Unconventional Warfare in Mountains

From the historical perspective, successful guerrilla warfare operations by irregular forces have usually been conducted in three environments: thick deciduous forests (as in partisan resistance to the Nazis during World War II), swampy, lowland-jungle environments (most notably like the Vietnamese Communists in that conflict), and alpine environments (the Afghan resistance to the Soviets and our own conventional-force incursions since 2002, and numerous resistance forces in World War II).

Since the first is only viable for the partisan in today’s world of thermal imaging and aerial infrared (IR) in summer months (the leaf canopy can provide some protection from this threat), and since the U.S. lacks large areas of lowland jungle (exception: the Everglades, bayous, and some notable areas of the southeastern states), the alpine advantages of the Appalachians and— more notably—the American Redoubt’s Rocky Mountains offer some significant advantages to a resistance movement in proverbial Shit-Hits- The-Fan (SHTF) scenarios.

While there are innumerable arguments that can be made for the (supposed) advantages of urban or suburban environments for guerrilla operations, the historical fact is: no successful insurgency has ever been sustained in the long-term, in a built-up, inhabited area. While many like to argue the examples of the Chechen resistance against the Russians in the first battle of Grozny, the sequel to that fight aptly demonstrated that a determined conventional force can simply raze the city and destroy the guerrillas’ urban defenses. Likewise, the oft-cited example of Fallujah in Iraq. While certainly expensive, it’s not a particularly challenging feat for a modern combined-arms force to destroy a city through bombardment. Destroying a mountain range? Somewhat more challenging.

Small-unit operations in alpine regions present some very unique, specific, and constantly shifting challenges and opportunities for the partisan. A well- disciplined, trained, and prepared irregular guerrilla force—specifically trained and acclimated for operations in mountain environments—has the ability to leverage the unique climatic and terrain considerations to overcome technological advantages of superior forces. Units composed of mountaineers can create opportunities to adapt and utilize the challenges of these environments for tactical victories. Nevertheless, mountain operations demand extreme physical conditioning, beyond the norm mental and physical toughness, and near superhuman endurance as well as a high level of tactical and technical expertise on the part of individual guerrilla fighters and leaders.

You must have training and experience in this environment. The physical characteristics of mountains create unique conditions favoring the guerrilla force who can utilize them as de facto allies.

The presence of intervening terrain features and extreme differences in elevation can severely limit the technologically superior enemy to use artillery and/or mortars. These same features also serve to canalize terrain, forcing the dispersion of numerically superior forces into smaller sub-units, providing the smaller guerrilla force a parity of numbers. This reduction in the immediate battlespace allows the trained and well-disciplined guerrilla force to attack larger forces piecemeal. This is known as the tactical principle of defeat in detail.

Steep angles and alpine mass negatively affects even the most advanced communications devices. Radios, cell phones, and even satellite communications: the usefulness of all of these is severely influenced by the cut-up nature of alpine terrain. For the trained, disciplined guerrillas, this allows the leverage of more primitive communications methods, such as couriers, to multiply force.

The broad vista characteristic of alpine provides the ability to engage hostile forces at—and beyond—the doctrinal limits of direct fire small arms range. This allows the guerrillas — with an appropriate emphasis on intermediate-distance marksmanship skills, individual movement techniques, and the near and far ambush — to leverage superior physical conditioning, knowledge of the local terrain, and technical and tactical expertise to their advantage.

The use of many aerial assets, such as close-air support from rotary-wing assets and troop transports, are severely curtailed by their limitations at high altitudes. The tight confines of alpine regions also limit the use of parachute-deployed airborne infantry to extremely limited applications in suitable drop zones (one very important exception to this is free-fall trained personnel to conduct HALO operations in “pinpoint” drop zones). When aircraft are used in alpine environments, their reduced performance thresholds leave them extremely susceptible to interdiction by man-portable weapons. Available to guerrilla forces internationally, these range from the relatively rare surface-to-air missile (SAM) weapons like Stingers and the SA- 7, to the more commonly available RPG and SMAW devices. Another available option is the use of special application sniper systems in heavier calibers (ranging from .338 Lapua Magnum to .50BMG) as counter aircraft weapons due to the reduced speed, performance, and handling characteristics of rotary-wing aircraft at high elevations.

Finally, despite the concerns of thermal imaging and IR capabilities, alpine environments offer significant advantages to counter these threats, including the sizable numbers of large wildlife to confuse heat signatures, heavy overhead foliage in coniferous forests, and especially caves, overhangs, and other terrain features that o er thermal masking shelter and the restrictions of field of view, which even drones and aircraft have difficulty surmounting.

While the comforts of the city or suburbia sing a siren call for many people, the dedicated survivalist must consider the tactical applications of the alpine advantage as a significant factor in long-term preparedness planning.

John Mosby is a former U.S. Army Special Operations soldier, and is the author of several books, including The Reluctant Partisan, Volume One and Volume Two. He lives somewhere in the mountains with his family.

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A how-to guide for counterinsurgency

A guest post from Roland Bartetzko, a former soldier in the German army and Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), offers key observations about counterinsurgency from the insurgent’s point of view.

Many books and manuals have been written about counterinsurgency strategies. But looking at the current situations in Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan, it seems that either nobody has read any of these writings, or the given advice is wrong or not applicable.

It is often said that to understand counterinsurgency, one first has to know insurgent’s point of view. Having been a guerrilla fighter myself and having interviewed a number of insurgents from the war in Syria and Iraq for a study on radical Islam, there are several aspects of counterinsurgency that seem to be misunderstood – not only by the public, but by militaries as well. Here are some key points to consider.

Air strikes damage assessment

When it comes to fighting an insurgency, air strikes don’t work the same way they do against a conventional army. Although it is indeed impressive to watch the big explosions on our TV screens, when the dust is settled surprisingly many insurgents come out of the rubble alive. “The bigger their bombs the deeper our caves” says the guerrilla.

If the purpose of these air raids was to cause panic or to lower the morale of the enemy, it seldom works. You can’t “shock and awe” someone who is not afraid to die, but on the contrary desires to do so on the battlefield. Never underestimate the resilience of your opponent: As late as of March 2016, after having been on the receiving end of a massive air campaign, the Islamic State in Iraq was still capable of launching armored assaults against Kurdish positions.

Tactics vs strategy

Unconventional wars are often won by tactics rather than strategy. The insurgent’s only strategy is to win the war. In order to successfully combat guerrillas, a military force has to have very capable and flexible infantry squad and platoon commanders. This is the infantry’s war, not that of the generals. Still, NATO’s militaries are very inflexible and it takes them forever to plan and to execute even a small size operation. To change this more autonomy must be given to smaller units.

In an unconventional conflict, the participants have to learn to apply unconventional methods. “Out of the box” thinking is not enough. The soldier or law enforcement officer also has to learn to act against his or her intuition.

This includes ignoring enemy activity because of a religious holiday, or condoning drug trade and other illicit activities in order to make deals with local warlords. This type of behavior comes naturally to the insurgents, but might be hard to accept for a Western professional career soldier. The aim is not to make the world a better place, but to win the war. Instead, counterinsurgency should tackle the political roots of the problem: What is driving locals into the arms of the insurgents?

Allies or political lackeys?

It is appalling to see how the United States and European treat their allies. This observation is especially true for the Afghan National Army, but extends even to smaller NATO partners that were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Although it is widely acknowledged that winning the sympathies of the local population is a key element to a successful counterinsurgency strategy, this will be difficult to achieve when the local military is not fully respected.

For the Iraqi Army, the problem is more that of training and recruitment. Both armies in Iraq and Afghanistan appoint high grade officers with the aim of trying to “respect the ethnic/religious diversity” of the country. This thinking has turned out to be disastrous.

This issue is not only about morale support and training; If you’re relying on local allies to bear the brunt of the fighting, they should receive the best equipment that is available. This has been especially true in regards to the Afghan forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) Main Battle Tanks (MBT), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), and most helicopters are Soviet made. Even their Special Forces (SF), although having somehow better material, can’t compare with Western SF.


Instead the ANA is expected to do the job with obsolete Soviet era arms. There is a military principle that commands that the units that go to battle always get the best equipment. This should always apply to NATO’s local allies.

Inside intelligence

Waging an unconventional war requires a different type of intelligence from the one when fighting against a conventional enemy. Guerrilla operations and movements cannot be easily spotted. Often the insurgents are well camouflaged or operate in disguise. Therefore human intelligence is an absolute necessity. It won’t be enough to just listen to the enemy’s radio communication or rely on aerial or satellite images in order to learn their intentions. Inside sources within the organization are needed. And the best air force with the most advanced technical capabilities is ineffective if there is no intelligence on targets available.

Currently most information that the coalition possess about ISIS originates from deserters, who repented joining the organization, and their testimony is often biased; this leads many people to underestimate the military capabilities of ISIS. Most “repenters” played only minor roles in the Islamic State organization and therefore the intelligence they provide is of little value.

Be patient

Time is the most underrated factor in unconventional warfare. Western politicians often expect positive results immediately. A guerrilla is not in a hurry. They are in for the long haul and can keep their head down and wait for better days.

There is often a gap between the moment a counterinsurgency measure is taken, and the time its effects are seen. For example, one might shut down the enemy’s supply lines, but it will still take weeks or months until this measure diminishes the enemy’s capability to wage war.

On the other hand less insurgent activity is not always the result of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. There are plenty of unrelated reasons why the guerrilla have stopped fighting, some of them as trivial as a wedding or the need of additional manpower to bring in the crops. In other instances, political crises in neighboring countries, fluctuations in international small arms trade, and regional conditions could revitalize a dormant insurgent force. The counterinsurgency forces might retreat from this “pacified’ region only to find out later that the enemy is still there.

Patience is demanded. Often the right military decision is made, but it shows no immediate effect. Western military planners often consider themselves as surgeons; their operations are described as “surgical cuts”. However, the war against insurgents asks for oncologists treating cancer patients.

The lower the intensity of an unconventional war is, the more the war “slows down”. At the lowest end, individuals and isolated cells that have pledged their alliance to a radical organization are conducting terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Years can pass before such persons finally begin to act. Planning and preparing those attacks can take months. The countermeasures to prevent those acts are usually the most time consuming. Don’t expect quick results in fighting urban terrorism.

A serious and thorough reform of the local counterinsurgency forces should include setting up an intelligence network which produces actionable intelligence from reliable sources, but also a need to introduce “soft’ measures like de-radicalization programs that will inevitably take time, personnel and money. Momentary battlefield “successes” and wishful thinking will make it more difficult to allocate the proper resources to do that. However, without making these changes, all victories against radical Islamic groups will turn out to be only temporary and meaningless.

Roland Bartetzko served in the German Army, the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) during the Bosnian War and with the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) during the 1999 Kosovo War. Last year he published a study about radical Islam in Kosovo. Bartetzko has a university degree in law and is currently working for a law firm in Pristina, Kosovo.

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Probability of Successful Revolutions?

Brigadier General Samuel Griffith, USMC (Ret.) wrote in-depth about his study of partisan resistance and guerrilla movements. One of the things that I find particularly interesting is how he qualified the execution of guerrilla movements. He describes ten factors that determine the outcome of guerrilla and resistance movements. Each factor should be scored for both the resistance movement and the regime in power. Ten factors with ten points each gives you an index of 100. In a future product, we’ll be breaking down the possibility of domestic insurgencies, both by the left and the right wings of the political spectrum, and judging their regional outcomes should the US experience a domestic conflict.

But before we get into those ten factors, take this into consideration:

Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this “significant segment” will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.

Movements that don’t gain the support of 15 to 25 per cent of the population, regionally if not nationwide, generally result in failure. Further, if a movement reaches that threshold but its tactics or strategy is not supported, the movement is simply doomed to fail. A PEW Research Poll from December 2011 says that while 44% of America supported the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, 49% disagreed with OWS tactics — and that was a largely ‘peaceful’ movement compared to all out revolution! So what happened to the OWS movement? It was forced to abandon its tactics, due both to the police and failure to maintain popular support. For any movement to create real and permanent change, it needs popular support on all fronts, including popular support for its tactics. That starts with the appeal of program.

Appeal of program: Does the populace line up behind a movement? Does the movement represent ideological and moral values to which people not only subscribe but would be willing to risk their lives to support? Does the movement have the moral high ground and do the people believe in what the movement is doing? These are some of the questions we can ask to satisfy this measurement. The ‘appeal of program’ must be internalized by the populace; therefore the program’s goal is to be both simply understood and dynamic. When I say dynamic, think loud, disruptive, explosive, meaningful, and significant. If you want a good illustration of a simple and dynamic appeal of program, just look at the Ron Paul Revolution. It created hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of mini-Ron Paul's. A good appeal to program leads to popular support.

Popular support: Gaining popular support is the keystone of any resistance or guerrilla movement. Resistance cells must depend on the empathy, hospitality, and refuge of the populace because the guerrilla doesn’t go home; he is home. Popular support is the result of one or more of two things: aggrievement and shared sacrifice, or common goals. Aggrievement and shared sacrifice often creates a deeper and more passionate support than a common goal. For instance, in football, there’s popular support for a team because a goal is shared: a national championship or Superbowl. But no one is expected or willing to die to win the Super bowl. On the other hand, let’s look at the revolution in Egypt several years ago. While Egyptians had a shared goal of changing their government, they had been deeply aggrieved through the rule of despotism and corruption. To create popular support, movement leaders need to find those who are aggrieved and identify a common goal towards the solution (appeal of program). People want revenge and sometimes they get it.

Quality of leadership: There’s an old saying that the military doesn’t produce leaders, it refines them. Leadership is sometimes developed in team sports, or in the office, or on the battlefield; sometimes it may lay dormant until necessity requires it to be born. Either way, leadership is required. If we look at Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the Shi’ite insurgent movement in Iraq, we see Muqtada al-Sadr: the militia leader with a strong family name and political clout. Muqtada may have had the name, influence, and fortune required to build the Mahdi Army, but without an organization filled with leaders, JAM would not have been so effective. And where would US military history be without Washington and his capable suboordinates? Were it not for Washington, there may not have been Lee and Grant, or Patton, or Eisenhower. Quality of leadership can determine outcomes so revolutionary movements must identify and choose good leaders.

Quality of troops: Quality of troops includes training and dedication. No amount of whizbang equipment can make up for poorly trained force. Training includes the three basic skills of combat: shooting, moving, communicating. But it doesn’t stop there because revolutionary movements need support functions like intelligence and logistics. There’s a reason why the three-part insurgency includes guerrillas, auxiliary, and the underground. Revolutionary movements who staff themselves with high quality, dedicated soldiers have a much higher likelihood of success, even if their end goal is to wear down an oppressive regime and enforce the area denial of their homelands. Dedication to the mission speaks volumes – just look at Afghanistan for that. Fifteen years after the first boots on ground and the most powerful military in the world is still fighting a bunch of under classed, outgunned, backwards hillbillies. In the early 2000s, the average age of the Taliban fighter was 35. When I left Afghanistan in 2011, the average age was 23. We’ve obliterated an entire generation of Afghans, yet the Taliban is still in control much of the country.

Military efficiency: Quality of leadership, quality of troops, economy of force, and mission success combine to produce military efficiency. ‘Economy of force’ is the concept of completing a task with the least resources required. So how do mission requirements compare to the organization’s fighting capability? What is the force’s supply capability? How quickly can it move from Point A to Point B? Can it achieve the objective and accomplish the mission? Anti-guerrilla and counterinsurgency forces seek to find, fix, finish, and exploit the guerrilla unit; how efficient will it be to evade detection and death/capture? Can the guerrilla unit simultaneously carry out its own activities to achieve and keep the initiative in the conflict? These are all questions with answers that will satisfy this metric. If the guerrilla unit is inefficient; if they cannot accomplish the mission to due poor training or poor leadership; if they cannot replace an effective leader who’s been killed in action; if they have suffered casualties to strength and are combat ineffective; then these deficiencies need to be identified and quickly resolved. Deficiencies affect internal unity and integrity, which affects the mission.

Internal unity: How is the unit’s morale? How well does the unit work together? How well do troops respond to leadership? Is leadership ensuring the troops are cared for? Is leadership putting the unit in undue risk of physical danger? Can all members of the unit be trusted? Unity is typically derived from shared sacrifice or a common goal. Lack of unity often derives from differing opinions of direction or purpose, or a general or specific lack of trust. Unity affects unit cohesion which affects military efficiency and results in mission failure.

Equipment: Good equipment can be a force multiplier. The better equipment (assuming you know how to operate and maintain it) and proper employment, the better military efficiency you’ll have. Aside from a battle rifle with ammunition, NVGs/NODs (like the PVS-14) is the best low-light equipment advantage you can have. Aside from that, will the force have sufficient access to food and water, medical supplies, radios or other communications devices, transport, survival tools and shelter, winter clothing, etc.? Many guerrilla movements are wholly dependent upon support from the populace – the main reason for popular support – for food, medicine, and intelligence. Other equipment can be gained through battlefield recovery. Think about the poor conditions of the Continental Army at Valley Forge where soldiers had little to eat, save the leather of their boots. Now think about the American soldier in Afghanistan with Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), chow tents, and dining facilities. There’s a world of difference there. If we can identify how a revolutionary movement plans to supply itself, what gear they have and how they will employ it, then we can make a more informed determination of how successful they might be against an adversary.

Operational terrain: What’s the operational terrain? This is your Area of Operation, something we refer to as the AO. This is the piece of terrain that a movement attempts to deny to and/or attack the enemy. The movement owns the domain; this is their battle space. The most effective guerrillas have expert knowledge of the surrounding terrain, and uses it to their advantage. For instance, there are caves up in the hills that surround Fort Huachuca, Arizona. During the fort’s early days, Indian raiding parties would attack US cavalry, then lead them up the hills, where the raiding party would enter into the cave system on one side, exit out the back, climb back over the top of the hill, then ambush the winded US soldiers as they entered the same cave entrance. That’s an expert use of the terrain. Whichever side can best use the operational terrain has an advantage.

Operational area communications: How does a revolutionary movement communicate? Hand signals and two-way radios for tactical movement, and physical/digital dead drops for operational communication? Will the terrain permit the use of cell phones or two-way radios? Does the movement’s communications require line of site, and do they have that kind of coverage in the AO? The more ways to securely and effectively communicate, the better the measure of success an organization has. An adversary’s capability to intercept signals may weigh heavily on a commo plan, but consider this: the inability or unwillingness to communicate electronically will remove not only an effective form of communication from the movement, but will also negate the easiest form of intelligence collection a regime has.

Sanctuary: Where is the guerrilla unit’s sanctuary? What’s the escape and evasion plan during the enemy’s Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit targeting cycle? Are there homes or other locations where a guerrilla unit can hide to escape a regime force search? Will the guerrilla unit use a hidden mountain base or does the base move with them? Successful guerrilla units avoid detection by hiding in hard to find or hard to search places. In the case of the original Red Dawn movie and in the case of the Chetniks resisting Nazi occupation during WWII, the mountains were natural sanctuary. In a world with satellite imagery and real-time overhead assets, sanctuary may be hard to come by. The bottom line is that the guerrilla needs a place to hide and blend in with his environment. If physical terrain is not an option, then guerrillas must use the human terrain. The simplest example of masking yourself using the human terrain came via the Taliban. A fighter armed with an AK-47 and engaging in a fire fight thirty seconds ago has now dropped his weapon and is hiding with the populace in the village. Blending in with the human terrain is made easier with smaller guerrilla units of three to five man teams because it’s nearly impossible to disperse a company (40-100) sized guerrilla unit in such a small area. If a revolutionary or guerrilla movement has substantial sanctuary then they have an advantage that may make their movement more successful.\

Conclusion

Those are the ten metrics we can use to judge the potential success of a guerrilla movement, however, keep in mind that most insurgencies end in a stalemate, and many insurgencies use violence as a way to achieve political concessions. Insurgent movements, especially regional ones, may be much more interested in introducing ‘self-rule’ or setting up an autonomous regional government than they would be to topple the existing national government. Furthermore, revolutionary and insurgent movements are aided in areas of weak state control where a power vacuum exists, or where the official government suffers from illegitimacy. The Taliban’s shadow government system in Afghanistan is a prime example, where locals actually use the Taliban’s judicial system. Where the Taliban is the legitimate government as perceived by the people, they are the government.

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AR-15 Zero

Zeroing our rifles is a very important topic, it is something we all need to know how to do, and why we do it that way. Here is a great article with some very good points about this topic, please read and add to your training plans.

If you had to rely on one zero, what would it be?

For a long time, the mantra has been that the 50 / 200 yard zero (which are not truly the same mind you) is the most useful zero for the AR15 platform as the flat trajectory allows near point of aim / point of impact to nearly 200 yards. It’s vanilla advice, and vanilla pretty much suits anyone, but each would individual would benefit from exploring the benefits of the different zero’s as it relates to his or her rifle.

Many of you might have heard of the maximum point blank range method of zeroing. It encompasses a single zero where the projectile is set to a zero that keeps it afloat in a defined vertical zone / arch to match the largest diameter of a target that you want to shoot. As an example, if the vital zone I want to shoot is six inches in diameter, I would zero the bullet path to arch 3 inches high and when it drops 3 inches below my line of site… that is the end of my maximum point blank range.

Hunters have used this method for a while, but we have to tighten it up a bit for use in a defensive setting. If we stay inside the vital zone, we would be OK in theory… but with bullet accuracy and shooter error factored in, we have to adjust the MPBR to float in a defined space despite inherent accuracy issues present in the shooter / rifle combo.

So the 50/200 +- yard zero is a great starting point, and depending on the projectile weight and barrel length, it will come up 1-1.5 inches of maximum ordinate (aka the bullets apex) and then dip below 1-1.5 inches where the MPBR would end. Since we count the total rise and fall, that gives us 2 to 3 inches of vertical resolution where the bullet will rise and fall in a 2 to 3 inch line.

That’s a pretty tight zero. Is it too tight? We can almost hit small game with that zero, but is a defensive rifle set up for small game or human sized targets? What’s the smallest point we might aim at on a human target? Let’s start by expanding upon why we want to ditch the 50/200 zero mantra and see how things go with a 4 inch diameter MPBR:

Point. Click. Hit.

If I am shooting a 20 inch AR15 with XM193 and a maximum bullet rise of 3 inches high, then I just extended my MPBR to 299 yards where at that point the bullet would dip 3 inches below the line of sight. That has effectively lengthened our resolution to 6 inches of rise and fall. That easily remains in the space occupied by a human head out to 300 yards! Remember, this sighting method is target defined and shooter-rifle-projectile unique. So in a self defense setup, we need to maximize the distance where we will hit our target without shot correction.

If the target is inside our zone… we want the rifle to be a simple point and click interface. Bam. Hit. We want the highest probability of hitting a head, torso, or half exposed limb. Point. Click. Hit. We want to maximize hang time to increase the probability our bullet will hit the target at unknown distances. Click. Boom. Hit. So why not 4.5 inches up and down if the average head is 9 inches tall? Why not a 3.5 inch zero for a 7 inch diameter vital zone? It all depends on your expectations of precision and how accurately and repeatability you can hold your rifle on the center of your intended target.

Goal: increase the probability that the projectile will intersect the target without calculations.

Factors: Rifle accuracy, shooter accuracy, target size, environment.

I would think that a target, once engaged, would be hiding and would present a small target for the shooter. Three inches of rise and fall (for a total of 6 inches of vital zone) gives us a great starting point for hitting hiding, peeking, or partially exposed targets. Rifle and shooter accuracy will play a role in deciding the final zero as we might be inside of the vital zone (say a headshot) where the bullet should just nick the target at the bullets apex… but if our ammo / shooter combo is shooting with 2MOA accuracy the INACCURACY could send the bullet another inch higher and that results in a missed shot.

So that’s why we need a little bit of wiggle room. 6 inches of vertical resolution should give us a good likelihood of hitting the target with a weapon capable of 1.5-2 minutes of accuracy… but if you can dial the accuracy down to 1 MOA with a match bullet, the MPBR system will deliver more consistent hits and we will get to that in a minute.

Six inches of total vertical resolution seems like a logical choice for a MPBR setup and extends us past our 50 yard / 200 yard zero a bit and is still a fine resolution for engaging defensive targets. I can’t think of anything I would shoot at that would be missed because my trajectory apex is three inches high. Look at your knee. It likely has a targetable area of at least six inches. Torso? This resolution is easily inside the vital zone of a center of mass hold.

So next I whipped up a basic chart to get an idea of what zero at 100 yards I would need to get a MPBR which targets a 6 inch radius. This is actually a very simple process as you would zero at 100 and then round up (in clicks) to the closest 1/2 value. If you have a 1/4 minute or 1/2 minute scope, red dot, or other optic you are all set.

XM193 and Mk 262: Sight in at 100 yards X high in blue for a bullet apex of 3 inches; the MPBR is in red for each barrel and projectile. The XM855 would benefit at similar zeros as it will be in between the MPBR of the 77 grain and 55 grain ammo.

Barrel Length 10.5 14.5 16 18 20
xm193 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.0
MPBR 262 281 289 300 303
Mk 262 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4
MPBR 242 261 270 279 284

So you can see there is a bit of difference in the MPBR between rifle, carbine, and bullet. At one end we have the longer point blank range of the 55 grain XM193 and at the other end the sexy new hotness of the 77 Mk 262 at the other. If you were to build a field gun for targets from 0-300 yards, your probability of hitting any targets without aiming correction (provided it fits within your targets diameter) will increase by the use of military spec 55 grain ammo out of a 20 inch gun. Another benefit of this zero is reduction of necessary holds: Out of a 20 inch gun with a red dot and XM193, two holds would get you hits out to 400 yards, COM for targets out to 300 and the head for targets out to 400.

This method of sighting in gives you some excellent hit probability. If the target is near, a dead hold will hit anything your aiming at. If you estimate the target is at 300-400 yards, holding on the head will ensure rounds drop into the mid torso. If you were incorrect and your target was closer than you estimated, your projectile would still likely hit the head.

It appears that M193 or quality defensive 5.56 equivalent such as Hornady 55gr TAP… would make the best choice because of the 55 grain projectiles flat trajectory, and having the extra distance where we could still hit small targets helps… but when wind is thrown into the equation the M193 makes it more difficult to hit the small targets at the end of its MPBR. So back to the heavier match bullets, what benefit do they offer? Increased accuracy and increased wind resistance.

Accuracy, Wind, and MPBR:

Typically M193 is considered a 1.5 to 2 MOA bullet and Mk 262 is considered a match sub MOA bullet. Think of each bullet as a probability to hit an area based on its accuracy and construction. Groupings are the defining measure of whether a more aggressive MPBR would work. If your gun cannot keep groups inside the defined zone, then the distance you have chosen won’t work.

Ideally you should start with a accurate, rifle length free floated barrel, and use the best ammunition available to you. Bonus points if you reload. In the below example, I tightened the acceptable MPBR to 2 inches apex for a total resolution of +-4 inches witch is another useful form of MPBR. I like 3 inches, but the example best illustrates accuracy and wind drift of two common projectiles. The hold is on the nose or dead center of the face. The large red circles represent your accuracy and points of impact (both high and at the very end of your MPBR) with a 1.5 minute 55 grain projectile, and a 1 MOA or sub MOA projectile in the Mk262 example. The blue circles represent a mild 5 mph wind drift of each projectile.

As the above illustration demonstrates, the heavier match ammo still shoots flat enough to give us 250 yards of headshot range out of a rifle, while being more accurate and fighting wind better. At 400 yards the bullet dips a bit further down the torso than M193, but that’s still a hit.

Wrapping Up:

So ultimately, your shooting goals should play into the rifle and its associated setup and upgrades. A red dot or BUIS set up with a MPBR zero will assist you in hitting targets of opportunity and at any distance inside your MPBR box. Since we cannot effectively range estimate every shot on fleeting targets, best practice would be to utilize MPBR to ensure hits by maximizing bullet flight hang time as it relates to the size of our target. This method may be off-putting to those with a ACOG or similar rifle optic since it negates the benefit of the bullet drop stadia.

Overall, it seems that a 1.5-2 inch high zero at 100 yards will get you very close to the 3 inch maximum apex for several loadings. As we deviate away from the 20 inch gun, maintaining a 2 inch 100 yard zero “rule of thumb” across all barrel length and bullet choices will slightly reduce your MPBR less than what the chart says as you go with heavier bullets and shorter barrels. Best practice appears to be a heavy match bullet out of an accurate rifle length platform. This should increase your success in hitting targets without much correction.

The true value of this setup is that it helps free you from thinking about your target in hundreds of yards, instead it allows you to estimate either near or far. Point. Click. Hit.

Integrating this into my setup… I foresee finalizing my Razor HD II for two projectiles: 55 Grain Hornady TAP for general purpose, XM193 for practice, and I am moving to Hornady 75 gr HPBT for longer range work. The Hornady is considerably cheaper than the 69 grain SMK I have been shooting, and switching back and forth between the two loadings is as simple as uncapping the dial and rotating in a few clicks of elevation and wind-age. I think these loadings can cover all shooting I can ever realistically do. I really like this method as it increases the probability of intersecting the target at x range inside my MPBR zone. It’s important to get away from the 100-200-300 yard paradigm and examine a zero which allows a more fluid approach to hitting a target at unknown ranges.

The goal of a marksman is to study the platform and integrate the best practice findings into his or her shooting. I think it is safe to say that for work inside of 400 yards, the 77 grain Mk 262 offers the best probability of hitting the target if shot out of a rifle length system, and its excellent characteristics make it best for environmental conditions. XM193 makes a good substitute as your holds would be the same, but wind may knock you off target without some very light wind correction. This method has now replaced my “chest, head, hat” methodology which I was using with the RDS.

It’s time to test my new method at the range. Vacation week cannot come soon enough!

Parent article: http://www.thenewrifleman.com/maximum-bullet-flight-getting-the-most-out-of-ar15-zero/

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