the ANA is expected to do the job with obsolete Soviet era arms. There is a military principle that commands that the units that go to battle always get the best equipment. This should always apply to NATO’s local allies.

Inside intelligence

Waging an unconventional war requires a different type of intelligence from the one when fighting against a conventional enemy. Guerrilla operations and movements cannot be easily spotted. Often the insurgents are well camouflaged or operate in disguise. Therefore human intelligence is an absolute necessity. It won’t be enough to just listen to the enemy’s radio communication or rely on aerial or satellite images in order to learn their intentions. Inside sources within the organization are needed. And the best air force with the most advanced technical capabilities is ineffective if there is no intelligence on targets available.

Currently most information that the coalition possess about ISIS originates from deserters, who repented joining the organization, and their testimony is often biased; this leads many people to underestimate the military capabilities of ISIS. Most “repenters” played only minor roles in the Islamic State organization and therefore the intelligence they provide is of little value.

Be patient

Time is the most underrated factor in unconventional warfare. Western politicians often expect positive results immediately. A guerrilla is not in a hurry. They are in for the long haul and can keep their head down and wait for better days.

There is often a gap between the moment a counterinsurgency measure is taken, and the time its effects are seen. For example, one might shut down the enemy’s supply lines, but it will still take weeks or months until this measure diminishes the enemy’s capability to wage war.

On the other hand less insurgent activity is not always the result of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. There are plenty of unrelated reasons why the guerrilla have stopped fighting, some of them as trivial as a wedding or the need of additional manpower to bring in the crops. In other instances, political crises in neighboring countries, fluctuations in international small arms trade, and regional conditions could revitalize a dormant insurgent force. The counterinsurgency forces might retreat from this “pacified’ region only to find out later that the enemy is still there.

Patience is demanded. Often the right military decision is made, but it shows no immediate effect. Western military planners often consider themselves as surgeons; their operations are described as “surgical cuts”. However, the war against insurgents asks for oncologists treating cancer patients.

The lower the intensity of an unconventional war is, the more the war “slows down”. At the lowest end, individuals and isolated cells that have pledged their alliance to a radical organization are conducting terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Years can pass before such persons finally begin to act. Planning and preparing those attacks can take months. The countermeasures to prevent those acts are usually the most time consuming. Don’t expect quick results in fighting urban terrorism.

A serious and thorough reform of the local counterinsurgency forces should include setting up an intelligence network which produces actionable intelligence from reliable sources, but also a need to introduce “soft’ measures like de-radicalization programs that will inevitably take time, personnel and money. Momentary battlefield “successes” and wishful thinking will make it more difficult to allocate the proper resources to do that. However, without making these changes, all victories against radical Islamic groups will turn out to be only temporary and meaningless.

Roland Bartetzko served in the German Army, the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) during the Bosnian War and with the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) during the 1999 Kosovo War. Last year he published a study about radical Islam in Kosovo. Bartetzko has a university degree in law and is currently working for a law firm in Pristina, Kosovo.

Original Article

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Counter Insurgency Operations

Counter Insurgency Operations are what "they" will be using against us during the "Restoration". We need to be aware of them, and use what we can against our enemies, train ourselves to be strong and prepared for what is coming. The more we know, and the better trained we are, the more effective we will be.

COIN: Seven Lines of Effort for Prepper Security

One threat that many preppers are likely to face post-SHTF is that of the criminal insurgent, or groups of criminals, gangs, mobs, and looters. This criminal threat will manifest for a few reasons; namely out of the criminal’s need to survive, the availability of unprepared, soft targets, and the community’s inability to enforce laws in a Without Rule of Law scenario.

Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. – T. E. Lawrence

One question that ought to be answered is, “How long after SHTF, and under what conditions, will the criminal threat become active in my area?” That’s a question best answered by the intelligence element. This article assumes that many communities will eventually encounter the conditions that support a criminal insurgent threat, and that the best way to fight against the criminal insurgent threat is through Counterinsurgency (COIN). The criminal insurgent defined is the individual, or group of individuals, who are not only actively engaging in common criminality, but also actively working against the re-establishment of the rule of law. In other words, it’s in the criminal insurgent’s best interest to work against any system that attempts to bring security back to the area.

COIN is and has always been, even before being named Counterinsurgency, about the people. There are wars that involve tanks and planes fighting for domination, and then there are wars of the people. In COIN, the populace is the center of attention; every plan is viewed through the lens of the populace, and every action is put through the paces of the populace. In short, as the populace goes, so goes the war.

The worst case scenario is that the criminal insurgent receives support from any segment of the populace. Let’s look at Ferguson, Missouri briefly. Are there members of that community who don’t support the rioters? Yes. But are there members of that community who like the police and perceived injustice less? Are there members of that community who believe, as much as they may be against it, that violent protests are the only way to effect change? Yes, there are, which is why those rioters are finding cover from the protestors and the community. If there wasn’t a significant part of the population who supported violent protests, then there would be very little violence and it wouldn’t last very long. Where there’s smoke, there’s fire, as the saying goes; and in this case, there is some level of support for the activities that go on there.

When considering a COIN plan for your community, first ask yourself, “What does this community want? What will this community want in a post-SHTF scenario?” To be honest, you may have a segment of the population who will tolerate criminality as long as it benefits them. As long as they benefit, they will tolerate it, and you may even find that they begin actively supporting that criminality if it helps them achieve their goals, i.e., survival.

To start COIN planning, we need to look at the seven lines of effort (slightly modified from its traditional form in FM 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN):

1. Establish Local Security – What will your community want? They’ll want what nearly all humans want: to be secure without the threat of violence against them and their family. If the criminal insurgent gives that to the populace, then the populace will find a very good reason to support the criminal insurgent. It’s therefore incumbent on you to be prepared before the SHTF and be ready to step in to provide this fundamental service to your community. If you can bring and/or maintain security without losing the trust of the people, then you will be successful. Lose the trust of the people, though, by having your volunteers loot, rape, or plunder, and the populace may seek, or form, a viable alternative.

2. Establish Local ‘Control’ – By control, I mean positive control of the situation. Bringing security must be the first step, but security is not governance. And I’m not talking about taxes or legislation, here. Establishing local control means establishing legitimacy by forming a judicial system, enforcing Constitutional laws, and generally protecting the citizenry against internal and external threats — the very basic tenets of limited government. Ask yourself, To whom will this community lend their support, and why? Answer that question, and you’ll be well on your way to establishing local control. Your community may support warlordism or the law of the jungle. I’m sorry if that’s the case, but it’s probably time to move if you find yourself in that situation. For all others, you can prevent warlordism and ‘might makes right’ by making these plans beforehand.

3. Support for Local Security – Once you’ve provided security for the community, are enforcing laws, and generally keeping the peace, then you’ll need to continue to keep the support for your efforts. That means doing everything above board and allowing the populace to have some skin in the game. It also means training up at least a semi-professional security staff who are effective at solving problems the least intrusively (to the populace) as possible and who make good decisions.

4. Support for Governance – How will you build support for local governance? If things get bad enough, building support for governance is going to be a huge problem for a lot of people. How do you get the average citizen to “buy-in” to your plan? Starting at the community-level, you could simply form an agreement that all disputes will be taken up by a third party, like a judicial system. However you decide to solve problems, disputes could arise that may negatively impact your legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. Maintain that support by being fair.

5. Restore Essential Services – Creature comforts come down to water and electricity. Both of these may be disrupted; in fact, it’s probably in the criminal insurgent’s best interest to keep essential services out of commission. So once essential services are restored, how are you going to protect and maintain them?

6. Support Economic/Infrastructure Development – Three words: Intelligence Preparation of the Community. How can you create meaningful work as soon as possible? What are the demands in your area? What goods and services can your area supply to others? Other things to consider are transportation and telecommunications. Being able to communicate easily, i.e., the restoration of phone lines, for instance, will make commerce much easier. Safe roads capable of supporting commerce is another piece of this puzzle.

7. Conduct Information Engagement – Simultaneously, we need a way to ‘exploit’ all the positive contributions we’re making in the community. How are we going to get out this information to the public? How are we going to shame criminals and continue to turn the public’s opinion against these criminal insurgents? How are we going to publicize attacks against the community and frame them in a way so that the populace will continue to turn against these threats? On the flip side, we need to keep our ears to the ground and learn how the populace feels and what they think. If they think we’re doing a good job, then they’ll continue their support. If they think we’re doing poorly, then they may find a good reason to support someone else.

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