When it comes to practicing “Man Down Drills” or “Injured Man Drills”, we need to remember that we will not always be healthy and in the best position to engage.
I recommend that you practice this with something other than your firearm to begin with, I would start off using, blue guns or perhaps air soft or air guns before attempting to draw and fire at a live range from the ground. It is best to practice shooting from this position with both your primary and secondary weapon systems (Rifle and Handgun). Just as those positions prove to be accurate after getting used to them, gun handling from a weakened position is an acquired skill. These drills need to be performed in your tactical gear and kit, there is no need to have your pack on, but have all your other gear on, remember you have to train the way you fight, because you will fight the way you train.
The next level would be to practice drawing while headed to the ground instead of after the fact. Again, be extremely mindful of muzzle direction and safety at all times.
To learn how to fall properly, I would recommend at minimum a brief enrollment in a martial arts school specializing in Judo, jujitsu, Aikido, Hwa Rang Do or some of the more traditional martial arts which teach nothing but how to roll, fall and recover from the same for the first few weeks.
Drawing from the ground, shooting from the ground and even practicing how to fall and recover can reveal shortcomings about gear and training. For example, an open bottom holster may get caked in mud or snow; this could cause a malfunction or barrel obstruction, so if you only have an open bottom holster, think about placing some duct tape over the barrel, or do not worry about it.
The most advanced stage would be moving to an advantageous position or perhaps engaging targets not just in front but to the back and sides. This would require a very specific and purpose built range to accomplish that safely, but could be replicated with air soft or pellet guns as mentioned previous for safety’s sake.
The best thing to do to gain a higher level of proficiency is to get off your butt, go to a place you can do drills like this, and actually do them. Practice going to the ground, drawing, and shooting acuratly, perform mag changes, and engage targets from different directions. I know this is hard if not impossible to do at a range, but if your range will not let you do this, find a place in the woods you can, or just practice in your backyard, or living room with an unloaded gun. Remember, even if you cannot go full bore and actually shoot, do what you can, you will still be better off than if you did nothing.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Friday, October 4, 2013
Bounding Over-Watch
The Bounding Over-Watch reinforces teamwork while moving toward an objective with limited cover. Essentially it is firing on the move and providing cover fire to help the team advance on the objective. To conduct it successfully a wide shooting range is needed of at least 100 yards. Ideally it is conducted with a four man fire team broken down into two groups, although this can be modified to suit your team or department's needs.
Initially, one of the teams will provide cover fire as the other team moves down range. It is important to maintain muzzle discipline at all times when conducting this drill. That means fingers off the trigger with safeties on, as the shooters on the other team may end up in front of you at times.
One two man team will shoot as the other team moves. Initially this can be done in increments of ten yards to develop a feel for it and to institute a level of safety. When the team moving reaches their destination, they alert the shooters that they are “Clear” and take up the task of providing cover until the other team passes them by ten yards.
The roles then switch back and forth until both teams are within 5 feet of the targets.
There is no firing across the range at any time in the interest of safety. Shooters should only engage targets directly in front of them.
It is equally important to vary range conditions with each session, so as not to build or train for complacency. Improvised pieces of cover can be used, such as pallets turned on their sides. In a real world situation, as officers are moving to a position of cover, the suppression fire is to provide them protection while on the move.
In military situations, this drill is conducted in the reverse as well by moving backward from the 10-yard line to the 100-yard line. This has limited use in police situations as the turning and traveling rapidly to the rear of the range is to simulate an egress or an escape.
If you conduct the rearward drill it is best to peel off to the outside. When moving, turn away from the team providing cover so that you never muzzle them with your weapon. Index your trigger finger, keep the muzzle down and safety on; at all times you want to keep as close to 180 degrees from them as possible.
This drill is the most effective way to practice moving over open ground while seeking the next piece of cover at all times. The Bounding Over-Watch is an essential drill to learn how to fight through an ambush and advance rapidly on an objective with one or more active shooters.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Initially, one of the teams will provide cover fire as the other team moves down range. It is important to maintain muzzle discipline at all times when conducting this drill. That means fingers off the trigger with safeties on, as the shooters on the other team may end up in front of you at times.
One two man team will shoot as the other team moves. Initially this can be done in increments of ten yards to develop a feel for it and to institute a level of safety. When the team moving reaches their destination, they alert the shooters that they are “Clear” and take up the task of providing cover until the other team passes them by ten yards.
The roles then switch back and forth until both teams are within 5 feet of the targets.
There is no firing across the range at any time in the interest of safety. Shooters should only engage targets directly in front of them.
It is equally important to vary range conditions with each session, so as not to build or train for complacency. Improvised pieces of cover can be used, such as pallets turned on their sides. In a real world situation, as officers are moving to a position of cover, the suppression fire is to provide them protection while on the move.
In military situations, this drill is conducted in the reverse as well by moving backward from the 10-yard line to the 100-yard line. This has limited use in police situations as the turning and traveling rapidly to the rear of the range is to simulate an egress or an escape.
If you conduct the rearward drill it is best to peel off to the outside. When moving, turn away from the team providing cover so that you never muzzle them with your weapon. Index your trigger finger, keep the muzzle down and safety on; at all times you want to keep as close to 180 degrees from them as possible.
This drill is the most effective way to practice moving over open ground while seeking the next piece of cover at all times. The Bounding Over-Watch is an essential drill to learn how to fight through an ambush and advance rapidly on an objective with one or more active shooters.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Friday, September 27, 2013
A couple of good reads from Max Velocity
Here are some articles from one of my favorite blogs, by Max Velocity. I am currently reading and almost done with Patriot Dawn, and have Contact and Rapid Fire to read next. So far I am impressed with the book, it is a good read, with tons of great info in it. From reading his stuff so far, I can say that there is not an article he has written that I did not agree with at least 95% of the time. So with that said, check out these articles.
There will be no theme music
Countering aerial thermal surveillance
Thermal Poncho
The concept of the thermal poncho, or blanket is of vital importance to us, and should be a part of each of our kits. We will not have any success in our fight if we are suseptable to thermal surveillance. We have to ensure every means of increasing our survivability. Without items like this in our loadout, we will not be of much use to our nation in it's time of need.
There will be no theme music
Countering aerial thermal surveillance
Thermal Poncho
The concept of the thermal poncho, or blanket is of vital importance to us, and should be a part of each of our kits. We will not have any success in our fight if we are suseptable to thermal surveillance. We have to ensure every means of increasing our survivability. Without items like this in our loadout, we will not be of much use to our nation in it's time of need.
Thursday, September 19, 2013
Combat Casualties
Here is another article by Max Velocity, I just find his articles so good I have to put them up for you guys. I just bought his books by the way, I will read them and do book reviews here when I am done.
SHTF Combat Casualty - Considerations & Realities
On my CRCD class, I don't have time to do a full class on TC3 (Tactical Combat Casualty Care). However, what I do is give a few pointers as to how causalities will fit into the game in a real SHTF contact situation.
When I train people in patrol break contact drills, I explain that it is like practicing a fire emergency drill. The fire alarm goes off, we all head downstairs and rally in the parking lot. Simple. But in the reality of a fire, we may not all get out, it may be a smoke and flame filled confusion, and we may take casualties. It's the same for break contact drills.
So, we practice our choreographed drills and at the level of the CRCD class I don't even throw in casualties. The worst case reality of a break contact drill, facing a well sited enemy ambush, is that you may get out crawling down a creek bed dragging your wounded buddy. Or you may not get out at all. But that is worst case.
Break contact drills are 'Oh Shit' emergency drills and there are worst case scenarios. The other side of that is that with a well executed drill, even though you are doing the drill to ultimately get away, you may react and hit the enemy in such an effective way that you leave them reeling, wondering what happened as you "faded away into the woods."
In the immortal words of Captain Jack Sparrow of 'Pirates of the Caribbean' fame: "We will fight them, to run away."
The main point that I want to bring out today is firstly the effect of casualties on your drill, and secondly the effect that SHTF will have on your TC3 procedures.
Firstly, the hardest thing you will do is going to probably be evacuating a casualty under enemy fire. Moving a casualty is very hard. Initially, you will be dragging the casualty by his gear every bound back that you make. You will move, dragging the casualty, covered by the other buddy pair. Then, you will stop, take a fire position, and fire to cover the withdrawal of the other buddy pair. As you get further away from the contact, creating a breathing space, you can consider reorganizing slightly so that, depending on the size of your team, there is an element moving the casualty and an element fire and moving back to cover that. For a four man team with one casualty, that will mean one person moving the casualty, whether by dragging or the Hawes carry, and the other two bounding back to cover that move.
Once you rally up out of contact, you can reorganize, again your numbers will determine exactly how you do that (are you a team or a squad?), to create a litter carry party and a security party to cover the move out.
Secondly, let's look at the reality of TC3 in an SHTF situation:
There are three phases to TC3:
1) Care under fire
2) Tactical Field Care
3) Evacuation
In the Care under Fire phase, the primary thing you must concentrate on is fighting the battle. If you are breaking contact that means do that. Don't do anything that will cause more casualties, such as running out in the open to get that downed point man, unless you have first suppressed the enemy.
Th only intervention you, or the casualty, can do in the Care under Fire phase is to apply a hasty tourniquet 'high and tight' on a wounded limb to stop imminent death from extremity bleeding. As a team you will be going through your individual RTR drills, reacting to the contact, and then flowing into the break contact drill as appropriate. If you have a man down, you will simply have to grab him and drag him back on each bound you make back as part of your fire and movement.
Even in the care under fire phase, don't try and put a tourniquet on in an exposed position. Drag the guy into a semblance of cover, be practiced so you can whip it on and tighten it down quick either in the groin or armpit area, and then get on with firing and moving. If you kneel in the open to apply a tourniquet, you will be shot down.
If you are in some other contact situation where you are not actually moving and breaking contact, and you are engaged in a firefight with a casualty exposed in the open, then don't risk all to go to them. Concentrate on suppressing the enemy and winning the firefight. There are pretty much four things you can shout to them under TC3:
1) Can you return fire?
2) Can you apply self-aid? (i.e. hasty tourniquet high and tight)
3) Can you crawl to me?
4) Lay still! (so as not to draw more fire - don't tell them to "play dead", it's not good psychologically!)
But, dependent on the situation you find yourself in SHTF, there are some other considerations. You probably don't have back-up and there is no 'dust-off' medevac on the way. If the guy is obviously dead, grey matter on the ground or whatever, then look to the greater good of the team and fight out of there. SHTF will make you face some hard decisions. You may not be able to bring them all home. The other side of that is that wounds can be horrific and look a lot worse than they are. So long as the guy is breathing, even better screaming, then do your best to get him out of there, even though you may be repulsed and unsure how you could ever take care of such a nasty wound.
The next phase to look at is the Tactical Field Care phase. This is where training can diverge from the SHTF reality. In training, once you have suppressed the enemy and got the casualty to cover, then you can go into Tactical Field Care, which means taking care of H-ABC (now MARCH, same thing) and then the full assessment before packaging up the casualty (thermal blanket to prevent hypothermia, even in hot weather) and monitoring them for evacuation. This is where a whole bunch of interventions are possible. However, in SHTF I can't tell you who your enemy will be. Worst case, they are an aggressive force that will follow you up, potentially even a Regime style 'enemies foreign or domestic' hunter-killer force. If so, you will not be able to hang around in the rally point for longer than it takes to do a personnel check, tactical reloads, and maybe a quick intervention on the casualty. Other than that, if you hang around and they follow up into your hasty ambush established as part of the rally, you will be back in contact and will have to roll back into the break contact drills again, back to another rally point. Don't hang about after breaking contact.
In that sort of situation, you will have to do what you can for the casualty as you move back, creating further distance as you E&E away from the contact point. But here we hit another dilemma. You need to have equipment with you, and personnel, to carry the casualty. If you are using a litter, one casualty will take a squad to move - four on the litter at any one time, struggling, and the others pulling security as you move. You could use other methods, such as the ruck-style carry straps allowing one person to carry the casualty, but all this is going to be really hard work and make you slow.
Enter: more hard decisions: how badly wounded is the casualty? Do you have definitive care to get him back to? How hard are you being pursued? Can you take care of the pursuit with a hasty ambush, or are you in serious trouble? Can you move fast enough to get away while moving the casualty? Will the casualty survive the evacuation (which as non-medically trained personnel you may not even know)? If you leave the casualty, what will the enemy do to him? Maiming, torture, cannibals, interrogation? Is leaving the casualty a security risk to your teams operations and ultimate survival? Do you have a contingency plan for team members falling into enemy hands - can you move your FOB location faster than you expect him to break to interrogation?
No, I'm not advocating that you shoot your guy and leave him, or that he shoot himself. But this may be a time for a little volunteer heroics from the casualty, which always carries a risk of capture. It all just depends on the situation, and no doubt an SHTF or civil war/resistance type situation is going to throw up some really hard choices. Some of this ties in with comments that I have made before about dumping gear to get away, running off naked through the woods after having dumped all your gear to escape. The key here is to carry a load that you can move with, and shuffle-run out with if necessary, so you never have to dump all your weapons, ammo and gear even if you dump your patrol pack. If you are being closely pursued, whether you have a casualty or not, then you may face a choice of dumping everything and running, or you may turn and fight, hasty ambush, get close to the enemy negating indirect fire weapons, and maybe survive in the chaos, in the gaps. That is your choice and largely depends on what you are about i.e. what you see as your mission.
There is a time to live, a time to fight, and a time to die. All that really matters is how much it's going to hurt, right? If you are going to go out like a fighting bear, go out like a grizzly.
This leads us on to the last part, which is evacuation. The whole point, in a nutshell, of the TC3 protocols is basically to stabilize the casualty and keep them alive so that they can be evacuated back to definitive care, in military terms at the CASH (Combat Hospital). But in SHTF you will only have whatever medical care you have. Whether that is a medically trained person, or yourself having read up and taken some courses.
The interventions that you do under TC3 protocols rely on further definitive interventions back at the hospital to take care of the problem. You have to take that tourniquet off some time right? Are you going to clamp that artery? Do you have the equipment? You have to get a chest tube in to take care of the sucking chest wound and tension pneumothorax (collapsed lung), right? Can you get over your own feelings of revulsion at the gore and blood in order to be effective in helping your buddy or family member?
So ultimately, keeping the guy alive until you can get him out will then rely on being able to keep him further alive by definitive interventions. You may be back to an 1860's level of medicine, giving him a bottle of whisky to drink while you do what you can. So, you need to be able to clean, debride and suture wounds. You need to consider antibiotics, because back in the day infection was the major killer of those who initially survived their wounds. Think about use of betadine/sugar poultices and similar, as used by vets on horses.
So, ultimately what is my point? Like all military style doctrine, it has to be assessed and looked at from the perspective of an SHTF situation. TC3 is no different. It is really useful to train as a combat lifesaver or combat medic and to learn to do TC3. But make sure you have assessed the use of it in a non-military SHTF environment and consider the potential absence of definitive care as well as the need for people in your group to step into those gaps with useful skills.
Live Hard, Die Free.
MV
http://maxvelocitytactical.blogspot.com/2013/09/shtf-combat-casualty-considerations.html
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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SHTF Combat Casualty - Considerations & Realities
On my CRCD class, I don't have time to do a full class on TC3 (Tactical Combat Casualty Care). However, what I do is give a few pointers as to how causalities will fit into the game in a real SHTF contact situation.
When I train people in patrol break contact drills, I explain that it is like practicing a fire emergency drill. The fire alarm goes off, we all head downstairs and rally in the parking lot. Simple. But in the reality of a fire, we may not all get out, it may be a smoke and flame filled confusion, and we may take casualties. It's the same for break contact drills.
So, we practice our choreographed drills and at the level of the CRCD class I don't even throw in casualties. The worst case reality of a break contact drill, facing a well sited enemy ambush, is that you may get out crawling down a creek bed dragging your wounded buddy. Or you may not get out at all. But that is worst case.
Break contact drills are 'Oh Shit' emergency drills and there are worst case scenarios. The other side of that is that with a well executed drill, even though you are doing the drill to ultimately get away, you may react and hit the enemy in such an effective way that you leave them reeling, wondering what happened as you "faded away into the woods."
In the immortal words of Captain Jack Sparrow of 'Pirates of the Caribbean' fame: "We will fight them, to run away."
The main point that I want to bring out today is firstly the effect of casualties on your drill, and secondly the effect that SHTF will have on your TC3 procedures.
Firstly, the hardest thing you will do is going to probably be evacuating a casualty under enemy fire. Moving a casualty is very hard. Initially, you will be dragging the casualty by his gear every bound back that you make. You will move, dragging the casualty, covered by the other buddy pair. Then, you will stop, take a fire position, and fire to cover the withdrawal of the other buddy pair. As you get further away from the contact, creating a breathing space, you can consider reorganizing slightly so that, depending on the size of your team, there is an element moving the casualty and an element fire and moving back to cover that. For a four man team with one casualty, that will mean one person moving the casualty, whether by dragging or the Hawes carry, and the other two bounding back to cover that move.
Once you rally up out of contact, you can reorganize, again your numbers will determine exactly how you do that (are you a team or a squad?), to create a litter carry party and a security party to cover the move out.
Secondly, let's look at the reality of TC3 in an SHTF situation:
There are three phases to TC3:
1) Care under fire
2) Tactical Field Care
3) Evacuation
In the Care under Fire phase, the primary thing you must concentrate on is fighting the battle. If you are breaking contact that means do that. Don't do anything that will cause more casualties, such as running out in the open to get that downed point man, unless you have first suppressed the enemy.
Th only intervention you, or the casualty, can do in the Care under Fire phase is to apply a hasty tourniquet 'high and tight' on a wounded limb to stop imminent death from extremity bleeding. As a team you will be going through your individual RTR drills, reacting to the contact, and then flowing into the break contact drill as appropriate. If you have a man down, you will simply have to grab him and drag him back on each bound you make back as part of your fire and movement.
Even in the care under fire phase, don't try and put a tourniquet on in an exposed position. Drag the guy into a semblance of cover, be practiced so you can whip it on and tighten it down quick either in the groin or armpit area, and then get on with firing and moving. If you kneel in the open to apply a tourniquet, you will be shot down.
If you are in some other contact situation where you are not actually moving and breaking contact, and you are engaged in a firefight with a casualty exposed in the open, then don't risk all to go to them. Concentrate on suppressing the enemy and winning the firefight. There are pretty much four things you can shout to them under TC3:
1) Can you return fire?
2) Can you apply self-aid? (i.e. hasty tourniquet high and tight)
3) Can you crawl to me?
4) Lay still! (so as not to draw more fire - don't tell them to "play dead", it's not good psychologically!)
But, dependent on the situation you find yourself in SHTF, there are some other considerations. You probably don't have back-up and there is no 'dust-off' medevac on the way. If the guy is obviously dead, grey matter on the ground or whatever, then look to the greater good of the team and fight out of there. SHTF will make you face some hard decisions. You may not be able to bring them all home. The other side of that is that wounds can be horrific and look a lot worse than they are. So long as the guy is breathing, even better screaming, then do your best to get him out of there, even though you may be repulsed and unsure how you could ever take care of such a nasty wound.
The next phase to look at is the Tactical Field Care phase. This is where training can diverge from the SHTF reality. In training, once you have suppressed the enemy and got the casualty to cover, then you can go into Tactical Field Care, which means taking care of H-ABC (now MARCH, same thing) and then the full assessment before packaging up the casualty (thermal blanket to prevent hypothermia, even in hot weather) and monitoring them for evacuation. This is where a whole bunch of interventions are possible. However, in SHTF I can't tell you who your enemy will be. Worst case, they are an aggressive force that will follow you up, potentially even a Regime style 'enemies foreign or domestic' hunter-killer force. If so, you will not be able to hang around in the rally point for longer than it takes to do a personnel check, tactical reloads, and maybe a quick intervention on the casualty. Other than that, if you hang around and they follow up into your hasty ambush established as part of the rally, you will be back in contact and will have to roll back into the break contact drills again, back to another rally point. Don't hang about after breaking contact.
In that sort of situation, you will have to do what you can for the casualty as you move back, creating further distance as you E&E away from the contact point. But here we hit another dilemma. You need to have equipment with you, and personnel, to carry the casualty. If you are using a litter, one casualty will take a squad to move - four on the litter at any one time, struggling, and the others pulling security as you move. You could use other methods, such as the ruck-style carry straps allowing one person to carry the casualty, but all this is going to be really hard work and make you slow.
Enter: more hard decisions: how badly wounded is the casualty? Do you have definitive care to get him back to? How hard are you being pursued? Can you take care of the pursuit with a hasty ambush, or are you in serious trouble? Can you move fast enough to get away while moving the casualty? Will the casualty survive the evacuation (which as non-medically trained personnel you may not even know)? If you leave the casualty, what will the enemy do to him? Maiming, torture, cannibals, interrogation? Is leaving the casualty a security risk to your teams operations and ultimate survival? Do you have a contingency plan for team members falling into enemy hands - can you move your FOB location faster than you expect him to break to interrogation?
No, I'm not advocating that you shoot your guy and leave him, or that he shoot himself. But this may be a time for a little volunteer heroics from the casualty, which always carries a risk of capture. It all just depends on the situation, and no doubt an SHTF or civil war/resistance type situation is going to throw up some really hard choices. Some of this ties in with comments that I have made before about dumping gear to get away, running off naked through the woods after having dumped all your gear to escape. The key here is to carry a load that you can move with, and shuffle-run out with if necessary, so you never have to dump all your weapons, ammo and gear even if you dump your patrol pack. If you are being closely pursued, whether you have a casualty or not, then you may face a choice of dumping everything and running, or you may turn and fight, hasty ambush, get close to the enemy negating indirect fire weapons, and maybe survive in the chaos, in the gaps. That is your choice and largely depends on what you are about i.e. what you see as your mission.
There is a time to live, a time to fight, and a time to die. All that really matters is how much it's going to hurt, right? If you are going to go out like a fighting bear, go out like a grizzly.
This leads us on to the last part, which is evacuation. The whole point, in a nutshell, of the TC3 protocols is basically to stabilize the casualty and keep them alive so that they can be evacuated back to definitive care, in military terms at the CASH (Combat Hospital). But in SHTF you will only have whatever medical care you have. Whether that is a medically trained person, or yourself having read up and taken some courses.
The interventions that you do under TC3 protocols rely on further definitive interventions back at the hospital to take care of the problem. You have to take that tourniquet off some time right? Are you going to clamp that artery? Do you have the equipment? You have to get a chest tube in to take care of the sucking chest wound and tension pneumothorax (collapsed lung), right? Can you get over your own feelings of revulsion at the gore and blood in order to be effective in helping your buddy or family member?
So ultimately, keeping the guy alive until you can get him out will then rely on being able to keep him further alive by definitive interventions. You may be back to an 1860's level of medicine, giving him a bottle of whisky to drink while you do what you can. So, you need to be able to clean, debride and suture wounds. You need to consider antibiotics, because back in the day infection was the major killer of those who initially survived their wounds. Think about use of betadine/sugar poultices and similar, as used by vets on horses.
So, ultimately what is my point? Like all military style doctrine, it has to be assessed and looked at from the perspective of an SHTF situation. TC3 is no different. It is really useful to train as a combat lifesaver or combat medic and to learn to do TC3. But make sure you have assessed the use of it in a non-military SHTF environment and consider the potential absence of definitive care as well as the need for people in your group to step into those gaps with useful skills.
Live Hard, Die Free.
MV
http://maxvelocitytactical.blogspot.com/2013/09/shtf-combat-casualty-considerations.html
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Monday, September 16, 2013
Covert Movement
I just read this article by Max Velocity and thought you guys and gals might find it of use also. So here it is from his site:
http://maxvelocitytactical.blogspot.com/2013/08/comment-on-covert-movement.html
Comment on Covert Movement
I'll try and keep this post short. That usually turns out to be harder than you think, as I start getting into the topic. I saw an interesting post on the American Mercenary blog: 'Moving Groups'. I am moved to comment.
So yes, a lot of this depends on the exact scenario you find yourself in. We are not soldiers on a foreign battlefield. It really just depends on how the situation pans out when you end up fighting those 'enemies foreign and domestic'. A few good points have been made out there in the blogosphere lately. Mosby with his 'Underground Tradecraft' post (part 1), and other comments about the likelihood of taking off into the woods in camo and a boonie hat (I'm game....).
It may be SHTF and you are able to wear your best camo.
It may be that you are an active member of the Resistance and you are operating out of camps in the forests and deserts.
It may be that you are a member of the auxiliary, still living in the suburbs and aiding and abetting the active resistance members out there freezing/sweating in the forests.
It may be that we have not yet reached a time of full camo-clad SHTF and you are fighting those pesky 'enemies foreign or domestic' in a more covert way.
In a situation where you are operating as an unconventional fighting force, you will most likely be adopting light infantry tactics. If that is the situation, and you are a classic resistance force out there in the boonies, then you have choices over how you will tactically move those forces around. A classic decision here would involve a platoon sized force, that you perhaps want to move out on an ambush patrol. To do so, you have the choice of moving the whole platoon together, on a route using the best terrain masking available. Or, you break the platoon down into smaller squads or teams and send them via different routes, to rally up at the ORP (objective rally point).
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages (don't they all): the platoon moving together is a larger force, better able to look after itself if discovered and bumped by the enemy, but harder to conceal. On the other hand, the smaller teams are easier to conceal, but using multiple routes may increase the likelihood of discovery, depending on the terrain available to you. You make your own decision based on METT-TC, which in plain language means depending on the circumstances.
In the AmMerc article the approach was discussed, if you are utilizing highly competent personnel, of infiltrating in a covert way as per prior instructions so that individuals would coalesce at a target and conduct an operation, without actually meeting up at something like a rally point beforehand. Well, again it depends on the circumstances but I would be very circumspect of conducting an operation without full orders/briefing plus rehearsals preceding it. It may be that you can then disperse and move to the target by a series of covert individual means, moving either via an ORP or perhaps straight into individual support by fire and assault positions, depending on what you are doing.
Of course, if it is some kind of covert hit onto an enemy target, then it may be able to be conducted more in this manner, with team members either recognizing each other or having recognition signals. It may be that you have an individual or team surveiling the target. Once the conditions are met, they somehow communicate the 'GO' to the kinetic team or individual (sniper perhaps) to move into position, to attack if they are already tin position, or whatever. The target is hit and the sniper team or individual moves out on a predesignated route. At this point, he may have a drop point or perhaps an individual to leave the rifle with (or dump it, clean of forensics, if you can afford to lose it). He then moves, covertly in nondescript civilian clothes, to outside the *** store on *** street, where he meets up with the extraction team/individual in a covert builders van, or whatever. He either knows the guy or the van description, or has some other signal that it is the right van. He gets in and is driven off.
You get the picture. The above description is a way that you could organize, even using a cell system perhaps with guys that did not know each other, to accomplish a mission. It still needs to be planned and coordinated. This would assume a more normal times scenario where people are still out and about in the streets unarmed and where vehicles can move in the streets. Hmmmm....perhaps after full gun confiscation laws are enacted, comes to mind....???
It's not so far fetched; both sides used to get up to stuff like this in Northern Ireland, before everyone hugged and became friends. Let's look at some techniques:
CMV: this is a 'civilian military vehicle'. It describes what is basically a civvy van, all decked out to be no different from a builders truck, delivery van or whatever. These can be used for the covert infil or exfil of troops onto a mission, such as a patrol. Sometimes they were used when the weather was too bad to get a chopper in or out, or when the RAF was watching the game back at their cosy base and could not be bothered to come out and get you. The vans are driven by guys in civilian clothes complete with concealed weapons. In the back, you could have anything up to a full uniformed patrol of twelve guys fully decked out in uniform, or you could have some more covertly attired guys perhaps in earth tone clothing or street clothes.
Because these CMV's were used by security forces rather than resistance fighters, it therefore allowed them freedom to do various things. Pick up and drop off would be done at some covert place. However, one way to do it would be to wait until the CMV was imminent at the pick up point, throw in a quick fake Vehicle Checkpoint on the road, the CMV would roll up and be stopped, and then the patrol would all pile into the van and drive off when no-one was watching. Obviously a tactic for night time use on deserted country roads. A Resistance team could use these vehicles in a similar way to covertly move personnel around, to infil and exfil them from drop-off points where they could continue the mission either in a 'uniformed' or plain clothes manner. Once dropped off, a camo-clad resistance team would then continue to use terrain masking to patrol on foot towards the objective.
In Northern Ireland, the rule of law was very much in evidence. It meant that known 'players' could be stopped at a temporary vehicle checkpoint, searched for weapons, and sent on their way. They did not go about armed for this very reason. They may have been let on their way because to continue to surveil them was a clever plan, or simply because without weapons or direct evidence they could not be arrested. It got complicated. However, I do wonder whether in our increasing police/surveillance state there would even be the freedom of movement accorded to known terrorist players in Northern Ireland? I suspect that in a tyrannical United States, merely being recognized as a suspect would result in a beating and arrest or execution. Its just how we are getting ready to roll right now....
If it's just mass arrests and murders, then that points to a camo-clad resistance based deep in the forests. And, most importantly, hiding families deep in the forests with you, which is going to be the subject of that post on family safety that I need to write. Simply because of reprisals against resistance fighters, you will have to move your families to a hidden and protected location. If that becomes the situation, then all this talk of covert stuff becomes a little irrelevant. It would become camo-clad resistance fighters hiding out in the boonies, supported by an auxiliary who would have to remain 'clean' in order for the Regime to continue to allow them freedom of movement. If movement is stopped due to a lock-down by martial law, then it's just up to the camo-clad guys in the woods to prosecute the campaign.
Back to the Northern Ireland thing: in that situation, the terrorists would not carry weapons except at the specific time that they were going to conduct an attack. That may be different here - you would still likely need to carry a concealed handgun even if you did not pick up your long rifle until just prior to moving into position. Not carrying weapons meant that they could transit on the roads and not get arrested at a traffic stop/search. They would be able to move into the vicinity of the target and be provided the weapon at the last minute, which would then be handed off or dropped as they made their escape.
In Northern Ireland, there was a 'quartermaster' logistics chain that would move weapons and equipment into position. Smuggling it across the border etc. For the next courier in the chain to pick up the item, such as a rifle, it would be left in a cache, often PVC pipes dug into the side of a ditch, and a description would be given. Like a pirate treasure map if you like. Example: "Go to the lay-by two miles north of the *** bridge. Walk north to the broken fence post. Cache in the ditch...etc." It would need a series of recognizable features like a chain to find the cache. The item would be picked up, moved on and eventually be used in an attack.
So, really what is my point? It is to point out a few methods that could be utilized to increase tactical and covert freedom of movement. With a little bit of imagination you can move covertly or you can transport 'uniformed' resistance fighters around the place in a covert manner. If you do so, then you need to have a series of SOPs and contact drills for if the CMV runs into a checkpoint.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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http://maxvelocitytactical.blogspot.com/2013/08/comment-on-covert-movement.html
Comment on Covert Movement
I'll try and keep this post short. That usually turns out to be harder than you think, as I start getting into the topic. I saw an interesting post on the American Mercenary blog: 'Moving Groups'. I am moved to comment.
So yes, a lot of this depends on the exact scenario you find yourself in. We are not soldiers on a foreign battlefield. It really just depends on how the situation pans out when you end up fighting those 'enemies foreign and domestic'. A few good points have been made out there in the blogosphere lately. Mosby with his 'Underground Tradecraft' post (part 1), and other comments about the likelihood of taking off into the woods in camo and a boonie hat (I'm game....).
It may be SHTF and you are able to wear your best camo.
It may be that you are an active member of the Resistance and you are operating out of camps in the forests and deserts.
It may be that you are a member of the auxiliary, still living in the suburbs and aiding and abetting the active resistance members out there freezing/sweating in the forests.
It may be that we have not yet reached a time of full camo-clad SHTF and you are fighting those pesky 'enemies foreign or domestic' in a more covert way.
In a situation where you are operating as an unconventional fighting force, you will most likely be adopting light infantry tactics. If that is the situation, and you are a classic resistance force out there in the boonies, then you have choices over how you will tactically move those forces around. A classic decision here would involve a platoon sized force, that you perhaps want to move out on an ambush patrol. To do so, you have the choice of moving the whole platoon together, on a route using the best terrain masking available. Or, you break the platoon down into smaller squads or teams and send them via different routes, to rally up at the ORP (objective rally point).
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages (don't they all): the platoon moving together is a larger force, better able to look after itself if discovered and bumped by the enemy, but harder to conceal. On the other hand, the smaller teams are easier to conceal, but using multiple routes may increase the likelihood of discovery, depending on the terrain available to you. You make your own decision based on METT-TC, which in plain language means depending on the circumstances.
In the AmMerc article the approach was discussed, if you are utilizing highly competent personnel, of infiltrating in a covert way as per prior instructions so that individuals would coalesce at a target and conduct an operation, without actually meeting up at something like a rally point beforehand. Well, again it depends on the circumstances but I would be very circumspect of conducting an operation without full orders/briefing plus rehearsals preceding it. It may be that you can then disperse and move to the target by a series of covert individual means, moving either via an ORP or perhaps straight into individual support by fire and assault positions, depending on what you are doing.
Of course, if it is some kind of covert hit onto an enemy target, then it may be able to be conducted more in this manner, with team members either recognizing each other or having recognition signals. It may be that you have an individual or team surveiling the target. Once the conditions are met, they somehow communicate the 'GO' to the kinetic team or individual (sniper perhaps) to move into position, to attack if they are already tin position, or whatever. The target is hit and the sniper team or individual moves out on a predesignated route. At this point, he may have a drop point or perhaps an individual to leave the rifle with (or dump it, clean of forensics, if you can afford to lose it). He then moves, covertly in nondescript civilian clothes, to outside the *** store on *** street, where he meets up with the extraction team/individual in a covert builders van, or whatever. He either knows the guy or the van description, or has some other signal that it is the right van. He gets in and is driven off.
You get the picture. The above description is a way that you could organize, even using a cell system perhaps with guys that did not know each other, to accomplish a mission. It still needs to be planned and coordinated. This would assume a more normal times scenario where people are still out and about in the streets unarmed and where vehicles can move in the streets. Hmmmm....perhaps after full gun confiscation laws are enacted, comes to mind....???
It's not so far fetched; both sides used to get up to stuff like this in Northern Ireland, before everyone hugged and became friends. Let's look at some techniques:
CMV: this is a 'civilian military vehicle'. It describes what is basically a civvy van, all decked out to be no different from a builders truck, delivery van or whatever. These can be used for the covert infil or exfil of troops onto a mission, such as a patrol. Sometimes they were used when the weather was too bad to get a chopper in or out, or when the RAF was watching the game back at their cosy base and could not be bothered to come out and get you. The vans are driven by guys in civilian clothes complete with concealed weapons. In the back, you could have anything up to a full uniformed patrol of twelve guys fully decked out in uniform, or you could have some more covertly attired guys perhaps in earth tone clothing or street clothes.
Because these CMV's were used by security forces rather than resistance fighters, it therefore allowed them freedom to do various things. Pick up and drop off would be done at some covert place. However, one way to do it would be to wait until the CMV was imminent at the pick up point, throw in a quick fake Vehicle Checkpoint on the road, the CMV would roll up and be stopped, and then the patrol would all pile into the van and drive off when no-one was watching. Obviously a tactic for night time use on deserted country roads. A Resistance team could use these vehicles in a similar way to covertly move personnel around, to infil and exfil them from drop-off points where they could continue the mission either in a 'uniformed' or plain clothes manner. Once dropped off, a camo-clad resistance team would then continue to use terrain masking to patrol on foot towards the objective.
In Northern Ireland, the rule of law was very much in evidence. It meant that known 'players' could be stopped at a temporary vehicle checkpoint, searched for weapons, and sent on their way. They did not go about armed for this very reason. They may have been let on their way because to continue to surveil them was a clever plan, or simply because without weapons or direct evidence they could not be arrested. It got complicated. However, I do wonder whether in our increasing police/surveillance state there would even be the freedom of movement accorded to known terrorist players in Northern Ireland? I suspect that in a tyrannical United States, merely being recognized as a suspect would result in a beating and arrest or execution. Its just how we are getting ready to roll right now....
If it's just mass arrests and murders, then that points to a camo-clad resistance based deep in the forests. And, most importantly, hiding families deep in the forests with you, which is going to be the subject of that post on family safety that I need to write. Simply because of reprisals against resistance fighters, you will have to move your families to a hidden and protected location. If that becomes the situation, then all this talk of covert stuff becomes a little irrelevant. It would become camo-clad resistance fighters hiding out in the boonies, supported by an auxiliary who would have to remain 'clean' in order for the Regime to continue to allow them freedom of movement. If movement is stopped due to a lock-down by martial law, then it's just up to the camo-clad guys in the woods to prosecute the campaign.
Back to the Northern Ireland thing: in that situation, the terrorists would not carry weapons except at the specific time that they were going to conduct an attack. That may be different here - you would still likely need to carry a concealed handgun even if you did not pick up your long rifle until just prior to moving into position. Not carrying weapons meant that they could transit on the roads and not get arrested at a traffic stop/search. They would be able to move into the vicinity of the target and be provided the weapon at the last minute, which would then be handed off or dropped as they made their escape.
In Northern Ireland, there was a 'quartermaster' logistics chain that would move weapons and equipment into position. Smuggling it across the border etc. For the next courier in the chain to pick up the item, such as a rifle, it would be left in a cache, often PVC pipes dug into the side of a ditch, and a description would be given. Like a pirate treasure map if you like. Example: "Go to the lay-by two miles north of the *** bridge. Walk north to the broken fence post. Cache in the ditch...etc." It would need a series of recognizable features like a chain to find the cache. The item would be picked up, moved on and eventually be used in an attack.
So, really what is my point? It is to point out a few methods that could be utilized to increase tactical and covert freedom of movement. With a little bit of imagination you can move covertly or you can transport 'uniformed' resistance fighters around the place in a covert manner. If you do so, then you need to have a series of SOPs and contact drills for if the CMV runs into a checkpoint.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Friday, September 13, 2013
List of possible extremists
Man, about 30 of the items on this list apply to me!
Originally posted and authored by Michael Snyder at The Truth. All credit goes to him.
Are you a conservative, a libertarian, a Christian or a gun owner? Are you opposed to abortion, globalism, Communism, illegal immigration, the United Nations or the New World Order? Do you believe in conspiracy theories, do you believe that we are living in the “end times” or do you ever visit alternative news websites (such as this one)? If you answered yes to any of those questions, you are a “potential terrorist” according to official U.S. government documents. At one time, the term “terrorist” was used very narrowly. The government applied that label to people like Osama bin Laden and other Islamic jihadists. But now the Obama administration is removing all references to Islam from terror training materials, and instead the term “terrorist” is being applied to large groups of American citizens. And if you are a “terrorist”, that means that you have no rights and the government can treat you just like it treats the terrorists that are being held at Guantanamo Bay. So if you belong to a group of people that is now being referred to as “potential terrorists”, please don’t take it as a joke. The first step to persecuting any group of people is to demonize them. And right now large groups of peaceful, law-abiding citizens are being ruthlessly demonized.
Below is a list of 72 types of Americans that are considered to be “extremists” and “potential terrorists” in official U.S. government documents. To see the original source document for each point, just click on the link. As you can see, this list covers most of the country…
1. Those that talk about “individual liberties”
2. Those that advocate for states’ rights
3. Those that want “to make the world a better place”
4. “The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule”
5. Those that are interested in “defeating the Communists”
6. Those that believe “that the interests of one’s own nation are separate from the interests of other nations or the common interest of all nations”
7. Anyone that holds a “political ideology that considers the state to be unnecessary, harmful,or undesirable”
8. Anyone that possesses an “intolerance toward other religions”
9. Those that “take action to fight against the exploitation of the environment and/or animals”
10. “Anti-Gay”
11. “Anti-Immigrant”
12. “Anti-Muslim”
13. “The Patriot Movement”
14. “Opposition to equal rights for gays and lesbians”
15. Members of the Family Research Council
16. Members of the American Family Association
17. Those that believe that Mexico, Canada and the United States “are secretly planning to merge into a European Union-like entity that will be known as the ‘North American Union’”
18. Members of the American Border Patrol/American Patrol
19. Members of the Federation for American Immigration Reform
20. Members of the Tennessee Freedom Coalition
21. Members of the Christian Action Network
22. Anyone that is “opposed to the New World Order”
23. Anyone that is engaged in “conspiracy theorizing”
24. Anyone that is opposed to Agenda 21
25. Anyone that is concerned about FEMA camps
26. Anyone that “fears impending gun control or weapons confiscations”
27. The militia movement
28. The sovereign citizen movement
29. Those that “don’t think they should have to pay taxes”
30. Anyone that “complains about bias”
31. Anyone that “believes in government conspiracies to the point of paranoia”
32. Anyone that “is frustrated with mainstream ideologies”
33. Anyone that “visits extremist websites/blogs”
34. Anyone that “establishes website/blog to display extremist views”
35. Anyone that “attends rallies for extremist causes”
36. Anyone that “exhibits extreme religious intolerance”
37. Anyone that “is personally connected with a grievance”
38. Anyone that “suddenly acquires weapons”
39. Anyone that “organizes protests inspired by extremist ideology”
40. “Militia or unorganized militia”
41. “General right-wing extremist”
42. Citizens that have “bumper stickers” that are patriotic or anti-U.N.
43. Those that refer to an “Army of God”
44. Those that are “fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation)”
45. Those that are “anti-global”
46. Those that are “suspicious of centralized federal authority”
47. Those that are “reverent of individual liberty”
48. Those that “believe in conspiracy theories”
49. Those that have “a belief that one’s personal and/or national ‘way of life’ is under attack”
50. Those that possess “a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training or survivalism”
51. Those that would “impose strict religious tenets or laws on society (fundamentalists)”
52. Those that would “insert religion into the political sphere”
53. Anyone that would “seek to politicize religion”
54. Those that have “supported political movements for autonomy”
55. Anyone that is “anti-abortion”
56. Anyone that is “anti-Catholic”
57. Anyone that is “anti-nuclear”
58. “Rightwing extremists”
59. “Returning veterans”
60. Those concerned about “illegal immigration”
61. Those that “believe in the right to bear arms”
62. Anyone that is engaged in “ammunition stockpiling”
63. Anyone that exhibits “fear of Communist regimes”
64. “Anti-abortion activists”
65. Those that are against illegal immigration
66. Those that talk about “the New World Order” in a “derogatory” manner
67. Those that have a negative view of the United Nations
68. Those that are opposed “to the collection of federal income taxes”
69. Those that supported former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin and Bob Barr
70. Those that display the Gadsden Flag (“Don’t Tread On Me”)
71. Those that believe in “end times” prophecies
72. Evangelical Christians
The groups of people in the list above are considered “problems” that need to be dealt with. In some of the documents referenced above, members of the military are specifically warned not to have anything to do with such groups.
We are moving into a very dangerous time in American history. You can now be considered a “potential terrorist” just because of your religious or political beliefs. Free speech is becoming a thing of the past, and we are rapidly becoming an Orwellian society that is the exact opposite of what our founding fathers intended.
Please pray for the United States of America. We definitely need it.
Originally posted and authored by Michael Snyder at The Truth. All credit goes to him.
Are you a conservative, a libertarian, a Christian or a gun owner? Are you opposed to abortion, globalism, Communism, illegal immigration, the United Nations or the New World Order? Do you believe in conspiracy theories, do you believe that we are living in the “end times” or do you ever visit alternative news websites (such as this one)? If you answered yes to any of those questions, you are a “potential terrorist” according to official U.S. government documents. At one time, the term “terrorist” was used very narrowly. The government applied that label to people like Osama bin Laden and other Islamic jihadists. But now the Obama administration is removing all references to Islam from terror training materials, and instead the term “terrorist” is being applied to large groups of American citizens. And if you are a “terrorist”, that means that you have no rights and the government can treat you just like it treats the terrorists that are being held at Guantanamo Bay. So if you belong to a group of people that is now being referred to as “potential terrorists”, please don’t take it as a joke. The first step to persecuting any group of people is to demonize them. And right now large groups of peaceful, law-abiding citizens are being ruthlessly demonized.
Below is a list of 72 types of Americans that are considered to be “extremists” and “potential terrorists” in official U.S. government documents. To see the original source document for each point, just click on the link. As you can see, this list covers most of the country…
1. Those that talk about “individual liberties”
2. Those that advocate for states’ rights
3. Those that want “to make the world a better place”
4. “The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule”
5. Those that are interested in “defeating the Communists”
6. Those that believe “that the interests of one’s own nation are separate from the interests of other nations or the common interest of all nations”
7. Anyone that holds a “political ideology that considers the state to be unnecessary, harmful,or undesirable”
8. Anyone that possesses an “intolerance toward other religions”
9. Those that “take action to fight against the exploitation of the environment and/or animals”
10. “Anti-Gay”
11. “Anti-Immigrant”
12. “Anti-Muslim”
13. “The Patriot Movement”
14. “Opposition to equal rights for gays and lesbians”
15. Members of the Family Research Council
16. Members of the American Family Association
17. Those that believe that Mexico, Canada and the United States “are secretly planning to merge into a European Union-like entity that will be known as the ‘North American Union’”
18. Members of the American Border Patrol/American Patrol
19. Members of the Federation for American Immigration Reform
20. Members of the Tennessee Freedom Coalition
21. Members of the Christian Action Network
22. Anyone that is “opposed to the New World Order”
23. Anyone that is engaged in “conspiracy theorizing”
24. Anyone that is opposed to Agenda 21
25. Anyone that is concerned about FEMA camps
26. Anyone that “fears impending gun control or weapons confiscations”
27. The militia movement
28. The sovereign citizen movement
29. Those that “don’t think they should have to pay taxes”
30. Anyone that “complains about bias”
31. Anyone that “believes in government conspiracies to the point of paranoia”
32. Anyone that “is frustrated with mainstream ideologies”
33. Anyone that “visits extremist websites/blogs”
34. Anyone that “establishes website/blog to display extremist views”
35. Anyone that “attends rallies for extremist causes”
36. Anyone that “exhibits extreme religious intolerance”
37. Anyone that “is personally connected with a grievance”
38. Anyone that “suddenly acquires weapons”
39. Anyone that “organizes protests inspired by extremist ideology”
40. “Militia or unorganized militia”
41. “General right-wing extremist”
42. Citizens that have “bumper stickers” that are patriotic or anti-U.N.
43. Those that refer to an “Army of God”
44. Those that are “fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation)”
45. Those that are “anti-global”
46. Those that are “suspicious of centralized federal authority”
47. Those that are “reverent of individual liberty”
48. Those that “believe in conspiracy theories”
49. Those that have “a belief that one’s personal and/or national ‘way of life’ is under attack”
50. Those that possess “a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training or survivalism”
51. Those that would “impose strict religious tenets or laws on society (fundamentalists)”
52. Those that would “insert religion into the political sphere”
53. Anyone that would “seek to politicize religion”
54. Those that have “supported political movements for autonomy”
55. Anyone that is “anti-abortion”
56. Anyone that is “anti-Catholic”
57. Anyone that is “anti-nuclear”
58. “Rightwing extremists”
59. “Returning veterans”
60. Those concerned about “illegal immigration”
61. Those that “believe in the right to bear arms”
62. Anyone that is engaged in “ammunition stockpiling”
63. Anyone that exhibits “fear of Communist regimes”
64. “Anti-abortion activists”
65. Those that are against illegal immigration
66. Those that talk about “the New World Order” in a “derogatory” manner
67. Those that have a negative view of the United Nations
68. Those that are opposed “to the collection of federal income taxes”
69. Those that supported former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin and Bob Barr
70. Those that display the Gadsden Flag (“Don’t Tread On Me”)
71. Those that believe in “end times” prophecies
72. Evangelical Christians
The groups of people in the list above are considered “problems” that need to be dealt with. In some of the documents referenced above, members of the military are specifically warned not to have anything to do with such groups.
We are moving into a very dangerous time in American history. You can now be considered a “potential terrorist” just because of your religious or political beliefs. Free speech is becoming a thing of the past, and we are rapidly becoming an Orwellian society that is the exact opposite of what our founding fathers intended.
Please pray for the United States of America. We definitely need it.
Leaderless Resistance
This article is about the concept of Leaderless Resistance; the ideas and comments are not my own, I do agree with much of what is said, I just wanted to get this point of veiw out there so people can make their own informed decision about the direction they want to go.
Author: SMB (US Army, Retired)
Edited for content.
A Brief Overview
Nothing defines the blatant ineptitude and rank incompetence of the radical resistance more starkly than the concept of so-called “leaderless resistance” (hereafter, LR). By its very nature LR amounts to little more than anarchy and, as demonstrated by some of the most recent examples, very rapidly degenerates into simple banditry. Furthermore, one notes for the record that the most vociferous proponents of LR have, in common with those to whom that fantastic idea appeals, exactly zero experience in guerrilla warfare, its theory, or practice.
Simply stated, the concept of LR posits that individuals or small, close-knit groups, acting on their own initiative, performing their own targeting and relying on their own resources, can strike at the government’s infrastructure at will without fear of infiltration. Tactically, LR ranges from individual nuisance acts for the sake of causing a nuisance on one end of the spectrum to small unit terrorism for terrorism’s sake on the other. However, nothing can be said about LR’s potential operational impact because, by definition, through rejection of any superior organizational structure, it can have no operational impact.
Strategically, LR is conspicuously absent from any historical examples of successful insurgency. The idea has been advanced by several writers on the subject that LR is essentially a modern version of the Committees of Correspondence of American Revolution fame. I do not think those writers mean to purposely distort the realities of revolutionary organization in the colonies, but their zeal to justify LR apparently overrode their rational faculties. If those writers had simply paused to consider the word “committee” juxtaposed with “correspondence”, the notion that Committees of Correspondence were autonomous bodies acting independently of one another would have collapsed of its own illogic. In fact, the members of the several colonies’ Committees of Correspondence were appointed by their colonies’ legislative bodies, everyone knew who they were, and they coordinated their activities between each other or with the Continental Congress through a chain of command. Hardly an example of leaderless resistance.
There are however several striking examples, discussed below, that demonstrate why LR is fundamentally flawed as a resistance strategy.
The Order
“The Order” is frequently cited as an example (in its early stages, before it began recruiting) of the principle of LR. Given that most members of The Order are either dead or in federal prisons it is also an example of many of the fundamental flaws in the concept.
The Order began as an eight man cell dedicated to creating an Aryan homeland in the Pacific Northwest. How eight men expected to accomplish that objective has never been clearly explained, but following their logic it seems that the organizers of The Order believed that direct action against the government for the purpose of financing other organizations in the racialist resistance would inspire others to imitate their example thus creating an avalanche effect as other self creating “cells” rallied to the cause. Predictably, that “strategy” failed miserably.
Had the organizers of The Order expended half the effort in researching failed insurgencies as they did planning armored car and bank heists they would have found that their strategy (if indeed they ever had one beyond “do things”) had already been tried by no less than Che Guevara. The name of that “strategy” is called the Loco (i.e., focus). The theory is this: Plunk a small band of guerrillas down in an ostensibly “oppressed” countryside, begin maiming, murdering and robbing the oppressors, and the peasants will rise up and flock in proletarian support to the Loco to sweep the bourgeoisie from the political landscape. However, the “oppressed” in whose name Che fought snitched off his band to the oppressors, and Che and his Bolivian Loco bandits were hunted down like animals and killed. End of insurgency.
Aside from robbing banks and armored cars and sharing the loot with phone booth emperors who were vying for the same mailing list, The Order did manage to kill a Jew in Denver, blow up a synagogue in Boise, Idaho, and murder one of their own recruits before they were finally hunted down, killed or arrested.
The Order therefore illustrates Reason #1 LR does not work. “Grass roots” resistance is doomed to failure; there are no examples of it having ever succeeded. Frustrated by any appreciable effect of propaganda on a population so dim it could offer not even neutrality, and impatient with time proven organizational principles, they simply decided to “kick things off” themselves armed with nothing but a single idea that was immediately discredited because (1) the population did not care about the idea, so (2) they possessed no means of enlisting assistance or acceptance for their crime spree. The lesson learned about The Order’s example is that rebelliousness has no place in a resistance.
Eric Rudolph
Personally, my reaction to the bombing of abortion clinics and gay bars is, “Where’s the crime?” In many respects Rudolph exemplifies LR at the individual level. He didn’t make threats or discuss his plans with anybody, he didn’t ask permission, he simply started punctuating his deeply held beliefs with explosions.
If Rudolph has one thing going for him (aside from being the “1997 – 1999 Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) it’s that he has a steep learning curve. Note the successive “product improvements” of his devices. He obviously paid close attention to the official Bomb Damage Assessments of his handiwork, and progressively applied those lessons learned to his subsequent projects, not only mechanically (although he had not yet come to appreciate that nails are crap for shrapnel — ball bearings are much better, having sounder ballistics) but also tactically.
For example, constructive development of Rudolph’s devices progresses to smaller timers, smaller batteries, dynamite instead of pipe bombs and thicker pressure plates. By the time of the Atlanta gay bar and abortion clinic bombings his devices fit very nicely into a book bag, and at the lesbian bar he left behind an 80 pound time delay “present” intended for enthusiastic crime scene investigators. A year later, a Birmingham, Alabama, cop who was guarding an abortion clinic between stints as a guard at a gay bar, poked at a flower pot with his baton causing Rudolph to allegedly command detonate his device (or lose it to the bomb squad). Significantly, the device was directional, the majority of the blast was focused on the front door. Eric’s obvious goal was to abort the abortionist when he arrived, but the cop’s ill considered curiosity preempted the objective of the attack. Nevertheless, Rudolph had progressed from crude pipe bombs to command detonated directional devices in four operations. Not bad.
Rudolph’s problem was that, while his devices advanced both mechanically and in lethality, their basic construction, and therefore their “signature,” remained the same. Because he was driving his own vehicle to and from the target area the feds quickly obtained a description of it and the plate number, and by the time he had driven back in Murphy, North Carolina, the FBI was scouring the city for him. Informed by friends that he was being sought by the FBI as a “material witness” to the Birmingham bombing, he did the next logical thing. He went to Burger King, bought some chow, then disappeared into the mountains.
What is remarkable about Rudolph, as an individual example of LR, is his focus, his dedication, his coolness, his self reliance, and his aggressiveness — and that he is still alive. In fact, by the spring of 1999, the FBI had almost completely retreated out of the mountains and into their compound in Andrews, North Carolina, because, in the words of SSA Terry Turchie, Rudolph manhunt director, “We think he is hunting us.”
But those very qualities that make young Eric so remarkable are precisely those qualities that make him not only the exception to the rule, but also a positive example of why LR on an individual level is again doomed to failure except in the rarest of circumstances. Eric possesses what precious few other individuals who might contemplate the “Rudolph model” of LR possess — the semblance of an infrastructure. Young Eric’s infrastructure is composed entirely of friends of belief in kind, or tacit sympathy for the act even if not for his beliefs. However, that necessarily delimited his operational radius. And even though Rudolph enjoys the active neutrality of the population in his area of operations, his limited circle of friends lacked any infrastructure that would have enabled him wider range in his holy mission.
What Rudolph’s circle of friends were incapable of providing was operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He built his own bombs. He performed his own targeting. He emplaced his own devices. He provided his own transportation. His circle of friends were useless operationally, and the best they could do for him locally when he became a fugitive was turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken coops or delay reporting his presence when he broke into their houses to raid the cupboard.
Eric Rudolph therefore illustrates Reason #2 LR does not work. It has no formal infrastructure, thus its support is at best haphazard and is always uncoordinated. Consequently, such notional “support” is bound to fall apart at the seams at some point. Even though there is not yet any evidence that his network of friends is beginning to crumble, it is painfully obvious that they are incapable of supporting or sustaining any further operations by Eric. The lesson learned about Eric Rudolph’s example is that independence of action means isolation from effective support, hence an inability to sustain operations in the face of determined opposition reaction.
Further Considerations
The above examples of group and individual LR illustrate only a very small number of associated problems. For example, as mentioned in the Eric Rudolph example, the lack of a formal organizational infrastructure means that LR “cells” must provide for themselves everything appertaining their operational requirements. This fact necessarily places the LR “cell” in the unenviable position of being personally involved in all the activities, such as logistics (including financing), communications, targeting and planning, needed to execute their operations. Because of their personal involvement they dramatically raise not only their own “profile,” but also that of the operation. Those named activities in a properly constituted resistance organization would be delegated to cells (unknown to the “direct action” operatives) specifically tasked to perform those functions thus virtually eliminating the operation’s profile — until bodies need to be dug out of the rubble. Traditional procedures also so diffuse the opposition’s post action investigation that it takes months or years, instead of days in the case of an LR “plan,” to unravel all the pre-mission details and thereby identify and begin hunting the operatives.
Furthermore, LR as a “strategy,” if we are to believe what its proponents expect us to believe about it, has specific appeal only to the lowest (or most psychotic) common denominator within any given organization. The fact that the notion of LR is being propagated should give pause to serious minded individuals because those organizations that promote LR almost universally make their appeals for membership to the “proletariat,” as demonstrated by the crudeness of their rhetoric and public manifestations. Nevertheless, the idea that independently conceived and executed “grassroots” action solely for the sake of action can have any appreciable impact as a resistance methodology to the planned destruction of our society is nonsense. And if the history of LR is any indicator it plays right into our enemy’s hand.
Consider the Progressive distorted prosecutive “legal” strategy known as vicarious liability. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence vicarious liability is the “indirect or imputed legal responsibility for the acts of another… as between an employer and employee… or a principle for torts and contracts of an agent.” (Black’s 6th ed.) In a nut shell, the Progressive-contorted version of vicarious liability contends that “hate speech” creates a “climate of hate” that propels small groups or individuals to commit “hate crimes” and that, therefore, any organization that espouses Progressive-defined “hate” is “responsible” for the actions of individuals or groups, employees or not, who commit the “crime.”
Never mind that the Progressive-version of vicarious liability perfectly inverts the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal precedent which places responsibility for crime upon the individual criminal and which reserves vicarious liability to employers whose agents’ (i.e., responsible to the employer) acts result in willful harm to others. In the example of the justifiable murder of the abortionist Sleppian, a web site that listed the names, addresses and photographs of abortionists was ordered to shut down even though there was no proof of any connection between the owners of the web site and the righteous man who dwindled our Progressive infestation by one. The web site had “created a climate of hate,” you see.
The Progressive-twisted version of vicarious liability is reserved solely for Christian men and their organizations. Why? Eric Rudolph serves as another example. Hundreds of FBI agents [has anybody else noticed that the FBI refers to its personnel using the same term intelligence officers understand as “street shit?”] are hunting him, and a million dollar reward has been offered for him, not because he allegedly planted a couple of bombs, but because he committed a politically incorrect crime; he tried to blow up abortionists and gays. His motive is the reason he is being hunted.
In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence motive is merely a mitigating factor. When Progressives are permitted to practice law — or more horrifying, make law — in Anglo-Saxon nations, the law rapidly degenerates into quibbling. In the case of vicarious liability, the extrinsic motive becomes the real crime. In other words, what you were thinking when you committed the crime is more important than what you did, and what you were thinking is the fault of the organization – whether you are a member or not — that espouses what you believe. Ergo, according to Progressive lawyers, the organization is vicariously liable for your crime and can be sued. The most recent Southern Poverty Law Center law suit against the Aryan Nations is only the most recent in a pattern of similar suits.
Why the long winded speech about vicarious liability? Because the organizations that promote LR are being sued in rotation by Progressives when proletarian groups or individuals (employees, members, or not) take them at their word and begin practicing it. Significantly, organizations that demand at least a modicum of discipline from their members and which prefer to recruit from the bourgeoisie, have so far been spared the embarrassment of “loose cannons” in their ranks. Think about it.
How “It” Is Really Done
What often amazes me is the simple-mindedness of those who propose to wage one or the other of many forms of armed resistance against the government. Because the sheer scale of the proposition cannot be grasped by minds conditioned to think in terms of snappy political slogans and time frames rarely exceeding seven minutes between commercial breaks, I often find that when the scale is explained to them their response is blank incomprehension. This inability to grasp the complexity and magnitude of the proposition is but one reason why such ideas as Leaderless Resistance gain currency.
Among all the outpourings about LR, the only comprehensible rationale given for promoting anarcho-resistance is the fear of opposition infiltration and penetration of properly constituted organizations. That rationale is the very reason LR should be dismissed out of hand as the drivel of flagrant neophytes who possess just enough comic book knowledge about armed resistance to be dangerously stupid (emphasis added –JM); and who are irresponsible enough to share their “knowledge” with others.
The reason advocates of LR advance the fear of infiltration as their only comprehensible rationale for promoting anarcho-resistance is because, like every other band of proletarian dissidents, they believe that resistance begins with armed groups. In other words, they organize everything backwards, from the bottom up. This does, as they fear, leave them vulnerable to penetration when they finally discover that they cannot support or sustain their own operations and of necessity need to recruit new members or organize some semblance of a support apparatus.
Armed resistance is only one subset of what is properly defined as Political Warfare. Policy making in Political Warfare encompasses ideological warfare, organizational warfare, psychological warfare (wherein falls armed resistance), intelligence warfare, and mass warfare. Within the subset of armed resistance we find planned political violence (assassination, kidnapping, bombing), which is employed as a tactic of both disruptive and coercive terrorism. The disruptive nature of terrorism is the repression of and reprisals against the general population that it provokes from government. As a coercive measure terrorism enforces obedience from noncombatants or punctuates the demands of the terrorists.
Note the words “policy” and “planned.” That means there must be a policy making body who turn their deliberated decisions over to another organizational element which plans the implementation of those policies, in turn delegating responsibility for executing the plan to further subordinate elements. This requires not only a centralized command element that makes decisions, but also a staff who turn those decisions into mission taskings to the staffs of subordinate resistance activities. In descending order of manpower and complexity of organization those activities are, (1) the underground, (2) the auxiliary, and (3) the guerrillas.
Mission tasking, broadly speaking, covers five basic categories; (1) action, (2) security, (3) cover and logistics, (4) surveillance and intelligence, and (5) communications. Each category is serviced by in independent element. Each element’s requirements are then forwarded to management who assemble the information into a mission planning guide and requirements list. Once this information is assembled, planning follows an ordered sequence.
The Intelligence Cycle sets into motion collection operations in response to the informational needs expressed in the requirements list. Targeting is highly discriminatory, begins very early in the planning process, and includes consideration of both primary and sub-targets. Wargaming, which considers the action to be taken and the probability of success of several courses of action. Protection, which prevents discovery, prevention of arrest, and provision for building and maintaining cover. Operational Support falls into five broad categories; (1) communications, (2) accommodations, (3) transportation, (4) technological support, and (5) supply. Planning of the final phase, Action, does not begin until all other planning requirements have been met.
LR objections to the foregoing model are, as already stated, the fear of infiltration and betrayal by government informants or penetration of the organization by government spies. The reason I mentioned my disdain for the tendency among the various proletarian organizations to organize armed cells first (i.e., do the whole thing backward) earlier in this essay is because organizing backward creates the very condition that leaves their groups open to infiltration and betrayal — their eventual necessity to organize some form of support. To do this they need to recruit from outside their immediate circle.
Tim McVeigh & Co. is an excellent example. When they realized they could not pull off their operation on their own they began enlisting support from people and organizations who really had no business knowing what they were up to. Within hours of the OKC bombing the FBI was all over them like flies on dung (and there is considerable evidence that the FBI began manipulating the operation about midway through their “planning”).
The point I am making is this: In a properly organized resistance one of the first things constituted is an overarching counterintelligence body that permeates the very fabric of the organization at all levels. Coincident with counterintelligence is the compartmentalization of the resistance organization and planning — something almost totally lacking in LR “cells.”
Furthermore, for those among you who think that resistance warfare is some type of free-booting tryst where “rugged individuals” can “get some back” from their oppressors, I suggest you stay home with the women. The authoritarianism and regulation of the standing military pales in comparison to the rigid authoritarianism, regulation and submission to duty found in resistance organizations.
Although some small measure of disjointed disruption may be achieved by LR, and although LR may exert some paltry degree of temporary coercion, its lack of far ranging planning, organizational discipline, coordination with other elements, or a support net designed to sustain operations will find them littering the streets with their corpses.
If there is a single good thing to be said about LR, it is that while LR “cells” are distracting the Enemy, the grown-ups can go about their more serious business.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Author: SMB (US Army, Retired)
Edited for content.
A Brief Overview
Nothing defines the blatant ineptitude and rank incompetence of the radical resistance more starkly than the concept of so-called “leaderless resistance” (hereafter, LR). By its very nature LR amounts to little more than anarchy and, as demonstrated by some of the most recent examples, very rapidly degenerates into simple banditry. Furthermore, one notes for the record that the most vociferous proponents of LR have, in common with those to whom that fantastic idea appeals, exactly zero experience in guerrilla warfare, its theory, or practice.
Simply stated, the concept of LR posits that individuals or small, close-knit groups, acting on their own initiative, performing their own targeting and relying on their own resources, can strike at the government’s infrastructure at will without fear of infiltration. Tactically, LR ranges from individual nuisance acts for the sake of causing a nuisance on one end of the spectrum to small unit terrorism for terrorism’s sake on the other. However, nothing can be said about LR’s potential operational impact because, by definition, through rejection of any superior organizational structure, it can have no operational impact.
Strategically, LR is conspicuously absent from any historical examples of successful insurgency. The idea has been advanced by several writers on the subject that LR is essentially a modern version of the Committees of Correspondence of American Revolution fame. I do not think those writers mean to purposely distort the realities of revolutionary organization in the colonies, but their zeal to justify LR apparently overrode their rational faculties. If those writers had simply paused to consider the word “committee” juxtaposed with “correspondence”, the notion that Committees of Correspondence were autonomous bodies acting independently of one another would have collapsed of its own illogic. In fact, the members of the several colonies’ Committees of Correspondence were appointed by their colonies’ legislative bodies, everyone knew who they were, and they coordinated their activities between each other or with the Continental Congress through a chain of command. Hardly an example of leaderless resistance.
There are however several striking examples, discussed below, that demonstrate why LR is fundamentally flawed as a resistance strategy.
The Order
“The Order” is frequently cited as an example (in its early stages, before it began recruiting) of the principle of LR. Given that most members of The Order are either dead or in federal prisons it is also an example of many of the fundamental flaws in the concept.
The Order began as an eight man cell dedicated to creating an Aryan homeland in the Pacific Northwest. How eight men expected to accomplish that objective has never been clearly explained, but following their logic it seems that the organizers of The Order believed that direct action against the government for the purpose of financing other organizations in the racialist resistance would inspire others to imitate their example thus creating an avalanche effect as other self creating “cells” rallied to the cause. Predictably, that “strategy” failed miserably.
Had the organizers of The Order expended half the effort in researching failed insurgencies as they did planning armored car and bank heists they would have found that their strategy (if indeed they ever had one beyond “do things”) had already been tried by no less than Che Guevara. The name of that “strategy” is called the Loco (i.e., focus). The theory is this: Plunk a small band of guerrillas down in an ostensibly “oppressed” countryside, begin maiming, murdering and robbing the oppressors, and the peasants will rise up and flock in proletarian support to the Loco to sweep the bourgeoisie from the political landscape. However, the “oppressed” in whose name Che fought snitched off his band to the oppressors, and Che and his Bolivian Loco bandits were hunted down like animals and killed. End of insurgency.
Aside from robbing banks and armored cars and sharing the loot with phone booth emperors who were vying for the same mailing list, The Order did manage to kill a Jew in Denver, blow up a synagogue in Boise, Idaho, and murder one of their own recruits before they were finally hunted down, killed or arrested.
The Order therefore illustrates Reason #1 LR does not work. “Grass roots” resistance is doomed to failure; there are no examples of it having ever succeeded. Frustrated by any appreciable effect of propaganda on a population so dim it could offer not even neutrality, and impatient with time proven organizational principles, they simply decided to “kick things off” themselves armed with nothing but a single idea that was immediately discredited because (1) the population did not care about the idea, so (2) they possessed no means of enlisting assistance or acceptance for their crime spree. The lesson learned about The Order’s example is that rebelliousness has no place in a resistance.
Eric Rudolph
Personally, my reaction to the bombing of abortion clinics and gay bars is, “Where’s the crime?” In many respects Rudolph exemplifies LR at the individual level. He didn’t make threats or discuss his plans with anybody, he didn’t ask permission, he simply started punctuating his deeply held beliefs with explosions.
If Rudolph has one thing going for him (aside from being the “1997 – 1999 Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) it’s that he has a steep learning curve. Note the successive “product improvements” of his devices. He obviously paid close attention to the official Bomb Damage Assessments of his handiwork, and progressively applied those lessons learned to his subsequent projects, not only mechanically (although he had not yet come to appreciate that nails are crap for shrapnel — ball bearings are much better, having sounder ballistics) but also tactically.
For example, constructive development of Rudolph’s devices progresses to smaller timers, smaller batteries, dynamite instead of pipe bombs and thicker pressure plates. By the time of the Atlanta gay bar and abortion clinic bombings his devices fit very nicely into a book bag, and at the lesbian bar he left behind an 80 pound time delay “present” intended for enthusiastic crime scene investigators. A year later, a Birmingham, Alabama, cop who was guarding an abortion clinic between stints as a guard at a gay bar, poked at a flower pot with his baton causing Rudolph to allegedly command detonate his device (or lose it to the bomb squad). Significantly, the device was directional, the majority of the blast was focused on the front door. Eric’s obvious goal was to abort the abortionist when he arrived, but the cop’s ill considered curiosity preempted the objective of the attack. Nevertheless, Rudolph had progressed from crude pipe bombs to command detonated directional devices in four operations. Not bad.
Rudolph’s problem was that, while his devices advanced both mechanically and in lethality, their basic construction, and therefore their “signature,” remained the same. Because he was driving his own vehicle to and from the target area the feds quickly obtained a description of it and the plate number, and by the time he had driven back in Murphy, North Carolina, the FBI was scouring the city for him. Informed by friends that he was being sought by the FBI as a “material witness” to the Birmingham bombing, he did the next logical thing. He went to Burger King, bought some chow, then disappeared into the mountains.
What is remarkable about Rudolph, as an individual example of LR, is his focus, his dedication, his coolness, his self reliance, and his aggressiveness — and that he is still alive. In fact, by the spring of 1999, the FBI had almost completely retreated out of the mountains and into their compound in Andrews, North Carolina, because, in the words of SSA Terry Turchie, Rudolph manhunt director, “We think he is hunting us.”
But those very qualities that make young Eric so remarkable are precisely those qualities that make him not only the exception to the rule, but also a positive example of why LR on an individual level is again doomed to failure except in the rarest of circumstances. Eric possesses what precious few other individuals who might contemplate the “Rudolph model” of LR possess — the semblance of an infrastructure. Young Eric’s infrastructure is composed entirely of friends of belief in kind, or tacit sympathy for the act even if not for his beliefs. However, that necessarily delimited his operational radius. And even though Rudolph enjoys the active neutrality of the population in his area of operations, his limited circle of friends lacked any infrastructure that would have enabled him wider range in his holy mission.
What Rudolph’s circle of friends were incapable of providing was operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He built his own bombs. He performed his own targeting. He emplaced his own devices. He provided his own transportation. His circle of friends were useless operationally, and the best they could do for him locally when he became a fugitive was turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken coops or delay reporting his presence when he broke into their houses to raid the cupboard.
Eric Rudolph therefore illustrates Reason #2 LR does not work. It has no formal infrastructure, thus its support is at best haphazard and is always uncoordinated. Consequently, such notional “support” is bound to fall apart at the seams at some point. Even though there is not yet any evidence that his network of friends is beginning to crumble, it is painfully obvious that they are incapable of supporting or sustaining any further operations by Eric. The lesson learned about Eric Rudolph’s example is that independence of action means isolation from effective support, hence an inability to sustain operations in the face of determined opposition reaction.
Further Considerations
The above examples of group and individual LR illustrate only a very small number of associated problems. For example, as mentioned in the Eric Rudolph example, the lack of a formal organizational infrastructure means that LR “cells” must provide for themselves everything appertaining their operational requirements. This fact necessarily places the LR “cell” in the unenviable position of being personally involved in all the activities, such as logistics (including financing), communications, targeting and planning, needed to execute their operations. Because of their personal involvement they dramatically raise not only their own “profile,” but also that of the operation. Those named activities in a properly constituted resistance organization would be delegated to cells (unknown to the “direct action” operatives) specifically tasked to perform those functions thus virtually eliminating the operation’s profile — until bodies need to be dug out of the rubble. Traditional procedures also so diffuse the opposition’s post action investigation that it takes months or years, instead of days in the case of an LR “plan,” to unravel all the pre-mission details and thereby identify and begin hunting the operatives.
Furthermore, LR as a “strategy,” if we are to believe what its proponents expect us to believe about it, has specific appeal only to the lowest (or most psychotic) common denominator within any given organization. The fact that the notion of LR is being propagated should give pause to serious minded individuals because those organizations that promote LR almost universally make their appeals for membership to the “proletariat,” as demonstrated by the crudeness of their rhetoric and public manifestations. Nevertheless, the idea that independently conceived and executed “grassroots” action solely for the sake of action can have any appreciable impact as a resistance methodology to the planned destruction of our society is nonsense. And if the history of LR is any indicator it plays right into our enemy’s hand.
Consider the Progressive distorted prosecutive “legal” strategy known as vicarious liability. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence vicarious liability is the “indirect or imputed legal responsibility for the acts of another… as between an employer and employee… or a principle for torts and contracts of an agent.” (Black’s 6th ed.) In a nut shell, the Progressive-contorted version of vicarious liability contends that “hate speech” creates a “climate of hate” that propels small groups or individuals to commit “hate crimes” and that, therefore, any organization that espouses Progressive-defined “hate” is “responsible” for the actions of individuals or groups, employees or not, who commit the “crime.”
Never mind that the Progressive-version of vicarious liability perfectly inverts the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal precedent which places responsibility for crime upon the individual criminal and which reserves vicarious liability to employers whose agents’ (i.e., responsible to the employer) acts result in willful harm to others. In the example of the justifiable murder of the abortionist Sleppian, a web site that listed the names, addresses and photographs of abortionists was ordered to shut down even though there was no proof of any connection between the owners of the web site and the righteous man who dwindled our Progressive infestation by one. The web site had “created a climate of hate,” you see.
The Progressive-twisted version of vicarious liability is reserved solely for Christian men and their organizations. Why? Eric Rudolph serves as another example. Hundreds of FBI agents [has anybody else noticed that the FBI refers to its personnel using the same term intelligence officers understand as “street shit?”] are hunting him, and a million dollar reward has been offered for him, not because he allegedly planted a couple of bombs, but because he committed a politically incorrect crime; he tried to blow up abortionists and gays. His motive is the reason he is being hunted.
In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence motive is merely a mitigating factor. When Progressives are permitted to practice law — or more horrifying, make law — in Anglo-Saxon nations, the law rapidly degenerates into quibbling. In the case of vicarious liability, the extrinsic motive becomes the real crime. In other words, what you were thinking when you committed the crime is more important than what you did, and what you were thinking is the fault of the organization – whether you are a member or not — that espouses what you believe. Ergo, according to Progressive lawyers, the organization is vicariously liable for your crime and can be sued. The most recent Southern Poverty Law Center law suit against the Aryan Nations is only the most recent in a pattern of similar suits.
Why the long winded speech about vicarious liability? Because the organizations that promote LR are being sued in rotation by Progressives when proletarian groups or individuals (employees, members, or not) take them at their word and begin practicing it. Significantly, organizations that demand at least a modicum of discipline from their members and which prefer to recruit from the bourgeoisie, have so far been spared the embarrassment of “loose cannons” in their ranks. Think about it.
How “It” Is Really Done
What often amazes me is the simple-mindedness of those who propose to wage one or the other of many forms of armed resistance against the government. Because the sheer scale of the proposition cannot be grasped by minds conditioned to think in terms of snappy political slogans and time frames rarely exceeding seven minutes between commercial breaks, I often find that when the scale is explained to them their response is blank incomprehension. This inability to grasp the complexity and magnitude of the proposition is but one reason why such ideas as Leaderless Resistance gain currency.
Among all the outpourings about LR, the only comprehensible rationale given for promoting anarcho-resistance is the fear of opposition infiltration and penetration of properly constituted organizations. That rationale is the very reason LR should be dismissed out of hand as the drivel of flagrant neophytes who possess just enough comic book knowledge about armed resistance to be dangerously stupid (emphasis added –JM); and who are irresponsible enough to share their “knowledge” with others.
The reason advocates of LR advance the fear of infiltration as their only comprehensible rationale for promoting anarcho-resistance is because, like every other band of proletarian dissidents, they believe that resistance begins with armed groups. In other words, they organize everything backwards, from the bottom up. This does, as they fear, leave them vulnerable to penetration when they finally discover that they cannot support or sustain their own operations and of necessity need to recruit new members or organize some semblance of a support apparatus.
Armed resistance is only one subset of what is properly defined as Political Warfare. Policy making in Political Warfare encompasses ideological warfare, organizational warfare, psychological warfare (wherein falls armed resistance), intelligence warfare, and mass warfare. Within the subset of armed resistance we find planned political violence (assassination, kidnapping, bombing), which is employed as a tactic of both disruptive and coercive terrorism. The disruptive nature of terrorism is the repression of and reprisals against the general population that it provokes from government. As a coercive measure terrorism enforces obedience from noncombatants or punctuates the demands of the terrorists.
Note the words “policy” and “planned.” That means there must be a policy making body who turn their deliberated decisions over to another organizational element which plans the implementation of those policies, in turn delegating responsibility for executing the plan to further subordinate elements. This requires not only a centralized command element that makes decisions, but also a staff who turn those decisions into mission taskings to the staffs of subordinate resistance activities. In descending order of manpower and complexity of organization those activities are, (1) the underground, (2) the auxiliary, and (3) the guerrillas.
Mission tasking, broadly speaking, covers five basic categories; (1) action, (2) security, (3) cover and logistics, (4) surveillance and intelligence, and (5) communications. Each category is serviced by in independent element. Each element’s requirements are then forwarded to management who assemble the information into a mission planning guide and requirements list. Once this information is assembled, planning follows an ordered sequence.
The Intelligence Cycle sets into motion collection operations in response to the informational needs expressed in the requirements list. Targeting is highly discriminatory, begins very early in the planning process, and includes consideration of both primary and sub-targets. Wargaming, which considers the action to be taken and the probability of success of several courses of action. Protection, which prevents discovery, prevention of arrest, and provision for building and maintaining cover. Operational Support falls into five broad categories; (1) communications, (2) accommodations, (3) transportation, (4) technological support, and (5) supply. Planning of the final phase, Action, does not begin until all other planning requirements have been met.
LR objections to the foregoing model are, as already stated, the fear of infiltration and betrayal by government informants or penetration of the organization by government spies. The reason I mentioned my disdain for the tendency among the various proletarian organizations to organize armed cells first (i.e., do the whole thing backward) earlier in this essay is because organizing backward creates the very condition that leaves their groups open to infiltration and betrayal — their eventual necessity to organize some form of support. To do this they need to recruit from outside their immediate circle.
Tim McVeigh & Co. is an excellent example. When they realized they could not pull off their operation on their own they began enlisting support from people and organizations who really had no business knowing what they were up to. Within hours of the OKC bombing the FBI was all over them like flies on dung (and there is considerable evidence that the FBI began manipulating the operation about midway through their “planning”).
The point I am making is this: In a properly organized resistance one of the first things constituted is an overarching counterintelligence body that permeates the very fabric of the organization at all levels. Coincident with counterintelligence is the compartmentalization of the resistance organization and planning — something almost totally lacking in LR “cells.”
Furthermore, for those among you who think that resistance warfare is some type of free-booting tryst where “rugged individuals” can “get some back” from their oppressors, I suggest you stay home with the women. The authoritarianism and regulation of the standing military pales in comparison to the rigid authoritarianism, regulation and submission to duty found in resistance organizations.
Although some small measure of disjointed disruption may be achieved by LR, and although LR may exert some paltry degree of temporary coercion, its lack of far ranging planning, organizational discipline, coordination with other elements, or a support net designed to sustain operations will find them littering the streets with their corpses.
If there is a single good thing to be said about LR, it is that while LR “cells” are distracting the Enemy, the grown-ups can go about their more serious business.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thursday, September 12, 2013
Resistance Tactics
Raids, ambushes, sniper attacks (a form of ambush, really), and sabotage, ARE the fundamental tactics of guerrilla/insurgent/resistance combat, but a sound grasp of the fundamental realities of these methods, as well as a solid grasp of strategic target selection and analysis is critical to prevent a waste of limited material and manpower resources on tactical level targets of insignificant worth. The level of potential effectiveness of offensive operations against a regime that can be sustained over time depends largely on the guerrilla base camp support and auxiliary support available to the resistance (it is hard after all, to sustain on-going combat operations, when your fighting men haven’t eaten in two weeks, have been barefoot all winter, due to a lack of footwear, and have nowhere to hide long enough to get some sleep after weeks of continuous combat. The guerrilla base MUST be located in order to maximize isolation, as well as difficulty of approach by regime forces thus precluding the use of a suburban neighborhood as an effective guerrilla base). The base camp area must be inherently defensible, and tenaciously defended by well-trained, highly-motivated forces. This provides the resistance’s fighting elements with a safe haven to operate from, ensuring they have the time and ability to properly plan offensive operations (this does NOT mean that irregular forces will be conducting their offensive operations in remote, rural areas, if that is not where the enemy is concentrating his forces).
Guerrilla element leaders must consider the nature of the terrain in their operational area (OAKOC), as well as the level of training and tactical expertise of their forces, when considering suitable targets for offensive operations (sending a bunch of 40-somethings with no combat experience and little realistic, tactical training, up against an AFV-equipped security forces element, with close-air support and reinforcements only a radio call and helicopter ride away would be a ridiculous waste of assets, regardless of their marksmanship abilities and/or motivation levels).
The current doctrinal method of target analysis/selection is the CARVER matrix. An analysis of any potential target, using this matrix will provide a planning organization with a method to categorize the cost-benefit value of potential regime targets in a hierarchical manner, allowing the greatest emphasis to be placed on the targets that offer the greatest political value to the resistance’s efforts (i.e. hitting as fuel depot that re-supplies occupation force Strykers or BMPs will be of much greater value to the resistance than ambushing a squad-sized element of conscripted infantrymen. In turn however, a sniper attack that assassinates key members of a special operations element within the regime security forces may have greater value than a raid on a vehicle park that results in destruction of a half-dozen armored vehicles).
Criticality. A potential target can be considered critical when its destruction or severe damage will create a SIGNIFICANT negative impact on the enemy’s ability to continue projecting military force in the operational area. Criticality is dependent on several key factors:
1.How rapidly/soon will the destruction/damage of this target impact and affect enemy operations in the operational area? Will it happen immediately (i.e. the destruction of his armored vehicles may preclude continued mounted patrolling the next day, especially in areas that require lengthy, time-consuming travel, such as in much of the western U.S.A.) or will there be a noticeable delay (destruction of a fuel storage depot might negatively impact the enemy’s ability to continue operations, but not until the fuel supplies maintained at the unit level are expended…and they may be able to replace the fuel depot before that happens)?
2.What percentage of enemy operations will be curtailed by target damage or destruction? What level of damage must be incurred in order to ensure a given percentage of curtailment (if I destroy ALL of their vehicles, will it curtail operations 100%, or will they continue with foot-mobile operations? If I destroy x percentage of rotary-wing assets, will it create a y percentage reduction in their operating ability)?
3.Do substitutes for the damaged/destroyed material/manpower assets exist within the enemy’s logistics trail? How long will it take for those to be put into place?
4.How many targets exist, and what is their position/value within the greater scheme of the enemy’s order of battle?
Accessibility. The target, in order to realistically be the subject of a planned attack, must be accessible. While it has been accurately stated that NO target is completely inaccessible, some high-value targets must, after being weighed on an objective cost-benefit basis, be considered as practically inaccessible, due to the cost involved with actually damaging/destroying them, in terms of resistance force manpower/material assets. A target can be considered accessible to resistance attack when it is possible for the maneuver element to physically infiltrate the target’s immediate area, or the target can be successfully engaged via direct or indirect fire weapons (the current focus on the development of open-source UAV technology by some elements within the liberty movement will greatly expand the accessibility of future targets for the resistance, due to the inherent “guided missile” nature of these force multipliers).
Critical concerns when considering the accessibility of a potential target include infiltration and exfiltration routes/methods, route security concerns for the maneuver element, the requirements for barrier penetration, obstacle negotiation, and survival/evasion considerations during exfiltration of the maneuver element.
Recuperability. The ability of the enemy to repair and return the target to service should be a critical element in target selection and analysis. This will vary, depending on the target, as well as other variables present only during the planning process. The effects of economic downturns/depressions, sabotage by the subversive underground in the manufacturing facilities that build the necessary repair parts, and the ability of the resistance to continue interdiction missions to prevent repair of the damaged/destroyed targets are all factors that must be considered when determining the recuperability of a given target.
Vulnerability. The vulnerability of a specific target refers to the actual ability of the maneuver element, given its organic or available inorganic weapons and assets, to actually cause the requisite damage/destruction needed to accomplish the stated mission (if a unit is limited to individual small arms, a tank unit in a vehicle park will not be particularly vulnerable, while a unit that has access to stockpiled HE munitions, or battlefield recovered munitions and/or anti-tank weapons will be much more dangerous to those vehicles. On the same hand, while an in-flight UAV will not be particularly vulnerable to resistance threats, the personnel that run the UAV, and the UAV itself, while grounded, may be particularly vulnerable to various resistance threats). A target can ultimately only be considered vulnerable if the maneuver element has the capability and expertise (or can acquire/borrow the expertise) to successfully attack the target. Vulnerability will be predicated on the nature and construction of the target (soft-skinned patrol vehicles will be inherently more vulnerable than armored vehicles. Personnel are often more vulnerable than material assets), the amount of damage required to affect it’s recuperability (it’s a lot easier to slash tires and punch holes in the oil pan of a soft-skinned vehicle than it is to damage a M1A2 Abrams MBT), and the assets available to the resistance force (the use of open-source UAV technology to provide the resistance an indirect-fire/air support mechanism, locally-manufactured HE weapons, and the availability of heavy-caliber, long-range sniper systems all provide interesting force multipliers to future resistance elements).
Effects. The positive or negative influence on the civilian population of the operational area, as well as the PSYOP value on enemy personnel is defined as the effect of a specific targeting operation. The effects paragraph of the CARVER format must consider public perception of the destruction of the target (i.e. destruction of a critical bridge in the area may have a severely detrimental effect on the ability of the local civilian population to continue their daily lives. While it will also impact the ability of the enemy to conduct vehicle-borne patrolling operations, it will more negatively impact the civilian population, since the security forces can always resort to airborne transportation methods, using rotary-wing assets, while the local civilian population is simply out-of-luck. Obviously, this would be a negative effect when looked at from the PSYOP angle, since it would negatively impact the public opinion towards the resistance). The effects paragraph must also consider the regime’s reaction to the destruction of a specific target, in relation to their actions towards the local civilian population however.
1.Will regime forces retaliate against the local civilian population? To what degree? Will that impact the civilian population’s willingness/ability to aid the resistance (harsh enough reprisals may terrorize the local population enough that they no longer feel the risk is worth the potential rewards of aiding the resistance. On the other hand, reprisals that result in the death of family members may drive some members of the civilian population to more actively support the resistance. There is an extremely fine balance that must be considered during all operational planning)?
2.Will the resistance’s PSYOP themes be reinforced by the destruction of this target (is one of the major themes that the regime cannot protect themselves, let alone the public? Is a theme that the government is inept, and so the people have no reason to fear reprisals)?
3.Will the local civilian population be alienated from the regime, or more closely supportive of the regime? There is a fine balance that must be kept in the forefront of all planning during UW missions, with the effect on the local civilian population being at the forefront of everyone’s mind, from the highest planner, to the lowest trigger-puller (For the record, doing things that are inherently inimical to the civilian population’s core beliefs….say, pissing on corpses, or burning religious items/texts, or murdering a dozen innocent non-combatants…is ALWAYS going to have a negative effect…just sayin’).
Recognizability. This pertains to the degree to which a target can be easily identified under adverse conditions, including inclement weather, low-light conditions, and other factors, without being confused for other nearby targets (a mission to assassinate a critical member of the regime’s local leadership will be difficult to effect if he has a member of his staff with a close physical resemblance who may be accidentally targeted due to low recognizability. On the same hand, a raid on a commandeered local home used by regime leadership may backfire if the next-door neighbor has a similar-looking house, full of kids, and it gets hit instead. This happens…a lot. For one simple example, look at the number of LEO warrants served on the “wrong house.”).
Once the evaluation criteria for a specific target has been established, the guerrilla planning cell use a numerical ranking system to to rate the CARVER factors for each potential target. In a 1-10 rating, a 10 indicates a highly desirable factor (from the insurgent’s PoV), while a 1 means the target is fundamentally off the chart for mission success. The analysts must tailor the criteria and rating system to suit the particular strategic/tactical situation in their operational area, for their elements, as well as the particular target(s) being analyzed.
Leadership within the guerrilla element must consider the potential adverse effects of a particular target selection, on both future resistance operations and the civilian population. Targets that will hinder civilian population life must be attacked ONLY AS A LAST RESORT!!! The goal is to diminish the regime’s ability to project military force in the operational area, not to piss off the locals. Similarly, unsuccessful guerrilla operations will have a tremendously bad impact on fighter morale within the resistance, probably leading to desertion by less committed individuals. Successful operations, on the other hand, will raise morale, even in the face of other morale-crushing factors, such as insufficient material re-supply, as well as raising the status of the resistance in the perception of the civilian population.
For the resistance element training to conduct necessary future offensive operations to ensure the adequate defense of their community against incursions by regime security forces, proper target analysis/selection, utilizing the doctrinal CARVER process, is a critical element in maximizing the cost-benefit application of necessarily limited manpower/material assets. Think strategically, plan operationally, act tactically.
Article from The Mountain Guerrilla http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/target-analysis-and-selection-criteria-for-irregular-forces/
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
Wheat information
Here is some really good information about wheat for food storage.
Wheat is the cornerstone of any emergency storage supply. Approximately 150 lbs will supply an adult for one year. A three-week emergency supply is approximately 5-10 lbs per adult. Children under 8 years old would need half those amounts. Wheat has been separated into several commercial classes based on color, hardness of the kernel, and growing season. The hard wheat classes are produced in areas that have dry-temperate climates. The kernels are usually small, red, and have a hard texture.
The white wheat classes are usually produced in areas where winters are relatively mild and there is adequate moisture. White wheat kernels are more plump and larger than red wheat kernels and have a softer texture than hard wheat. Wheat kernels are also known as wheat “berries”. Gluten is a wheat protein that giving flours the ability to retain gases produced by bread yeast to permit dough leavening. The hard red wheat varieties are high in gluten and make the best bread flour. Gluten will degrade during storage and lose half its raising power after several years of storage. Gluten can be purchased and added to poor quality flour in order to produce better quality bread.
Quality and Purchase. Whole wheat berries can be purchased from a producer (farmer). These grains are almost always not cleaned and may have been bulk stored for many months. Grains may also be purchased from a processor. In this case they may have been cleaned and packaged. Do not purchase “seed” wheat for storage, since these products may have toxic chemical treatments. Lastly, grains may be purchased cleaned and packaged from a retailer. Please call your local county Cooperative Extension Office for local outlets to purchase grains for storage.
Variety: Hard red spring , Hard red winter & Hard white spring
Protein: 11-15%
Best Use: bread flour (high gluten)
Variety: Soft red winter, Soft white winter & Soft white spring
Protein: 9-12%
Best Use: pasta, cake, biscuit, cracker, and pastry flours (low gluten)
Packaging.
Store wheat in moisture-proof, food-grade packaging, such as Mylar-type bags, polyethylene bags, plastic buckets, or #10 cans. Be aware that rodents can chew through plastic bags. Wheat stored in ~10 pound bags is easy to manipulate, facilitates rotation, allows easy inspection of the grain, and compartmentalizes the grain so contamination of one lot does not expose large quantities of stored grain to contamination. Several bags can be placed inside a 5-gallon plastic bucket. It is not necessary to store wheat in the absence of oxygen unless insects are present.
Storage Conditions.
Storage at 40-60°F is optimal for most home stored grains but is usually impractical in most homes except during winter months. Freezing or sub-zero temperatures do not damage stored grains. Storage at temperatures above 60°F causes a more rapid decline in seed viability (ability to germinate) but only a slightly faster loss in food value. A moisture level over 12% encourages mold growth and chemical degradation of all grains (barley, corn, millets, oats, rice, rye, sorghum, triticale, and wheat). Moisture above 12% may allow grains to start to respire causing chemical degradation. Moisture above 15% will allow molds to grow. When the moisture reaches 20% some bacteria can start to grow. The result is spoiled grain unfit for use. Store containers off the floor-- especially off concrete floors. Concrete can wick moisture to stored containers very easily. Inspect grain often for insect activity. Treat for insects (see below) or discard affected lots.
Method
Insect Control Recommendation
Insecticides
NOT RECOMMENDED, may be toxic if not correctly used
Heating
NOT RECOMMENDED, too difficult to control the correct amount of heat to apply.
Bay leaves, nails or salt
NOT RECOMMENDED, these have absolutely no effect on insects or insect eggs.
Freezing
Freeze 1-15 lb bags of wheat for 2-3 days. Allow to warm for 24 hours. Freezing kills live pests, but not insect eggs. Multiple freezing and warming cycles may be needed to kill all insects and hatching eggs.
Vacuum Sealing
Seal wheat in vacuum bags using follow vacuum sealer instructions. Regular polyethylene bags are not suitable to maintain a vacuum.
Dry Ice (CO2)
Place 3-4” of grain in the bottom of a 5-gallon plastic bucket. Use gloves when handling dry ice. Add 2-3 oz. crushed dry ice. Fill the container to the full height. Place the lid on top slightly askew. After 30 minutes, seal the lid air-tight. Dry ice will control most adult and larval insects present, but usually will not destroy eggs or pupae. If properly applied, a single treatment with dry ice is sufficient for long-term storage. Annual dry ice treatments are not necessary unless an infestation is recognized in the stored grain. Treating grain with dry ice does not reduce its ability to sprout or its food value.
Oxygen absorbers
Seal wheat in Mylar-type bags or #10 cans along with appropriate number of oxygen absorber packets to create an oxygen-free atmosphere. This will kill adult insects and prevent larval insects from surviving.
No treatment
Choose insect-free sources for wheat. Store them in clean and dry containers impermeable to insects.
* Polyethylene bags and 5-gallon plastic buckets will not maintain an oxygen-free environment after dry-ice or oxygen absorber treatment. Over time oxygen will re-enter the container and this may allow larvae to grow to adults and cause an infestation during storage.
Nutrition and Allergies.
A typical serving of whole wheat is 16 grams. It is recommended that adults get at least three servings (48g) per day. Wheat grain is high in protein, fiber, calcium and iron. Spouting wheat can obtain small amounts of vitamins A, B, C, and E not present in whole grain wheat. Other health claims for sprouted wheat remain unsubstantiated and lack science-based credibility.
Wheat Nutrition
16 g serving
Hard Red
Hard White
Soft White
Soft Red
Calories
57
53
53
53
Cal. From fat
3
1.5
3
2
Fat
0.35
0.15
0.35
0.25
Tot. Carbohydrates
11
11
11
12
Dietary Fiber
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.0
Protein
2.3
2.0
2.3
1.7
Some people are allergic to wheat proteins. The allergy can cause a variety of symptoms due to an autoimmune inflammation of the digestive system, such as diarrhea, bloating, constipation, and pain. Ulcerative colitis and irritable bowel syndrome may be caused by a food allergy. A severe allergy can result in life-threatening anaphylactic shock. In some the allergy is life-long and non-reversible and is called “celiac’s disease”. Other people may be simply “intolerant” to wheat. In this case they suffer from symptoms, but there is not an immune response. People with minor allergic reactions or intolerances can lose them over time. Always seek the advice of a physician to help with any allergies. All varieties of wheat and processed wheat (flour, germ, cracked, etc) contain the allergy proteins.
Shelf life.
Develop a program to utilize stored wheat on a regular basis. As stored wheat is used, replace it with containers of new wheat. Identify each container for variety and storage date. A good rule of thumb is to rotate wheat so that no stored product is older than 5 years. However, older stored wheat did make acceptable bread. A B.Y.U. study indicated that, regardless of headspace oxygen level, wheat packaged in No. 10 cans throughout 32 years of storage at ambient or cooler temperatures made bread acceptable to a majority of consumers.
Use from storage. Stored wheat can be ground for flour, popped (like popcorn), steamed, or cracked and cooked. Some like to germinate and sprout wheat for wheat grass.
References.
Brennand and Hendricks. 1988. “Food Storage in the Home.” USU Extension Circular 257, Logan, Utah. 16 p.
Cuperus, G. (coordinator). 1989. Wheat Pest Management, a Guide to Profitable and Environmentally Sound Production. Extension Service/United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Industry Resource Committee, and The National Association of Wheat Growers Foundation. 59 p.
Green, D. J. Rose, L. V. Ogden, and O. A. Pike. 2005. Department of Nutrition, Dietetics and Food Science, Brigham Young University, S221 ESC, Provo, UT 84602. Poster: IFT Annual Meeting, July 15-20 - New Orleans, Louisiana.
Hilfliger, E. (editor). 1980. Wheat-documenta: CIBA-GEIGY, Technical Monograph. CIBA¬GEIGY Ltd., Basle, Switzerland. 95 p.
Martin, J. H., W. H. Leonard, and D. L. Stamp. 1976. Principles of Field Crop Production, 3rd edition. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York. 1118 p.
USDA Nutrition Database. Obtained via Esha Genesis Software.
http://www.wheatfoods.org for recipes using wheat
Wheat is the cornerstone of any emergency storage supply. Approximately 150 lbs will supply an adult for one year. A three-week emergency supply is approximately 5-10 lbs per adult. Children under 8 years old would need half those amounts. Wheat has been separated into several commercial classes based on color, hardness of the kernel, and growing season. The hard wheat classes are produced in areas that have dry-temperate climates. The kernels are usually small, red, and have a hard texture.
The white wheat classes are usually produced in areas where winters are relatively mild and there is adequate moisture. White wheat kernels are more plump and larger than red wheat kernels and have a softer texture than hard wheat. Wheat kernels are also known as wheat “berries”. Gluten is a wheat protein that giving flours the ability to retain gases produced by bread yeast to permit dough leavening. The hard red wheat varieties are high in gluten and make the best bread flour. Gluten will degrade during storage and lose half its raising power after several years of storage. Gluten can be purchased and added to poor quality flour in order to produce better quality bread.
Quality and Purchase. Whole wheat berries can be purchased from a producer (farmer). These grains are almost always not cleaned and may have been bulk stored for many months. Grains may also be purchased from a processor. In this case they may have been cleaned and packaged. Do not purchase “seed” wheat for storage, since these products may have toxic chemical treatments. Lastly, grains may be purchased cleaned and packaged from a retailer. Please call your local county Cooperative Extension Office for local outlets to purchase grains for storage.
Variety: Hard red spring , Hard red winter & Hard white spring
Protein: 11-15%
Best Use: bread flour (high gluten)
Variety: Soft red winter, Soft white winter & Soft white spring
Protein: 9-12%
Best Use: pasta, cake, biscuit, cracker, and pastry flours (low gluten)
Packaging.
Store wheat in moisture-proof, food-grade packaging, such as Mylar-type bags, polyethylene bags, plastic buckets, or #10 cans. Be aware that rodents can chew through plastic bags. Wheat stored in ~10 pound bags is easy to manipulate, facilitates rotation, allows easy inspection of the grain, and compartmentalizes the grain so contamination of one lot does not expose large quantities of stored grain to contamination. Several bags can be placed inside a 5-gallon plastic bucket. It is not necessary to store wheat in the absence of oxygen unless insects are present.
Storage Conditions.
Storage at 40-60°F is optimal for most home stored grains but is usually impractical in most homes except during winter months. Freezing or sub-zero temperatures do not damage stored grains. Storage at temperatures above 60°F causes a more rapid decline in seed viability (ability to germinate) but only a slightly faster loss in food value. A moisture level over 12% encourages mold growth and chemical degradation of all grains (barley, corn, millets, oats, rice, rye, sorghum, triticale, and wheat). Moisture above 12% may allow grains to start to respire causing chemical degradation. Moisture above 15% will allow molds to grow. When the moisture reaches 20% some bacteria can start to grow. The result is spoiled grain unfit for use. Store containers off the floor-- especially off concrete floors. Concrete can wick moisture to stored containers very easily. Inspect grain often for insect activity. Treat for insects (see below) or discard affected lots.
Method
Insect Control Recommendation
Insecticides
NOT RECOMMENDED, may be toxic if not correctly used
Heating
NOT RECOMMENDED, too difficult to control the correct amount of heat to apply.
Bay leaves, nails or salt
NOT RECOMMENDED, these have absolutely no effect on insects or insect eggs.
Freezing
Freeze 1-15 lb bags of wheat for 2-3 days. Allow to warm for 24 hours. Freezing kills live pests, but not insect eggs. Multiple freezing and warming cycles may be needed to kill all insects and hatching eggs.
Vacuum Sealing
Seal wheat in vacuum bags using follow vacuum sealer instructions. Regular polyethylene bags are not suitable to maintain a vacuum.
Dry Ice (CO2)
Place 3-4” of grain in the bottom of a 5-gallon plastic bucket. Use gloves when handling dry ice. Add 2-3 oz. crushed dry ice. Fill the container to the full height. Place the lid on top slightly askew. After 30 minutes, seal the lid air-tight. Dry ice will control most adult and larval insects present, but usually will not destroy eggs or pupae. If properly applied, a single treatment with dry ice is sufficient for long-term storage. Annual dry ice treatments are not necessary unless an infestation is recognized in the stored grain. Treating grain with dry ice does not reduce its ability to sprout or its food value.
Oxygen absorbers
Seal wheat in Mylar-type bags or #10 cans along with appropriate number of oxygen absorber packets to create an oxygen-free atmosphere. This will kill adult insects and prevent larval insects from surviving.
No treatment
Choose insect-free sources for wheat. Store them in clean and dry containers impermeable to insects.
* Polyethylene bags and 5-gallon plastic buckets will not maintain an oxygen-free environment after dry-ice or oxygen absorber treatment. Over time oxygen will re-enter the container and this may allow larvae to grow to adults and cause an infestation during storage.
Nutrition and Allergies.
A typical serving of whole wheat is 16 grams. It is recommended that adults get at least three servings (48g) per day. Wheat grain is high in protein, fiber, calcium and iron. Spouting wheat can obtain small amounts of vitamins A, B, C, and E not present in whole grain wheat. Other health claims for sprouted wheat remain unsubstantiated and lack science-based credibility.
Wheat Nutrition
16 g serving
Hard Red
Hard White
Soft White
Soft Red
Calories
57
53
53
53
Cal. From fat
3
1.5
3
2
Fat
0.35
0.15
0.35
0.25
Tot. Carbohydrates
11
11
11
12
Dietary Fiber
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.0
Protein
2.3
2.0
2.3
1.7
Some people are allergic to wheat proteins. The allergy can cause a variety of symptoms due to an autoimmune inflammation of the digestive system, such as diarrhea, bloating, constipation, and pain. Ulcerative colitis and irritable bowel syndrome may be caused by a food allergy. A severe allergy can result in life-threatening anaphylactic shock. In some the allergy is life-long and non-reversible and is called “celiac’s disease”. Other people may be simply “intolerant” to wheat. In this case they suffer from symptoms, but there is not an immune response. People with minor allergic reactions or intolerances can lose them over time. Always seek the advice of a physician to help with any allergies. All varieties of wheat and processed wheat (flour, germ, cracked, etc) contain the allergy proteins.
Shelf life.
Develop a program to utilize stored wheat on a regular basis. As stored wheat is used, replace it with containers of new wheat. Identify each container for variety and storage date. A good rule of thumb is to rotate wheat so that no stored product is older than 5 years. However, older stored wheat did make acceptable bread. A B.Y.U. study indicated that, regardless of headspace oxygen level, wheat packaged in No. 10 cans throughout 32 years of storage at ambient or cooler temperatures made bread acceptable to a majority of consumers.
Use from storage. Stored wheat can be ground for flour, popped (like popcorn), steamed, or cracked and cooked. Some like to germinate and sprout wheat for wheat grass.
References.
Brennand and Hendricks. 1988. “Food Storage in the Home.” USU Extension Circular 257, Logan, Utah. 16 p.
Cuperus, G. (coordinator). 1989. Wheat Pest Management, a Guide to Profitable and Environmentally Sound Production. Extension Service/United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Industry Resource Committee, and The National Association of Wheat Growers Foundation. 59 p.
Green, D. J. Rose, L. V. Ogden, and O. A. Pike. 2005. Department of Nutrition, Dietetics and Food Science, Brigham Young University, S221 ESC, Provo, UT 84602. Poster: IFT Annual Meeting, July 15-20 - New Orleans, Louisiana.
Hilfliger, E. (editor). 1980. Wheat-documenta: CIBA-GEIGY, Technical Monograph. CIBA¬GEIGY Ltd., Basle, Switzerland. 95 p.
Martin, J. H., W. H. Leonard, and D. L. Stamp. 1976. Principles of Field Crop Production, 3rd edition. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York. 1118 p.
USDA Nutrition Database. Obtained via Esha Genesis Software.
http://www.wheatfoods.org for recipes using wheat
Monday, June 24, 2013
Building Your SHTF Combat Overwatch Rifle
By: Brandon Smith
http://www.alt-market.com/articles/1557-building-your-shtf-combat-overwatch-rifle
After several years in the Liberty Movement working with various survivalists, you begin to realize that there are as many viewpoints and opinions on self defense tactics as there are people. This is because each individual survivalist’s environmental circumstances are a little different, and unique problems call for unique solutions. That said, there are certain universal elements that every survivalist should consider, and certain pieces of gear that can aid us greatly regardless of our particular situation. I believe the concept of the “overwatch rifle” is one of these universal elements, and an often overlooked combat necessity.
Preparing for a fight, in general terms, is about understanding one’s own weaknesses better than one’s opponent. This means rigorously examining your capabilities and rounding them out as much as possible. Are you strong in close quarters but terrible at a distance? Are you able to engage an enemy regardless of his position, or, do you have to risk closing the gap while he waits comfortably for you? Are you ready mentally and technically for surprises?
The overwatch rifle is not just a tool, it is also a strategy, and when I refer to “overwatch”, I am referring to a guerrilla methodology, not the standard military usage involving sniper support.
This strategy revolves around adaptability, movement, and creative offense. You have to be physically fit and ready to move quickly from one engagement to the next in a sequence that creates the utmost advantage for you and your team. You have to be willing to move from a rear supporting role to a forward scouting role at a moments notice. Sometimes, you have to operate at the very center of it all, coordinating supporting elements and removing obstacles in their path.
Not everyone can serve this role within their team. The overwatch rifle does not automatically make a survivalist overwatch ready. It is the man that makes the rifle effective, not the rifle that makes the man effective.
But before I discuss overwatch rifle design ideas, I want to address a question that ALWAYS comes up when I write an article dealing with any defensive measures:
“Who do you plan to fight?”
The question often insinuates that there is “no one” to fight and that such prepping articles are based in “paranoia”, or, that the enemy will be so technologically advanced that it is “foolish” of us to believe that we can fight them.
My answer is simple – I will fight anyone who attempts to undermine my individual freedom and safety, the individual freedom and safety of the people I care about, innocent citizens, and even future generations I will never meet. Anyone who suggests that such threats do not exist - foreign, domestic, and internationalist - must have been living under a rotting log for the past several years (or they’ve been mesmerized by Facebook and “reality” television, which is very similar). The superiority of these very real threats is irrelevant. I’ve been a fighter for most of my life, and I know well that the biggest and most intimidating opponents are often the easiest to topple in the end, as long as you have the will to press forward, and the intelligence to engage them in a way they cannot predict.
If you are an enemy of liberty and the constitutional philosophy of natural law, then you are my enemy, and if you push me, I will push back. Count on it…
This principle goes for tyrannical political systems as well. When a society loses its ability to regulate and restrict government, when all authority is derived through backroom brokered deals between the money elite and puppet politicians on both sides of the aisle, when individual liberties are deemed expendable in the name of illusory “collective safety”, and when the establishment proclaims that the only way for the public to be prosperous is for the bureaucracy to be prosperous, a war is soon at hand.
The elites will never walk away quietly and neither will we. There are Americans who still respect the virtues of freedom, and there are people in this world whose only goal is to dominate and enslave. We are at a dangerous impasse, and I believe there may be only one way left to fully resolve it…
Of course, when one discusses citizen armament and preparation for combat, the assumption is that every survivalist has already undertaken the correct prerequisite steps to make himself an effective fighter. Before anyone even considers combat preparedness, they should have already:
1) Stockpiled ample food and water.
2) Stockpiled proper medical and emergency first aid.
3) Stockpiled ample ammunition.
4) Chosen a retreat location and hardened their home for defense.
5) Been diligent in their personal health.
6) Trained their bodies for the most terrible rigors imaginable.
7) Trained their minds to be psychologically ready for combat.
8) Trained to control the jarring fight-or-flight response caused by the influx of adrenaline.
9) Fired hundreds if not thousands of rounds through each of the weapons they intend to use in combat until they know them intimately.
10) Studied the history of combat tactics and war strategy (especially asymmetric warfare).
11) Built up a community of like minded individuals who are also prepared.
If you have not at least begun to pursue all of these goals then you are not ready to pull the trigger. Period. If you don’t respect yourself enough to prepare in a practical way, the enemy certainly won’t respect you either, and why should he? You’ll be the punchline of a sad joke, the bullseye on the target, and just another notch in his rifle stock.
If you have at least initiated preparations in all of the above areas, THEN it is time to take a look at your rifle setup…
The Overwatch Concept In Asymmetric Warfare
The term “overwatch” is most often applied when a sniper team is placed in a supporting role during a major offensive. However, the concept has expanded into other areas, especially where guerrilla warfare is concerned, and I would like to use the broader definition here. A person on “overwatch” could be a sniper, or a general team member who is able to place precision fire almost anywhere on the battlefield at vectors difficult for the enemy to spot. This means being in a central position covering not one sector, but all sectors of fire, and striking the enemy from one angle while he is distracted by another.
Being in an overwatch role would mean a certain freedom of movement. You are often designating your own targets and your own fields of fire as you go, and as your teammates push forward. But, it also means you have to be highly adaptable, quick thinking, creative and imaginative in your strategy, and be willing to cause enough damage during a fight to sometimes draw the majority of enemy fire. You become the fulcrum of your team’s initiative.
Ideally, you would want every person you work with to be able to fill the overwatch position, and be able to think in terms of creative combat. The overwatch strategy is meant to stall an enemy advance, destroy enemy sniper positions, create openings in enemy lines, and thus, create targets of opportunity for other team members.
Designing Your Overwatch Rifle
The weapons system you use for overwatch will depend greatly on what you find works best for you as an individual. However, here are some issues you need to take into consideration before building your weapon:
Short Range, Medium Range, Long Range: Your overwatch rifle must be able to engage targets at almost any range (between 0 – 800 yards would be ideal). You must also be able to shift from medium and long range opponents to close range surprise attacks quickly and efficiently.
Penetration And Distance: The caliber you choose should not only be able to travel long distances, but also maintain strong penetration ability at those distances.
Precision: The rifle should fire consistent groups of less than 1 MOA (at least 1” groups at 100 yards).
Frequency Of Fire: The more fire you can put down range quickly and accurately, the better. This means semi-auto rather than bolt action.
Adaptable To Optics: The weapon should have a rail system that accommodates a number of optics, making it adaptable to almost any situation. Or, at least modifiable for a rail.
Rifle Systems
I have found that the .308 military caliber tends to be the most practical for overwatch requirements. The bullet has long range capabilities and far greater penetration than the AR-15’s .223 caliber, or the AK-47’s 7.62 × 39 caliber. The AR and AK are great for close range, room-to-room fighting, and some medium range targets without cover, but they have many limitations and are not useful for overwatch. I have also chosen .308 rifles that are semi-automatic, and that can be fitted with comprehensive rail systems. A common complaint concerning .308 tactical rifles is that they are "too heavy" and slow to aim. All I can say is, if you can't wield the weapon effectively, do some push-ups until you can.
Here is a short list of possible rifle platforms:
AR-10
FN FAL
Springfield M1A
FN SCAR
FNAR
Saiga .308
Heckler & Koch PTR-91
I’m sure there are few more that could be added here, and I recommend all readers carefully research and fire the weapon they are interested in before purchasing it (especially at today’s prices).
Optics
Next, you need to devise an optics system that allows you to engage at a distance AND up-close and personal. There are many ways of setting up a rifle for this, but most involve a combination of a scope and red dot, or a scope and iron sights. Here are some ideas…
Variable Scope: A variable scope, as opposed to a fixed power, makes it possible to shift your focus from a wider field of view to narrow longer distance shot with a twist of a dial. But such a scope alone will not enable the kind of speed you will require for overwatch. Buying a cheap hunting variable is also not advised. Make sure the glass is good, and the body can take a beating. Spend the extra cash…
Mini-Red Dot / Variable Scope Combo: Mini-Red Dots are very versatile and new mounting systems make it possible to tie one to your scope at any angle you wish. Some mounts place the red dot directly above the scope, but this often forces the shooter to sacrifice his cheek weld in order to take aim. I prefer angled mounts to the side of the scope. A very quick shift of the rifle to the inside and you can immediately fire without ever taking your cheek away from the stock. Red dots have no magnification, and thus no vision box. Both eyes can be used to target the enemy, and your peripheral vision can be utilized to acquire the next target before firing at the first. My favorite mini-red dot sights are made by Trijicon and Aimpoint, because of their proven durability in the field.
Pre-Designed Multi-Mounts: Multi-railed ring systems like the Burris P.E.P.R. Mount create a solid platform for you to attach a scope and red dot package to your rifle quickly and easily. Many of these systems are meant for AR-15 enthusiasts, but I have seen them adapted for use on .308 caliber rifles.
Short Dot Variable Scope: Short dot scopes (or CQB scopes) usually come in the 1-4 or 1-6 power variety. The concept was to make a single optics system that combined the speed and wide field view of a red dot with the magnification of a variable scope. Some of the more affordable short dots are made by Burris, Leupold, Vortex, and SWFA, and even these models can be pricey. If you have the cash, they are an excellent investment. Many models include an illuminated reticle that can be used in combination with night vision. Short dot scopes are popular in 3-gun competitions because of their versatility, and are beginning to see more use in the military. They can be very effective for overwatch purposes. I recommend 1-6 scopes in second focal plane, which prevents the red dot reticle from being magnified as power is increased, causing a loss of precision.
Night Vision: Overwatch includes nighttime operations. The tactical rail on your rifle should be long enough to accommodate a scope and a night vision system. Or, a red dot and night vision combo. Quick-detach mounts like those produced by LaRue Tactical are perfect for switching out sights and scopes quickly without losing your zero.
In any lopsided contest to the death, the less technologically advanced opponent must inevitably turn to asymmetric warfare; meaning, he must fight smarter, and be more effective with fewer tools at his disposal. He has to turn his weaknesses into strengths, and make the smallest weapon devastating to his seemingly invincible enemy. Taking on the role of overwatch rifleman means you must understand all the intricacies of asymmetrics, and be able to apply them in real time in the midst of a battle frenzy. It is a very ugly mission.
Above all, you have to have the will and the courage to stand against what you know are incredible odds. You have to be unwavering. You have to have a clear understanding of why you picked up that rifle in the first place, and maintain a deep belief in your cause despite the seeming impossibility of the task before you. Otherwise, fear will be your guide, and the fearful can never provide adequate overwatch.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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http://www.alt-market.com/articles/1557-building-your-shtf-combat-overwatch-rifle
After several years in the Liberty Movement working with various survivalists, you begin to realize that there are as many viewpoints and opinions on self defense tactics as there are people. This is because each individual survivalist’s environmental circumstances are a little different, and unique problems call for unique solutions. That said, there are certain universal elements that every survivalist should consider, and certain pieces of gear that can aid us greatly regardless of our particular situation. I believe the concept of the “overwatch rifle” is one of these universal elements, and an often overlooked combat necessity.
Preparing for a fight, in general terms, is about understanding one’s own weaknesses better than one’s opponent. This means rigorously examining your capabilities and rounding them out as much as possible. Are you strong in close quarters but terrible at a distance? Are you able to engage an enemy regardless of his position, or, do you have to risk closing the gap while he waits comfortably for you? Are you ready mentally and technically for surprises?
The overwatch rifle is not just a tool, it is also a strategy, and when I refer to “overwatch”, I am referring to a guerrilla methodology, not the standard military usage involving sniper support.
This strategy revolves around adaptability, movement, and creative offense. You have to be physically fit and ready to move quickly from one engagement to the next in a sequence that creates the utmost advantage for you and your team. You have to be willing to move from a rear supporting role to a forward scouting role at a moments notice. Sometimes, you have to operate at the very center of it all, coordinating supporting elements and removing obstacles in their path.
Not everyone can serve this role within their team. The overwatch rifle does not automatically make a survivalist overwatch ready. It is the man that makes the rifle effective, not the rifle that makes the man effective.
But before I discuss overwatch rifle design ideas, I want to address a question that ALWAYS comes up when I write an article dealing with any defensive measures:
“Who do you plan to fight?”
The question often insinuates that there is “no one” to fight and that such prepping articles are based in “paranoia”, or, that the enemy will be so technologically advanced that it is “foolish” of us to believe that we can fight them.
My answer is simple – I will fight anyone who attempts to undermine my individual freedom and safety, the individual freedom and safety of the people I care about, innocent citizens, and even future generations I will never meet. Anyone who suggests that such threats do not exist - foreign, domestic, and internationalist - must have been living under a rotting log for the past several years (or they’ve been mesmerized by Facebook and “reality” television, which is very similar). The superiority of these very real threats is irrelevant. I’ve been a fighter for most of my life, and I know well that the biggest and most intimidating opponents are often the easiest to topple in the end, as long as you have the will to press forward, and the intelligence to engage them in a way they cannot predict.
If you are an enemy of liberty and the constitutional philosophy of natural law, then you are my enemy, and if you push me, I will push back. Count on it…
This principle goes for tyrannical political systems as well. When a society loses its ability to regulate and restrict government, when all authority is derived through backroom brokered deals between the money elite and puppet politicians on both sides of the aisle, when individual liberties are deemed expendable in the name of illusory “collective safety”, and when the establishment proclaims that the only way for the public to be prosperous is for the bureaucracy to be prosperous, a war is soon at hand.
The elites will never walk away quietly and neither will we. There are Americans who still respect the virtues of freedom, and there are people in this world whose only goal is to dominate and enslave. We are at a dangerous impasse, and I believe there may be only one way left to fully resolve it…
Of course, when one discusses citizen armament and preparation for combat, the assumption is that every survivalist has already undertaken the correct prerequisite steps to make himself an effective fighter. Before anyone even considers combat preparedness, they should have already:
1) Stockpiled ample food and water.
2) Stockpiled proper medical and emergency first aid.
3) Stockpiled ample ammunition.
4) Chosen a retreat location and hardened their home for defense.
5) Been diligent in their personal health.
6) Trained their bodies for the most terrible rigors imaginable.
7) Trained their minds to be psychologically ready for combat.
8) Trained to control the jarring fight-or-flight response caused by the influx of adrenaline.
9) Fired hundreds if not thousands of rounds through each of the weapons they intend to use in combat until they know them intimately.
10) Studied the history of combat tactics and war strategy (especially asymmetric warfare).
11) Built up a community of like minded individuals who are also prepared.
If you have not at least begun to pursue all of these goals then you are not ready to pull the trigger. Period. If you don’t respect yourself enough to prepare in a practical way, the enemy certainly won’t respect you either, and why should he? You’ll be the punchline of a sad joke, the bullseye on the target, and just another notch in his rifle stock.
If you have at least initiated preparations in all of the above areas, THEN it is time to take a look at your rifle setup…
The Overwatch Concept In Asymmetric Warfare
The term “overwatch” is most often applied when a sniper team is placed in a supporting role during a major offensive. However, the concept has expanded into other areas, especially where guerrilla warfare is concerned, and I would like to use the broader definition here. A person on “overwatch” could be a sniper, or a general team member who is able to place precision fire almost anywhere on the battlefield at vectors difficult for the enemy to spot. This means being in a central position covering not one sector, but all sectors of fire, and striking the enemy from one angle while he is distracted by another.
Being in an overwatch role would mean a certain freedom of movement. You are often designating your own targets and your own fields of fire as you go, and as your teammates push forward. But, it also means you have to be highly adaptable, quick thinking, creative and imaginative in your strategy, and be willing to cause enough damage during a fight to sometimes draw the majority of enemy fire. You become the fulcrum of your team’s initiative.
Ideally, you would want every person you work with to be able to fill the overwatch position, and be able to think in terms of creative combat. The overwatch strategy is meant to stall an enemy advance, destroy enemy sniper positions, create openings in enemy lines, and thus, create targets of opportunity for other team members.
Designing Your Overwatch Rifle
The weapons system you use for overwatch will depend greatly on what you find works best for you as an individual. However, here are some issues you need to take into consideration before building your weapon:
Short Range, Medium Range, Long Range: Your overwatch rifle must be able to engage targets at almost any range (between 0 – 800 yards would be ideal). You must also be able to shift from medium and long range opponents to close range surprise attacks quickly and efficiently.
Penetration And Distance: The caliber you choose should not only be able to travel long distances, but also maintain strong penetration ability at those distances.
Precision: The rifle should fire consistent groups of less than 1 MOA (at least 1” groups at 100 yards).
Frequency Of Fire: The more fire you can put down range quickly and accurately, the better. This means semi-auto rather than bolt action.
Adaptable To Optics: The weapon should have a rail system that accommodates a number of optics, making it adaptable to almost any situation. Or, at least modifiable for a rail.
Rifle Systems
I have found that the .308 military caliber tends to be the most practical for overwatch requirements. The bullet has long range capabilities and far greater penetration than the AR-15’s .223 caliber, or the AK-47’s 7.62 × 39 caliber. The AR and AK are great for close range, room-to-room fighting, and some medium range targets without cover, but they have many limitations and are not useful for overwatch. I have also chosen .308 rifles that are semi-automatic, and that can be fitted with comprehensive rail systems. A common complaint concerning .308 tactical rifles is that they are "too heavy" and slow to aim. All I can say is, if you can't wield the weapon effectively, do some push-ups until you can.
Here is a short list of possible rifle platforms:
AR-10
FN FAL
Springfield M1A
FN SCAR
FNAR
Saiga .308
Heckler & Koch PTR-91
I’m sure there are few more that could be added here, and I recommend all readers carefully research and fire the weapon they are interested in before purchasing it (especially at today’s prices).
Optics
Next, you need to devise an optics system that allows you to engage at a distance AND up-close and personal. There are many ways of setting up a rifle for this, but most involve a combination of a scope and red dot, or a scope and iron sights. Here are some ideas…
Variable Scope: A variable scope, as opposed to a fixed power, makes it possible to shift your focus from a wider field of view to narrow longer distance shot with a twist of a dial. But such a scope alone will not enable the kind of speed you will require for overwatch. Buying a cheap hunting variable is also not advised. Make sure the glass is good, and the body can take a beating. Spend the extra cash…
Mini-Red Dot / Variable Scope Combo: Mini-Red Dots are very versatile and new mounting systems make it possible to tie one to your scope at any angle you wish. Some mounts place the red dot directly above the scope, but this often forces the shooter to sacrifice his cheek weld in order to take aim. I prefer angled mounts to the side of the scope. A very quick shift of the rifle to the inside and you can immediately fire without ever taking your cheek away from the stock. Red dots have no magnification, and thus no vision box. Both eyes can be used to target the enemy, and your peripheral vision can be utilized to acquire the next target before firing at the first. My favorite mini-red dot sights are made by Trijicon and Aimpoint, because of their proven durability in the field.
Pre-Designed Multi-Mounts: Multi-railed ring systems like the Burris P.E.P.R. Mount create a solid platform for you to attach a scope and red dot package to your rifle quickly and easily. Many of these systems are meant for AR-15 enthusiasts, but I have seen them adapted for use on .308 caliber rifles.
Short Dot Variable Scope: Short dot scopes (or CQB scopes) usually come in the 1-4 or 1-6 power variety. The concept was to make a single optics system that combined the speed and wide field view of a red dot with the magnification of a variable scope. Some of the more affordable short dots are made by Burris, Leupold, Vortex, and SWFA, and even these models can be pricey. If you have the cash, they are an excellent investment. Many models include an illuminated reticle that can be used in combination with night vision. Short dot scopes are popular in 3-gun competitions because of their versatility, and are beginning to see more use in the military. They can be very effective for overwatch purposes. I recommend 1-6 scopes in second focal plane, which prevents the red dot reticle from being magnified as power is increased, causing a loss of precision.
Night Vision: Overwatch includes nighttime operations. The tactical rail on your rifle should be long enough to accommodate a scope and a night vision system. Or, a red dot and night vision combo. Quick-detach mounts like those produced by LaRue Tactical are perfect for switching out sights and scopes quickly without losing your zero.
In any lopsided contest to the death, the less technologically advanced opponent must inevitably turn to asymmetric warfare; meaning, he must fight smarter, and be more effective with fewer tools at his disposal. He has to turn his weaknesses into strengths, and make the smallest weapon devastating to his seemingly invincible enemy. Taking on the role of overwatch rifleman means you must understand all the intricacies of asymmetrics, and be able to apply them in real time in the midst of a battle frenzy. It is a very ugly mission.
Above all, you have to have the will and the courage to stand against what you know are incredible odds. You have to be unwavering. You have to have a clear understanding of why you picked up that rifle in the first place, and maintain a deep belief in your cause despite the seeming impossibility of the task before you. Otherwise, fear will be your guide, and the fearful can never provide adequate overwatch.
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Click here for all your prepping/tactical needs: The Tactical Patriot Store
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Thursday, June 20, 2013
Tactical Use of Terrain/Ground
By: Max Velocity
I am going to concentrate on the offense. Mainly because I have covered defense, types of terrain and the principles of defense in detail in 'Contact' and although I have covered offense, there is more detail that can be gone into about use of ground in the assault, rather than just the mechanics of an assault. I have also covered use of terrain for navigation and movement, which is itself a separate topic. So for now, I will hone in on offense and use as a vehicle for the discussion either hasty or deliberate attacks (or raids) to go through a terrain analysis process.
Straight up I am going to launch into one of the old faithful U.S. Army mnemonics. These are all well and good as an aide memoir but must be understood rather than trotted out as a standard answer (METT-TC anyone?) A standard approach that you may find useful is to use the mnemonic OCOKA:
O – Observation and Fields of Fire
C – Cover and Concealment
O - Obstacles
K – Key Terrain
A – Avenues of Approach
If you are attacking, you will need to consider these from the point of view of the enemy position you are attacking i.e. what are the enemy's observation and fields of fire from their position....? How will I apply that to a covered approach?
OK, after my foray into standard U.S. Army doctrine, moving swiftly on:
When considering terrain, or as I prefer to say, ground, you must consider it in conjunction with the enemy. Thus you do not think about ground as its own thing, but as enemy/ground (enemy & ground). You will then relate that to your position. It is a spacial relation and application of fire problem that is up to you to solve. The position of the enemy on the ground, related to the position of friendly forces and how the lay of the land falls between the two will inform your decision making.
I have put in a chapter on the 'Combat Estimate' in 'Contact': this is a planning tool that also acts as a 'mental trainer' for real situation when you don't have time to actually conduct a written estimate. It follows the process of going though factors such as enemy/ground and making decisions that will lead to potential 'courses of action' and finally a plan. Such a tool can be used in slower time when planning a deliberate attack/raid or off the cuff if engaged in a reaction to contact and hasty attack.
(I do cover MDMP, mainly as an explanation of what it is, and then I largely steer clear of it. My advice: once you get a basic understanding, stay largely away from set military doctrine i.e. trotting out the old faithful key words and mnemonics, it will bog you down. Free your mind!)
Dead Ground: this is a positional concept that applies to ground that cannot be seen from a position i.e. it is not covered by observation or direct fire from the enemy position. In a macro sense, I can't see the valley behind the ridge, so that is 'dead ground' to me. This dead ground concept is really important and goes to cover and concealment. You must try to develop a 'soldier’s eye for the ground' which basically means that when you view terrain, it’s not pretty, it's a relationship of slopes and angles that will either provide cover or it will not. In the micro sense, you can apply the concept of dead ground as related to the enemy position and your position. A simple angled slope may therefore provide you cover, and thus be dead ground from the enemy perspective. Even if it is only useful if you are in a low crawl, it may be the difference between life and death.
Cover & Concealment: Cover will protect you from enemy fire and observation (i.e. in a ditch) while concealment will only protect you from enemy observation, (i.e. behind a bush) and if the enemy fires through the concealment they may well hit you. Clearly cover is preferable to concealment but you may have to use a mixture of both.
Smoke: you can use smoke as a form of concealment. The enemy can fire through it. It may also be used as a form of deception. You can buy very effective smoke grenades for the air soft market. If you have the reach it is always better to smoke off the enemy position, rather than your position. With a handheld smoke grenade you are limited in range. Remember also that smoke can interfere with your accurate suppression fire. With a civilian smoke grenade, the smoke generation is not instant and thus you will have to wait for the smoke to 'build' before you can use its concealment; smoke also has to be thrown to take account of wind direction. You could perhaps use the smoke grenade to conceal the movement of your flanking assault element, while not screening off your fire support element.
Smoke can therefore be used to help when natural cover and concealment is lacking, perhaps when you have to move off 'the X', which is the enemy killing area, or to conceal movement across an area of open ground. Remember though, it is a double edged weapon - once you pop smoke, you will indicate what you are doing - thus consider it also as a form of deception, and have someone pop it on the right flank, for example, when you went left.
Thermal Smoke: used as a form of concealment from aerial thermal surveillance, or ground thermal surveillance. Burning suitable materials, such as oil drums, tires, brush, grassland or whatever, can create a thermal smokescreen that will drift across the area of operations, wind dependent, to screen off your operation and even your approach to an attack. This will work against visual and thermal observation. You may even just burn the enemy out of their positions.
Darkness: like smoke, darkness can be used as a form of concealment. However, consider the night vision capabilities of the enemy balanced against your own before making decisions on night attacks. You may also employ judicious use of white light, such as parachute illumination flares, either the handheld rocket type or fired from mortars if you have it. But also remember that darkness may have other advantages, such as surprise and the enemy having perhaps let their guard down/asleep, depending who they are. As usual, balance the factors and make a decision. If using white light, you can employ it as you wish, lighting up and then going dark to cover movement etc. The murky light and moving shadows will always add to the confusion and terror of a night attack.
Key Terrain: this is ground or position that provides a marked advantage to whichever side holds it. For example, if the enemy is defending a small farm complex, and there is a little knoll behind it, perhaps upon which they have an observation post (OP) then taking this key terrain (the knoll) may afford you a distinct advantage in assaulting the enemy complex. Not only because you destroy their OP/fire support position/sharpshooter hide, but you may also be able to position your own fire support elements there to support your assault onto the complex. Conversely, if the enemy continues to hold the knoll, they can not only observe and call fire onto your assault elements as they maneuver onto the farm complex, but they can also disrupt your attack from the knoll itself, with support fire. A preliminary surprise attack on the knoll would allow you to position a support by fire element there and consequently assault onto the farm complex.
There is a difference between a deliberate attack/raid and a hasty attack. The main difference is that with a deliberate attack you retain the initiative because you plan it, move to the enemy position and initiate the attack from a position and at a time of your own choosing. So long as you can approach the enemy position undetected you will have a choice of where to position your fire support element and where to move your assault elements, where to concentrate force to achieve the break-in and your sequence of assault. Remember that 'no plan survives contact with the enemy' and there will always be a need to maintain flexibility and adapt to changing circumstance. That is why it is best to adopt a 'mission command' mindset where it is the achievement of a mission/task and the 'reason why' behind it that is important, rather than just simply doing exactly as you were told in orders.
A brief explanation on mission command (also covered in 'Contact'): although missions/tasks should be given in the form of a task(s) followed by a unifying purpose (reason why) this is not to let your guys go and do whatever they want to do on the objective. There needs to be a plan and a sequence, and that will be tied in with control measures to allow best utilization of support by fire, sequencing, and to prevent fratricide. So stick to the plan as much as possible and improvise in accordance with the 'reason why' if things start to go wrong.
For example, 2nd squad was supposed to echelon (i.e. move in sequence) through 1st Squad to move on and assault objective 2. However, an unseen/unknown mutually supporting enemy position has opened fire. 2nd Squad has taken casualties and is now totally involved in a firefight tying to suppress this new enemy position, which is to a flank. The platoon leader now makes a decision out of the original plan to move a machine gun team from the fire support element out to a flank to a position where it can suppress this new enemy position. While he is engaged with giving orders for that, 3rd squad did not wait for orders. They were in reserve (part of the assault cycle) and took the opportunity to push through 1st squad, past 2nd squad, and seize 2nd squads initial objective, thus getting the plan back on track but with different elements doing the planned tasks. Now that we are at this point, and the new enemy position is being successfully suppressed, the platoon leader can now view the assault on this new position as an unplanned hasty attack and give quick battle orders (QBOs) for a squad to assault, now that the enemy are suppressed.
With a deliberate attack, you are looking for various key positions. These should be found in your recce of the enemy position, before you give orders and conduct the mission. You need an ORP (objective rally point) which is where you will patrol to before dispersing to the various assault positions. This should be on a covered approach to the enemy position. Your fire support position will be covered and allow a sufficient range for your weapon systems to engage and suppress the enemy. Don't be too close; if you have the range and accuracy - use it. If you can get an elevated position overlooking the enemy objective, with decent fields of fire not obscured by too much vegetation, then you are getting a good fire support location. Your weapon systems, and also the ground, will decide ranges. If you have tripod mounted machine guns, you could be pushing back out to as far as maybe 800 meters, but balance this against the ability to accurately observe and 'fire in' the assaulting elements. For standard small arms, given suitable ground, you may be 100 meters away in fire support; you don't ideally want to be more than 300 meters away.
Your fire support element will need to be able to switch fire ahead of the assaulting elements and engage depth and mutually supporting positions as the assault elements work through the enemy position. Because of this, and because of ballistics, you ideally want to have an angle of 90 degrees between your fire support and your assaulting elements. So your assaulting elements will come in from either the left or the right of the fire support elements, which will be firing across their front and then switching away from them onto enemy depth as the assault progresses. Don't have an angle beyond 90 degrees where your assault elements are heading towards your fire support. If the angle is less than 90 degrees then your assault elements will obscure the enemy position sooner as they advance. Real life is never ideal.
So when planning for your deliberate attack you need to have a covered approach for the assault elements to move to a forming up position (FUP) which is where they will shake out into assault formation before crossing the line of departure (LD) into the assault. They will approach, assault and fight through the enemy positions in sequence and each element will be controlled by a limit of exploitation (LOE). This applies to any type of objective, such as trenches, bunkers, buildings, small complexes, compounds or a camp attack. The difference is the specifics of the assault techniques (don't get me started on 'CQB'!)
Once you spatially assess the enemy position you will be able to position your locations for the approaches, FUP, LD, fire support etc. and sequence how your elements will assault onto and through the enemy objective. Remember that although you will have a fire support element, each assault element will be providing its own integral fire support and fire and movement as it moves through the objective, and each assault element will be supporting the others as they cycle through the various enemy positions.
When considering the assault, think about distances that your guys will have to cross from the LD to the first objective, how the objectives (buildings/trenches etc) lay related to each other, how you will move from one to another and where will you position integral fire support elements. Are you able to assault downhill, or will it have to be uphill? If you come from a certain direction, are there any good options for fire support locations? Once you understand the spatial relations of ballistics, how an element covers another element and the characteristics of obscuring and unsafe fire support, you will be able to spatially plan such an assault.
The best use of ground comes into this when you are looking for covered approaches to move between one location and another and to close distances and open ground that you have to cross. Any movement in the open risks enemy fire. Of course, when in contact there is never movement without supporting fire. The more open the ground is the more supporting fire you will need to be able to survive across that open area. The more cover you can utilize the less fire you will need. Moving on a football field is totally reliant on the effectiveness of your accurate suppression fire. Movement in a ditch can be done if your suppression fire is not totally effective.
How does this apply to a hasty attack? A hasty attack will usually take place after a surprise contact when your element has been 'advancing to contact'. It may also take place when you are hit on a patrol. Depending on your patrol orders/SOPs you will either conduct immediate action break contact drills or you will be in an offensive mission mode. Even if you are in an offensive mode you will still go through immediate action contact/battle drills to take cover and return fire, locate the enemy and begin to suppress. The difference here between a deliberate and hasty attack is that with the latter the enemy has the initiative and has opened fire on you at a point of their choosing. You are therefore in their killing area (the X) and you must seize back the initiative and prosecute an assault with speed, aggression and surprise.
(I am not going to bog down in the difference in U.S. Army doctrine between 'near' and 'far' ambush. In simple terms, a near ambush is within grenade range (30 yards) and the suggested reaction for a near ambush is a standard immediate action drill for the closest team to assault onto the enemy. The far ambush should be taken care of as I describe below. I disagree in general terms about this immediate reaction to a near ambush simply determined based on distance. If the team leader under contact decides to assault immediately, then so be it and he must be supported as much as possible. However 30 yards is a long way under fire and still depends a lot on the ground. The contacted team may well be pinned down with casualties. If possible always try and bring an element, the rear team, to a flank to either assault or at least support by fire).
This means that after initial contact and everyone having done their individual react to contact drills, the squad leader for the element that comes under contact will most likely maneuver his element off the immediate X into a better position to begin to win the firefight with the enemy. This will be done by basic fire and movement, either forwards, to the flank, or rearward, into better position of cover and concealment. This could be a single squad/element or it could be one element of a larger force, such as a platoon. The squad leader that came under contact, if part of a larger force, will make a decision, based on his assessment of enemy location and strength, to either put in a hasty squad attack or defer to the platoon leader if the enemy is too strong. If he hands it over to the platoon leader, he may well become the fire support squad, or the platoon leader may move elements around into better positions, supporting each by fire to do so. It's another spatial/mechanical action.
If you are a squad leader who has come under fire and moved off the X or at least into better cover, and you are contemplating a hasty attack, you will hand over the control of the firefight to your second in command and conduct a quick combat estimate. This is where you are looking at the spatial combination of enemy/ground. as it relates to the enemy position, your position and the ground in between. It is vital at this point to observe as best as you can and identify enemy positions, numbers and firepower.
You are looking for:
- A fire support location. In a hasty attack that is often simply leaving a team in support where you are right now. If you have to put a team into a better location, then that will be conducted by fire and movement in a series of preliminary moves to get them where you need them.
- A covered approach to a flank. Concealed if not covered.
- A forming up position (FUP) & line of departure (LD).
- A sequence of assault onto the enemy objective. For a squad, you are only really going to be assaulting with one team and thus onto a single enemy fighting position/trench/bunker.
When assessing the ground, it is helpful to divide it into left, center and right. Center is not usually a good idea unless very close to the enemy. Best to go either left or right flanking. So you are effectively looking for a left or right flanking approach. Decide on the best one depending on your assessment of the various factors. Once you decide, go with it. There may be a couple of options to a flank, such as far left and near left. Decide on the best one as it relates to the spatial problem.
As you plan to take your assault team left or right flanking, you will also need to consider the need for further suppression of the enemy as you get closer, using one of your buddy pairs in the assault team to either be a 'point of fire' to provide closer suppression on the enemy as you approach from the flank, or to be a point of fire as outward looking flank protection, facing out to cover any depth or mutually supporting enemy positions. Remember flank protection as you move through that covered route - you may run into another enemy position, which was holding its fire in anticipation of your move or simply out of sector for your initial contact location, and in that case you may want to reconsider the odds. It may already be too late and you are committed to following the fight through to its conclusion. 'Finish the fight!'
If you are assaulting enemy in the open you will usually simply fight through in a skirmish line by fire and movement in buddy teams. If you are assaulting a fighting position such as a trench or bunker, then you may use the point of fire method to drop off one buddy pair as intimate fire support and assault with a buddy pair.
If you have to use a point of fire to screen off a depth position that you came across in the assault, then once you have taken care of the initial position, continue to suppress the depth. Then, bring in the team that you used as fire support and have them assault the depth. That is one way to skin the cat.
When you have cleared the enemy position, you will need to have your fire support team join you. Potentially you will be send them through to destroy that depth position your point of fire was suppressing, but assuming you are not they will rejoin you on the enemy objective. The way to do this has changed - it used to be that they would follow the route you took, all the way to the flank, on the basis that you just came up there and so it should be clear of booby traps and further enemy etc. Modern thinking says they can just take the shortest route. Make your own mind up what is best for you.
Obstacles are something that you must consider when planning your flanking approach - are there any and how do they affect that approach? Wire, concertina wire, walls, fences, buildings, ditches, creeks, rivers etc are all things that may make you decide against one route and for another. Punji pits - can you even identify/see them before you are on them? Maybe even other booby traps such as mines and IEDs.
Once on the enemy position, you also need to consider the ground where you are at as you conduct your reorganization post-assault. Are you best where you are or do you need to move to a better defended or covered position? Is there a danger of counter-attack or even indirect fire? If so, get into a defended covered position and even start digging. Often it is best to get off and away from the objective as soon as possible to avoid retaliation.
Another thing related to the direction of your assault and the lay of the land is what options are you giving the enemy? Will you trap them and force them to fight or do you give them a route to withdraw on? What do you intend - kill, capture, just seize the ground, or destroy them all? This also applies to a raid or deliberate attack where you may leave the enemy 'open door' opportunities to escape or you may deliberately place cut-off groups along egress routes to kill/capture any escaping enemy. If you do put such groups out, just like cut-off groups in an ambush you must use terrain to screen them from your direct fire as you conduct the assault, as they will likely be positioned 'downrange ' from your assault.
Live hard, die free.
MV
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